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Abstract 
Technological change when a large social technology is under the processes of 
deployment and development are complex and uncertain. In this dynamic context, 
risks and uncertainties (R&U) incurred are unavoidable, which might obstruct the 
progression of the technology implementation and innovation. Hence, a set of 
mechanism and strategy are required from the stakeholders to facilitate these two 
processes and to deal with R&U arise. This research studied biofuels in the UK by 
looking at the context of a regulated market. The Scottish Government and two oil 
companies (BP and Shell) were selected as cases studied. Subsequently, an 
overarching research question was formulated to drive the research “How these 
major actors interact with one and another to deal with R&U arising from 
technological change during a technology deployment and development?” By using 
Social Shaping of Technology (SST), integrating with Risk Governance and the Risk 
Regulated Regime; an interdisciplinary concept has been developed. The application 
of SST was to broaden the risk governance and risk regulated regime, helped to look 
at R&U of technological change from a social dimension. The research was 
grounded on social constructionism under an exploratory study. A qualitative case 
study approach was adopted, backed by three data collection methods-interview, 
observation and document analysis. This research was aimed to investigate the 
driving forces for the government and oil companies in taking biofuels as the current 
energy source for transport; their roles and responsibilities in biofuels deployment 
and development; interactions taken place, R&U faced during two processes, as well 
as counteracting strategy implemented to deal with these R&U. After that, 
explanation building and time series analysis were adopted for data analysis. The 
research points out there were different types of R&U (expected and unexpected) 
arose when a technology undergoes the processes of technological change. These 
different types of R&U required different strategies to deal with. Therefore, the 
regulators have to set a clear direction for a technology deployment and 
development, as well as to have the control mechanism with precautionary principle 
instituted, in order to facilitate the technology implementation and innovation. 
Meanwhile, oil companies are collaborating with the governments, to commit 
consistent biofuels supply which fulfil the requirements set by the regulators; as well 
as established various types of partnership with biotechnology institutions/agriculture 
industry to conduct the next generation biofuels (NBG) R&D. Such seamless 
interactions and cooperation, not only aim to reduce the possibilities of R&U 
occurrence, to minimise the impacts, but also to set a path for the ease of technology 
adoption and innovation. Therefore, apart from satisfying their respective internal 
interests of political and economic gains; these two actors have to safeguard the 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
Demand for mobility through international/national transport system is critical to the 
global, regional and national economic growth. Yet the existing transport 
infrastructure which underpins today's economy is vulnerable, due in part to its 
overwhelming dependence upon a single fuel source-hydrocarbon. In recent years, 
the issues of energy security and environmental preservation have made hydrocarbon 
consumption a primary area of concern for many developed countries. Firstly, the 
hydrocarbon reserves are concentrated in a relatively small number of countries, 
many of them beset by economic and political problems that threaten their stability 
of supply. Hence, these myriad political, social and economic factors are making 
trade between oil exporters and highly dependent importing nations increasingly 
tense/vulnerable to disruptions.  
 
Secondly, extracting hydrocarbon from the ground also means taking out the carbon 
captured in the form of liquid/gas, then releasing them into the atmosphere. 
According to a report from the European Environmental Agency (2008), regional 
road transport generates about 1/5 of the EU's CO2 emissions, with passenger cars 
responsible for 12%. This makes road transport one of the most prioritised areas 
targeted for intensive greenhouse gases (GHGs) reduction.  
 
World mobility is growing exponentially. The increasing demand for hydrocarbon is 
pressuring on global oil reserves. GHGs generated as the consequence of the fuels 
used have caused global warming and contributed to climate change. This leads to 
questions such as “How to reduce the GHG emissions, while maintaining the 
capability to mechanise the economic/transport system?”, “How to make transport 
energy sustainable?” and “How to strike a balance between limited sources with 
unlimited demands?” All of these questions are waiting for answers and solutions. 
Inevitably, both energy security and excessive GHG emissions have alarmed the 
international community. Sustainability of energy supply represents one of the 




Biofuels appear as one of the alternative for transport energy. Besides biofuels, other 
potential sources such as electricity and H2 are favourable as elements for the 
Renewable Energy for Transport (REfT). However, biofuels gained global attention 
have become the front runner. Biofuels, either as low blend use in the existing 
internal combustion engine (ICE) or as neat form used in green cars, would allow 
partially energy security to be achieved for nations which do not produce oil and gas. 
Furthermore, biofuels could reduce the GHG/CO2 emission both through tailpipes 
and posses natural carbon neutrality. The benefits of biofuels allow the increasing 
fuel demands to be met, while the GHG emissions could be halved.  
 
However, looking only at the technical convenience of biofuels, does not justify why 
they gained the favourable front runner position. This technology, in fact, is a social 
product which is shaped by political, cultural, organisational, economic and other 
social factors that influenced the conditions for its creation and use. Thus, the Social 
Shaping of Technology (SST) is used to help understanding, by mapping out the 
actors, to examine the interactions between these actors, to investigate the content of 
technology and the processes of technology implementation and innovation 
(MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985). 
 
The social network for biofuels adoption and innovation is linked to the stakeholders' 
political, social, economic, environmental and technological forces. All of these 
forces are interacting within a setting of a regulated market, which signifies biofuels 
deployment and development processes are socially constructed. Many renewable 
energy (RE) concerned countries have taken the lead in biofuels implementation and 
innovation. For example, through regional (the EU) and national (the UK) policies 
formulation, biofuels are allowed to claim a larger market share for their adoption in 
regional/national transport markets. Meanwhile oil companies are responsible for 
supplying biofuels to fulfil the political mandates, market demands as well as to 
achieve their economic interests.  
 
Compared with the UK Government, the Scottish Government (SG) demonstrates a 
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more progressive effort in the development of the next generation biofuels (NGB). 
Working under the Devolved Matters, the SG has undertaken some significant 
pioneering activities, such as the establishment of the UK's first biodiesel plant, and 
the first biofuels research centre. Furthermore there are some ongoing R&D projects 
which foster the NGB development in Scotland. There are obvious different affinities 
(as evidenced by their respective policies, political visions and directions), where the 
UK Government is aligned to H2/electricity, while the SG prefers biofuels. This 
justifies why the SG is selected as one of the case studies.  
 
BP and Shell are also chosen for study. Both BP and Shell are internationally well-
known oil companies, ranked as the 4th and the 2nd world largest corporation 
respectively among top 500 companies in Fortune Global 500 (2010). As two of the 
main oil companies operating in the EU/UK, BP and Shell economic motivations are 
influenced by the EU/UK Government's interests in commencing biofuels blends and 
further developing the NGB.  
 
During the period of biofuels implementation in the UK, most of the oil companies 
operating in the UK do not produce their own biofuels, instead buy biofuels from the 
international market. Up to June 2010, BP and Shell are two of the world six oil 
companies which are currently pursuing the NGB research (refer appendix 7.1.1). 
Their progressive efforts in the NGB R&D since 2003 and 2002 respectively, 
demonstrate their willingness to build upon their pioneering status in the field of the 
NGB technology. 
 
According to Elliott (2003a), any new technology introduction and innovation for a 
new marketplace would face a certain degree of risk and uncertainty (R&U) for its 
development and deployment. Since technology is an inclusive phenomenon, its 
development and implementation are proceeded by the interaction of various social 
and technical elements. Technologies, once developed and implemented, not only 
react back upon their environments, but also generate new implications (Clark and 
Staunton, 1989; Fleck, 1993). These implications could be both positive and 
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negative. Furthermore, a shift of hydrocarbon fuels' paradigm towards biofuels, 
signified the technological change, not only includes innovation/diffusion of a new 
technology, but also has incurred more unexpected R&U after the entrenchment of 
hydrocarbon technology for more than a century.   
 
When we look at a utility like biofuels, which is used for a nationwide road transport 
system, the context of such large technology deployment/development is considered 
as a large social technical system. As advocated by Weber (2002) “large” is the 
pervasive character of technology, given that it comprises entire countries (like 
biofuels), while the term “sociotechnical”  highlights the fact that new technology 
cannot be analysed in isolation from its social context. Sociotechnical systems 
comprise humans, human activities and artefacts (technology) which are 
characterised by interactions among these components.  
 
Hence, the R&U encountered are far more complicated than those encountered by 
consumer products when introduced for a particular market segment. If this large 
technology is mismanaged during its deployment/development, the negative 
implications generated could be enormous and destructing. Therefore, the regulators 
and oil companies have to ensure such a large social technology deployment and 
development must be kept well under control and managed effectively. There are 
different types of mechanism in place, and various strategies applied to deal with 
different kinds of expected/unexpected R&U encountered during the first generation 
(1G) biofuels deployment and the NGB development.  
 
However, two unexpected systemic risks were encountered during the 1G biofuels 
deployment, resulted in food price increases and destruction of the ecology (refer 
appendix 7.3.1). To this end, existing theories such as Public Administration and 
Corporate Risk Strategy could not fully deal with the systemic risks incurred which 
are unpredictable, highly uncertain, complex and have large scale/prolonged 
implications. Besides, theories of Technology Management could hardly explain on 
today's political, social, economic and environmental phenomenon on a continuous, 
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dynamic and evolving technological change happened during the processes of one 
technology adoption and innovation.  
 
More comprehensive strategies/mechanisms have to be instituted, to ensure biofuels 
execution and development could lead to successful outcomes and meet the initial 
objectives set. By using SST, integrated with Risk Governance and the Risk 
Regulated Regime, an interdisciplinary concept has been developed. This concept is 
built, to correlate the social shaping of one technology, and social construction of 
R&U, with strategies to deal with these R&U in a more systematic manner. The 
application of SST is to broaden the risk governance and risk regulated regime, and 
to help to look at R&U of technological change from a comprehensive social 
dimension.  
 
1.1 Research Questions and Research Objectives 
My inspiration for this research was based on the comments made by Scurlock 
(2007). “The British renewable energy policy appears to be focussed too much on 
electricity production. Many earlier studies have underestimated biofuels potential in 
shifting the entire landscape of future road transport” (Scurlock, 2007). The shift not 
only to prosper exporting nations in their agriculture sectors and employment, but 
also to benefit all the importing nations in their GHG reductions and diversification 
of energy choices economically.  
 
The focus on biomass (compared with biofuels) is because biomass has been utilised 
in heat and power generation for centuries, mainly coal/wood as fuels. Meanwhile 
biofuels are still a developing area which is only recently adopted in many nations, 
except from the more experienced countries-Brazil and the US. The existing 1G 
biofuels is derived from food stocks, while the NGB R&D is still ongoing. In fact, 
biofuels are not an entirely new technology. They are, basically vegetable oil and 
alcohol, which have been diversified from the food chain to fuel up the automobile. 
With nearly three decades of the Brazilian bioethanol (sugarcane), and the US five 
years bioethanol (maze) and biodiesel (soy) implementation, they are not appearing 
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as “new and high-technology” which would capture the world attention. As the NGB 
would only be commercially available five-to-ten years from 2008; currently there 
are too few tangible the NGB results which capable to demonstrate the practical 
application and convince the world of its potential. Therefore, the current intensive 
NGB R&D projects remain confined to laboratories. 
 
A qualitative case study method is employed to investigate the roles and strategies 
taken by the SG and the two leading oil companies-BP and Shell, to answer the 
leading research question: “How these major actors interact with one and another to 
deal with risk and uncertainty arising from technological change during a technology 
deployment and development?”  
 
The role of the SG is determined by the Reserved and Devolved Matters (refer 
appendix 4.2.1) outlined by the UK Government. Therefore the research looked into: 
(a) How biofuels became one of the current renewable energy sources for transport? 
(b) What are the Scottish Government's roles in biofuels deployment and 
development? 
(c) What mechanisms are in place to create a supportive environment for oil        
companies in pursuing biofuels deployment and development?   
(d) What are the risks and uncertainties that appear during biofuels deployment and       
development? 
(e) What strategies have been applied to counteract the risks and uncertainties arising 
during biofuels deployment and development? 
 
For the oil companies, BP and Shell are also being investigated. They are primarily 
profit driven entities who have become interested in biofuels technology/business. 
They are actively engaged in supplying and researching the NGB. The research 
investigated: 
(a) What are the rationales that moved these oil companies into biofuels business? 
(b) What are the oil companies’ role in biofuels deployment and development? 
(c) How the oil companies have reacted to the government initiatives for biofuels 
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deployment and development?  
(d) What risks and uncertainties appeared during biofuels deployment and 
development? 
(e) What strategies have been adopted to counteract the risks and uncertainties 
arising during biofuels deployment and development? 
 
Taking the SG, BP and Shell as qualitative cases study; the research could gain 
insight from the SST angle. It helps us to understand how political, social, economic, 
environmental, institutional capability and the regulatory setting have all facilitated 
large technological change on technology deployment and development. 
Simultaneously, these two processes might also be constrained by the emergence of 
R&U. Therefore, the research has investigated the strategies applied (by the 
government and oil companies) from Risk Governance and Risk Regulated Regime 
to manage and control these R&U. These strategies are imperative to ensure the 
existing deployment could be continued, while the NGB would be developed for 
commercial use. Consequently, this led to five research objectives: 
1.To investigate the driving forces for the government and the oil companies in 
taking biofuels as the current renewable energy source for transport.  
2.To determine the respective roles and responsibilities of the government and the oil 
companies in biofuels deployment and development. 
3.To understand the mechanism which delivers biofuels deployment and 
development, and the interactions that take place between the government and the oil 
companies. 
4.To identify the risks and uncertainties faced by the government and the oil 
companies during biofuels deployment and development.  
5.To examine the strategies adopted by the government and the oil companies to deal 
with risks and uncertainties arising during biofuels deployment and development.  
 
1.2 Research Contributions 
The research aimed to get an insight into a large social technology which is 
experiencing dynamic technological change as it is being deployed and developed. In 
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addition, the focus on corporate/public risk management which dealt with R&U 
associated with a large technology deployment/development could be utilised for 
other application, either for private company or government, who is/are interested in 
advancing biofuels as the REfT. The research portrays the driving forces, the 
mechanisms, the roles and responsibilities and the interactions of policy maker and 
the oil companies during biofuels implementation and innovation. Besides, the 
expected R&U are identified from technology deployment and development 
processes, and the counteracting strategies are implemented to deal with these R&U 
as they arise.  
 
These first-hand experiences provide some valuable information which are helpful in 
decision-making. Firstly, the driving forces and the roles and responsibilities of the 
political authorities and the oil companies could be accurately defined under the 
regulated market. This would ensure the effective development of 
mechanisms/strategies, to help foster collaboration and commitment, leading 
ultimately to seamless interactions between these two actors to have one technology 
deployed and developed.  
 
Secondly, R&U identified from the deployment and development processes, and the 
systemic risks could be a threshold for learning and for keeping the decision makers 
from falling into the same trap. The counteracting strategies applied to deal with 
these R&U provide many practical solutions that could be used by others when any 
stakeholders encounter a similar situation.  
 
To date, the biofuels regulated market is still under-researched. Some of the 
mechanisms in place are extended from the existing hydrocarbon regulated market. 
Although they could provide guidance for biofuels operations, they are inadequate 
for biofuels deployment and development, as the biofuels technology is really 
different from hydrocarbon. The research generally mapped out the context/content 
of the biofuels regulated market, described the mechanisms in place and described 
the interactions between the regulator and the oil companies. The five general types 
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of institution advocated by Gregory and Stuart (2004) are helpful in explaining the 
general context/content of biofuels regulated market (refer appendix 2.1.3). 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews some key areas of academic literature pertinent to the topic of the 
research namely: the regulated market (section 2.1), SST on the large social technical 
system (section 2.2); R&U arising from a technology development and deployment 
for both government (section 2.3) and corporate institutions (section 2.4). In addition, 
an understanding of systemic risk is introduced (section 2.5) with regulator and 
corporate counteracting strategies on risk governance (section 2.6) and of the risk 
regulated regime (section 2.7) adopted to deal with these expected R&U and 
systemic risk.  
 
Chapter 3 describes the method used to meet the research objectives, and draws upon 
social constructivism philosophy to arrive at a qualitative case study for an empirical 
exploratory investigation. Chapter 4 begins the case study investigation by 
examining the SG. By looking into its roles in biofuels deployment and development 
under the Reserved Matters, the researcher looked at the SG's reactions in responding 
to the various levels of regulatory authority (EU/UK) for biofuels deployment. In 
addition, under the Devolved Matters, the SG interaction with different institutions 
(academic/private sector) for the NGB development is investigated. This chapter also 
examines how the combination of the EU/UK Government applied strategies to deal 
with the complexities of the systemic risk occurred during the 1G biofuels 
deployment.  
 
Chapter 5 and 6 details BP and Shell case studies, which shared much on a common 
ground. Studying BP's and Shell's economic motivations in biofuels, these two 
companies are actively engaged in the 1G biofuels supply, while simultaneously 
pursuing the NGB development. The research examined the rationales, roles and 
responsibilities and incentives which led BP and Shell to move into biofuels 
deployment and development. The anticipated R&U defined in literature chapter 2, 
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facilitates corporate R&U identification when companies are dealing with technology 
deployment and development. These chapters also examine how both companies 
applied their strategies in dealing with systemic risks occurring during the 1G 
biofuels deployment.  
 
Chapter 7 then integrates these case studies and presents an analysis of data arising 
from the research. The concentration on discussion and analysis are driven by the 
research questions and research objectives formulated, to make sure they have been 
answered and achieved. Finally, chapter 8 draws together the conclusions for the 
























Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Understand the Mechanisms of Regulated Market under the Mixed 
Economy System 
Preface 
There are vast amount of literature about free market under capitalist economy. Yet, 
there are just a handful of articles discussing regulated market under mixed economy. 
Through this literature analysis, the researcher aimed to investigate: How the 
regulated market works? What mechanisms are in place under this type of market 
setting? To arrive such understanding, we will look into two issues: the regulated 
market under the mixed economy, and the energy economics leading to renewable 
energy (RE) adoption.   
 
2.1.1 Introduction 
The regulated market is a marketplace, where there is a degree of supervision by 
government concerning either permissible price movements/market behaviours for 
the utility assets (Moles and Terry, 1997). According to Gregory and Stuart (2004), 
since the definitions and classifications of economic systems have become complex; 
we no longer divide the world into capitalist and socialist/planned economy. Beyond 
the conventional inputs (land, labour, capital), economic outcomes are also 
influenced by political, social, geographic and technology. 
 
Biofuels regulated market (BRM) is slightly different from an oil market (at the 
upstream), yet its criteria are also partly continue (at the downstream) from the 
conventional oil regulated market (refer appendix 2.1.1). Within the regulated 
market, the business entities are organised to pursue their private economic 
objectives. Simultaneously, the business processes are influenced by the 
interventions of governments in conducting public's socioeconomic responsibilities 
while to fulfil the regulators' own political motivations. Despite the regulated market 
is complicated, there is still a grounded theory advocated by Gregory and Stuart 
(2004)-the five general types of institutions (FGTI), helps to understand the general 
concepts of the regulated market. 
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2.1.2 Institutional Classification  
Gregory and Stuart (2004) explain, traditionally, economic systems were classified   
according to the “isms”-feudalism/capitalism/socialism/communism. These 
classifications identified systems in two characteristics: the “ownership” and the 
means of “production” both are based on the institutional features. However, 
institutions exist in a large number of forms: corporations/unions/economic customs. 
Since they are varying in complexity, there is no universally accepted definition of 
“institution”.  
 
North (1990) defines “institutions are the rules of the game of a society under which 
economic decisions are made. Fundamentally, institutions are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interactions. Consequently, they structure incentives in 
human exchange whether political, social or economic.” This defines institutions are 
broadly interpreted to include legislation, organisations (governments) and 
corporations, or any other political, social, and economic rules that affect the way 
people deal with each other in the exchange of private/public goods/services. 
Whenever there are rules of behaviour, there must be a means of enforcing these 
rules. Thus, institutions consist not only the rules themselves; but also the means of 
their enforcement. Voigt and Engerer (2002) cite five types of rules and enforcement 
mechanisms in Table 2.1.1 (refer appendix 2.1.2) 
 
Table 2.1.1: Types of Rules and the Means of Enforcement 
Rules Enforcement 
Convention Self enforcing 
Ethical  Self commitment 
Customs Informal social control 
Private  Organised private enforcement 
State Law Organised state enforcement 
Source: Voigt and Engerer 2002. pp. 132. Ch. 2 
 
2.1.3 Mechanisms of Regulated Market under Mixed Economy  
Gregory and Stuart (2004) explain, an economic system (mixed economy) has a set 
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of institutions for decision-making, implementation, concerning production, income 
and consumption within a geographic area. Therefore, the economic system consists 
of mechanisms, organisational arrangements and decision-making rules (laws, 
traditions, beliefs, attitudes, values and behaviour stated in Table 2.1.1). They could 
directly/indirectly affect economic behaviour and outcomes. Since the economic 
systems are multidimensional, a feature can be formalised as:   
ES1 = f (I1, I2, ….In) 
 
An economic system cannot be defined with a single institution (property 
ownership); rather the full set of institutions must be known before ES is specified. 
The FGTI is used to differentiate economic systems from one another (refer 
appendix 2.1.3), and they are: 
(a) Organisation of decision-making: the structure 
(b) Mechanisms for the provision of information and coordination: market and plan 
(c) Property rights 
(d) Mechanisms for setting goals and inducing people to act: incentives 
(e) Procedures for making public choices: the role of government  
 
2.1.3.1 The Organisation of Decision-Making 
Simon (1966) explains “organisation refers to the complex pattern of 
communications/relations in a group of human beings.” According to Montias 
(1976), “an organisation consists of a set of participants regularly interacting in the 
process of carrying on one/more activities”. There are two perspectives: rules and 
relationship, which guide the decision-making processes. 
 
(i) Rules as Guidelines 
In an organisation, goals exist and information is created. According to Ben-Ner et 
al. (1993), individuals participate in an organised behaviour, pursuing self-interest 
constrained by bounded rationality, and responsibilities towards an organisation. 
                                               




Economic theory assumes we make perfectly rational decisions armed with perfect 
information. However, if we lack of perfect information and outcomes are uncertain, 
we cannot rationally weigh every decision to find the maximising outcome. In such 
situation, we turn to the use of rules as guidelines.  
 
(ii) Relationship of Principal-Agent 
Gregory and Stuart (2004) explain, an organisation is characterised by the levels at 
which resource allocation and decisions are made then executed. In a decentralised 
organisation, decisions are made primarily at low levels of the organisation. In a 
centralised organisation, most decisions are made at the highest levels. Decision-
making level reflects the organisation's structure, the manner which the organisation 
generates/utilises information and allocates authority/responsibility. 
 
In most organisations, a superior-subordinate (principal-agent) relationship implies 
that a principal is a party who has controlling authority that engages an agent to act, 
subject to the principal's control/instruction. An agent is a party that acts for/on 
behalf, or as a representative of a principal. Once the relationship is established, the 
principal is responsible to monitor performance, ensuring the agent is providing the 
services as specified/required (Gregory and Stuart, 2004).  
 
2.1.3.2 Mechanisms for Information Provision and Coordination 
In a centralised organisation, the authority that makes decisions rests in a single 
central command that issues orders to lower units. The decentralised, would be a 
structure where all decision-making authority rests with the lowest subunits 
independently. In reality, perfect centralisation of information is impossible, because 
of the mass of information on prices, locations, time and quality. Organisations must 
have some degree of information decentralisation. Typically, lower level units have 
an information advantage concerning their local circumstances and accessibility 
compared with higher level units (Gregory and Stuart, 2004). 
(i) Market and Plan 
Gregory and Stuart (2004) explicate, market and plan are two mechanisms for 
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providing information/coordinating decisions in organisations. However, there is no 
simple relationship between the level of decision-making and the use of market/plan 
as a coordinating mechanism. In regulated market, it has to combine a considerable 
concentration of decision-making authority and information, in large corporations 
with substantial state involvement. Coase (1937) posed the question of why some 
activities are carried out through markets, whereas others are carried out by 
directives/plan from government. Coase then concluded: activities will be carried out 
by plan whenever the transaction costs2 of using markets are too high.   
 
2.1.3.3 Property Rights 
Montias (1976) states, institutions also differ in how property is owned. Ownership is 
an amalgam of rights that individuals may have over objects/claims on 
objects/services. There are three forms of property ownership: private, public and 
collective/cooperative. Differences in ownership rights affect economic outcomes. As 
the owners seek to maximise their incomes, capital will be disbursed to yield the 
highest rate-of-return commensurate with the risk involved. If capital is owned by the 
state, the rules of capital allocation are different, because greater attention may be 
paid to long-term social rates of return (Gregory and Stuart, 2004). 
 
2.1.3.4 Incentives 
Pryor (1974) explains, an organisation can be characterised in terms of the incentives 
that motivate people. “Goals and incentives are vital links in understanding the 
transformation inputs into effective actions.” Montias (1976) adds, an incentivise 
mechanism should induce agents to fulfil the directives of the principals. The 
                                               
2 It is the cost incurred in undertaking an economic exchange; which considers the relative merits of 
conducting transactions within firms and between firms using markets. It takes into an account of 
bounded rationality, information problems, the costs of negotiating contracts (Black, et al., 2009a), the 
costs in making a bargain over and above the benefit exchanged, costs of travel, time to complete an 
exchange, the research costs, bargaining costs, enforcement costs (Law, 2009); opportunity cost, 
agency costs if an agent is used and for opportunism (Law and Smullen, 2008). Transaction costs can 
reduce the volume of transactions, as they reduce welfare by suppressing mutually beneficial 
transactions and using up resources. Through incentives provision to individuals to economise and 
bundle their transactions is a way to overcome it (Calhoun, 2002a), while businesses and markets 
prefer to see lower transaction costs over time as this will improve profitability (Law and Owe, 1999). 
16 
 
principal can devise material3/moral4 incentives to motivate the agent.  
 
2.1.3.5 The Role of Government 
The government must provide public goods5 . Even in market economies, public 
goods must be provided because non-payers/free riders, cannot be prevented from 
using them (Gregory and Stuart, 2004). 
 
2.1.4 Leading to the Understanding of Mixed Economy 
The researcher sought advices from two scholars of economics from the Edinburgh 
University, in affirming the type of economy under the biofuels market in the UK. 
“There is less interest in classifying national economies than there used to be after 
the fall of Soviet type economies twenty years ago. In some respects the UK still has 
a mixed economy, based on an ownership model of industry being part publicly and 
part privately owned, although not so much as in the 1948-88 period when Britain 
had large nationalised industries,” said Rutherford (2009). “The UK is a mixed 
economy, as are other OECD economies. It involves a mix of private and public 
ownership and allocation by markets/government, as does the biofuels sector. 
Describing it as mixed is not particularly interesting. What is more interesting is the 
precise nature of the mix” Sayer (2009). 
 
Mixed economy is defined as an economic system which combines 
elements/characteristics of the market economy with elements of a planned economy. 
The state generally plays a larger role in setting policy, rules and objectives (Scott 
and Marshall, 2009). Institutionally, a mixed economy is a mixture of state and 
private enterprises, where the economic activities are carried on by individuals/firms 
with some degree of centralised states decision taking (Black, et al., 2009b). Besides, 
Rutherford (2007) comments, the mixed economies attempted to soften the effects of 
                                               
3 Material incentives promote desirable behaviour by giving the recipient a greater claim over 
material goods (Gregory and Stuart, 2004). 
4 Moral incentives reward desirable behaviour by appealing to the recipient's responsibility to society 
and raising the recipient's social stature within the community (Gregory and Stuart, 2004). 
5 Roads must be built, water and electricity to be supplied, children must be educated, and healthcare 
provision must be made. 
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capitalism, without adopting the strong central controls of many types of socialism 
(refer appendix 2.1.4).  
 
2.1.4.1 Balancing Between Government and Private Sectors 
Stiglitz (2000) states, free markets often fail, and governments must play a role in 
correcting the failures of the market. There is an agreement that there are many 
problems which the market does not address adequately. However, the recognition of 
the limitations of government implies that, government should direct its energies 
only at areas in which market failures are most significant; and where the 
government intervention can make a significant difference. The dominant view is 
that limited government intervention could alleviate the worst problems. Thus, the 
government should take an active role in balancing the economic system and 
alleviating the worst aspects of poverty, while private enterprise should play the 
central role in the economy. This attempts to find ways for government and markets 
in working together and strengthening each other.  
 
Therefore, industry like telecommunications, rails, airlines have loosened from being 
regulated, while the energy market is still operated under control. Since the oil 
companies have been largely privatised accordingly, their businesses are organised-
not only focusing at profit seeking; but their business operation also is strongly 
influenced by the intervention of governments to conduct public socioeconomic 
activity.  
 
2.1.5 Energy Economics and Renewable Energy Adoption  
According to Eden, et al. (1983), energy economics are concerned with the 
availability of energy resources and their relation to economic activity. The 
industrialised world is in an uncertain stage of transition from low-cost hydrocarbon 
fuels to higher-cost, which the prices fluctuating accordingly.  
The developing world will provide an increasingly important fraction of the world 
energy demand. Surged by the economic growth, it will have an increasing demand 
for world energy resources. The econmic growth in both the industrialised and the 
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developing world will be disturbed/frustrated by energy shortages. The world energy 
demand is now two/three times its level when coal was the dominant fuel which 
associated with changing life styles and rising standards of living. 
 
Both energy and economic policies are determined on a national basis. 
Investment/trade in energy supplies forms a key component of economic activity, 
that no satisfactory energy/economic policy can ignore the potential political/social 
consequences of the scarcity of energy. The time scales need to be considered in 
formulating energy policies, are an order of magnitude longer than those commonly 
considered for economic policies. Yet, no one can foresee the future energy situation 
for decades. This recognition of uncertainty should play a major role in energy 
planning. Policies and strategies need to be designed to remain robust under a variety 
of alternative futures. The assessment of alternative energy strategies for costs and 
risk avoidance is an essential part of planning (Eden, et al., 1983).  
 
According to Stevens (2007), in the oil regulated market (which biofuels blends are 
currently supplied by oil companies), the key to oil companies operation lie in the 
role of the institutional power-which are in oligopolistic market structure. While the 
supply-and-demand influences the price determination, the context of market is 
highly controlled by government intervention.  
 
Oligopolistic is a market with a small number of sellers/producers, and oil/biofuels 
markets have limited competition (Catherine and Stevenson, 2005; Calhoun, 2002b). 
Most of the oil companies operating in the UK are international oil companies 
(IOCs). Since 1998, the IOCs have experienced mergers and acquisitions, which 
significantly increased the concentration ratios in the upstream and downstream of 
the industry (Luciani and Salustri, 1998). This was triggered by the oil price collapse 
of 1998 which made the purchase of others' reserves an attractive proposition. 
Certainly mergers and acquisitions were perceived as synergies to reduce costs, it 
also gave an opportunity to reshuffle the new asset portfolio to sell the lesser 
performing assets. Once the first mega-merger in the oil history had taken place 
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between BP and Amoco, shareholders' expectations created a feeding frenzy forcing 
the others to follow and the industry became more concentrated (Stevens, 2007).  
 
In the last 20 years, oil importing countries have pursued three broad strands of 
policy: deregulation, imposition of sales taxes and measures to address security of 
supply concerns (Fried and Trezise, 1993; Mitchell, 1994; Bohi and Toman, 1996; 
Mitchell et al., 1996; Andrews Speed et al., 2002; Leiby et al., 2002). The trends of 
recent years have been for the legal and regulatory, to encourage greater private 
sector involvement in the industry and to deregulate the sector. In the downstream 
and midstream, the emphasis has been on maintaining competition. For example, 
during the mega mergers, the competition authorities notably in the EU have 
examined the implications and in most cases forced some degree of divestiture to 
maintain competition. The emphasis has been on moving what was a largely state 
controlled sector into the private sector and now these oil companies have been 
transformed to public limited companies. This has involved a combination of 
privatisation and deregulation. In the upstream, the main change has been opening 
acreage for exploration and development for IOCs, driven by a desire to access 
capital and technology (MacKerron and Pearson, 1996; 2000). 
 
Even though these oil companies are privatised organisations, the government is also 
playing its part to intervene the oil market for the sake of public socioeconomic 
responsibilities: taking care society's welfare and protecting those in energy poverty. 
Additionally, the government is also eyeing on the lucrative taxes which oil 
companies could generate. Supported by Paga and Birol (1994); Bhattacharyya 
(1995) and Stevens (2007): most of the governments in OECD have been imposing 
ever higher sales taxes on oil products. Most recently, some governments from 
developing countries have moved away from protecting consumers from the oil 
shocks of the 2008 through subsidy, to raising final prices through sales taxes. The 
motive has been the attraction of raising revenue from oil products disguised under 
rhetoric to protect the environment/society, although rising international prices have 
made the cost of continuing subsidy increasingly difficult to bear. The reality is oil 
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products have a large tax base and an inelastic demand allowing for high tax rates-
which are a very attractive source of net revenue to any exchequer. 
 
Several broad policy areas are under considerations: reduce oil demand, develop 
alternative technologies (like biofuels), increase domestic supplies, diversify sources 
of oil imports and build up strategic stocks. While such policies can be driven by 
security of supply concerns, they carry implications for other energy policy 
objectives, such as environmental concerns (Stevens, 2007). 
 
In the transport sector, the personal mobility powered by automobiles has become an 
entrenched characteristic of society in developed/developing countries, which 
reinforces the view that world energy demand for transport will continue to rise. The 
average yearly finding rate for world oil reserves has been lesser than total 
consumption for some years. If this continues, it is inevitable the oil production will 
eventually decline.   
 
The first policy option to solve security problems is to reduce the demand for oil. 
However Stevens (2007) agrees, this is more complex than it might seem. Since the 
oil price shocks of the 1970s, the only realistic option is to try to reduce oil intensity 
lies, in reducing its use in the transportation sector. Consequently, there is 
undoubtedly considerable scope for further improvements in automotive fuel 
efficiency.  
 
The second option is to encourage alternative technologies for transport which used 
different fuels. Since the millennium, the environmental issues play a crucial role in 
oil markets, and will remain a central dimension of policy because of the 
environmental concerns dominate all stages of the industry. In the production of 
crude oil, there are issues of access to wilderness areas, plus the negative impact of 
operations ranging from gas flaring to the disposal of drilling muds. Environmental 
policy outcomes in the upstream, all of which will increase production costs and 
reduce supply, will depend upon the extent to which other policy drivers, most 
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obviously supply security, supersede environmental concerns. At the same time, 
concerns regarding emissions as a result of burning oil products are creating serious 
pressures for tighter environmental policy. The most general and widespread 
regulations are concerning sulphur content in diesel and the issues related to the 
emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Based on CO2 emissions, in a world of a true 
carbon tax, arguably oil has caused the GHG emissions leading to the climate change 
(Stevens, 2007). 
 
These few years, calls for RE have awaken awareness and demands. Such 
substitution involves the cost of diversion of other resources (solar, wind, tidal/wave, 
hydro, geothermal, biomass), manpower and skills, and also requires time to achieve. 
The lead time for a transition to new RE is varying widely with higher cost. 
However, the extent of cost itself could not be de-facto for oil sustainability. The fact 
is, hydrocarbon is a depleting resource. Historically, cheap natural gas and low priced 
oil in the past have penetrated the fuel market and displaced coal. With the 
resurrection of RE-if properly developed with the economies of scale would create 
another evolution to complement hydrocarbon.   
 
2.1.6 Conclusion  
The researcher utilised the FGTI advocated by Gregory and Stuart (2004) to analyse 
the UK BRM (refer appendix 2.1.3). Besides, important concepts advocated by Eden, 
et al. (1983), Stevens (2007) on energy economics led to the identification of three 
factors (energy security, overpopulation and environmental concern) which called for 
the RE adoptions (as biofuels for transportation). Inevitably, there are limitations for 
this literature analysis. Since the oil regulated market and mix economy disciplines 
are too broad; this literature analysis is aimed to provide a general understanding of 








































2.2 Social Shaping Technology: Large Social Technology Deployment 
and Development  
Preface 
The processes of biofuels deployment and development are complex. These 
processes are continuous over time involve the nationwide-supply of biofuels (as 
utility6) by oil companies under the supervision of the government; while the next 
generation biofuels (NGB) R&D are simultaneously underway.  
 
There are vast literature of Social Shaping Technology (SST) contribute to the 
analysis of technology. Selected publications of MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985), 
Williams and Edge (1996), Rip and Schot (2002), Weber (2002) are substantial in 
helping towards a better comprehension of a large social technology deployment and 
development. The SST's theory attributes, technology, is a social product which 
shaped by political, cultural, organisational, economic and other social factors. Thus, 
the SST perspective helps the understanding by mapping out the actors, examine the 
interactions between these actors, and contextualise the activities (decisions in 
identifying, selecting, developing, adopting and innovate a technology) during one 
technology deployment and innovation.  
 
2.2.1 Introduction  
SST advocated by MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985) examines the content of 
technology and the processes of implementation and innovation. It explores a range 
of social factors which pattern the design and implementation of technology. 
Therefore, SST concludes, technology does not develop according to an inner 
technical logic, but is instead is a social product, patterned by the conditions of its 
creation and use. Every stage in the generation and implementation of new 
technologies involves a set of choices between different technical options.  
 
                                               
6 Utility is the basic infrastructure for public services: electricity, water, gas, fuels and ICT (Black, J. 
et al., 2009; Black and Myles 2009). Biofuels are one of the utility since they are used at large social 
context, blend with hydrocarbon in powering the entire national road transport system. 
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Weber (2002) introduces the term “large social technical system” (LSTS). “Large” is 
the pervasive in character of technology, that it comprises entire country (like power 
supply) or connecting the world (ICT).  Meanwhile “sociotechnical” is to highlight 
new technology cannot be analysed isolated from its social context. The 
sociotechnical systems comprising humans, human activities and artefacts which 
characterised by interactions among these components (Trist, 1981). Hence, 
government as one of the actors within the system can shape new technology in a 
sustainable way, and to ease problems/risk and uncertainty (R&U) the technology 
may cause.  
 
2.2.2 The Concept of Large Social Technical System 
Weber's LSTS framework consists of five distinctive features: 
(a) technology 
(b) actors 
(c) interactions among/between actors 
(d) System structures 
(e) the exogenous system environment. 
 
The framework (Figure 2.2.1) represents an attempt to integrate SST theories into a 
framework for a constructive research. It is to emphasise three realms: politic, 
economic and technology which society has considered. According to Weber (2002), 
the framework is an explicit method of delimiting and studying a selected segment of 
sociotechnical, to keep its description manageable. In practice, it could be difficult to 
justify the delimitation of such specification. If later empirical analysis reveals that 
the system has a significant influence on environment, the definition of the system 
boundaries should be reconsidered.  
 
The framework delimitations need to be justified individually for each empirical 
study. In some cases, it may be appropriate to define at specific level (global, 
national, regional or local/sectoral). Due to changing patterns of interaction, a 
framework's boundary could be changed over time. Keeping these considerations in 
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mind, the framework should be interpreted as a guide to structure the description of a 
particular study. As depicted in Figure 2.2.1, the framework covers both the micro 
perspective (actors and interactions), and the macro perspective of structural 
transformations. It puts technology in the centre of a network of social relationships, 
to reflect the interdependence between technology and the social forces while the 
entire framework is embedded in its environment setting (Weber, 2002). 
 
2.2.3 Five Distinctive Features 
There are five features advocated by Weber (2002) under the LSTS: 
1. The technology: which is subject to change and innovate/compete with the 
emergence of new niche solutions. 
2. Actors and their motivations/interests: users and suppliers of technology with 
political authorities, intermediary organisations and interest groups. 
3. Interactions among actors: determine the selection of technology, with the 
generation of strategies-mainly for decision-making on technology 
adoption/innovation. 
4. Structures: provides the evolving settings and institutions which interactions take 
place (as discussed in appendix 2.3). 
5. The exogenous environment: the system which adapts to the changes taking place 
from the environment. 
 
2.2.3.1 Technology 
Generally, a technology represents more than the technical hardware/functions. It 
comprises the entire body of knowledge (codified and tacit) and organisational 
practices to make it operate.  
 
Since technology is an inclusive phenomenon, its development is continued by the 
interaction of various social and technical elements. There is no linear effect of 
technologies upon society, so too the conditioning of technologies by social factors is 
not a one-way process. Technologies, once developed and implemented, not only 
react back upon their environments, but also generate new implications (Clark and 
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Staunton, 1989; Fleck, 1993). Consequently, to characterise a technology and its 
emergence, the multi-dimensional and multi-actor framework are needed. Thus, 
whereas a technology may be on one hand subjected to the limitations of what is 
physically feasible, the remaining set of options is further constrained by the social 
context (Weber, 2002). 
 
2.2.3.2 Actors  
SST states: technologies are not neutral, but are fostered by groups to preserve/alter 
social relations (Hard 1993); they are “politics pursued by other means” (Latour 
1988). Thus, SST is influenced by a desire to democratise technological decision-
making, to forms the social accountability and control. New technologies embedded 
in society, and their impacts depend on the processes of contextualisation. In the co-
evolution of technology and society, a variety of actors are interested in influencing 
technological change with their own goals (market success, sustainability and 
others). Through actions and interactions of these actors, technologies evolve and 
adopted (Rip and Schot, 2002). 
 
In describing the negotiability of technology development, there are choices inherent 
in both the design of individual artefacts and systems, and in the 
direction/trajectory/processes of innovation. If technology does not emerge from the 
unfolding of a predetermined logic or a single determinant, then innovation is a 
garden of forking paths. Different routes are available, leading to different 
technological outcomes (Williams and Edge, 1996).  
 
Significantly, these choices could have different implications for society. The 
characters of technologies and their social implications have opened up for enquiry. 
The social scientists can analyse the social influences over the particular 
technological routes taken and their consequences. These are united by an insistence 
that the “black-box” of technology must be opened, to allow the socioeconomic 
patterns embedded in both the content of technologies and the processes of 
27 
 
innovation7 to be socially exposed and analysed (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985).  
    System Environment 
                


























    Political Structures 
Impact 
Figure 2.2.1: The Basic Elements of the Framework 
Source: Weber, K. M., 2002. pp.331. 
 
This opens up two issues. Firstly, the negotiability of technology (Cronberg, 1992)-
which highlights the scope for particular groups and forces to shape technologies to 
their ends; and the possibility of different kinds of technological and social outcome. 
The technological development and implementation involves processes of 
collaboration between suppliers and users, a hybrid between the ideal-type market 
                                               
7 According to Dosi (1988) and Kemp et al. (1991), innovation decisions predominantly depend on: 
(i) the further opportunities offered by a new technology, 
(ii) the perceived opportunities to appropriate the benefits of innovation, and  

















relationship and a social inter-organisational interaction (Brady et al., 1992; 
Lundwall, 1993).  
 
Secondly, it raises issue about irreversibility (Collingridge, 1992; Callon, 1993)-the 
extent/manner in which choices may be foreclosed as earlier technological choices 
will pattern subsequent development (Rosenberg, 1994). Certain options may be 
selected and become entrenched, as a result of the tendency of new technologies to 
develop cumulatively, erected upon the knowledge-base, social and technical 
infrastructure of existing technologies, particularly where increasing returns to scale 
of investment result in “lock-in” to established solutions (David, 1975; Arthur, 1989; 
Cowan, 1992).  
 
Negotiation processes precede the final decisions regarding a new technology, but 
apart from these negotiations, it needs to be explained by which general motivations 
and processes an actor (an individual, a private company or a public body) takes a 
decision. In making decision under limited information (about developments 
available and emerging technical options), actors (users, suppliers, political 
authorities) are confronted with the necessity and possibility to spend limited 
resources on different types of activities while remain interacting and negotiating 
with one another. This serves the purpose of reducing any uncertainty, presumably 
the best possible decision to be made. During the negotiation process, different types 
of mechanism are used by the actors involved to affect the final decision, so that they 
match their own perceived interests well. These interests can be seen as a 
combination of internal and external interests8 (Weber, 2002). 
 
2.2.3.3 Interaction and Decision-Making Processes 
According to Weber (2002), the decision to adopt a technology is the result of 
interactions with others. A decision is the final result of a negotiation process in 
conjunction with the interests/goals/expectations of the decision-taking actors. These 
                                               
8  Internal interests: reflecting the self-referential aspects of decision-making. External interests: 




negotiation and decision-making processes take place within the limits of certain 
rules and institutional settings9. New control measures are analysed, involving not 
only government bodies but also representatives from industry/other relevant social 
groups.  
 
The innovation and adoption of new technologies, and the control are determined by 
overlapping groups of actors involved, but in different areas of interaction, each with 
its specific mechanisms of selection and variation. The organisational settings in 
which these mechanisms are used can be described with markets, hierarchies or 
networks. Administrative hierarchies are responsible for the implementation of 
political decision, but consultation processes in the networks of interest groups also 
play an important role in the preparation of political decisions. Technological 
innovations often take place in network type settings (Callon, 1992; Lundvall, 1988) 
involving suppliers, users of technology, research centres, interest groups and 
political institutions. These inter-institutional networks pervade the system are 
responsible for shaping a conducive/(maybe detrimental) climate for a new 
technology. 
 
2.2.3.4 System Structures 
Weber (2002) emphasises, technology develops within a socioeconomic and 
technological environment can be structured along some categories. These structures 
are not fixed, but in a continuous process of change-mostly slow and incremental, but 
on occasions also fast and revolutionary. Being the result of a historical process, 
these structures could be regarded as the accumulated result of decisions made by the 
actors in the course of time. They play an important role in framing/constraining 
individual decisions, but in turn, they are also shaped by individual decisions. 
                                               
9 Three types of decisions related to interaction are distinguished as shaping the innovation and 
diffusion of new technologies (Weber, 2002). 
(i) Innovation decisions: the decision of a supplier to develop (and market) a new technology. 
(ii) Adoption decisions: made by technology users, after explored alternative options, and the different 
requirements to be fulfilled. 





2.2.3.5 System Dynamics 
Weber (2002) explains, an impetus driving change in the framework consists of 
external pressures such as: societal problems, resource scarcity, major political 
changes or scientific discoveries from outside the technological realm under study. 
Within the framework, the main driving forces of change and variation are on one 
hand rooted in the auto dynamics of technology, opening up new opportunities for 
future development paths. On the other hand, different types of needs: political, 
technical, economic and social can induce efforts to generate variety and innovation. 
Such needs can be driven by exogenous developments, but also can be rooted in the 
interests/problems/objectives of the actors within the system. Besides, uncertainty 
adds to the variation in the search for new solutions because ex ante different paths 
can be worth exploring.  
 
This interpretation implies a notion of a co-evolution, rather than discontinuous. In 
LSTS, it is not easy to introduce fundamental changes due to structural resistances. 
However, past histories of such systems show that, once the right matches are 
established, a fast process of change with pervasive impacts can happen. The 
underlying reasons for initiating such transformations can be exogenous to the 
system, as well as coming from within the system. Changing the dominant paradigm 
of structural settings, mental frameworks of the actors and related sets of interests, 
can be regarded as a process that requires a high activation impulse (Weber, 2002). 
 
2.2.4 The Dynamism of Technological Development   
The innovation journey starts with the identification of a technological opportunity: a 
new option/pressure to find a solution for a problem. Such options may derive from 
R&D findings/scientific advance in general. With the tentative introduction of the 
new product/process in a societal experiment, the complexity increases (Rip and 
Schot, 2002).  
 
Innovation is seen as a contradictory and uncertain process. It is not just a rational-
technical problem-solving process; it also involves social, economic and political 
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processes in building alliances of interests (suppliers, technologists, users, funders, 
regulators) with the necessary resources and technical expertise around certain 
concepts/visions, yet unrealised technologies. In this approach, technological 
development is a spiralling rather than a linear process. The crucial innovations take 
place both at the design and the implementation stages (Williams and Edge, 1996).  
 
A challenge, not just for technology developers, users, but increasingly also for 
policy makers and critical societal groups, is to influence technological change at an 
early stage, when irreversibilities have not yet set in while one can sway the balance 
between desirable and undesirable impacts. The problems face during technology 
R&D is not just cognitive (how to anticipate the unpredictables), but also a 
sociopolitical (Rip and Schot, 2002).  
 
The suppliers orient themselves to the new technology where economies of scale and 
scope are exploited; and recognition by users, of further possibilities which create 
new sociotechnical linkages. The sector starts to change, and its relations with other 
sectors are also changing. The latter can become so important that the technology 
driving such changes by being taken-up widely-called as a pervasive technology, and 
will construct a new technoeconomic paradigm (Freeman 1992). 
 
The argument about actors and analysts is mirrored in practice by the contrast 
between insiders (who will take a concentric view) and outsiders. These 
considerations set the scene which addresses the problem of keeping the overall 
picture in mind, in spite of a concentric bias. The simplification is to keep the overall 
picture manageable, to reduce four poles to characterise activities: science, 
technology, market/society and regulation; each of them operationalised with 
dominant intermediaries and interactions (Rip and Schot, 2002). 
 
If actors want to exert influence and change an emerging path in another direction, 
they face the momentum that has been built-up and following the increasing 
alignment. Internal actors are constrained by their inclusion in the dynamics, while 
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external actors have to overcome the distance between inside and outside (Garud and 
Ahlstrom 1997). In practice, the first requirement is to understand the dynamics of 
such developments in context. It is important to enrich the innovation journey, by 
anticipations and response. Anticipations of outcomes (including impacts of the 
technology on society) must be an ongoing concern, rather than ad-hoc efforts to 
persuade a regulator that the journey could be continued. The learning made possible 
through scenarios-especially important at an early stage (Rip and Schot, 2002). 
 
As with emerging rules and institutions, a precarious product of actions and 
interactions of actors, requiring care and repair all the time, turns into a stable regime 
which orients actions and perceptions. This is the way to understand how design 
hierarchies become established (Clark 1985), and the regime concept can be used to 
broaden the notion of design hierarchy (Van de Poel 1998). Cumulative effects may 
thus lead to the emergence of new regimes, or shifts in existing regimes. This is a 
multi-actor, multilevel process, in which no single actor can sway the balance 
intentionally (Rip and Schot, 2002). 
 
2.2.5 Conclusion 
Weber's (2002) five distinctive features highlighted 1technology, 2actors, 
3interactions, 4system structures and 5exogenous system environment, could be 
extended for the analysis of deployment and development of biofuels. The concept 
advocated by Rip and Schot (2002), is helpful to widen the understanding on 
uncertainty caused by institutional change, emergence of new actors to imprint new 










2.3 Identifying Risk and Uncertainty from Renewable Energy Projects in 
the UK 
Preface  
Renewable energy (RE) is a dynamic research field which has a large collection of 
literature base in recent years. Most of the literatures are developed into respective 
fields: science, technology/engineering applications, policy study and environmental 
concerns (refer appendix 2.3.1). There is limited number of articles angled from 
social science perspective. The contemporary work of “RE in social science study” is 
led by David Elliott. Elliott's work began in 200310 has been a debut, in addressing 
various social issues related to the RE generation and adoption. Continue in 2009, 
Elliott's work is expanded, contributes to the understanding of sustainable energy11 
based on different types of RE. 
 
Even though Elliott (2003a, 2007a, 2007b) studied a small section about biomass12, 
yet biofuels have not been adequately addressed. Besides, a chapter written by 
Scurlock (2007), discusses broadly general information about biofuels has not 
addressed biofuels adequately from social science angle. Hence, most of the 
literatures on RE/biomass have overlooked the potential of biofuels as transport 
fuels. Even if they do, most of the literature have been largely based on the nature 
science, technology and engineering (refer appendix 2.3.2).  
 
While the next generation biofuels (NGB) is still undergoing an intensive R&D, the 
1G biofuels is adopted in most of the road transport use. There are some literatures 
addressing the 1G biofuels execution in other countries, but not in the UK. For 
                                               
10 Elliott (2003a, 2003b, 2003c) addresses the issue of world's highly dependence on fossil fuels, 
resulted to the rising level of CO2 in the atmosphere. Hence, there is an urgency to develop RE which 
has lower environmental impacts.  
11 Elliott (2007a, 2007b) correlates climate change to the prospect of RE technologies that can help 
society to develop a sustainable energy future. His work analyses nuclear, wind, biomass, sea and 
solar power from the social science perspective.  
12 Biomass is a general biological substance provides energy and heat, but limitedly performs as fuel 
for transport. This is due to the long history of biomass (wood fuel and coal) has been used for 
centuries which has established a vast knowledge base.   
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example, the Worldwatch Institute (2007) 13  addresses biofuels production and 
implementation in the US, Bhojvaid's (2006) focuses at Indian agriculture, while 
Langeveld et al. (2009)14 explain biofuels adoption in various parts of the world. 
Their publications are helpful for a general understanding. Yet, the UK would have 
some unique reasons and mechanisms to execute and develop biofuels. It would also 
face different risks and uncertainties (R&U) during these processes. Hence the 
adoption and localisation of biofuels in the UK are worth for further investigation.  
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
A new technology introduction into a new marketplace will face certain degrees of 
R&U for its development and deployment. When we look at a utility like biofuels-
which are applied for the UK nationwide road transport system (the biofuels market 
is a whole nation), the R&U encountered are far more complicated than a consumer 
product introduction which has a stand in a particular market segment.  
 
The social network for biofuels adoption and innovation is linking political, social, 
economic, environmental and technology (biofuels) factors-all of these are 
integrating and reacting within the regulated market. Through the combination of 
governments' intervention and the technology providers (oil companies in supplying 
biofuels), they are working closely to introduce biofuels blends with petrol/diesel for 
the UK road transport use. Hence, there are various parameters such as the market 
behaviour, mechanisms in driving biofuels deployment and development, R&U 
encountered-all of these will reflect the intricate social forces and social network 
involved. 
 
2.3.2 Risk and Uncertainty Arise During Technology Development 
The development of a new technology is never easy. A new technology will face a 
                                               
13 Worldwatch Institute (2007) discusses the production and use of biofuels; covers not only the 
technical details, but also the environmental, economic and social issues mainly based in the US.  
14 Langeveld et al. (2009) address the threats of climate change and peak oil crisis in driving society 
towards the increased use of biomass for energy. Case studies are used to demonstrate the potential of 
the biobased economy in different parts of the world-North America, Europe, China and Brazil. 
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range of technical, economic, social, political and institutional hurdles as it tries to 
get started on the long process of development. These constraints and hurdles have 
been particularly apparent in RE technologies (Elliott, 2003d).  
 
Under the technology development, Elliott looks at the difficulties experienced by 
RE in trying to get funding for research by using the UK wave power programme 
(refer appendix 2.3.3). Besides, he studies the way which wind power has been 
developed around the world (refer appendix 2.3.4) through different R&D strategies. 
Finally, he investigates the technical problems experienced by the UK geothermal 
energy programme (refer appendix 2.3.5), highlights how this projects led to failure 
at the end.  
 
(a) First R&U: The Research Funding 
In the early stage of R&D, this is the critical time where research projects have 
experienced in obtaining financial support from governments. Even when it is 
forthcoming, the resultant projects may not always fare well and supports may not be 
continued. Elliott explains, most of the new technologies need financial support to 
get established through R&D. Yet, obtaining access to this represents a major hurdle. 
Inevitably, there are disagreements about which projects should be funded and how 
projects should be developed. Certainly, it is hard to pick a winner when technologies 
are at an early stage of development. In addition, there may be resistance to new 
developments from those with vested interests in the existing range of technologies, 
and lack of commitment from decision-makers to pressing ahead with what may 
seem like risky and long-term development (Elliott, 2003d). 
 
(b) Second R&U: Social Acceptance  
The wind turbine (appendix 2.3.4) shows how technological development interacts 
with social acceptance. The eventual outcome illustrates the weakness of the 
research-led programme, adopting “technology push” approach as opposed to being 
geared to responding to “market pull”. Of course, in the early years there were no 
markets for wind turbines. However, as the markets emerged, technology push gave 
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way to demand pull, and the Danes were in the right place to exploit this then 
enjoyed 90% share of the US market (Elliott, 2003d). Close involvement with users 
is increasingly important for successful technological innovation. Equally important 
is the fact that the export success of Danes was launched from a strong domestic 
market created from the bottom up. Around 80% of the wind turbines installed in 
Denmark are locally owned by individuals/cooperative guilds. Local ownership and 
local development have meant that funding was relatively easy to obtain as the local 
banks were willing to provide loans (Elliott, 2003e).  
 
(c) Third R&U: Technical Criteria and Performance Expected 
According to Paker (1991), the major technical uncertainties for geothermal 
technology in SouthWest England are still remaining to be overcome. The concept of 
reservoir stimulation to be used in the construction of a geothermal system will 
remain highly speculative, unless further experimental work is carried out. Besides, it 
is unlikely that current cost estimates of geothermal power plants could be reduced, 
even if the research proved successful. Studies conducted by Energy Technology 
Support Unit (ETSU, 1991a; 1991b) concluded that, the generation of electrical 
power via Geothermal is neither technically nor economically viable in the UK for 
the short/medium term. 
 
Hence, the technical problems experienced by the Camborne Geothermal Project are 
not uncommon at the early stage of the R&D process. This is because the initial 
technical problems are to be expected as part of the learning process. The withdrawal 
of financial support may have as much to do with short-term economic 
considerations (Elliott, 2003d). 
 
2.3.3 Risk and Uncertainty Arise During Technology Deployment 
Overall, it seems most of the RE technologies will continue to develop and become 
more cost effective when time goes by. However, even the institutional support and 
funding are facilitated, there are many problems which RE face in trying to become 
established. Elliott (2003e) warns, even when the novel energy technologies have 
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passed through the research phase, it is sometimes hard for them to get support for 
full scale implementation. The existing financial and institutional arrangements often 
do not favour/prioritise new technologies. By taking tidal power (refer appendix 
2.3.6) as an example, Elliott looks at the problem of promoting energy conservation.  
 
(d) Fourth R&U: Institutional Interests and Involvements 
The economic benefits of energy conservation are clear. The RE technologies will 
increasingly come to the fore, as the environmental costs of existing energy 
technology have become more apparent. However, the pattern of deployment so far 
has revealed a number of major institutional problems. 
 
A key problem facing new technologies is that, they are inevitably trying to establish 
themselves in an institutional, market and industrial context based on the existing 
types of energy technology. There are powerful vested interests in the status quo, and 
this is reflected in the current financial, organisational and institutional environment, 
which may not be well suited to the adoption of new technologies (Elliott, 2003e). 
 
After all, energy conservation has some obvious economic advantages. Superficially, 
some of the RE technologies are free resources. Therefore, they ought to be 
commercially attractive. However, all change involves disruption and the economic 
advantages may take a longer time to materialise than financial backers are willing to 
accept. The payback time is often less in the case of energy conservation measures, 
but it can be serious for some RE technologies. Although the RE sources are 
essentially free (natural flow sources like wind, solar and wave); nevertheless, there 
are significant costs associated with constructing the necessary energy-conversion 
infrastructure (Elliott, 2003e). This is return to the root of cost-benefits analysis15. As 
can be seen, the primary problem in tidal barrages (appendix 2.3.6) was not 
technological, because the technology existed and was relatively mature. The 
problem facing the UK barrages was financial and the relatively short-term economic 
                                               
15 How soon the returns would be gained? How quick the benefits could be obtained with the cost of 
investment is trade-off? These are the most concern issues of the decision-makers (Elliott, 2003e). 
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perspective that prevailed in the energy sector. Once built, barrages would pay off 
their investment costs in a matter of decades; they would produce very cheap 
electricity for centuries. However, the initial capital cost is large. As a result, 
investment funds proved impossible to find and the payback times were simply too 
long (Elliott, 2003e). 
 
Large projects like tidal barrages clearly have problems in obtaining funding. 
Although smaller scale of RE products may have the attractions that they can be 
deployed incrementally on a modular basis, similar problems can also face them. In 
the past, the emphasis of major financial investment has been on the use of large 
scale concentrated forms of energy and managed by large scale centralised agencies. 
Investment agencies are therefore often suspicious of smaller projects, which are 
sometimes viewed as likely to be low yield investments (Elliott, 2003e). 
 
(e) Fifth R&U: Social Acceptance 
Similar to the parameter (b) discussed above, but in the context of technology 
deployment; social acceptance is important in the energy conservation at the 
domestic sector. Their success depends on the adoption of new technologies by 
consumers. Information can alert people what is available, but uptake has often 
proved to be a problem. There is still evidently a need to convince consumers of the 
benefits gained from RE technologies (Elliott, 2003e). 
 
Compared to most conventional energy generation technology, wind turbines ought 
to have some advantages of public acceptability. They are relatively small scale and 
although there may be a need for fairly large numbers of them. In contrast to the 
hidden dangers of a nuclear plant, they have the advantage of transparency about 
their functionality-“what you see is what you get”. Their purpose and operation are 
clear from their appearance. If necessary, wind farms can be easily 
decommissioned/removed, returning the site to its original state.  
 
In reality, it seems vital that the public can influence the way the RE technologies are 
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deployed. The early enthusiasts for RE argued that, one of RE's attractions was that it 
could be used on the smaller scale and be more susceptible to democratic control on 
a local level. For local environmental impacts of “thinking globally and acting 
locally”, the deployments of some RE technologies are likely to be constrained by 
local environmental, planning and land use. Equally, the deployment of renewables 
may be stimulated by increasing environmental concerns over the global impacts of 
using conventional energy-global warming from the emission of GHGs and CO2 
produced when fossil fuels are burnt. Thus, the local and global impacts have to be 
traded-off against each other (Elliott, 2003e).  
 
2.3.4 Economic versus Environmental Benefits on Renewable Energy 
Development and Deployment  
According to Elliott (2003e), economic concerns inevitably determine the 
success/failure of a technological project, but land use issues and environmental 
concerns also enter into the commercial equation. While conventional economic 
factors are important, the need for a trade-off between local and global 
environmental factors is also important and may shape the way in which renewables 
are developed and deployed. 
 
RE provides part of the solutions to global environmental problems such as 
combating climate change, global warming, and reducing pollutions, but no 
technology can be entirely benign in environmental terms. Even the cleanest solar 
energy also been questioned about the spaces/land use for solar farm and the 
disposable issues of solar panels. Although the impacts of most renewables are 
relatively small and localised, compared to the large and global impacts of fossil 
fuels, there can still be local problems. The most significant impacts are associated 
with large tidal barrages and hydro dams, involve large scale of engineering 
constructions and massive modifications to local ecosystems. 
 
Studies of public attitudes to proposals for a barrage on the Severn estuary have 
indicated some mixed responses (Barac et al., 1983). There was a general enthusiasm 
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for RE projects, and support for the local economic. However, there was concern 
over local impacts on wildlife and the ecosystem. Although wind farms involve less 
environmental modification, they also intrude on the landscape (refer appendix 
2.3.7), causing significant changes in land use and social patterns. It will still be 
important for developers and planners to be sensitive to local concerns and to consult 
with local communities over the location/layout of proposed schemes. The RE 
technologies present system designers and planners with an interesting challenge. 
They must try to balance the global advantages of renewables against the local 
impacts, and come up with technically workable, economically viable and 
environmentally acceptable compromises. What seems to be needed is some way to 
negotiate a balance between global and local requirements (Elliott, 2003e). 
 
2.3.5 Ten Features of a Solid Framework for Renewable Policy Design 
and Implementation 
Mallon (2006) summarises ten key features of a successful RE policy 16  as the 
highlighted key factors required for the RE policy design and implemention. Each 
feature will be discussed respectively as below: 
 
(a) Transparency 
In order to kick-start the RE markets, support schemes and policy frameworks must 
be visible and accessible. In a new market, most of the potential entrants may come 
from the external energy companies/heavy industry. Hence, support must be 
transparent, accessible and open to all players to ensure that new entrants are not 
dissuaded from entering the market because of lacking of clarity and transparency. 
The best outcome for a government occurs if the maximum number of business is 
attracted to participate in a new industry. This will translate into high production of 
RE and competition to drive down prices and accelerate industry development.  
 
 
                                               
16 Mallon (2006) classifies the ten key features within the framework of drivers, contexts and society. 
According to Mallon (2006), features one to six are driver-based issues, while seven to nine are 
contextual issues. The final key feature, equalization is a societal issue. 
41 
 
(b) Well-defined objectives 
Government policies from various departments are not always fully aligned; rather it 
is dynamic and may contradictory. This affects a RE investment when there is 
inherent conflict between statements and policies. Therefore, it is important the 
policy should be constructed to ensure the main objectives are actually achieved. 
There are many objectives17 for accelerating a RE development. From this basket of 
objectives, the aim is to make a framework (to align all the related policies), as 
conducive/specific as possible.  
 
The next step is to prioritize these objectives. Once the list of intended outcomes is 
identified, the policy framework18 must be built to ensure its actual delivery. The 
more specific a policy is about the RE technologies eligible for support under a 
scheme, the more certain will be the delivery of those technologies into the market, 
and the more rapid the delivery of the associated benefits/objectives. 
 
(c) Well-defined resources and technologies 
The RE technology19 can either be defined by resource20/technology21/outcome22, 
notionally referred to as technology specific23. Thus a decision-maker may see merit 
in building up some industry groups/technologies, putting others into 
R&D/commercialisation programmes and choosing to leave alone others which have 
                                               
17 They include sustainability objectives, energy policy reform, RE production, new generating 
capacity, indigenous fuel manufacture, GHGs mitigation, distributed generation, increment size, 
energy cost and least-cost planning (internalisation), reliable energy security, new 
industry/manufacturing development, development of intellectual property in new technologies, job 
creation, rural development and nuclear phase-out. 
18 the respective parameters on support, targets, prices, tax benefits, trade tariffs and milestones 
which need to be established. 
19 We can classify RE technologies into four categories: low-cost commercial, high-cost commercial, 
non-commercial but with declining prices and non-commercial without declining prices. 
20 Resources such as: water, geothermal, solar, wind, biomass, or sea/ocean. 
21 such as wind onshore, wind offshore, solar thermal electric, solar thermal hot water and others. 
22 With policies geared specifically towards RE projects implementation, a spectrum of desired 
outcomes may be possible. At one end of the spectrum may be a single technology policy-for 
example, to support solar hot water heating; while at the other end of the spectrum there may be a mix 
of possible technologies. 
23 The advantage of being technology specific is that it becomes possible to get what is wanted in 




less long-term viability.  
 
(d) Appropriately applied incentives 
Policies intended to support renewables must permit technologies to migrate from 
R&D (laboratories) and to introduce into the market. Hence, financial support has to 
be provided where needed-according to RE’s different levels of maturity.  
 
(e) Adequacy 
New renewable markets require a strong injection of resources to get them running. 
It is important to achieve the correct financing, duration and intensity thresholds. 
However, the short-term objective of commercial gain might create arguments for 
minimising the cost of impact of renewable, or waiting until the technology achieve 
its economies of scale that could take longer time to be materialised.  
 
Since governments do not have deep enough pockets, the way to mobilise 
renewables is to mobilise private sector finance. The key to that is ensuring investors 
can get a return on their money. Thus, a good policy design will need to consider the 
investment profile of the RE projects and determine what is required to make the 
industry attractive (bankability) to private investment.  
  
(f) Stability 
Policy stability is a fundamental requirement of market certainty-which is strongly 
related to the production of RE and the development of the manufacturing capacity. 
Because policy frameworks evolve, therefore, the policy framework must have some 
faculty to handle change. We must ensure that the revision of RE policies will not 
destabilize the industry.  
 
(g) Contextual frameworks 
There are two ways to ascertain that the correct policy frameworks are present. 
Firstly, from a project perspective: We should put ourselves in the shoes of the 
business person attempting to establish a renewable production, and travel the path 
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from project conception to project completion. We need to check every point that the 
project hits a contractual/legislative interaction to ensure the policies are conducive 
and not obstructive to RE development.  
 
Secondly, drill down through all the levels of government and their legislative 
jurisdiction. Government policies with respect to large-scale renewables can come at 
a variety of levels. Beginning from the highest level, legislation may start with 
international agreements-such as the Kyoto Protocol. Then, there are national energy 
policy-making and state, provincial or community based initiatives. 
 
(h) Energy market reform  
Some renewables will leapfrog past conventional energy generation. However, 
renewables will be integrated into physical and management systems which have not 
been designed for this type of distributed generation.   
 
Access to distribution is primarily an issue for renewable in a new market. Problems 
occur when the entities responsible for connecting RE generators have too much 
discretion/inadequate guidance regarding the cost requirements for connection. 
Hence, the approach of distributing cost over the entire consumer base may be 
applicable.  
 
(i) Land use planning reform 
The first step is to ensure that sufficient information24 and adequate infrastructure25 
exist. This must be overlaid with information about potential points of environmental 
and social26 impacts. Furthermore, we need to understand which types of impacts27 
                                               
24 Questions such as: What resources the country has? What volumes? Where they are located? 
25 Questions such as: Are roads required to bring fuel in? Are major power lines required to get 
renewable power out? Is this infrastructure adequately mapped? How this infrastructure will affect the 
harnessing of these resources?   
26 Considerations include population distribution, the impacts relevant to populations, optimising 
employment creation with location, positive/negative overlaps with other land use (farming), and 
issues of landscape sensitivity. 
27 It is impossible to cover all impacts here. However, some of the common impacts include noise 
levels from wind farms at the nearest dwellings, impacts of wind farms on birds/bats, impacts of 
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from the technology concerned must be considered. 
 
Much of the information will be readily available to a government. Sometimes, 
government may not have the information/the agencies that can do the work or it 
may choose not to take the lead. In these situations civil society and the renewables 
industry must step into the gap. If we now assume that all the information is in place 
to make good decisions, the next step is to establish standards/planning requirements 
to ensure the impacts of RE development are acceptable. 
 
(j) Equalising the community risk and cost–benefit distribution 
The environmental and energy benefits of renewables mainly accrue at a national and 
international level. The environmental and social direct impacts occur mainly at a 
local level. This discrepancy can lead to inequitable distribution of costs and benefits 
if they are not considered carefully.  
 
For nations embarking on RE adoption which are signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, 
the benefits of the RE could be said to accrue at a national level. However, localised 
impacts/lifestyle adjustments will occur at the community level where the RE 
projects are hosted. Since these impacts can be both positive and negative, it is 
important to ensure that local communities get their fair share of the benefits of RE 
development/deployment so that they may consider themselves net beneficiaries. 
 
2.3.6 Inductive Analysis towards Framework Construction  
Reflect from Weber's work (2002), a broad range of actions can be taken by 
regulators to steer these RE technologies development and deployment, but only 
limited knowledge is available on what the actual impacts and side effects of these 
measures will be. There is a clear scope for improving our understanding of policy 
actions and of their impacts on system change in particular for any large social 
technology introduction. Through the inductive analysis on work advocated by 
                                                                                                                                     
biomass crops on local biodiversity, impacts of biomass residue removal on soil quality, effects of 




Elliott, the researcher has extracted general concepts on causal factors from the 
previous RE projects discussed, and the strategies applied to have these R&U dealt 
along the technology development and deployment. Table 2.3.1 and Table 2.3.2 are 
the summaries from the literature analysis.  
 
2.3.7 Conclusion 
Learning about the past can guide us into the future. Biofuels at their early stage of 
deployment and development are carrying various R&U. Therefore the previous 
experiences are helpful in identifying the potential R&U (which biofuels are going to 
face), and knowing some constructive strategies in dealing with these R&U, would 
ensure biofuels could be executed and innovated successfully. The ten features of a 
solid framework have the attempt to cover the basis of a sound RE policy framework. 
They provide a way where the policy makers need to consider as forming a checklist 




















Table 2.3.1: Causal Factors and Types of Risk and Uncertainty 
Causal Factors 
of R&U 
Types of R&U 
During Technology Development During Technology Deployment 
Political 
supports  
1. Political supports (rhetoric, lack of vision, 
and lack of follow through when projects are 
faceing with initial problems). 
2. Government change (from one ruling party 
to another). 
1. Political supports (lack of follow through 
when projects are under deployment). 
Funding 1. Funding (inadequate, sudden budget slash 
from the government/private funders). 
2. Short-term economic decision. 
3. Require enormous investment of time, 
capital and resources for R&D. 
1. Financial support (inadequate and 
discontinuous). 
2. Require further vast investments of time, 
capital and resources for technology 
deployment. 
3. High capital/cost, high operation cost, 
slow payback time. 
4. Significant cost (switching cost) associated 




1. Timing/Scenario/Contextual Setting (right 
time? right technology? right place?). 
2. Mismatch of technical performance (scale 
and functions) with market expectations. 
3. Disinformation, misrepresentation, 
prejudgement render to low appreciation on RE 
technology.  
1. Low market acceptance on RE technology. 
2. Difficult establishment of new RE 
technology in marketplace. 
3. Economic benefits and environmental 
impacts. 
4. Disinformation, misrepresentation, 
prejudgement which render to low 











1. Not understand the technical criteria of one 
technology (both performances and 
limitations).  
2. Unrealistic high expectations upon technical 
performance. 
3. Do not know how to develop a technology. 
4. Asking too much too soon of an embryo 
technology. 
5. Unclear about the future direction of one 
technology. 
1. Mismatch between the new RE technology 
and the existing supporting infrastructure 
required. 
2. Competition between this RE technology 




1. Institutional biases/structure resistance upon 
vested interests, which resist the development 
of new technology:  
-Resisted/vested interests from government 
(pro-nuclear, pro-fossil fuels or pro RE?). 
-Resisted/vested interests from the industry to 
change to accommodate for new RE.  
2. Lack of commitment from the industry. 
3. Authority intervention (different 
roles/interests within different government 
departments). 
4. Excuses, procrastination one technology to 
the future, expecting future could solve the 
current problems.  
1. Institutional vested interests which resists 
the further deployment of new technology. 
2. Institutional preconceptions (selective only 
on large scale project, suspicious on smaller 
projects-risky and low yield investments or 
vice versa). 
 Source: Summarised by the Researcher  
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Table 2.3.2: Strategies to Dealing with Risk and Uncertainty 
Causal Factors 
of R&U 
Types of R&U 
During Technology Development During Technology Deployment 
Political supports  1. Changes of political climate (from fossil 
economy to green economy, combating climate 
change). 
1. Providing supports (institutional and 
financial support for the full scale 
deployment). 
Funding 1. Strong and continuous financial support 
2. Eyeing for future benefits (social, economic, 
environmental). 
1. Strong and continuous financial 
support 
2. Eyeing for future benefits (social, 
economic, environmental). 
Social Acceptance 1. Be realistic. Not all sophisticated technology 
could guarantee a market success. 
2. New technology should be closer to the users 
(culture, economic). 
 
1. Local ownership for strong domestic 
market, generating strong supports from 
domestic funders for the project 
deployment. 
2. Public concerns have to be addressed 
and local sensitivity/reactions have to 
be considered. 






limitations) with  
expectations 
1. Do not push too far the premature 
technology and too soon. 
2. Allow gradual process of new technology 
incremental developments: from R&D, 
innovation, moving to the full scale 
development and finally for commercial 
deployment. 
3. The bottom up approach can ensure the 
small scale project are flexible (for 
accommodate any changes and further 
innovations), allow for piecemeal adaptation, 
incremental developments, obtaining feedbacks 
and learning from mistakes.  
1. Well established of technical 










1. Converged interests and responsibilities. 1. Responsibility sharing between 
government and private sectors. 
















































2.4 Identifying Risk and Uncertainty for New Technology Deployment 
and Development: A Corporate Perspective 
Preface 
There are two types of literature focusing on managing risk and uncertainty (R&U) 
from the business/management angle. Firstly, managing R&U for consumer 
product/technology which strongly correlates with managing innovation/new product 
development. Scholars like Pitblado and Turney (1996), Courtney et al. (1999), 
Phillips (2001), Trott (2005), Bhattacharya (2006) (refer appendix 2.4.1) shared a 
common ground which focuses on consumer product/technology for profit 
optimisation. Hence, there are tools and techniques, centred at business strategies in 
planning, forecasting and decision-making to deal with R&U arise that aim to reduce 
their implications that would depress the profitability.  
 
Secondly, managing specific “subject” of R&U (refer appendix 2.4.2) like managing 
risk on construction, various projects, R&D, banking/finance/insurance and so forth. 
The emphasis is subjective in tackling R&U based on particular discipline.  
 
There are limited articles about managing R&U for utility operating in a regulated 
market. Yet, either managing R&U for utility, consumer products or specific subjects; 
all of these shared a similar principle-“to avoid the occurrence of R&U”, or “to 
resolve the R&U in oder to minimise the consequences”. What make the differences 
depend on the types and scale of the R&U, mechanisms/strategies applied and the 
contexts of the R&U defined. This section presents the extracted general 
theories/concepts from some of the R&U literature, identify different types of R&U 
arise during one technology execution and innovation with counteracting strategies 
applied. These then could at least contribute to the understanding of managing R&U 
for biofuels deployment and development, from the corporate perspective.  
 
2.4.1 Risk and Uncertainty during Technology Deployment 
It is easy to assume that R&U are drastically reduced after the first commercial 
introduction of a new technology. Yet, Rip (1995) comments, introducing technology 
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is not a straightforward matter, especially when the technology is new, there is no 
guaranteed receipe based on previous experience. Rosenberg agrees, it is true that 
some of the R&U have been reduced at that point. However, after a new 
technological capability is established, we will then see new R&U arise (as explained 
in section 2.2.3.1).  
 
Since technology is an inclusive phenomenon, its deployment continues by 
interaction of various social and technical elements. There is no linear effect of 
technologies upon society, so too the conditioning of technologies by social factors is 
not a simple one way process. Technologies, once implemented, not only react back 
upon their environments, but also generate new implications (Clark and Staunton, 
1989; Fleck, 1993). Rosenberg then asks: “Why is it so difficult to foresee the impact 
of technologically practicable applications?”  
 
Guided by this question, Rosenberg (1994) then outlined six dimensions of 
uncertainty, which R&U are playing their role in technological deployment. Besides, 
Special Chem (2011) through its corporate report (items (a) and (b)) also delivers 
some of the general concerns in technology introduction. 
 
(i) Ex Ante Uncertainty about Improvements and Uses 
New technology comes into the world in a primitive condition. Often, it does with 
properties/characteristics whose usefulness cannot be immediately appreciated. It is 
inherently difficult to identify for its long-term uses. Its eventual use turns upon an 
extended improvement that vastly expands on its practical applications, and how 
rapidly it affects economy. Generally, a radical new technology must have a long 
gestation period before its characteristics and opportunities are well-understood and 
can be thoroughly exploited. 
 
(ii) The Need for Infrastructure 
New technology requires major/complete redesign and restructuring of infrastructure. 
This is because, a new technology-notably those which is game changing may 
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require an entire system change to support its operation. Therefore, it needs to be 
perceived as having enough impact and chance to become a new standard by a large 
number of the industry players (SpecialChem, 2011). Firms that had huge 
investments in manufacturing plants, with long productive lives still ahead of them, 
naturally were reluctant to discard a facility that was still perfectly usable 
(Rosenberg, 1994). 
 
(iii) Innovations as Competition to the Existing Technology 
Major technological innovation often constitutes an entirely new technological 
system. The relationship between the new and the old technology would create 
technological competition since contemporaries of a new technology would offset 
certain inherent limitations of an existing one. Innovations often appear to induce 
vigorous responses on the firms that find themselves confronted with close 
substitutes for their traditional products (Rosenberg, 1994). 
 
The SpecialChem (2011) concerns: apart from substitution, within a stiff rivalry, 
competitors can introduce a better performing new product/technology that could 
introducing a disruptive situation, setting new industry standards along dimensions 
on which others cannot compete. This could threaten the survival of incumbent firms. 
This new technology introduction, notably those which are game changing often 
require an entire system change. They need therefore to be perceived as having 
enough impact and chance to become a new standard by a large number of industry 
players.  
 
(iv) Unanticipated Applications 
Historically, a reason why it has been difficult to foresee the uses of a new 
technology is that, many major inventions had their origins in the attempt to solve 
very specific/narrowly defined problems. However, it is common that once a solution 
has been found, it turns out to have significant applications in totally unanticipated 
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contexts28 (Rosenberg, 1976).  
 
(v) Impacts on Other Industries 
Innovations often arise as solutions to highly specific problems in a particular 
industry, and their subsequent inter-industry flow is bound to be highly uncertain. In 
some cases, a new technological capability may have multiple points of impact on 
another industry. 
 
(vi) Identification of Needs 
The impacts of new technology are not just a matter of technical feasibility/improved 
technical performance. They are rather matters of identifying human needs, and 
catering to them in a novel and cost-effective way. New technology needs to pass a 
socioeconomic test, not just a technological one. New technology, with its eventual 
impact will depend on what is subsequently designed and constructed with it. What 
shapes it will depend on the ability to visualize how it might be employed in new 
contexts. 
 
(a) Economy climate  
The Special Chem (2011) highlights, macro-economic risks such as economic 
slowdown can delay the technology introduction. Inevitably, the passive economic 
climate will result in insufficient resources allocation for the technology launch and 
management attention. Perhaps, not many companies are adventurous enough for a 
massive investment at technology introduction which also could not guarantee a 
convincing return. Shareholders’ short-term views on financial results, might force 
management to withdraw its support if the technology introduction/adoption is 
significantly slower than anticipated. Furthermore, during passive economy climate, 
the consumers are particular aware about expenditure.  Therefore, the additional 
costs is one of the important factors, which could turn to be the main hindrance to 
execute/adopt the new technology (for both corporate and consumers). 
                                               
28 Major innovations such as the steam engine, once they have been established (initially used for 
pumping water out of flooded mines), have the effect of inducing further innovations and investments 
over a wide frontier (later became one of the power sources). 
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(b) Market Acceptance on New Technology 
According to SpecialChem (2011), customers want to avoid risks on technology 
adoption: proof of reliability, scalability and future availability must be given. They 
want to be sure that the new technology becomes a standard in order to have backup 
suppliers, which reduces supply risks. They would prefer the new technology could 
be experienced first, during a significant time to ensure of its reliability. Customers 
also want to be sure that the new technology will still be there for longer time, before 
deciding to occur the cost and pain of a change.  The benefits of technology have to 
be promoted. Baron (2011) suggests, mass education through media is one of the 
effective ways to reach the large population of the customer.  
 
Strategically, the company has to take into account the transaction, learning and 
switching costs when building a value proposition to convince customers. The 
customer must not only be convinced that the price is good, performances and 
benefits are higher than the current technology; they must also be convinced that all 
other costs, including time, will be offset. 
 
2.4.2 Pearson Uncertainty Map for Identifying Risk and Uncertainty in 
Technology Development 
In view of the R&U appear along the innovation process, firms have historically, 
experienced high failure rates. The vast majority of attempts at innovation fail. R&U 
are the products and they have a number of peculiar characteristics that shape the 
innovation process (Rosenberg, 1994). Theses could be explained through Pearson 
Uncertainty Map (PUM) advocated by Pearson (1991).  
 
PUM provides a framework for understanding the R&U in technology development 
at two dimensions:  
(a) Uncertainty about ends (the target/output of the activity) 
(b) Uncertainty about means (how to achieve this target/output) 
with the classification into four quadrants (Qs) (shown in Figure 2.4.1) (Pearson, 
1991).  Pearson has each quardrants discussed as below: 
54 
 
Figure 2.4.1: Pearson Uncertainty Map 
Source: Pearson (1991). 
 
(a) Quadrant 1 
Q1 represents activities with high degree of uncertainty on means and ends. The 
ultimate target is not clearly defined, and how to achieve this target is also not clear. 
These activities often involve working with technology that is not fully understood, 
where potential products/markets have not been identified. This is largely the domain 
of research laboratories, usually are supported by public/private funds. The recent 
trends on RE development show, many research organisations and large 
organisations (oil/energy companies), have the necessary/rich resources embarking 
on exploratory study. 
 
(b) Quadrant 2 
The Q2’s end is clear. Yet, how to achieve it is not clearly defined. A commercial 
opportunity may have been identified, but the means of fulfilling this has yet to be 
established. Companies may initiate several different projects centred at different 
approaches trying to achieve the desired product/technology. The success could only 
after much trying efforts and many technical difficulties need to be overcome.  
 
(c) Quadrant 3 
Activities in Q3 are those in the process is which relatively well-known, yet the 
outcomes are not clearly defined. 
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(d) Quadrant 4  
It covers the type of innovative activities where the goals/outputs can be well 
specified and the means to achieve them are clear. The problems often arising in the 
area of speed: How quickly can the technical-market combination be put together 
(Teece, 1987; Pearson 1991). 
 
By knowing the characteristics of each quadrants, Pearson (1991) explains, the PUM 
is a concept developed through working with managers from retrospective case 
analysis. Even though it has been briefly described, the real value lies in its ability to 
help identifying important characteristics in reducing the R&U of innovation.  
 
Ideas arising from work in the Q1 may not be easily recognisable as potentially 
useful by those concerned with the practical aspects of managing organisations. 
Communication links between the explorers and the implementers need to be strong 
when operating within the Q1. Ideas arise in the Q4 may be exciting to the person 
concerned, but be seen as trivial by those who have to implement them. With the 
result that the innovation process is less effective than it might be, motivation can be 
a big challenge when working within the Q4 (Pearson, 1991). 
 
However, creativity and innovation in the Q3 about known technologies might be 
most usefully exploited. The challenge is to recognise which strategies to be used to 
ensure the most effective implementation. The risks are frequently related to 
spreading resources too thinly across too many market opportunities. One of the 
greatest obstacles to success in innovation is the availability of choice and the 
consequent tendency toward indecision. Lastly, in the Q2 is an area in which 
innovative projects require high rewards/motivation to push the efforts in pursuing 
the development (Pearson, 1991).  
 
A number of management issues are raised by the PUM. Pearson (1991) suggests 
that Q1 might best be left to the scientists, with cultivation instead of management 
being the modus operandi (Breton and Gold, 1987). People who spend much time in 
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this type of activity (exploratory research) will probably have already built up a 
reputation in the area. Q2 project requires advanced technology and the transition to 
manufacturing is complex and requires very large scale-up. The possibilities of high 
rewards to the organisation at the end of the day are likely to be the major influences.  
 
2.4.2.1 Dealing with Risk and Uncertainty during Technology Development 
Fundamentally, the PUM aids to a better understanding and management of what is 
inevitably a complex process of technology development. The PUM addresses the 
nature of the R&U from two dimensions, turns to be useful since it focuses on the 
nature of the R&U and raises issues of technology, organisational, resources and 
strategies. It provides information regarding the possible need in decision-making: 
either to change management style, to accelerate, decelerate or even to terminate the 
activity earlier in order to save resources which can be used to good effect elsewhere 
(Pearson, 1991). The reality is, shareholders/decision makers do not have much 
sentimental value would emphasis on financial results, might force the management 
to withdraw its support if the technology development is significantly slower than 
anticipated (SpecialChem, 2011). 
 
The PUM application in practice, shows its focused attention on critical issues and 
highlights areas for management intervention. It raises important questions about 
issues such as the clarity of objectives, coordination (for initial screening), 
management and resources commitment (for committing resources) (Pearson, 1991). 
 
(i) Initial Screening 
It provides a clear charter for corporate research. The top management must ensure 
that corporate research supports the firm's corporate development strategy. This 
requires the top management to establish an effective process for deciding which 
new businesses/competences the firm wants to develop. Having a clear corporate 
development strategy makes it easier for the top management to access the strategic 
importance of different research areas (Burgelman et al., 2004). Elliott (2003) agrees 
“most new technologies need initial R&D support to get established”. For a company 
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which is embarking on R&D, it needs a series of reflexive analysis at initial 
screening to examine company readiness/capability before resources commitment 
(action) for technology development. 
 
Rosenbloom and Kantrow (1982) list out factors considered by George Pake-the 
former vice president of corporate research at Xerox, to access technological R&U 
by following questions: 
(a) Are the first class researchers available? 
(b) Is major investment likely to yield major advances?  
(c) How many years will it take before we see results?  
(d) How many failures and successes have others had in this area?  
 
(ii) Committing Resources 
If a proposal survived the initial screening, resources then could be committed. 
Factors considered by George Pake are as following questions: 
(a) Can the expert of technology be obtained through acquisition?  
(b) What costs would be incurred by displacing an existing research program? 
(c) Is a successful result can be transferred downstream?  
(d) Will the necessary capital be available?  
 
Clearly, answering these questions involves both qualitative and quantitative 
judgement/analysis. Due to the generality of these questions, they could be borrowed 
for common use in decision-making in the process of technology development. The 
messages behind these questions drawn out the factors which need to be considered 
such as: resources (manpower, financial), returns on investments, time, historical 
evidences, methodology and opportunity for commercialisation. Knowing these 
factors are important to limit a company's R&U exposure during the decision-making 
processes through screening the scenario before committing the resources. 
 
2.4.3 Four Basic Strategies of Risk Response 
Generally, R&U are the potential harm that may arise from some current process or 
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future event (Elky, 2006). Within the research context of biofuels deployment and 
development in the UK, managing R&U is the process of identifying, understanding 
and responding to factors that may lead to failure in the biofuels implementation and 
innovation.  
 
According to Elky (2006), R&U are the likelihood of a given threat-source 29 
exercising a particular potential vulnerability/threats30, and the resulting impact of 
that adverse event on the stakeholders. In this case we can refer to both the policy 
makers and the oil companies in executing the national biofuels programme and 
developing the next generation biofuels (NGB). Elky (2006) then adds, the principle 
reason for managing R&U is to protect the mission and assets of the stakeholders. 
However, managing R&U is not an easy task. Limited resources and an ever-
changing landscape of threats and vulnerabilities make mitigating all risks 
impossible. 
 
Recall the principle reason for managing R&U-a process of identifying, accessing 
and developing strategies to manage the R&U; Dorfman (1997) advocates, there are 
four basic strategies of risk response which are discussed below: 
 
(a) Mitigation 
Since the significance of a risk is related to both its probability of occurrence and its 
effect on the organisation, mitigation is the most commonly considered strategy. 
Mitigation involves fixing the flaw or providing some type of compensatory control 
to reduce the likelihood, or to lessen the impact associated with the flaw. 
 
                                               
29 either intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of a vulnerability, a situation and 
method that may accidentally trigger a vulnerability (National Institute of Standards and Technology 
Special Publication, 2002). 
30 This is often called as threat-vulnerability pairing.  
The threat is merely the potential for the exercise (accidentally trigger or intentionally exploit) of a 
particular vulnerability (National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication, 2002). 
Threats must be coupled with threat-sources to become dangerous. This is an important distinction 
when assessing and managing R&U, since each threat-source may be associated with a different 




Transference is the process of allowing another party to accept/bear the risk on your 
behalf. This does not decrease the likelihood or fix any flaws, but it does reduce the 
overall impact on the organisation. Flanagan and Norman (1993) state: Transferring 
risk does not reduce the criticality of the source of the risk, it just removes it to 
another party. Thus, each significant risk should be considered in terms of which 
party should own it and who is suitable/capable for dealing it.   
 
(c) Acceptance 
Acceptance is the practice of simply allowing the system to operate with a known 
risk. All risks that are not avoided/transferred are accepted by default. 
 
(d) Avoidance 
Avoidance is the practice of removing the threats/vulnerable aspect of the system. It 
includes not performing an activity that could carry risk, or prevent an organisation 
to be exposed to the risk. Avoidance may seem the answer to many risks, but 




These literatures have demonstrated some concepts for better understanding of the 
R&U which a company would face during a technology development and 
deployment. There are three identified factors, forming the R&U on technology 
development/deployment from corporate stand point: technology, process of 
innovation/business operations and market acceptance. Besides, strategies that 
focusing at how to overcome these R&U are also summaried, then shown in Table 







Table 2.4.1: Causal Factors and Strategies Applied during Technology Development 
Factors R&U during Technology Development Strategies in dealing with R&U  
Factors R&U during  
Technology Development 
Strategies in dealing with R&U  
Technology -Uncertainty about ends  -PUM  
-Initial screening for company 
readiness/capability 
-Guided by the objectives to develop 
this technology  









- Shareholders’ short-term economic 
decision 
 
-Passive economic climate 
-PUM 
-Initial screening for company 
readiness/capability* 
-Resources commitment*  
*establish the infrastructure to develop 
the technology. Be ready to set-up the 
infrastructure to support the technology 
introduction/operation in the market.  
 
-Understand the potential of the 
technology  
 
-Be persistent and long-sighted if the 
technology is rewarding for long-term 
even though it is not for the time being  
Market Acceptance  -The identification of needs 
 
-The expectation of technological 
performance 
-Fulfil the needs 
 
-Promote the positive 
characteristics/benefits of a new 
technology through mass education. 















Table 2.4.2: Causal Factors and Strategies Applied during Technology Deployment 
Factors R&U during Technology Deployment Strategies in dealing with R&U  
Technology -Performances and expectations: 
Evaluation on the Ex ante uncertainty 
about improvements and uses 
-Technology should perform as what 
has been expected.  







-Stiff competition (substitution, new 
disruptive technology) 
 
-Shareholders’ short-term economic 
decision 
-Passive economic climate 
-Initial screening for company 
readiness/capability* 
-Resources commitment* 
*establish the infrastructure to support 
the technology introduction/operation 
in the market  
 
-Be innovative to sustain technology’s 
competitive advantage.  
 
-Be persistent and long-sighted if the 
technology is rewarding for long-term 
even though it is not for the time being 
Market Acceptance  -The implications 
(i) Unanticipated applications 
(ii) Impacts on other industries 
 
-The identification of needs 
 
-Passive economic climate that influence 
consumers interests of technology 
adoption 
-Customer’s acceptance 
-Control and monitor. R&U and 
negative implications should be 
minimal as possible. 
 
-Fulfil the needs 
 
-Promote the positive 
characteristics/benefits of a new 
technology through mass education.  

















































2.5 Understand the Systemic Risk 
Preface 
Up to date, there are mainly two types of risk and uncertainty (R&U) discussed by 
various literatures. Firstly, the individualist R&U-the scope encompasses risk events 
happen on a personal scale, an organisation, a specific group/team of people, but 
does not apply at a larger context (entire society/nation). Most of the literatures 
explain the consequences on personal circumstances such as the losses of lives with 
accidents/injuries 31  occurred (refer appendix 2.5.1). Meanwhile, for the 
organisational/group/team level, the examples of R&U are the violation of law, risky 
projects with uncertain businesses that might lead to lives, financial/resources, 
reputation and time losses32 for the organisation (refer appendix 2.5.1).  
 
Besides individualist, some literatures address risk events at a larger scale-the 
society/national/international level by some of the renowned scholars 33  (refer 
appendix 2.5.2). They advocate the understanding of societal/national/international 
scale of risk events with contemporary issues, topics and case studies.  
 
2.5.1 Definition and Conceptualisation of Risk and Uncertainty 
Risk is an undesirable situation/factor involving danger/hazard, or likeliness to cause 
losses/injuries. A risk situation is defined, which an action will result an outcome that 
is not known with certainty, but the set of possible outcomes and their associated 
probabilities could be estimated. The risk situation is described by the analogue of 
flipping a fair coin. A person knows what the outcomes/probabilities are; though 
he/she cannot be certain which outcome will occur (Shapira, 1997; Colman, 2009a).  
 
According to Hansson (2009), risk (in a non-technical context) refers to a situation 
which it is possible, but uncertain that some undesirable even will occur. In technical 
                                               
31 Adams (1995), Green (1997), Barton (2006). 
32 Chapman (2006), Samociuk et al. (2010). 
33 Luhmann (1991), Doughlas (1992, 1994, 2002) Leiss and Chociolko (1994), Lupton (1999, 2000), 
Boyne (2003), Tulloch and Lupton (2003), Ericson and Doyle (2003), Sunstein (2004), Kasperson and 
Kasperson (2005), Titterton (2005), Smith and Petley (2009). 
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uses, risk refers to something quantifiable. In decision theory (Bayesian Decision 
Theory34), decision under risk means decision with known probabilities. In risk 
analysis, risk often denotes numerical representation of severity, obtained by 
multiplying the probability of an unwanted event with a measure of its disvalue.  
 
Meanwhile, uncertainty is defined as the state/condition of not being able to 
know/predict something accurately (Colman, 2009b). It is the situation when the 
outcome that will result from an action is unknown, or when decisions have to be 
made about the future is impossible to assign probabilities to the various outcomes 
(Moles and Terry, 1997). This is mainly caused by the limitation of knowledge about 
present facts or future possibilities which bring to unknown/unanticipated (Black et 
al., 2009a). 
 
Knight (1921) made his famous distinction between R&U, which the former is about 
the randomness with objective or knowable probabilities; while the latter is about the 
randomness with subjective or unknown probabilities. To further distinguished risk 
from uncertainty, McLean and McMillan (2009) explain, the distinction is that a 
risky event is one where the odds can be calculated, while an uncertain event is one 
they cannot with no dominant strategy. Hence, derive from these explanations; risk is 
the factor/action leading to an unwanted situation, which the possible outcomes and 
their associated probabilities can be estimated. Thus there are various counteract 
strategies applied to deal with risk: to detect, react, resolve; (if cannot eliminate the 
problem totally), at least to minimise the impacts for losses. 
 
Lindley (1971) comments, a different and more useful form of distinction are often 
drawn between events which are statistical (risk) and those which are not 
                                               
34 Bayesian decision theory is an ideal of rationality, where definite probability value has to be 
assigned to each and every statement about the world that can be made in language. Non-logical 
propositions should never been fully believed. Hence Bayesian undertakes a complete reduction of 
uncertainty to probability. The crucial drawback of Bayesianism is that, it does not take into account 
the cognitive limitation of actual human beings. We need to reduce the prevailing epistemic 
uncertainty not only to probabilities, but also to full beliefs (Hansson, 2009). 
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(uncertainty)35. However, many decision situations are unique and refer to choice on 
one occasion, so that decision makers are not often confronted by repeatable 
situations. Thus, they must often make non-statistical/subjective probability 
assessments which are consistent/coherent in terms of the laws of probability to 
represent the uncertainty which exists in decision-making situations.  
 
Under the decision theory, lack of knowledge is divided into two categories: risk and 
uncertainty. Risk is known with what the possible outcomes are, and what their 
probabilities of occurring. For uncertainty, probabilities are either unknown at all or 
are known with insufficient precision. The distinction between R&U is practically 
useful, but from a more theoretical point of view, it is unclear how to draw them in a 
principled way (Hansson, 2009).  
 
Hence, the explaination above is simply to illustrate, while distinctions between 
R&U and statistical/non-statistical events are conceptual terms, they have limited 
value in the practical process of risk assessment and analysis. Indeed, concepts of 
risk must reflect the realities of strategic decision situations. They must recognise 
issues as the quality of information available to decision makers and the importance 
of outcomes and organisational goals. Recent literatures have classified both as the 
same under the risk management discipline where these terms are used 
interchangeably. Black, J. et al. (2009b) argued, risk is a form of uncertainty as the 
actual outcome of an action is unknown. Even though Hertz and Thomas (1983) and 
Renn (2008a) aware some earlier writers drew a distinction between R&U, they 
conclude risk also means both uncertainty, and the results of uncertainty.  
 
2.5.2 Theoretical Positions of Risk 
As risks become complex and uncertain, the formalised systems for assessing and 
managing them become more pervasive. Although the dominant definition of risk in 
contemporary society adheres to a positivist notion of validity, risk theory presents 
                                               
35 Statistical events are defined to be capable of very extensive repetition, whereas non-statistical 
events are essentially unique (Lindley, 1971). 
66 
 
often competing ideas what constitutes risk. The differentiated forms of discourse 
which have been developed in relation to risk are based upon a number of theoretical 
positions (Flynn, 2007). Denney (2005) has examined risk from the six positions 
shown in table 2.5.1. 
 
The forms of analysis described above, present the notion of risk from distinctive 
standpoints and lead to the formulation of a number of partially answered questions. 
Individualists ask “How people perceive risk and the frequency of risk?” “Are errors 
in judgement about the likelihood of risk predictable?” “Is it possible to understand 
the cognitive processes underlying such judgements?” (Colledge and Stimpson, 
1997). Douglas (1966) then widens the discussion of risk to encourage the 
consideration of some social scenario. Since early writings in the mid 1960s, she 
asked “Why some communities regard some social phenomena as constituting a risk 
while others are not?” Douglas then concluded: the ideas about risk are culturally 
created according to different communities.  
 
The socially constructed risk has subsequently influence the phenomenological 
analysis, which risk perceptions are socially constructed, while the phenomena and 
pervasiveness of the risk consequences are taken place through social interaction. In 
this modern day, Beck (1992) who advances “risk society” advocates, individuals are 
constantly seeking to come to terms with uncertainty through a contested form of 
scientific rationality36. Hence, insecurity from this perspective on the modern society 
forms the basis for a “risky” society. Finally, the governmentalist approaches which 
focus on the relationship between authority and risk with how political authority and 
governance system attempt to control/manage risk (Denney, 2005).  
 
Denny (2005) then draws some of the limitations in all of these approaches. While 
the individualistic approaches fail to take an account of the complexity of risk, the 
culturalist and phenomenological explanations have not taken sufficient cognisance 
                                               
36 Why have individuals become responsible for anticipating and negotiating risks? Why risks are 
unknown and unpredictable as technology takes a global grip? Can I believe the expert who tells me 
that it will be effective and safe? (Beck, 1992). 
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of the environmental and structural problems which risks are conceptualised. 
 
Table 2.5.1: Theoretical Position of Risk 
Six Positions Theoretical base Definers of risk       Policy implications Explanation of 
emergence of risk 







-Need for individual 
risk assessment to be 
structured into 
institutional activities 
-Risk is calculable 





-Scientific risk analysis 
-Insurance industry 











-Ideas about risk 
and danger are 
culturally created 
by communities 
-Policies must take 
account of cultural 
(moral, aesthetic and 
political foundations) 
to understand risks 
-Reality is mediated 
through political need 
for a forensic 
approach to risks 
-Static structural 
functionalism 
-Too little attention is 






















relevant risk  
-Emergence of 




-Can be used for the 
purposes of analysis  
-HIV/AIDS infection 







-Experts -Third way 
combination of 
private with public 
-State should provide 
protection against 
risks according to 
needs 





emphasis on risk 
-Fail to capture the 
fluidity of risk, which 





















-Experts -Increasing use of 




-State claims to be 
working to protect the 
population from risk 
-The tendency to 
deconstruct the 
subject, and the 
creation of calculable 
heterogeneous 
elements which 
constitute risk  
-There is an over 
concentration on 
deconstructing what 
exists and an under 
emphasis of the real 
risks 
-Preventative policies, 
moral obligation,  
















natural, social and 
manufactured 
-There is an over 
emphasis on systems 
-De contextualisation 
-Hood, et al.39 
Source: Denney, D. (2005). pp. 15-16. 
 
There are dangers in regarding the emergence of a risk society as the result of a 
historical logic, since risk has been uppermost in the minds of citizens throughout 
                                               
37 Beck (1992) emphasis on reflexive modernisation and introduced the concept of risk society to 
denote a special stage, which the nature of hazards and their lack of temporal and spatial limits, are 
profoundly different from previous eras. New inequality is created, a crisis of credibility and trust is 
taken place. These risks are man-made hybrids, combining cultural definitions, technologies, politics 
and mass media. Beck (1998) argues, we no longer choose to take risks as we have them thrust upon 
us. Thus, for Beck (2000), risk discourse begins where trust in security and belief in progress end and 
uncertainties are manufactured. Paradoxically, science and technology solved major problems, but 
also (albeit unintentionally) produced new hazards. 
38 Giddens (1991) argues that modernity is a risk culture. The concept of risk has become an 
organising concept for lay actors as well as experts. People have become more reflexive, questioning 
risks but also embracing some of them.  
39 The notion of risk regulation regime is meant to denote the complex of institutional, rules, practice 
and ideas that are associated with the regulation of a particular risk/hazard (Hood et al., 2001). 
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history. Furthermore analyses of risk based upon the governmental perspective are 
narrowing, which do not give appropriate recognition to the reality of risk in 
everyday life. 
 
Numerous commentators have repeatedly stressed the ambiguous, contested and 
opaque character of the concept of risk. It is not surprising that, there is such an 
enormous scholarly and technical literature about different aspects of risk (Flynn, 
2007). However, Renn (2008a) advocated, these different positions of risk could be 
grounded from two perspectives: the social constructionism versus the realism of 
risk. 
 
2.5.3 Social Constructionism versus Realism of Risk 
According to Renn (2008a), all concepts of R&U have one element in common: the 
distinction between possible and chosen action. At any time, an 
individual/organisation/society, faces several options for taking action (including 
doing nothing), which is associated with potential negative consequences. The term 
“R&U” denotes the possibility that an undesirable state of reality/adverse effects may 
occur as a result of natural events/human activities. This definition implies that 
humans can/will, make casual connections between actions. They can be altered, 
either by modifying the initiating activity/event, or by mitigating the impacts. Hence, 
the definition of R&U contains three elements:  
(a) Outcomes that have an impact upon what human value;  
(b) The possibility of occurrence (uncertainty); and  
(c) A combination of both elements mentioned above.  
 
There are debates about the nature of risks: Is risk social constructed or is a real 
phenomenon? The issue is whether technical risk represents “objective” probabilities 
of harm, or only reflects the conventions of an elite group may claim no more degree 
of validity/universality. Besides, different cultures may have different mental 
representations of what they regard as R&U, the magnitude and the probability of 
harm. On the first glance it is obvious that risk constitute mental models (OECD, 
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2003). Different stakeholders involved, creatively arrange and reassemble signals 
that they get from the real world, and then provide structure and guidance to an 
ongoing process of reality enactment. Therefore, risks represent what people observe 
in reality and what they experience. The link between risk as a mental concept and 
reality is forged through the experience of actual harm, as the consequences of risk 
(Renn, 2008a)  
 
The status of risk as a mental model has major implications for how risk is perceived. 
Although societies have gained experience and collective knowledge of the potential 
impacts of events/activities, one cannot anticipate all potential scenarios and be 
worried about all the potential consequences of an activity/event at all the time. 
Besides, it is impossible to include all possible options for intervention to avoid 
R&U. Therefore, societies have been selective in what they have chosen to be worth 
considering and what to ignore (Douglas, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990; Beck, 1994). 
Specialised social organisations such as social movements/environmentalists have 
been established to monitor the environment for hints of future problems, and to 
provide early warning of some potential future harm. This selection process is not 
arbitrary, rather guided by cultural values and institutional arrangement (Renn, 
2008a).  
 
Meanwhile, the technical risk analyses rest on many conventions (Weinberg, 1972; 
IRGC, 2005), such as the selected rules to identify undesirable effects, the choice of 
probability and the equal weighting of probability and magnitude. All of these 
conventional risk analyses can be defended through logical reasoning; but they 
represent only parts of what individuals and society experience as risk. This does not 
mean the technical risk analyses are unnecessary/less relevant, because they do serve 
a major purpose (Shrader-Frechette, 1991). Technical risk analyses help decision 
makers to estimate the expected physical harm. They provide the best knowledge 





Kasperson et al. (2005) explain, the technical concept of risk is focused on the 
probability of events and the magnitude of specific consequences. Clearly, other 
aspects of the risk such as familiarity with the hazard/catastrophic would shape the 
public responses (Slovic et al., 1982). Hence, the technical concept of risk, according 
to Kasperson et al. (2005) is narrow and ambiguous. Even though the technical 
concept of risk aggregates data over space, populations and time; the undesired 
effects are still being confined to physical harm (to humans and ecosystems). The 
narrowness of this approach constitutes both weakness and strength.  
 
Abstracting a single variable from the context of risk taking, makes the concept of 
risk one dimensional. While, confining undesirable consequences to physical harm 
excludes other consequences (like cultural change) that people might regard as 
undesirable. However, the main emphasis on physical harm may be the only 
consequence that almost all social groups and cultures agree to be undesirable 
(HMSO, 1988; Kasperson, 2005).  
 
Therefore, the next few questions are: “How to define, and balance the interpretation 
of a large scale societal risk event, from both social constructionism and realism 
points of view?” “What should be considered, and how we should react to the 
expected versus unexpected societal risk event?” For example, climate change is a 
known societal risk event supported by the realism and social constructionism. 
Meanwhile, some unanticipated R&U due to a large technology application (like 
biofuels adoption for nationwide transport system) are rather uncertain. Hence, both 
expected and unexpected R&U for societal risk event would have a strong 
correlation on probability theory, but should be wider than the individual risk 
implications. They would have a societal scale of risk, yet should be more than 
merely cultural and phenomenological since the risk consequences are tangible. They 
ought to have the governmental and regulatory participation, but to deal with 
emerging R&U they would require more than just the political involvement rather 
the relevant stakeholders to have the R&U solved. Besides, for unexpected R&U, it 
would not allow a well-planned preventive method to be set in place beforehand, 
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rather an impromptu strategy is needed to confront with any dynamic changes. 
Therefore, the concept of systemic risk has to be taken in, because it could enrich the 
existing six theoretical positions, and widen the understanding of new form of large 
scale societal risk.  
 
2.5.4 Introduction to Systemic Risk 
Krechowicz and Fernando (2009) contextualise “emerging risk” as eight 40 
environmental trends and their impacts on three key sectors41. Although they do not 
entirely define the term of emerging risk, yet the idea has been built on the large 
scale of the R&U that associate with environment consequences. Another two 
definitions on emerging risk are provided by Barney (2009), and Jourdan and 
Michalson (2010).  
 
According to Barney (2009), emerging risks involve a high degree of uncertainty 
because they do not have a track record which can be used to estimate the likeliness 
of probabilities and expected losses. Meanwhile Jourdan and Michalson (2010) 
define emerging risk as a large scale event/circumstance which is hard to predict, 
beyond any particular party’s capacity to control. It may have large impacts not only 
on the organisation but also on multiple stakeholders across geographic borders, 
industries and sectors.  
 
The OECD (2003) report contextualises systemic risk based on five large risk 
clusters42. The report defines systemic risk as any risk in a larger context of social, 
environment and economic consequences. It is driven by natural events, human 
action, economic, social, technological developments or policy actions, which takes 
place at national/international level. These driving forces will reshape conventional 
                                               
40 1deforestation, 2water scarcity, 3climate change, 4food security, 5energy security, 6air pollution, 
7urbanisation, 8population growth. 
41 Krechowicz and Fernando (2009) research is connecting eight environmental trends to the 
investment decision-making process, to demonstrate how these trends affecting three sectors (food 
and beverage, power generation and real estate). This is aimed to help investors and analysts to assess 
the trends’ financial impacts on company valuations.  




hazards and create new ones with bigger amplitude, modify vulnerability to higher 
frequency of R&U, spread the negative impacts and alter society's responses. The 
International Futures Programme (2009) explores implications of the economy and 
social developments in the 21st century, focusing on the possibility of major systems 
becoming more vulnerable in the future. Sectors like transport, energy, food are all 
examples that could be severely damaged by a single catastrophic event or chain of 
events.  
 
The emergence of systemic risk advocated by the OECD's (2003) and the 
International Future Programme (2009), have opened-up the tunnel view in defining 
risk, more than the polarised constructivist or realist perspectives. The combination 
of these two views is important to provide an understanding of what systemic risk is 
about. The systemic risk which is considered as a large scale of R&U with 
widespread implications could affect a society on many aspects such as: public 
health, food supply, security, environment and others (refer appendix 2.5.3).  
 
2.5.5 Limitations of the Existing Models in Managing Systemic Risk 
According to OECD (2003), limitations of conventional risk management (RM) are 
likely to lead to difficulties in dealing with systemic risk. This is justified by four 
reasons:  
(a) Existing risk assessment/management is based on models, which are sometimes 
far from reproducing real world conditions accurately. In many risk areas, the model 
is a recording of past occurrences/cases, rather than a formal evaluation of the 
various upstream interacting processes influencing risk. Besides, in a context where 
underlying conditions are changing, past experience in dealing with R&U might be 
misleading. 
(b) Most models assume a more or less linear relationship, linking a hazard from a 
well identified source to a single endpoint of solution. This simplification appears to 
be inadequate to explain and resolve complex phenomena. 
(c) The long-term consequences and impacts of the risk assessment/management 
system studied are usually neglected. This is because the system is assumed to be 
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self-contained in space at physical, operational and time, to simplify the 
resources/strategies applied in counteracting with the R&U. 
(d) Human behaviour is a prevailing risk factor, but is difficult to evaluate as the 
social interaction are dynamic. Faced with these difficulties, the existing RM often 
uses simplistic/standardised models of behaviour.  
 
As such, risk assessment/management must recognise the plurality of factors 
involved which cause the risk to be happened. This means that risk 
assessment/management will need to combine knowledge coming from a larger 
variety of disciplines and areas of expertise, and pay increased attention to changing 
conditions. On a technical level, improved methods are gradually emerging, with 
integrated approaches that can deal with interactions and non-linearity; probabilistic 
methods that allow variability and uncertainty to be incorporated; and information 
systems that can provide socioeconomic data help manage information for effective 
decision-making (OECD, 2003). 
 
2.5.6 A Comprehensive Risk Management: The Risk Governance 
The OECD (2003) mentions the concern of the conventional RM framework, should 
encompasses a larger context of analysis. This could then provide a bigger overview, 
during the analysis, assessment and appraisal, towards the effective strategies 
applied. To capture the RM paradigm, adequate understanding of a given risk 
through analysis, assessment and appraisal are not an end in itself, because these 
methods are providing inputs for decision-making. In reality, the decision maker is 
pressured to determine the level of risk from the community's standpoint, many times 
in a situation where resources are limited and scientific understanding of the issue 
may be incomplete while opinions and interests are contradicted. Therefore, as 
systemic risk emerged, the RM could gradually become extremely challenging.  
 
Thus, OECD (2003) highlights:  
(a) It is important that resources for risk reduction are allocated efficiently. 
Rationalising the use of resources is often hampered by scientific uncertainty and the 
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absence of consensus in society as to the value issues involved. 
(b) Risk assessment has to deal with various kinds of uncertainty. Due to the 
complexity of causal relations and gaps in data, emerging systemic risk often can 
involve large gaps in the understanding of the phenomena at work. This kind of 
uncertainty often goes hand-in-hand with scientific controversy, which is extremely 
difficult for related stakeholders to address. 
(c) The proponents of a technical approach to RM have long considered that the 
public's perceptions were unfounded. At the same time it is increasingly accepted 
that although the public perception of risk can be wrong-biased and mislead by the 
amplifications of media. Risk has a multitude of dimensions, some of which involve 
ethical considerations. A number of different views can thus be pertinent and 
legitimate. 
 
To address these issues, decision-making tools and processes, need to clarify the 
respective contributions of facts and uncertainties. They also need to satisfy more 
than one objective (using resources efficiently, meeting public expectations), and 
often in a situation where the different objectives are competing. It is possible to 
develop a framework for dealing with R&U, conflicting values and interests while 
trying to maintain consistency (OECD, 2003).  
 
2.5.7 Conclusion 
The systemic risk is a new form of a large scale R&U, which has widened the 
conventional theoretical positions. Inevitably, it is the consequence of risk society 
and modernisation. The combination of realist and constructivist could bring better 
understanding of it. Since it is a new type of risk, it requires new strategies to 
assess/manage at both expected and unexpected R&U which it might bring.  
 
The RM framework to deal with systemic risk should be an unconventional one. 
According to OECD (2003), the framework should use a combination approaches. 
First, it endeavours to tackle the issue of systemic risk in a future oriented manner, 
by examining the trends and driving forces shaping the risk landscape. Second, it 
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looks at the vulnerability of vital systems (energy, transport), to identify any gaps 
that allow the systemic risk to be appeared. Third, it examines a broad range of 
expected and potential yet unexpected risks across the entire risk assessment cycle, 
aiming for a holistic approach.  
 
Hence, the risk governance (RG) framework advocated by Renn (2008), could fulfil 
many of the criteria required, not only to deal with conventional/expected risks, but 
also a large scale and unexpected systemic risk. The RG framework will provided a 
comprehensive analysis from the activities of pre-assessment, risk 
characterisation/evaluation, risk appraisal to RM while risk communication linking 
these four activities in soothing information exchange (will discuss in section 2.6). 
Besides, Renn (2008) RG framework is one of the up-to-date method in managing 
risk. The framework's action oriented is applicable for any decision makers either 
from the public/private sectors. It helps to draw out conclusions in particular, 




















































2.6 Risk Governance: Dealing with Risk and Uncertainty Systematically 
Preface 
There are three reasons why Renn (2008a) risk governance (RG) framework is 
selected for the literature analysis. Firstly, the conventional risk management (RM) 
literature are much explaining on each of the functions-risk assessment, risk 
perception, risk communication and RM independently (refer appendix 2.6.1); 
rendered to significant overlaps exists among each of these functions. Renn (2008a) 
advocated the concept of RG. It is a framework which pulls in five functions (1pre-
assessment, 2appraisal, 3characterisation/evaluation; 4management; while 5risk 
communication integrating all four activities) to deal with R&U.  
 
Secondly, some of the RM literatures favoured the quantitative analysis43 (Korath, 
1998; McNeil, 2005; Vose, 2008) (refer appendix 2.6.2); while some are prone to the 
qualitative analysis44. Certainly, there are literatures that combine both methods in 
order to enhance the validity/accuracy for decision-making. The RG framework is 
central on the qualitative approach which suits the nature of this research. 
 
Thirdly, many of the suggested strategies (from various RM literatures) are 
specifically defined. They are based on the respective “subjects” of the R&U (refer 
appendix 2.4.2), which have the specific contexts for application. Conversely, Renn's 
RG general framework which is constructed from the social science/management 
perspective, could be applied at many organisations either private/public sector. 
Through inductive/deductive analysis, the framework helps to identify, evaluate the 
risks while justify the counteracting strategies for better decision-making. Renn 
(2008a) advises, RG framework should not be seen as the sequential steps, rather as 
elements that are closely interlinked. The main objective from the framework is to 
standardise procedures/techniques, to enhance the spectrum of risk events that can be 
modelled, and to ensure that R&U are understandable and could be dealt in a 
                                               
43 emphasises on measurements to drive decisions, such as cost-benefits analysis, probability 
analysis, statistical analysis, ratio projection and model simulation 
44 The “subjectiveness” and the interpretations of qualitative R&U are varied. It is designed to 





2.6.1 System Structures of the Risk Governance Framework 
Governance is described as a structure/process for collective decision-making, 
involving the governmental/non-governmental actors (Nye and Donahue, 2000). 
Governing choices in a modern society is the interplay between governmental 
institutions, private companies, non-governmental organisations, socioeconomic 
forces and other civil society actors (Renn, 2008a). Therefore, RG involves the 
translation of the substance and core principles of governance to the context of 
understanding R&U and decision-making.  
 
RG requires the consideration of legal, institutional, social and economic contexts, 
which R&U are evaluated, through the involvements of the related stakeholders. RG 
looks at the complex web of actors, rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms 
concerned with how risk information is collected, analysed, communicated; and how 
management decisions are taken. Encompassing the combined decisions and actions 
of both governmental and private actors, the RG signifies the nature of a risk requires 
the collaboration/coordination among stakeholders. RG, not only includes a 
multifaceted, multi-actor risk process, but also calls for the consideration of the 
contextual factors such as institutional arrangements45 and political culture (Renn, 
2008a).  
 
2.6.2 Four Phases of the Risk Governance Framework 
The RG framework will be directed by relevance claims46, evidence claims47 and 
normative claims48. The framework proposed consists of: pre-assessment, appraisal, 
characterisation/evaluation, and management; while the risk communication 
accompanies all four activities. It has transformed the linear structure which 
                                               
45 The regulatory and legal framework that determines the relationship, roles and responsibilities of 
the actors, and the coordination mechanisms such as markets and incentives (Renn, 2008b). 
46 What matters to society? What are important phenomena that should receive our attention? (Renn, 
2008b). 
47 What are the causes? What are the effects? (Renn, 2008b). 
48 What is good, acceptable and tolerable? (Renn, 2008b). 
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commonly found in other comtemporary conceptions of RM (RCEP, 1998; Prime 
Minister's Strategy Unit/UK Cabinet Office, 2002) into an iterative/interlinked 
process, shown in figure 2.6.1. 
Figure 2.6.1: The RG Framework 
Source: Renn (2008b) pp. 48. 
 
2.6.2.1 Pre-assessment 
In this stage, the risk event is framed/defined. This needs to be governed by societal 
values and inspired by what we have known about the hazard (Zinn and Taylor-
Gooby, 2006). It starts with an identifying of major societal actors related to the risk 
event. They could be the causers of risk, the problem solvers, or those who might be 
affected by the risks; such as the governments, the companies, the pressure groups 
and the general public. Then, values from the stakeholders and risk evidences have to 
be investigated. This is because values are shaping the interests, risk perceptions and 
concerns of the different stakeholders (Renn, 2008b), while the evidences are the 
realism of risk consequences. 
 
The second part of the pre-assessment concerns the institutional means of an early 
warning and monitoring. This task refers to the institutions of government, business 
and civil society to identify unusual events/phenomena, to detect new emerging 
R&U and to provide some initial insight into the extent/severity of these R&U. Risks 
information is pre-screened and allocated to different assessment and management 
routes. Sometimes in a crisis situation, management actions may need to be taken 
before any assessment is even carried out. Renn (2008b) concludes four components 
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of the pre-assessment (refer appendix 2.6.3), which are useful when accessing risks.  
 
2.6.2.2 Appraisal 
The risk appraisal has two stages: Firstly, technical scientists use their skills to 
produce the best estimation of the physical harm that a risk may induce. Secondly, 
social scientists and economists will identify and analyse the issues that 
individual/society links with risk. Considering the results from the pre-assessment, 
then investigate/calculate the socioeconomic implications of risks; all of these are 
intended to produce the best possible scientific estimate of the physical, economic, 
social and environmental consequences of a risk event (Renn, 2008c). Meanwhile, 
appraising risks is confronted with three challenges: complex, uncertain and 
ambiguous (refer appendix 2.6.4). These three challenges are not related to the 
intrinsic characteristics of risks, but to the state and quality of 
information/knowledge available about risks.  
 
2.6.2.3 Characterising and Evaluating Risk 
There are two aspect of risks, the tolerability49 and acceptability50 of a risk (HSE, 
2001) (refer appendix 2.6.5). By examining the resulting risks as a function of 
vulnerabilities, a judgement on tolerability and acceptability regarding to the 
selection of protective measures becomes meaningful (Renn, 2008d). Hence the 
evaluation is directed three different kinds of deliberations: 
(a) Deliberation on the results in consideration of wider socioeconomic factors: 
societal needs, quality of life, risks-benefits balance, social mobilisation, potential of 
conflict resolution, political priorities, legal requirements and policy imperatives; 
(b) To arrive at a judgement on tolerability and acceptability, based on balancing pros 
and cons, trading-off of different (competing/conflicting) preferences, interests and 
values; 
(c) Taking into account the individual and social benefits, associated with the risk-
                                               
49 Tolerable, refers as worth pursuing for the benefit that it carries; yet requires additional efforts for 
risk reduction (HSE, 2001). 
50 Acceptable refers to an activity where the remaining risks are low, that additional efforts for risk 
reduction are not seen as necessary (HSE, 2001). 
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bearing technology and activities, testing potential socioeconomic and environmental 
impacts, discussing different development options for the economy/society, and 
weighing the competing arguments/evidence claims in a balanced manner (Renn, 
2008d). 
 
2.6.2.4 Risk Management  
Risk management (RM) refers to the creation/evaluation of options for 
initiating/changing human actions, or structures with the objective of increasing the 
net benefit to the human society and preventing harm to what they valued. The 
identification of these options/evaluation is guided by a systematic/experiential 
knowledge gained, which prepared by the experts and stakeholders. However, we 
may also need to act in some situations which are lacking/insufficient of 
knowledge/information about potential outcomes of human actions. The most 
complex questions emerge when one looks at “how” society and its various actors 
managing a risk.  
 
This is because the decision-making structure of a society is highly 
complicated/fragmented. Apart from the structure itself, the people/organisations that 
share the responsibility for managing a risk must also consider the need for the 
sufficient organisational capacity to create the necessary knowledge, and to 
implement the required actions to accommodate political, cultural norms, rules and 
values within a societal context, and the subjective perceptions of individuals and 
groups (Renn, 2008e). On the other hand, Hammond, et al. (1999), Morgan (1990; 
1995), Keeney (1992), Aven and Vinnem (2007) have discussed and provided some 
new inputs on six classic decision theories (refer appendix 2.6.6). 
 
2.6.3 Risk Management-Strategies Based on Risk Characteristics 
Using the distinction between complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity; it is possible to 
design a set of generic RM strategies to four risk classes, which would enhance the 
efficiency of the strategies. The choice of the RM strategies not only depend upon 
the risk characteristics, but also the type of risk and the risk context (Renn, 2008e). 
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The appendix 2.6.7 has summarised these four classes; yet, the brief explanations are 
shown as below:  
 
(a) Linear/routine risk problems51 
The risk event requires hardly any deviation from the traditional decision-making. 
Data are provided by statistical analysis, and goals are determined by law/statutory 
requirements. The role of RM is to ensure that all risk reduction measures are 
implemented/enforced. Traditional risk-risk comparisons, risk-risk trade-offs, risk-
benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness studies are the instruments of choices for 
finding the most appropriate risk reduction measures. Additionally, risk managers 
can rely upon best/effective practices, upon trial and error. However these simple 
risks should not be equated with small/negligible risks. The major issues here are the 
potential negative consequences are obvious, the values applied are non-
controversial and the remaining uncertainties are low (Renn, 2008e). 
 
(b) Complex risk problem 
Complex risks are often associated with major scientific dissent about complex dose-
effect relationships, or the alleged effectiveness of measures to decrease 
vulnerability. The objective for resolving complexity is to receive a complete and 
balanced set of risk and concern assessment results that fall within the legitimate 
range of plural truth claims (Renn, 2008e). 
 
In a situation where there are no complete data, the major challenge is to define the 
factual base for making RM and regulatory decisions. The main emphasis is on 
improving the reliability/validity of the results that are produced in the risk appraisal. 
They may not get a single answer, but they might be able to get a better overview of 
the issues of scientific controversy. If input variables to decision-making can be 
properly defined/affirmed, risk characterisation and evaluation can be done on the 
basis of risk-benefit balancing and normative standard-setting. Traditional methods 
                                               
51 Examples of linear risk problems: accidents, known food and health risks and also regularly 
recurring disasters (Renn, 2008e). 
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such as risk-risk comparison and cost-benefit analysis are well suited to facilitate the 
overall judgement for placing the risk in the traffic-light model (acceptable, tolerable 
or intolerable). These instruments provide effective/efficient/fair solutions with 
regard to finding the best trade-off between opportunities and risks (Renn, 2008e).  
 
(c) Risk problems52 due to high uncertainty 
If a high degree of uncertainty remains, RM needs to incorporate hazard criteria, 
including aspects such as reversibility, persistence, ubiquity, and select management 
options that would empower a society to deal with the worst-case scenarios. It seems 
prudent to take a precautionary approach when managing risks characterised by 
multiple/high uncertainties. Since unresolved uncertainty implies that, the true 
dimensions of the risks are not yet known, one should pursue a cautious strategy that 
enables learning by restricted errors. The main philosophy for managing this risk is 
to allow small steps in implementation (containment approach) that enable risk 
managers to stop or even reverse the process (Klinke and Renn, 2002). 
 
(d) Risk problems due to interpretative and normative ambiguity 
Generally, risk information is interpreted differently by different stakeholders in a 
society. This is due to different viewpoints about the relevance, meaning and 
implications of factual explanations/predictions; for deciding the tolerability and 
acceptability of a risk event. If the values and priorities of what should be 
protected/reduced are subjected to an intense controversy, RM needs to address the 
causes for these conflicting views (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1984). Thus, RM 
should initiate a broader societal discourse, to enable a participative decision-
making. These discursive measures are aimed at finding appropriate conflict-
resolution mechanisms, which capable of reducing the ambiguity to a manageable 
number of options that can be further assessed/evaluated (Renn, 2008e). 
 
 
                                               




2.6.4 Risk Communication 
Risk communication (RC), according to Renn (2008f) investigates how expert 
assessments could be communicated to the public best. Then Leiss (1996) has 
identified three phases in the RC practices:  
(a) The first phase: the necessity of conveying the probabilistic thinking to the 
general public, and to educate the laypersons to acknowledge/accept the RM 
practices from the respective institutions. However, there is a possibility where 
people were unwilling to abstract from the context of risk taking, and they might 
reject the reliance on expected values as the only benchmarks for evaluating risks. 
When this attempt at communication failed, phase two was initiated.  
 
(b) The phase two: to emphasis persuasion and focus on public relations in order to 
convince people that public worries/concerns about risk events were regarded as 
overcautious. However, it did not convince a majority of the people that the current 
RM practices were politically appropriate response. This one-way-communication 
will produce very little effect. Most respondents were appalled by this approach or 
simply did not believe the message, regardless of how well it was packaged; as a 
result, phase three has to launch (Renn, 2008f).  
 
(c) The phase three: stresses a process of two-way-communication which, not only 
the members of the public who are expected to engage in a social learning process, 
but the risk managers as well. The objective is to build up mutual trust by responding 
to the concerns of the public and relevant stakeholders. The ultimate goal is to assist 
the stakeholders to understand the rationale of risk assessed results and the RM 
decisions taken, and to help them to arrive at a balanced judgement that reflects the 
factual evidence about the matter at hand on their own interests and values (OECD, 
2002).  
 
Good practices in RC help the stakeholders to make informed choices about matters 
of concern to them and to create mutual trust (Hance et al., 1988; Lundgren, 1994; 
Breakwell, 2007). Although RC implies a stronger role for risk professionals to 
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provide information to the public rather than vice versa, it should be regarded as a 
mutual learning process in line with the requirements postulated. Hence, effective 
RC has a major bearing on how well people are prepared to face/deal with risk. 
 
There are four functions of RC (Morgan et al., 1992; OECD, 2002): 
(a) Education: inform the audience about risks. 
(b) Risk training and inducement of behavioural changes: help people to deal with 
risks and the way in handling. 
(c) Creation of confidence in institutions responsible for the assessment and RM: 
give people the assurance that the existing RG structures are capable of handling 
risks in an effective, efficient, fair and acceptable manner.  
(d) Involvement in risk-related decisions: give stakeholders and representatives of 
the public the opportunity to participate in the risk appraisal and management efforts, 
or be included in the resolution of conflicts about risks and appropriate RM options. 
 
2.6.5 Conclusions 
The RG framework builds on the logical structure of four activities (pre-assessment, 
appraisal, characterisation/evaluation and management, while risk communication is 
connecting all four activities). This framework is in line to ensure the compatibility 
with professional codices and practices (refer figure 2.6.2). According to Renn 
(2008g), the RG framework could help to identify the key steps in the RG process, 
and the diagnosis of potential causal factors, lead to complex, uncertain and 
ambiguous R&U. In addition, the framework assists in facilitating a thorough 
understanding of the R&U issues, identifying the stakeholders concern with the R&U 
and providing guidance for how to include stakeholders in the processes.  
 
The RG process includes the matters of institutional design, technical methodology, 
administrative, consultation, legislative procedure and political accountability on the 




Figure 2.6.2: Basic Elements for the Risk Governance Framework 














2.7 Risk Regulation Regime  
Preface 
Previously in literature section 2.3 and 2.4, we have identified various risk and 
uncertainty (R&U) and their causal factors during one technology under 
development and deployment from Pearson (1991), Rosenberg (1994), Elliott (2003) 
and SpecialChem (2011). We also understood the principle of Renn's (2008) Risk 
Governance to manage R&U in a comprehensive and systematic manner. This 
section is aimed to understand the risk regulation regime (RRR), to examine the 
involvement of government and other institutions (private, semi-public) in dealing 
with public R&U within the socio-political setting.  
  
2.7.1 The Introduction of Risk Regulation Regime  
When decision makers/stakeholders are facing with collective/private benefits that 
impose R&U on public, this would create inequitable situations (Jaeger et al., 2001). 
The question then becomes: “What risk can a decision maker imposes on society- 
which includes those who do not share the benefits in full?” (MacLean, 1986; Rayner 
and Cantor, 1987). This is because, most of the stakeholders/policy makers are 
willing to impose some degree of acceptable/tolerable risks on the society, if some 
broader groups, or the bigger population within the society would gain the benefits. 
This led to some examples of infrastructure/technology installations like renewables 
(hydro dam construction) which puts some damaging impacts on the ecology for the 
sake of energy generation.  
 
In order to balance the risk-benefit relationships, Shrader-Frechette (1984) 
comments, this relationship is sometimes far from being symmetrical. Therefore, the 
distribution of benefits and risks must be scrutinised carefully. Helps from the 
regulatory actions may be necessary to prevent major inequities. According to 
Andreeva, et al. (2009), the government's motivations are complex, but represent the 
wish to ensure their message is carried clearly to the public. In the context of public 
risk, any ruling government wishes to be seen as responding appropriately/effectively 
to safeguard the socioeconomic interests of the public.  
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The “public risk” is an anxiety which resonates a significant portion of the public. It 
is often closer to the public perception than to the risk related experts (Andreeva, et 
al., 2009), or stakeholders whom impose risks on public. Meanwhile, the “regulation 
of risk” is the governmental interference with market/social processes to control the 
potential adverse consequences. According to Hood et al. (2004a) “regime” connotes 
the way risk is regulated in a particular policy domain that concentrates on the public 
management of risks. Since many regulatory regimes involve mixture of public, 
private and semi-public organisations; “regime” denotes the complex of institutional 
geography, rules and practices associated with the regulation of a particular risk. 
Institutional geography can vary in features on scale, integration and specialisation 53. 
Rules can vary in formality, from unwritten rules to statutory codes/targets. These 
rules are affecting inputs to processes, outputs for products, and penalty or incentive 
structures (refer appendix 2.1.2).  
 
There are three basic features of the regime approach advocated by Hood et al. 
(2004a). Firstly, we see RRR as a system that consists a set of interacting/related 
parts rather than as single cell phenomena. It correlates the front-line people do on 
the ground in the activity of standard setters, and policy makers at the centre of 
government. Secondly, RRR is an entity that has some degree of continuity over 
time, and does not appear as completely static. This complies with the nature of 
politics-which is dynamic/evolving over time and there are always debates about the 
direction politics on its development. The RRR has its sudden climacterics, as well as 
incremental adjustments and steady trends. It is dynamic/evolving, either due to a 
minor adjustment into an existing regime, or an extra item/new inputs to be added to 
the routine will cause a step-change in the regime. Thirdly, regimes are conceived 
relatively bounded systems that can be specified at different levels of breadth. While 
regimes could be described from an overall system, we can also conceive the regime 
                                               
53 Scale: from international level, national level to local jurisdiction. 
Integration: from a single agency handling all features of regulation, to highly fragmented 
administration and complex overlapping systems controlling related aspects of a risk event. 
Specialisation: from a risk-specific and hazard-specific expertise to a general-purpose administration. 
Source: Hood et al., (2004a). 
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in a narrower sense as the system of control that centres at different levels54. Hence, 
we have to specify what level (basic, middle or the highest prioritised level) of 
regime is being analysed (Hood et al., 2004a). 
 
2.7.2 The Anatomy of Risk Regulation Regime 
Hood et al. (2004b) explains, the anatomy of RRR begins with two dimensions. 
Firstly, a dimension has three components that forming the basis of a control system. 
It includes:  
(a) ways of gathering information to produce knowledge about current/changing 
states of the system;  
(b) ways of setting standards, goals, and targets; and  
(c) ways of changing behaviour to meet the standards/targets.  
Next, the second dimension is to investigate the “context” and “content” (will be 
explained in 2.7.2.2). 
  
2.7.2.1 Three Control Components of Risk Regulatory Regime 
(a) Information Gathering (IG) 
Information about risks could be gathered with numerous ways: regulators 
conducting their analyses; by imposing legal requirements to report/test/register by 
others; by paying others to provide information; or it can be provided voluntarily by 
complainants, whistle-blowers/individuals who are willing to contribute. Risk 
regulators also vary in the extent to which they gather information by active55 , 
reactive56, or interactive57 methods (Hood et al., 2004b).  
                                               
54 For example, if taking the risks to patients associated with health care, we could conceive the 
regime for controlling those risks as composed of all the regulatory activities that affect health care 
directly/indirectly. Those activities (at a higher level) include attempts to control the risk from 
dangerous doctors/other health-care workers, by attempts to exclude unqualified medical workers 
from practice. Then, to control the risk (at a middle level) from dangerous drugs/medical equipment 
by drugs approval procedures testing for side-effects and efficacy. Furthermore, to control the risk (at 
a basic level) from dangerous of infectious diseases by controls strictest international medical 
procedures, banned contaminated blood and prioritise the cleanliness of the environment (Hood, et al., 
2004a).  
55 It is known as police patrol in the oversight-systems, means regulators scan the environment, 
seeking out and assembling information about the policy issue in question (Hood et al., 2004b). 
56 It is known as fire alarms, means regulators rely on others to come forward with information 
(Hood et al., 2004b). 
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(b) Standard Setting (SS) 
The standard setting comprises goals/targets/guidelines and measurements. Standards 
could be emerged from a technocratic process that applies technical approaches and 
draws on systematic tests. Standards sometimes emerge from bargaining among 
stakeholders with different interests, producing solutions represent a compromise 
between rival positions or the interests of different parties (Hood et al., 2004b).  
 
(c) Behaviour Modification (BM) 
Changing individual/organisational behaviour is challenging. One of the debates over 
BM in the law and regulation literature, concerns the relative merits of compliance58 
and deterrence 59 , as ways of applying legal/regulatory standards (Hawkins and 
Thomas 1984). However, some regulatory designers such as Ayres and Braithwaite 
(1992) argue for a hybrid approach by mixing them both. This advocates the 
compliance responses towards regulatees who are identified as poorly informed or 
morally concern about the regulatory requirements. Meanwhile deterrence 
approaches is for those regulatees who demonstrate themselves to be opportunistic or 
amoral. 
 
2.7.2.2 The Context and Content of Regimes 
As shown in table 2.7.1, the “three control component of RRR” (discussed at 2.7.2.1) 
are varied in the context60 and content61 (refer appendix 2.7.1).  According to Hood et 
al. (2004b), the six elements of regime context and content cover a wide range of 
ways in which regulatory regimes can work (refer appendix 2.7.2).  
 
                                                                                                                                     
57 It comes somewhere in between the active and reactive, typically through regulators imposing 
periodic reporting requirements on others and then responding to the content of the reports (Hood et 
al., 2004b). 
58 The compliance doctrines rely on diplomacy, persuasion and education, rather than routine 
application of sanctions to produce a compliance culture on the part of those affected by regulation 
(Hawkins and Thomas 1984). 
59 The deterrence doctrines rely on the credibility of penalties/punishment, expressed in the expected 
cost of non-compliance to violators, to prevent those regulated from breaking the rules (Hawkins and 
Thomas 1984). 
60 The regime context means the setting in which regulation takes place (Hood et al., 2004b). 
61 The regime content means the regulatory objectives, the configuration of state and other 
organisational structure directly engaged in regulating the risk (Hood et al., 2004b). 
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Table 2.7.1: Elements of Context and Content 
 Control Components 
Context 
(a) Type of risk 
(b) Public preferences and attitudes 




Standard setting Behaviour 
modification 







Standard setting Behaviour 
modification 
Source: Hood, et al., 2004b. pp.29.    
 
2.7.3 Involvement of Government in Risk Regulation Regime  
There are three hypotheses-according to Hood et al. (2004c) that seek to explain why 
the government involve with risk regulation. 
 
(a) Market Failure (MF) 
MF hypothesis is based on the assumption that the government will not interfere the 
markets' self-regulation, unless there is a danger of failure (Breyer, 1982; Ogus, 
1994). The level of possible interference is determined by information cost62 and opt-
out cost63 of a particular hazard. It is expected that government will interfere when 
either of these costs is substantial (Hood et al., 2004c). 
 
(b) Opinion Responsiveness (OR) 
This is a populist approach, which the government follows public 
opinion/preferences-the stronger the opinion, the stronger the response (Breyer, 
1993). However, the OR hypothesis offers an incomplete explanation. This is 
because: Firstly, it is difficult to measure a public's opinion to form a representative 
picture. Although polling is a preferred method, it is not without limitations (Dryzek, 
1990; Fishkin, 1995). Secondly, even though the alternative methods (focus groups) 
were used; Hood et al. (2004c) argue, the opinion was limited and selective. Thirdly, 
                                               
62 relates to the cost of assessing the level, impact of danger the people are exposed to (Hood et al., 
2004c). 




public opinion is volatile and distorted by media (Hood et al., 2004c). 
 
Alternatively, the government could rely on the “experts” to get information about 
public opinion. There are two-forms of experts: Firstly, those who are employed by 
the government 64  and secondly, the perceived experts65  from the issue lobbyists 
(Andreeva, et al., 2009). Both types of expert may raise issues that are picked up by 
others, or from the media. Their motivation may be laudable for self-publicity or 
intention for social justice. If their view fits in within a political agenda, then 
government may find they are helpful. If they are on the opposite side of the 
regulator and become the focus of other groups/media, it will turn to be hard for 
government to ignore them. 
 
(c) Interest Pressures (IP) 
Political science and political economy theories argue that, the government's 
response to risk is mainly driven by interest groups' pressures-best investigated is 
about business lobbyists (Self, 1985; Wilson, 1990). Yet, there are other pressure 
groups, such as labour unions, consumer organisations and environmentalists.  
 
Literature on business lobbying goes back to the Chicago school. It explains that 
business firms would organise themselves into groups, aiming at influencing/shaping 
regulations to protect/enhance their profits (Stigler 1971, Peltzman 1976). Hood et al. 
(2004c) refer to the these pressure groups as “policy entrepreneurs” which often have 
their own agendas, apart from defending the public interests, or protecting 
community which they represent. Hood et al. (2004c) admit, it is difficult to separate 
group interests from public opinion, and it is common for regulators to see the 
pressures coming from such groups as the expressions of public opinions (refer 
appendix 2.7.366)   
                                               
64 They provide the government (through employment relationship) with advice which is based on 
their own skills and knowledge (Andreeva, et al., 2009). 
65 They are perceived as having credibility through their qualifications, position/representation in one 
society, the research they can quote, or even the attention they receive from others (Andreeva, et al., 
2009). 
66 The appendix discusses the example of the GM product (advocated by Fischer, 2004), which 
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2.7.4 Triggers and Time Elements of Public Risk 
Generally, experts often have lower estimates of risk than both the government and 
the public. Mostly, it is the scientific advice given to a government that will shape a 
government policy rather than public opinion67.  To understand political interaction 
with public risk, it is sensible to consider how public risk may be triggered, with 
some elements are described as “events”, “innovation” and “change”68. However, 
time plays a central role in public risk and reaction towards it. Time often determines 
the action taken by government and subsequent reaction by the public. If government 
is perceived not to take action within a reasonable time, the public's concern may be 
heightened. A sense of crisis could be developed that takes on its own momentum, 
and risk supersedes to become the focus of the public. This can have some very 
negative consequences for government. Even though governments hope that their 
action could allay public anxiety, in some contexts this is not the case. Furthermore, 
campaigns and the media in reality and in certain degree do affect public attitudes 
and amplify the public anxiety (refer appendix 2.7.4). 
 
2.7.5 Precautionary Principles in Policy Formulation  
For public activities that administrated by a government (like new technology 
introduction), a clear set of benefits could be anticipated by those who are supporting 
the activities. However, the risks associated with these activities arise when things do 
not go as planned. This is often the case when risks arise from processes within a 
complex system, involving ecology and sociocultural institutions. The complexity of 
these effects can make it very difficult to assess and reduce the resulting uncertainty. 
Such concerns are part of the motivation for precautionary approaches that would 
                                                                                                                                     
illustrates the different opinions between various groups/institutions.  
67 In a study of government and the public risk perceptions in Sweden, Sjoberg and Drottz-Sjoberg 
(2008) found that, government and the public have similar risk perceptions across a range of risks 
studied, except for nuclear waste, where the public perceived a greater risk than government. In 
nuclear waste policy, the government study tends to base on their policy attitudes, as well as on their 
own risk perceptions, but not the views that they believed the public has. The reason may be that 
government perceives benefits arise from nuclear power which the public do not accept.  
68 Events often trigger public concern, such as the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease, sinking of 
the Herald of Free Enterprise, the train accident at Ladbrook Grove etc. Innovation on technology, can 
also lead to public concern, for example GM foods and the sitting of nuclear plants. Changes in 
contexts can also cause risk, such as changes in banking practices were contributing factors to credit 
crunch (Andreeva, et al., 2009).  
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substitute highly protective decisions/rules, for the calculations and trade-offs on 
risk-based decision-making (Dekay, et al., 2009). 
 
Page (1978) offers a characterisation of the types of risk, which support for 
precautionary approaches is the most likely to arise: 
(a) there is an ignorance of mechanism, so that our knowledge of the physical 
processes that determine the likelihood and magnitude of the risk is poor; 
(b) there is a potential for catastrophic loss, so that the harm to the affected 
individuals and society can be great if the activity/technology entails such a risk; 
(c) there is a relatively modest benefit associated with the activity/technology, 
especially when compared to the potential harm; and 
(d) there is a low subjective probability associated with the feared outcome.  
However, there is often no consensus about the probability of occurrence, due to the 
rarity/one-of-a-kind nature of the risk, with little/no actuarial history upon which to 
base estimates. 
 
Page (1978) argues that, traditional regulatory approaches are inadequate for 
problems listed above. These approaches have often focused solely/primarily on 
limiting false positives-by assuming that new technologies are safe and beneficial 
until proven otherwise. Furthermore, conventional policies have often failed to 
address the implications of differences in the distribution of benefits-and-costs; 
especially when those exposed to the greatest risk do not receive a commensurate 
portion of the benefits. Some risks are latent, not exhibited until far into the future, 
making it difficult and sometimes impossible to prevent future damages/losses.  
 
As a result, precautionary approaches for dealing with risks have been proposed to 
embody in various forms of the precautionary principle (Raffensperger and Tickner, 
1999; Commission of the European Communities, 2000). The principle is designed 
to ensure the intentions to protect political stability, safeguarding social, economical 
and environmental harmonisation. The Commission of the European Communities 
(2000) has attempted to refine the precautionary principle, stating that it should be 
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considered within a structured risk-analysis approach that incorporates information 
regarding the economic and non-economic benefits, and also costs of the various 
policy options. Such assessments can consider the multiple political, environmental, 
economical and social impacts that occur over time. Possible outcome are 
characterised by weighting and combining various impacts into a series of 
parameters and weighting them by their probabilities to generate an expected values 
for each decision alternative (Raiffa, 1968; Keeney, 1982; Clemen, 1996). Then this 
is designed to clarify trade-offs among different concerns for individual decision 
maker, or multiple stakeholders who share a common view of a decision. This is not 
to say that different parties must be agreed on the appropriate course of actions. 
However, full rational considerations may show that a decision that appears have the 
appropriate amount of prudent precaution for its proponents (Dekay, et al., 2009). 
 
2.7.6 Conclusion  
Hood et al. (2004a) concentrate on the public management of risks, but do not solely 
focus on the state involvement in a narrow sense. This is because the RRR involves a 
mixture of public-private and semi-public organisations. Hence, RRR denotes the 
complexity of institutional, geography, rules, practices and ideas, associated with the 
regulation of a risk event. The institutional and geography can be varied in scale, 
from an international to a national setting. In the real practice, there is no single 
agency (public, private, or semi public institutions) which should be assigned solely 
to handle all R&U. The wide focus of RRR, matched well to the researcher's topic, 
involving both the government and the oil companies who have been taking up 
biofuels adoption, while dealing with R&U arise during biofuels deployment and 
development.  
 
There are three basic features of the RRR approach: interpreted as systems, 
continuity and regimes. These basic features of regime constructed a fundamental 
context for risk analysis. The interpretation of regime as a system helps the 
researcher to investigate the mechanism applied within the system (road transport 
system); such as instruments, strategies and methodologies adopted for biofuels 
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deployment and development. Besides, the continuity of the regime signify the 
context that could have the capability of accommodating any further innovations, 
changes (increasing/decreasing affords), improvements, modifications as well as the 
results of termination. Furthermore, the regimes which could be specified at different 
levels of analysis enable the researcher to focus entirely at the UK, yet relate its 
correlations with the EU, and regional/international government bodies which are 
shaping the biofuels deployment and development. 
 
Three components (IG, SS and BM) are the mechanism utilised by the government to 
have the R&U managed. They formed an interconnected controlling system to drive 
both biofuels development and deployment in meeting the objectives of nationwide 
biofuels application. Besides, Dekay et al. (2009) and Page (1978) advocate the 
precautionary principle required in policy formulation, to ensure the intentions to 
protect political stability, safeguarding socioeconomical and environmental 
harmonisation. 
 
Meanwhile, the anatomy of the context and content of a regime provide a clear 
distinction in explaining the regime of biofuels development and deployment in the 
UK. Under the regime hierarchical structure, the UK government commences 
biofuels nationwide has a strong correlation with the EU Biofuels Directive (2003). 
The Scottish Government (SG) is also deploying biofuels in Scotland, due to the 
context and the style of power delegation between Scotland and the UK. Both have 
the identical regulatory contexts, risk contexts, institutional interests and policy 
contents in biofuels development and deployment under the UK Renewable 
Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO). Therefore, we can observe a “conjoint” RRR, the 
massive size extending from the EU to the UK, in order to suit the issue of 
localisation. Finally, three hypotheses from Hood et al. (2004c) on MF, OR, IP (refer 
2.7.3); seek to explain why the government involve with risk regulation would be 





Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
Preface 
The research methodology maps out the methods that a researcher has utilised whilst 
conducting his/her research. Driven by the research questions and objectives, this 
chapter provides a thoroughly description of the grounded theory/philosophy; 
explaining how data collection was conducted, while justifies the analytical 
procedure used which led to a sound conclusion made. This chapter begins with a 
discussion of the research philosophy (section 3.2), the research methodology 
(section 3.3), the research design (section 3.4), the questionnaire design (section 3.5), 
reflexivity (section 3.6 and 3.7), the analytical procedure (section 3.8), and finally the 
validity, reliability and generalisability (section 3.9).  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The research epistemology was grounded on the social constructivism, whilst the 
research design was established through a purpose-based (exploration) choice of 
study. The areas of the study were explored, then supported by cases studied (the 
Scottish Government, BP (UK) PLC and Shell (UK) PLC) conducted through 
interviews, observations and documents analysis in qualitative method. Thus, the aim 
of this chapter is to demonstrate the researcher understood the theories, and to lay out 
the methodological considerations used to answer the research questions, and to 
achieve the research objectives initially set. 
 
3.2 Research Philosophy 
Zalan and Lewis (2004) state, ontology asks about reality. It asks whether “reality”, 
is in fact objective 69 , or whether it is the internal creation of an individual 
cognition/intellect, which cannot exist on its own. The central question of ontological 
concerns “What do we believe about the nature of reality” since it stresses on the 
“nature of being” (Patton, 2002; Denzin and Lincoln, 2003).  
 
                                               
69 means external to an individual and existing independently. It depends on how people see/judge it 
(Zalan and Lewis, 2004). 
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On the other hand, epistemology is the philosophical theory of knowledge. It 
concerns with the external validity, generalisability, explanation and causality (Zalan 
and Lewis, 2004). Some of the main questions of epistemological debate are “How 
do we know what we know?” (Patton, 2002); and “What is the relationship between 
the inquirer and the known?” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003) (refer table 3.1). According 
to Easterby-Smith et al. (2004), social scientist is looking at these three ontological 
positions: representationalism70, relativism71 and nominalism72. The acceptance of a 
particular epistemology will lead a researcher to opt for a method that is 
characterised by that ontological position. Table 3.2 summarises the correspondence 
between the three epistemologies and methods in social science study (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2004). 
 
Table 3.1: Ontology and Epistemology in Social Science 
Ontology of  
Social Science  
Representationalism Relativism 







Determined through the 
verification of predictions 
 
 






depend on viewpoint of 
observer 




are all human creations 
Epistemology  
of social science 
Positivism 
(refer appendix 3.2.2) 
Relativism 
(refer appendix 3.2.3) 
Social Constructivism 






                                               
70 Representationalism: whether or not phenomena are concrete. It is only possible to gather indirect 
evidence of what is going on in fundamental physical processes (Putnam, 1975). Hence, 
representationalist asks whether the research results are an accurate reflection of reality. This is 
because, representationalist believes that reality could be observed and measured. 
71 Relativist: assumes that, different observers may have different viewpoints. What counts for truth 
could be varied from one place to another, as well as from time to time. Thus, the relativist would 
want to ensure that a broad sample of viewpoints has been taken into account (Collins, 1983).  
72 Nominalist: includes the view that, it is the labels and names that we attach to experiences and 
events which are crucial. The nominalist is interested where the labels came from and who influenced 
their acceptance (Easterby-Smith et al., 2004). 
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Table 3.2 Methodological Implications of Different Epistemologies within 
Social Science Study 
Elements of Methods Positivism  Relativism Social Constructionism  
Aims Discovery Exposure Invention 
Starting points Hypotheses Suppositions Meanings 
Designs Experiment Triangulation Reflexivity 
Techniques Measurement Survey Conversation 
Analysis/interpretation Verification/falsification Probability Sense-making 
Outcomes Causality Correlation Understanding 
Source: Easterby-Smith, et al. 2004. pp.34. 
 
These three philosophical positions are the pure/confined versions of each paradigm. 
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2004), although the basic beliefs may be quite 
incompatible, when one comes down to the actual research methods, the differences 
are by no means as clear and distinct.  Moreover, some management researchers 
deliberately use methods which originate in different paradigms. 
 
3.2.1 Social Constructivism  
Social constructivism focuses on the ways that people make sense of the world. 
Through experience/knowledge sharing via the medium of language, information is 
diffused (Berger and Luckman 1966; Watzlawick 1984; Shortter 1993). There are 
two key ideas of social constructivism. Firstly, the “reality” is not objective and 
exterior; rather it is socially constructed and given meaning by people. The 
constructionist perspective starts from a viewpoint which does not assume any pre-
existing reality. The aim of a researcher is to understand how people invent 
structures, in order to help them make sense of what is going on around them. 
Consequently, much attention is given to the use of language through conversation 
between people. Given a observer/researcher can never be separated from the sense-
making process; this means a researcher/observer is starting to recognise, that 
theories which apply to the subjects of his/her work must also be relevant to 
him/herself (Easterby-Smith et al., 2004).  
 
Secondly, one should try to understand and explain why people have different 
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experiences, rather than search for external causes and fundamental laws to explain 
their behaviour. Human action arises from the sense that people make of different 
situations, rather than as a direct response to external stimuli. Hence, the task of the 
social scientist/researcher should not to gather facts and measure how often certain 
patterns occur, instead to appreciate the different constructions and meanings that 
people place upon their experience. The focus should be on what people, 
individually/collectively is/are thinking. Attention should be paid to the ways they 
interact with each other (Easterby-Smith et al., 2004). The methods of social 
constructionist research could be contrasted with the eight features summarised in 
Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3: Social Constructivism and Its Eight Features 
Features Social Constructivism 
The observer  
Human interests  
Explanations 
Research progresses through      
Concepts  
Units of analysis 
Generalisation through  
Sampling requires 
is part of what is being observed  
are the main drivers of science 
aim to increase general understanding of the situation 
gathering rich data from which ideas are induced 
should incorporate stakeholder perspectives 
may include the complexity of whole situations 
theoretical abstraction 
small numbers of cases chosen for specific reasons 
Source: Easterby-Smith, et al. 2004. pp.30. 
 
This study opted  for the social constructivism which aimed to understand a 
technological change that incurred expected/unexpected risk and uncertainty (R&U). 
By using the theories of Social Shaping Technology, Risk Governance and Risk 
Regulated Regime; the application of Social Shaping Technology was aimed at 
broadening the Risk Governance and Risk Regulated Regime, and assisted the 
researcher to look at R&U of a technological change from a social dimension. 
 
The subject of the study involved the Scottish Government (SG) and two oil 
companies-BP and Shell as cases studied. Through experience sharing and resources 
combined, these stakeholders have implemented strategies to deal with the different 
types of R&U that emerged during biofuels deployment and development. The 
strategies were intended to ease the commencement of the 1G biofuels, and to 
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materialise the next generation biofuels (NGB) development.  
 
The dynamism of the sociotechnological change is explained by Sztompka (1991). 
The adoption/innovation of a technology within a social reality is never a steady 
state, rather a dynamic process. This is because, the social process and technological 
change are created by human agents. Through individual/collective decisions made, 
interactions are generated. As such, social constructionism suits this type of research. 
Easterby-Smith, et al., (2004) further support that, the strength of the social 
constructionism and qualitative methods are complementing one another since both 
have the ability to bring-out and make-sense on people’s meanings.  
 
3.3 Research Methodology  
The choice of methodology is determined, not only by the ontological and 
epistemological stance of the researcher, but is also influenced by the objectives of 
the research. Taylor and Bogdan (1998) state, methodology refers to the way73 a 
researcher approaches the problems and seeks answers. Besides, Fisher (2004) 
describes methodology as the study of methods. It raises all sorts of philosophical 
questions: for example “What is possible for researchers to know?” “How to validate 
a researcher claims to knowledge?”-which Leedy (1989) then describes as an 
operational framework where the facts are placed, so that their meaning may be seen 
more clearly.  
 
Additionally, Ghauri et al. (1995) claim that research methodology can be conceived 
as a system of rules and procedures-which are important for several reasons: 
(a) it can be conceived as rules for reasoning, a specific logic to acquire insights of a 
study. 
(b) it is important for inter-subjectivity. Reporting (in detail) how a researcher has 
obtained his/her findings, means that his/her work can be evaluated by others, 
(c) it can also be considered as rules for communication. Reporting on the rules and 
                                               
73 The term applies to how the research is conducted, what the assumptions are, and what are the 
interests/purposes a researcher has which shapes the methodology chosen (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998). 
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procedures used, enables others try to replicate/criticise the approach chosen. 
 
Thus, qualifying research requires a competence in logical reasoning and analysis. A 
researcher therefore needs to have command over the research methodology used. 
Research, however, is also closely related to finding, structuring and solving 
problems to answer problems/questions-since problems represent the point of 
departure in one study. In order to grasp the comprehension of problems, an 
understanding of the concepts/theories surrounding the problems is crucial. 
Furthermore, the ability to think conceptually is important as a prerequisite for doing 
qualifying research (Ghauri et al., 1995).  
 
3.3.1 Qualitative Research  
Research methods refer to the systematic, focused and orderly collection of data; for 
the purpose of obtaining information to solve/answer the research 
problems/questions (Ghauri et al., 1995). Thus, which method (qualitative or 
quantitative) is most suitable for a research project, depends on the research problem 
and the objective of the study (Jankowicz, 1991). In qualitative research, findings are 
not arrived by statistical methods/procedures of quantification. It is a mixture of the 
rational and explorative, where the skills74 and experience of a researcher play an 
important role in the analysis of data (Ghauri et al., 1995).  
 
Supported by Denzin and Lincoln's (2003), qualitative research cuts across 
disciplines, fields 75  and subject matters 76 , all of which are complex and have 
interconnected terms, concepts and theories surrounding the research. As such, the 
qualitative method is the practical purpose in the ways of finding out what people 
                                               
74 Skills needed for a qualitative research: thinking abstractly; stepping back and critically analysing 
situations; recognising and avoiding biases; obtaining valid and reliable information; having 
theoretical and social sensitivity; and the ability to keep analytical distance while at the same time 
utilising past experience, with a shrewd sense of observation and interaction (van Maanen, 1983; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  
75 Social Shaping Technology, Risk Governance, Risk Regulated Regime. 
76 Technological change, renewable energy for transport, biofuels, R&U during biofuels deployment 




do/know/think/feel; by observing, interviewing and analysing (Patton, 2002) to 
understand people from their own frames of reference (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998). 
Driven by the research objectives (refer section 1.2), the qualitative method (that 
adopted interview, observations and document analysis) were chosen to conduct this 
study. The emphasis of qualitative method is illustrated in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4: Emphasis in the Qualitative Method  
Emphasis on understanding 
Focus on understanding from respondent/informant point of view 
Interpretation and rational approach 
Observations and measurements in natural settings 




Generalisation by comparison of properties and contexts of individual organism 
Source: Reichardt and Cook. 1979. 
 
3.3.2 Type and Purpose of Research: Exploratory Study 
Omerod (1996) states that there are five types of research under the qualitative 
method (refer appendix 3.3.1); while this research was an exploratory study, which 
could be justified by two reasons. Firstly, exploration is useful when a researcher 
lacks a clear idea of the problems he/she will meet during the study (Cooper and 
Schindler, 2008). The technological change has incurred various R&U during 
biofuels deployment and development. This shows that biofuels introduction and 
innovation are complex and highly uncertain. Thus, effective strategies from the 
regulators and oil companies operating within the biofuels regulated market have to 
be effectuated to resolve/mitigate R&U incurred, in order to ensure biofuels 
execution/development could achieve the ultimate objectives set. Yet, in reality, the 
researcher lacked a clear idea about what R&U would be faced, and what strategies 
                                               
77 A social process is difficult to study with quantitative methods. Hence, qualitative method is the 
most suitable and can provide intricate details and understanding (Ghauri et al., 1995).  
78 Whenever a holistic, dynamic and contextual explanation of the phenomenon is required (like 
technological change for biofuels deployment and development), qualitative method would be the 
most appropriate choice (Zalan and Lewis, 2004). 
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would be adopted to resolve/mitigate them accordingly. This information could only 
be obtained through field work. 
 
Secondly, the area of investigation is new/green-field. Hence, the researcher needs to 
explore/develop some concepts to establish priorities and operational definitions 
(Cooper and Schindler, 2008). Although the research design had been established in 
the second year of the study; yet, it has a certain degree of flexibility in nature in 
order to accommodate new inputs79 along the research execution process. Since the 
technological change is a dynamic process which keeps evolving, the researcher has 
to continuously engage in searching, updating and reviewing the latest information 
(secondary data), and to obtain (primary data) through interviews and observations 
on cases studied.  
 
3.3.3 Research Strategy: Case Study 
Yin (2003) defines research strategies as ways of investigating an empirical topic, by 
following a set of pre-specified procedures. Furthermore, Denzin and Lincoln (2003) 
suggest, there are several research strategies that are commonly used in a research80.  
 
For this study, the case study strategy was adopted. Case study is a way of 
establishing valid/reliable evidence for the research, as well as presenting findings 
resulted from the research (Remenyi et al, 1998). It focuses on a single 
organisation/institution/group, which serves as the case being studied (Baker, 1999). 
The primary advantage of case study is that, an entire organisation/entity could be 
investigated in depth and with meticulous attentions to detail. This highly focused 
attention enables a researcher to carefully study the order of events as they occur, or 
to concentrate on identifying the relationship among functions/individuals/entities 
(Zikmund, 2003).  
                                               
79 For example, until which stage the biofuels implementation/innovation processes should be 
investigated; are largely depend upon the proliferation of the international/regional/nation political 
decisions, as well as the advancement of biotechnology in the NGB development. 
80 1Study design; 2Case study; 3Ethnography (participant observation, performance ethnography), 





Yin (1994) states that, a case study could be defined as an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context. It may be 
largely exploratory/descriptive, since it examines current phenomenon in a real life 
situation, with multiple sources of evidence being used. A case study strategy is 
particularly valuable in answering research questions of “why” and “how”, which 
often seeks explanations. Besides, Bell (1993) adds, the philosophy behind a case 
study is that: sometimes, by looking carefully at a practical and real life instance, a 
full picture could be obtained from the actual interaction of variables/events. It is the 
aim of the case study to provide a multi-dimensional picture of the situation. Thus, 
Remenyi et al, (1998) agree, a case study strategy allows a researcher to concentrate 
on the specific instances, in an attempt to identify detailed interactive processes.  
 
The exploratory study was chosen, because it helped the researcher to develop clear 
concepts along the research progresses. Likewise, the research strategy which 
employed case study could provide insight of research phenomena on the 
technological change. Hence, this has suggested qualitative research (more plausible 
than quantitative) since the qualitative is capable in interpreting meaning, making 
sense of data and producing new ideas/concepts towards theory building.  
 
3.4 Research Design  
Cooper and Schindler (2003) and Ghauri et al. (1995) describe, research design is the 
strategy for a study, and the plan to collect the information needed. There are three 
essentials of a research design: 
(a) It is a plan for selecting the sources/types of information used to answer the 
research question.  
(b) It is a framework for specifying the relationships amongst the study’s variables. 
(c) It is a blueprint that outlines each procedure, from the hypotheses to the analysis 
of data. 
Thus, Yin (2003) emphasises, a research design is the logic that links the data to be 




Ghauri et al. (1995) specify, there are six activities81 which are guide the research 
process. Yet, these activities are not rigidly sequential as expected. Since the 
exploratory study has been applied, emerging inputs/latest updates have to be 
captured from time to time. Often, when a researcher is working within an 
exploratory research, the initial problem set may need to be reframed from time to 
time. This is because, new insights may emerge, which influence the understanding 
of the problem. Thus, research activities have to be constantly evaluated. The 
following sections explain further on research question formulation, literature 
selection, data collection and data analysis.  
 
3.4.1 Building the Analytical Framework through Literature Review 
Rose and Sullivan (1996) explain, social science research is concerned to explain the 
society exhibits. When we consider “How a social researcher explains?”, “Where 
his/her explanations begin from?”-the answer is from theory. Theory is a form of 
selective focusing-a way of separating out from the confusing world, which assails 
our senses with the elements of reality that concern us as a social researcher. In doing 
any research, we have questions we wish to answer. However, those questions must 
always derive from theory. Thus, research is a theory-guided process that leads in the 
end to a new way of thinking about the world.  
 
Therefore, we need to have a theory before we can observe anything about the social 
world. The theory must be capable of being operationalised in a way which enables 
facts to be measured (Comte, 1853). Aligned with this, Zikmund (2003) affirms, 
theories allow us to select from a mass of confusing materials, in order to form a 
coherent set of general propositions that can be used to explain the apparent 
relationships among certain observed phenomena. Thus, literature review is the 
process of searching relevant theories, to build up the concept/content/context of the 
                                               
81 1Problem definition, 2Research design, 3Measurements, 4Data Strategies, 5Data Analysis, 6Research 
Report.  A distinction may be drawn at activity 1 (problem definition), which may be classified at the 
conceptual/theoretical level. Meanwhile activities related to steps 2-5 are at the empirical level. 
Finally, activity 6 is aimed to communicate/disseminate the produced findings (Ghauri et al., 1995).   
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research.   
According to Ghauri et al. (1995), the prime purposes of literature review are: 
(a) to frame and structure the research problem; 
(b) to identify relevant concepts, methods/techniques and facts; 
(c) to position the study, while adding something new. 
Besides, literature review is defined as the process of describing and criticising 
relevant literature within a particular subject area.  
 
In order to make sense of the literature, and to find out the literature pertinent to 
Social Shaping Technology, Risk Governance and Risk Regulated Regime, the 
researcher started the literature search by identifying who are the gurus within these 
fields, and then searched for their published works. According to Drucker et al. 
(1990), good gurus possess timing and the intuitive ability to fasten on and to 
articulate trends before others see them. With in-depth knowledge of their special 
areas, they can situate within a wider context of evolving social trends. Consistent 
with this, the gurus are those who could change the paradigm, as they change the 
way people look out from the window of the world.  
 
Within the field of Social Shaping Technology, the gurus have been identified and 
universally agreed are: (a) Donald Mackenzie (b) Judy Wajcman (c) Robin Williams 
(d) David Edge, while some of the recognised international scholars in this field are 
(a) Knut H. Sørensen (b) Arie Rip (c) Johan W. Schot (d) Steward Russell (e) Shen 
XiaoBai (f) Matthias K. Weber. Meanwhile in the field of Risk/Risk Management, 
the universally recognised are: (a) Ulrich Beck (b) Ortwin Renn (c) Christopher 
Hood (d) Roger E. Kasperson and Jeanne X. Kasperson (e) Jake Ansell. Furthermore, 
to correlate the subject of the study in renewable energy from social science angle, 
the guru is: (a) David Elliott; while contributors in managing R&U from corporate 
strategies are: (a) Nathan Rosenberg, and (b) D. M. Pearson. 
 
By identifying the leading gurus/scholars in these fields made it possible for the 
researcher to go through their works-which are mainly appeared in the form of 
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books, chapters of books, journal articles and online database journals 82  (refer 
appendix 3.4.1). Furthermore, the researcher has also conducted the literature search 
using the proceedings, articles and publications from some of the reputable 
organisations 83 . Therefore, literature review enabled the researcher to draw on 
research ideas, refine the research concepts and to set up analytical frameworks to 
validate them via cases studied. 
 
Through the focus on theories of Social Shaping Technology, Risk Governance and 
Risk Regulated Regime, the researcher has built a grounded concept, content and 
context for technological change which incurred R&U; involving large social 
technology (biofuels) deployment and development. Simultaneously, the researcher 
has also searched, analysed and synthesised the secondary data including tracking the 
international/regional/national policies, corporate reports, international/national 
media materials84 and website publications from the related organisations85. From the 
theoretical concept to the secondary data, the applications of these theories were 
testified (as advised/guided by the researcher's supervisors), while the actual 
scenarios in technological change are comprehended. This helped the researcher to 
identify gaps and under-researched areas, which led to research questions formulated 
and research objectives established.  
 
3.4.2 Data Collection Methods 
Under a qualitative method with case study strategy, there were three approaches 
adopted for this research: interview, observation and document analysis. 
 
(a) Interview 
An interview is a conversation with purpose, to yield direct quotations from people 
                                               
82 such as: Emerald, Science Direct, Jstor, Sage and others. 
83 1Publications from the European Association for the Study of Science and Technology; 
2Publications from the Society for Social Studies of Science (4S).   
84 The broadcasting media such as BBC, and the print media like the Guardian, the Independent, the 
Scotsman, the Telegraph and others. 
85 The UN/EU/UK/Scottish Government and their related agencies; BP and Shell, and other social 
movement/learned societies and environmentalists.  
109 
 
about their experiences, opinions and knowledge. Data consists of verbatim 
quotations with the sufficient context to be interpretable (Cooper and Schindler, 
2008). Along the interview process, the researcher utilised the questionnaire (refer 
appendix 3.4.2a and 3.4.2b) as the primary data collection tool to gather the 
respondents' responses.  
 
Zikmund (2003) advises, by conducting an interview means to establish a discussion 
with the well-informed respondent. This could lead to an understanding of a complex 
situation. Although the researcher has been equipped with the secondary data found, 
the aim for an interview was to gain the justifications to answer the questions of 
“how” and “why”, which usually could not be explained by the secondary data 
gathered. Besides, taking into a consideration the researcher's background86; some of 
these needed to be explained by the respondents through an interview.  
 
However, Zikmund (2003) reminds us that a researcher who applies this method 
must be flexible and attempt to glean information and insights. The freedom to 
search for data a researcher deems necessary makes the success of any case study 
highly dependent on the alertness, creativity, intelligence and motivation. The 
researcher has some experience of interviewing corporate executives and public 
agency representatives at home. There are few issues which have to be considered 
when interviewing the designated respondents-particularly at effective time 
management and be efficient throughout the interview process (refer appendix 3.4.3).   
  
Since the researcher has decided for an in-depth case study, Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2008) remind us for an in-depth case study: Firstly, it is based on personal contacts, 
generally through interview. Secondly, it takes place within a single organisation, but 
then involves the selection from a number of individuals, which were mainly based 
on their designations/job descriptions that relevant to the research topic. Thirdly, the 
collection of data takes place over a period of time, and may include both live 
                                               




observations and retrospective accounts of what has happened.  
 
(b) Observations 
This is a fieldwork description of activities, behaviours, actions, conversations, 
organisational or community processes; or any other aspect of observable human 
experience. Data consisting of field notes are rich with detailed descriptions, 
including the context within which the observations are made (Patton, 2002). 
 
The researcher used the method of streaming media (of organisational websites, 
independent news agencies from international/national broadcasting/print media), 
with the focus on a conceptual/thematic analysis as “hands-on observation” to 
capture the relevant issues surrounding the research concept. This is supported by 
Wilkinson and Birmingham (2003), where the conceptual/thematic analysis is one of 
the methods under content analysis. It examines either the incidence or the frequency 
of concepts, such as themes/issues/words/phrases that appear in a text. The key focus 
is on the themes/issues within the text that the researcher intends to observe and 
analyse.  
 
Apart from streaming media, field observation has also been carried out. The 
researcher has captured the on-going works executed by respective stakeholders: the 
SG, BP and Shell, together with other relevant actors such as the UN/EU/UK 
Governments, international/national broadcasting/print media, international/national 
social movements, learned societies and environmentalists. Firstly, the interactions 
between stakeholders were observed. Secondly, how the expected R&U occurred, as 
well as the emergence of systemic risks-which caused public anxiety were captured. 
Next, how the media and pressure groups amplified the systemic risks and put 
pressure on regulators/oil companies were observed. Then, how the regulators/oil 
companies strategised themselves to counteract with expected/unexpected R&U, as 
well as their response to the pressure coerced by international/national media, social 
movements and environmentalist were noted. Furthermore, how the NGB technology 
has been shaped socially, and how it would impact the green and sustainable (G&S) 
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biofuels requirement were observed. Hence, observation assisted the researcher to 
understand the contents surrounding the technological change with the R&U that 
emerged from biofuels deployment and development, whilst identifying strategies 
implemented to have these R&U solved.  
 
(c) Document Analysis 
This is to analyse written materials and documents (reports, print media) published 
by various organisations87-which are the stakeholders for biofuels introduction and 
innovation; particularly focus in the UK. Such data consisting of excerpts from real 
event documentations (Patton, 2002). 
 
The document analysis covered the UN/EU/UK and the SG policies, ranging from 
climate change, renewable energy, transport and biofuels. There were significant 
correlation and transposition from the UN-Kyoto Protocol to the EU Biofuels 
Directive (EUBD, 2003), and further to the UK Renewable Transport Fuel 
Obligation (RTFO, 2008). Additionally, the oil companies (BP and Shell) annual 
corporate reports/magazines/websites, and related news releases have been used as 
the source for secondary data.  
 
Generally, in a common research practice, secondary data collected from document 
analysis; primary data collection from interview and observation are equally 
important. To simplify these explanations: 
(i) the document analysis is used to build up basic knowledge, to answer the inquires 
of “what”, “who”, “when”, “where” and “which”. Some of the “why” and “how” 
questions were answered, but they were rather limited. The availability of the 
secondary data has strengthened the researcher's basic concept before the interviews 
were conducted; as well as providing updated information after the interviews were 
completed. The strength of document analysis is-these documents were 
written/published and made available from time to time. They record the past, 
                                               
87 The UN/EU/UK government and the SG, BP and Shell and their research partners for the NGB 
development, the international/national social movements, learned societies and environmentalists. 
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present the current situation, might as well foresee/projects in the future. However, 
online materials mostly have such a short shelve-lives unlike the printed documents. 
They might be altered/dropped according to the organisational decisions. Therefore, 
a proper record on dates of access and the universal resource locator (URL) for these 
electronic materials are important to validate the source of information. 
 
(ii) Interviews are set to gain answers for the “how” and “why” questions from the 
respondents. Normally, the secondary data like international/regional/national 
policies, and the corporate publications lack of an explanations at: “why” such 
decisions were made, “how” to materialise such decisions through actions, and 
“how” to measure the outcomes/results after such decisions have been executed. 
Therefore, an interview is a channel to get these justifications, to understand the 
motivations, interests and objectives of respective stakeholders, which led to such 
technological change, as well as the relation of the causes for some of the 
expected/unexpected R&U incurred during the process of execution. 
 
(iii) Not only has the researcher observed the reactions from the respondent88, the 
emerging themes on document analysis89, but also experienced the phenomena on 
changes and hand-on field observation90.  
                                               
88 Things which could be observed through interview:  
(a) How far he/she knows about his/her subject matters/scopes of job-to strengthen the reliability of 
the data obtained. 
(b) Through his/her explanations: What does he/she think about other companies/organisations that 
also one of the stakeholders (positive/negative impressions, the action and reaction). 
(c) Through his/her explanations: What is the relationship between his/her organisation with other 
institutions (roles and responsibilities, complementing, rivalry, pressuring, power distance and 
relationship).  
(d) Through his/her explanations: How does his/her institution interact with other institutions 
(cooperate, avoidance). 
89 When visiting the organisational websites/media in the real time order, the researcher observed and 
experienced the changes of information according to the latest decisions made politically, 
economically and socially that aligns with the latest development of the NGB technology. For 
example, “combating climate change” was used during the formulation of the EUBD (2003). “Cutting 
GHG/CO2 emissions” was used during the formulation and the execution of the UK RTFO (2008). 
While “green and sustainability biofuels” is used after the emergence of systemic risks, and will be 
prioritised for the existing and the NGB product/production.  
90 emphasised during the emergence of two systemic risks: how the media/social groups pressured the 
regulators (the EU/UK/Scottish Government) and oil companies. Simultaneously, how the regulators 
and oil companies responded to the pressure from these social groups and media.  
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3.4.3 Data Collection at a Field Setting  
Cooper and Schindler (2008) note that, the research design is different as to whether 
it occurs under an actual environmental condition (on site/field) or under other 
condition (laboratory with controlled condition). Easterby-Smith et al. (2004) add, 
field work is the study of a real organisation, where a researcher immerse him/herself 
and become part of the group under study, in order to understand the 
meanings/significance that people put upon the behaviour of themselves. This 
research was conducted under the field condition. Data were collected directly in the 
real public and private organisational through interview the SG, BP and Shell 
representatives. 
 
3.4.4 Identifying and Contacting the Respondents for Interview  
The researcher has conducted the face-to-face interviews with four representatives 
from the SG across four departments: Transport, Rural Development, Renewable 
Energy/Bioenergy and Communication/Media. The respondents from the SG are held 
the roles of manager, assistant manager or executive.  
 
For the private sector, there was one representative from Argent, three representatives 
from BP and five from Shell whom are working across Biofuels Business Unit, 
Quality Control, General Administration, Engineering and Renewable Energy. These 
respondents are holding either the managerial or the technical positions which 
directly/indirectly involve in biofuels activities. As such, these respondents are 
significant for the study, since their views/opinions were strongly supported by their 
designations/experiences. Consequently, this helped to build a higher validity and 
reliability of the primary data collected. 
To select these respondents, a candidate contact list was prepared from the search of 
their organisations' websites or through networking (seminars/talks attended). After 
that, an email of invitation-for-interview (if the respondents’ email address were 
available), or a letter was sent (if the respondents’ email address were not found). 
Both emails and letters included an Official Supporting Letter prepared by the 
researcher's principal supervisor-Dr. XiaoBai Shen (refer appendix 3.4.4). This letter 
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helped to clarify the researcher's identity and to support the research. After that, a 
three-to-four-week duration allowed for their reply. Sometimes, a second email/letter 
had to be sent as a reminder. Once a candidate replied, communication was organised 
via email/telephone, which led to an appointment for an interview.  
 
According to Crow et al. (2004), gaining informed consent from the respondent is 
central to an ethical research practice. As such, the researcher has to clarify which the 
data collected would be used solely for an academic research of a Ph.D degree, and 
not for commercial purposes. Some parts of the transcript were returned, which 
allowed the respondents to verify the validity of the data collected. The respondents 
were free to comment/alter/withdraw the information, which made themselves felt 
comfortable and confident for their views to be appeared in the researcher's thesis.   
 
3.5 Questionnaire Design 
The data collection was guided by two sets of questionnaire, one for the SG 
representatives (refer appendix 3.4.2a), with the other for the private companies 
representatives (refer appendix 3.4.2b). According to Warwick and Lininger (1975), 
relevance and accuracy are the basic criteria that a questionnaire must meet and 
design, in order to achieve the research objective. Besides, Zikmund (2003) suggests, 
the types of question and the questionnaire sequence are important for a 
questionnaire design. To achieve these ends, a researcher while designing a 
questionnaire is required to make several decisions as listed in Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5: Decisions in Questionnaire Design 
What should be asked? 
How should each question be phrased? 
In what sequence should the questions be arranged? 
What questionnaire layout will best serve the research objectives? 
How should the questionnaire be pretested? 
Does the questionnaire need to be revised? 
Source: William. 2003. Business Research Methods, pp. 330. 
 
Zikmund (2003) stresses, the importance of a good problem definition and the clear 
objectives in particular, will drive a good questionnaire design. This is because the 
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problem definition will indicate which types of information must be collected to 
answer the research questions. 
 
3.5.1 Questionnaire Relevancy 
A questionnaire is relevant if no unnecessary information is collected, and if the 
information required to address the research questions is obtained. Asking a 
wrong/irrelevant question should be avoided. Some of the recommended questions 
which could be helpful for reflexivity: “Is information being collected on the relevant 
respondent?” “Are there any questions that might clarify the answers to other 
questions?” “Will the results of the study provide the solution to the research 
question?” These questions are highlighted in order to capture the framework of 
questionnaire design (Zikmund, 2003). 
 
3.5.2 Questionnaire Accuracy  
After a researcher has decided what should be asked, the criterion of accuracy then 
becomes the primary concern. Zikmund (2003) defines accuracy as the reliability and 
the validity of the information. By using simple, understandable and unbiased 
wording, this could enhance the accuracy in question writing. Unavoidably, obtaining 
accurate answers from a respondent is strongly influenced by a researcher’s ability to 
design a questionnaire that facilitates recalls and motivates cooperation from a 
respondent. 
 
Psychologically, a respondent tends to be the most cooperative when the subject of 
the research is interesting; and where the questions are not lengthy, difficult to 
answer or ego-threatening. Under the questionnaire design process, the secondary 
data is used to select terms/key words91, which the policy makers and the industrial 
practitioners use. The secondary data helped to strengthen the knowledge base, and 
to avoid information which will be obtained from reading was set as one of the 
questions. One of the objectives of interview was to obtain answers for “how” and 
                                               
91 For example, biodiesel is named as vegetable oil by the SG representatives, biodiesel in BP, while 
is called FAME (Fatty Acid Methyl Ester) in Shell. 
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“why” questions, and to get further information which the secondary data has not 
justified.  
 
3.5.3 Open-Ended Response Questions 
There are many ways to phrase a question. For the construction of a questionnaire, 
the researcher opted for the open-ended format, which asked the respondents to 
express his/her opinions freely. Open-ended response questions are free-answer 
questions. It is most beneficial when a researcher is conducting exploratory research, 
especially if the range of responses is not known. Zikmund (2003) admits, 
respondents are free to answer with whatever is uppermost in their thinking. 
However, the open-ended response questions carry disadvantages too.  
 
Firstly, the cost of open-ended response questions is substantially greater than fixed-
alternative questions. This is because of the job of coding, editing and analysing the 
data gathered are quite extensive and time consuming. Each respondent’s answer is 
unique. There is some difficulty in categorising and summarising the answers 
(Zikmund, 2003).  
 
Secondly, the interviewer bias may influence the responses. While most instructions 
state that the interviewer is to record answers verbatim, rarely can even the best 
interviewer get every word spoken by a respondent. There is a tendency for 
interviewer to take short cuts in recording answers. Unfortunately, this could lead to 
changing a few of a respondent's words and thereby substantially influencing the 
meaning/results. Thus, the final answer often is a combination of the respondent’s 
and the interviewer’s ideas rather than the respondent’s ideas alone (Zikmund, 2003).  
 
In order to overcome such shortcomings, the researcher exercised precautionary steps 
to ensure more accurate answers could be obtained. Firstly, knowing the open-ended 
question does not set a limit for answers, the researcher designed the questionnaire 
which excluded biasness/carelessness. The questionnaire has been checked by the 
researcher' supervisors and being tested on two/three close friends of the researcher 
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who are working in the SG, BP and Shell. Reflexivity and refinement of the 
questionnaires were carried out from time to time, to accommodate new inputs/latest 
information and new event emerged. 
 
Next, even though a respondent can express his/her opinions freely, yet he/she is 
being guided to avoid from giving information which will deviate too far away from 
what the question is seeking to answer 92 . The researcher has another copy of 
questionnaire with sub-questions set, in order to guide the interview process and 
probe for further answers from the respondent.  
 
Thirdly, one of the most important criteria which contributed to a higher accuracy of 
the information obtained was-the researcher was truly participative and paid full 
attention during the discussion. The researcher played “no presumption”. Any 
ambiguities which was beyond the researcher's knowledge, the researcher then asked 
for further explanation. For example, the researcher understood the RTFO 
programme, yet when the Gallagher report (2008) was mentioned by the respondent, 
the researcher requested the respondent to provide further explanations.  This is 
because, it is better to get the first-hand understanding from a well-informed 
respondent, rather to get the information and search through later. Lastly, the 
researcher got permission to use a dictation phone and recorded the entire interview 
session, while shorthand was performed simultaneously to write down the 
information. Not every single word has been written. The shorthand was made as a 
back-up when important points were made by the respondent by highlighted the key 
words/key messages. After parts of the conversation have been transcribed, 
shorthand could be used to compare with the transcripts to check for accuracy. In 
order to gain the validity of the data, some parts of the transcript were sent to the 
respondent, and he/she was free to comment, alter or to drop any parts which made 
him/her felt more confident on the information revealed.  
                                               
92 Some of the respondents were willing to share their personal childhood stories or working 
history/experience which seemed to appreciate the renewables. Yet, realising that this information 
would not going to answer the research questions, the researcher has been cautiously guided them 
back to the question being discussed. 
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3.5.4 Questionnaire Sequence 
The order of the questions may serve several functions for a researcher. Zikmund 
(2003) states, if the opening questions are interesting, simple to comprehend and 
easy to answer; then a respondent’s cooperation and involvement can be maintained 
throughout the interview. If a respondent’s curiosity is not aroused at the outset, then 
he/she could become disinterested and the interview would be terminated. 
 
In an attempt to warm up respondents toward the questionnaire, Zikmund (2003) 
advises that a researcher frequently asks demographic/classification questions at the 
beginning of the questionnaire. This is generally not advisable as asking for personal 
information such as income level or education may embarrass/threaten the 
respondents. It is generally better to ask embarrassing questions at the middle or the 
end of the questionnaire after a rapport has been established.  
 
For the questionnaire design, the designation and the scope of job of the respondent 
have been identified beforehand. Such information usually could be obtained from 
the organisational websites, or from information provided by the introducer for this 
respondent. No sensitive questions have been set which could invade the privacy of 
the respondent. The ultimate aim was not to know about the respondent individually, 
but rather his/her thoughts on issues/topics which were discussed. The designation 
and the scope of job of the respondent were parameters to identify the 
suitability/credibility of the respondent before the interview was carried out.  
 
In addition, Zikmund (2003) reminds, order bias could distort result. Normally, the 
sequencing of specific questions before asking about broader issues are a common 
cause of order bias. Therefore, it is advisable to ask general questions before specific 
questions, to obtain the freest of open-ended responses. This procedure is known as 
the funnel technique, which allows a researcher to understand the respondent’s frame 
of reference before asking more specific questions about the level of the respondent’s 




3.6 Reflexivity: The Respondent's Perception on Interview 
The researcher found out, the presence of the researcher during the interview process 
has affected the respondents’ perception. The respondents inclined to act unnaturally 
and became formal and cautious during the conversation. In general, they were 
careful to reveal information, particularly when the researcher intended to probe 
further from the previous statements which they have made. Redding (1970) 
explains, this is because, when people in the study perceive that research is being 
conducted, the respondents’ perceptions influence the outcomes of the research in 
subtle ways. Although there is no widespread evidence of attempts to please a 
researcher through a successful hypotheses guessing, or an evidence of the 
prevalence of sabotage, when a respondent believes that something out of the 
ordinary is happening-especially what he/she said would be recorded, he/she may 
behave less naturally.  
 
There were two levels of perception which the researcher would reflect during 
interviews: Subjects perceive minor/no deviations and subjects perceive deviations 
induced by the researcher. The perceptions of the respondents were variedly behaved 
according to the types/functions of their business, either as a public/corporate 
representative. In order to demonstrate these reactions, the “Response Likert Scale”93 
could be applied, to represent the openness of the respondents.  
(a) Subjects perceive minor/no deviations 
There were four representatives from the SG across four departments: Transport, 
Rural Development, Bioenergy and Media. The Likert Scale Scores generally ranged 
4-to-4.5. The respondents perceived minor/no deviations with the presence of the 
researcher, and they generally showed a high enthusiasm in sharing information 
openly during the interview process. This was mainly due to the nature operation of 
the SG as the policy maker, of which the main audience is the general public. 
Therefore, information dissemination is one of the main functions of its operations. 
The researcher had an easy access to these respondents, and received adequate 
information-which was mainly supported by the policies established by the SG. After 
                                               
93 Five is the highest openness while one as the highest closeness. 
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the interview, the researcher was in touch with two of them for information updates. 
They were keen to provide more updated information which was related to their 
work.   
 
(b) Subjects perceive deviations as the researcher induced 
Corporate representatives (one from Argent, three from BP and five from Shell) 
could be evaluated with the Likert Score ranged 3-to-3.5. Most of the information 
shared was limited to the general/corporately published information, but strictly did 
not cross into any business secrecy/classified information.  
 
One strategy which the researcher applied was to have himself adequately prepared. 
By reading as much as possible/as wide as possible from the corporate publications, 
the basic understanding of the information helped the researcher to be well-informed, 
which could then tap into more in-depth questions relating to “how” and “why”, and 
avoided irrelevant questions from being asked. Overall, some of the questions from 
these corporate representatives were answered well. Yet, some were not answered at 
all due to commercial confidentiality/classified information since the respondents 
were unwilling to reveal. There was a good rapport built (with one respondent from 
BP and two respondents from Shell). They were helpful and are still in touch to 
provide further updates/share internal used corporate publications/information to the 
researcher. 
 
3.7 Reflexivity: Problems Faced during Data Collection and Solutions  
Apart from attaining the research objectives-as an ultimate academic achievement; 
learning of the research skills through this research process is also one of the 
accomplishments. In reality, the researcher has some limitations94. Apart from these 
natural limitations, the green field of the study generates more problems that the 
researcher anticipated. There were three problems faced by the researcher along this 
                                               
94 Issues like: the researcher is an international student, whose the first language is not English. The 
researcher is trained as an engineer as his first degree, but then doing social science research in 




“contemporary” research process: networking establishment for data collection, 
sociotechnological change which was dynamic/uncertain, and information which was 
not adequately/on-timely available. Yet, all of these have not been taken as the 
natural hurdles by the researcher himself. The passion about gaining knowledge, a 
willingness to learn and the courage to conduct an entirely new study in a foreign 
country could never have materialised without the support of the researcher's 
supervisors, family members and friends.  
 
3.7.1 Networking Establishment 
There were four representatives95 from the SG. Compared with the oil companies, 
the researcher had easy access to these respondents, received adequate information 
that was mainly supported by the policies established by the SG. However, to 
establish networking in the oil companies was never easy. This networking building 
was the most challenging assignment before the data collection could began. It was 
trying, challenging and time consuming. The researcher took more than a year to find 
the right person who was working directly/indirectly in biofuels96.  
 
The problems were resolved once the researcher obtained information about BP 
through the Edinburgh University Business School Alumni. Besides, the 
participations of the researcher in some of the seminars/talks organised by the 
Business School where oil representatives were invited as the speakers were helpful. 
Furthermore, through a friend of the researcher who is working at Shell (working 
across projects in Malaysia, Singapore and Dubai), the accession into Shell UK was 
finally established. Inevitably, “who do you know” played the ultimate factor for 
networking expansion. Introduction from one respondent to his/her colleagues, one-
                                               
95 These four SG representatives are those who working on biofuels directly/indirectly. Initially there 
were six interview conducted. Two have been rejected by the researcher after the data collected due to 
the data obtained were not related to biofuels, rather they were centred around: RE generation (wind 
farm, tidal), media and campaign for eco-driving. 
96 Three representatives from BP and five from Shell are those who working closely related or 
directly on biofuels. Initially, there were eleven interview conducted. Three (two from BP and one 
from Shell) have been rejected due to the results obtained were not suitable for the study. The 
information obtained centred around: consultants working for these oil companies, and engineers 
working off shore. 
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by-one was time consuming and fragile. The discontinuities happened many times 
and it was trying. However, reflecting on the process, it was a rewarding learning 
curve. The networking was finally established to both the regulator and the oil 
companies’ representatives.  
 
3.7.2 Dynamics of Sociotechnological Change 
Data collection through interviews officially began on 1 April 2008 and ended on 30 
September 2009. The researcher has travelled to Edinburgh, Glasgow, London, 
Aberdeen and Dundee; met up with the respondents according to the appointments 
set. There were three important events which occurred during this interview period. 
Firstly, the early period of the RTFO execution; Secondly, when the systemic risks 
responded by the UK Government on 7 July 200897; and thirdly, the period after the 
systemic risks were cooled down beyond 15 September 200898. The marking of these 
important dates was aimed to highlight the emergence of new inputs, which the 
researcher had to take into consideration when interviews were conducted.  
 
Biofuels deployment and development are contemporary and evolving with the 
technological change. These two processes are complex and uncertain. The main 
drawback for interviews conducted during the RTFO early execution was, that they 
seriously lacked feedback for the deployment process. Most of the information 
gained was related to the pre-deployment of the RTFO, most of which could be 
gained through the document (regional/national policies, corporate reports) analysis.  
 
During the emergence of the two systemic risks (food-fuel competition and 
biodiversity threatened) which was amplified by the international/national pressure 
groups and media, the UK Government responded to this issue and declared on 
media publicly to slow down the biofuels expansion in the UK. This was a new input 
                                               
97 On 7 July 2008 marked the official date, where the UK ex-Transport Secretary Ruth Kelly 
announced the decision to slow down biofuels expansion in the UK. Two months later, this was 
followed by the alteration of the RTFO targets after the publishing Gallagher Review (2008).  
98 which marked the date of the media/public attention was switching from the biofuels debates to the 
world financial downturn after the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brother. 
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which had to be taken into consideration for the interviews. However, during this 
period of time, most of the respondents (the SG, BP and Shell representatives) were 
unable to provide any precise and definite answers on the counteracting 
strategies/actions, apart from commented that, more evidence would be required and 
analysed before any decision could be made. 
 
The real situation was, two-month after the news, many respondents were unsure and 
uncertain as what should be done next. The oil companies’ representatives generally 
were waiting for decisions/instructions made from the EU/UK government. They 
refused to comment about the systemic risks occurred. Meanwhile the SG 
representatives were also lacking information, and were waiting for more evidence. 
Only after 20 September 2008, the researcher was able to obtain a copy of the 
Gallagher Review with the conclusion: biofuels would continue, but the RTFO 
targets are revised to slow down the biofuels expansion in the UK. Furthermore, 
more stringent requirements for the green and sustainable (G&S) criteria will be 
enforced and emphasised on biofuels supply which is controlled by the RTF 
Certificate  and the Renewable Fuel Agency “Carbon and Sustainability” monthly 
reporting system must be obligated to be complied by biofuels producers and 
suppliers (refer appendix 4.1.4).    
 
On 15 September 2008 marked another important date for the research's data 
collection. It was the day where the global media announced the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. This switched the British public’s attention and the 
media concentration from the biofuels controversy to the beginning of the global 
financial crisis. This was the period where the biofuels disputes/systemic risks were 
cooled down. Apart from the pressure groups which continued their agendas against 
biofuels, the media showed more interest on the financial crisis which had a higher 
news value. Some interviews conducted after this date had begun to take in this new 





Given the deployment process which did not generate adequate feedbacks for the 
execution, and the emergence of systemic risks and then the financial crisis; each of 
these events added to the complication of the research. Hence, conjectures about 
certain aspects are unavoidable. To overcome these problems, the researcher re-
invited all respondents to conduct a second interview. Only two99 from the SG and 
one100 from Shell responded to the invitation. Even though more than half invitations 
were turned down101, fortunately, some are still being helpful to be in touch with the 
researcher, and sending in (through email/post) new information. Two representatives 
from BP and two from Shell were supportive and shared the most updated 
publications (internal use/circulated corporate magazines, classified reports) with the 
researcher. Without their help, further updates would be more challenging, as much 
of this information was not publicly available.  
 
3.7.3 Inaccessibility of Updated Secondary Data 
As expected, the openness of the SG representatives was positive. Much information 
has been obtained during interviews. However, the efficiency of their publications 
was rather low, particularly for the latest information/updates after the RTFO targets 
were reduced to slow down biofuels expansion in the UK. However, the openness of 
the corporate companies’ representatives was low due to information reservation. 
Despite the fact that, they have higher efficiency on their publications; yet it is the 
matter of accessing the latest information. Latest information is hardly to be 
obtained/accessed by the public without knowing someone who is working for the 
organisations.   
 
Information relevant to the pre-commencement of the RTFO was more than adequate 
to support the first three research objective (refer section 1.2) particularly the policies 
formulated for biofuels deployment. However, after the commencement of the RTFO 
                                               
99 Executive of Renewable Policy Team, Policy Manager of Cleaner Vehicles and Alternative Fuels 
100 Executive in the Shell CO2 Abatement Project. 
101 The reasons to turn down the second invitation for interview: No further updates from his/her 
organisation; the RTFO alteration/systemic risks/global recession did not impact his/her organisation, 
no adequate information which he/she could share, or personal reasons such as uninterested.  
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and the subsequent systemic risks emerged, the researcher faced difficulties in 
getting the relevant information and latest updates. With no specific date of release 
(from regulators) and no guarantee for public access (from oil companies), one of the 
toughest challenges which the researcher faced was catching up the up-to-date 
development surrounding the RTFO executions, the R&U incurred, the systemic 
risks emerged and the strategies that were implemented to have these R&U resolved.   
 
The delay in publication of official reports is a normal practice in public 
administration. Most of the issues would be fully investigated by some independent 
consultants (appointed by the UK/Scottish government), while the 
evidence/conclusions would only be published few months later. Sometimes, it could 
take up a year or two for the report to be finally published102. Meanwhile, corporate 
publications are restricted for internal circulation/use, and not for releasing to the 
general public. Unless it is reported in their annual report which is publicly available 
to attract investments; most of the latest information is confined within the 
organisation and would be termed secured/classified business information.  
 
Since the secondary data is a complementary source to support the primary data and 
to enrich the information for the research subjects; the researcher paid serious 
attention to the availability of this information. Firstly, the researcher used Google 
search engine to find the latest information103 every day. Secondly, the researcher 
watched BBC News daily and read online/purchased newspapers or visited each 
organisations 104  website once per week. Thirdly, for documents which were not 
accessible, the researcher contacted the respondents and requested the publications105 
                                               
102 For example a report from AEA Technology, about Greenhouse Gas Inventories for England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 1990-2006, was released in September 2008. Besides, the 
Gallagher Review was published in July 2008, but only made available to the public in November 
2008. 
103 The keys words put into string: biofuels, the next generation biofuels R&D, the EU/UK 
Government biofuels, the Scottish Government biofuels, BP biofuels (year), Shell Biofuels (year), the 
RTFO, the 2G biofuels, the 3G biofuels, algae biofuels, food-fuel competition, biodiversity 
threatened, world hunger biofuels, green and sustainability biofuels and roundtables.  
104 the UN/EU/UK/Scottish Government, BP, Shell, and related pressure groups (like the Friends of 
the Earth, Oxfarm, the Royal Society) biofuels roundtables and others. 
105 Articles, reports, magazines, policies, news release which were obtained from the print media and 
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as well as opinions from them.  
 
3.8 Data Analysis  
Data analysis refers to the practical application of investigative procedure in social 
science data. It is concerned with familiarising a social researcher to the use of 
interpretation/evaluation of relevant data; in order to arrive at a better understanding 
of social processes (Rose and Sullivan, 1996) and to achieve the research objectives. 
Since open-ended questions were used for data collection, the researcher has to 
manage the raw data collected efficiently. Recognising that each of the respondent’s 
answers were unique, there were some difficulties in categorising and summarising 
the answers accordingly. However, some could be easily arranged since they showed 
some significant patterns of coherency.  
 
The researcher has gone over questions, and classified the information collected 
according to the classification scheme. These schemes were mainly based on the 
research objectives, and set as a guide to counter-check whether information has 
been collected, has answered the research questions appropriately and achieved the 
research objectives accordingly. Although it was an extensive and time consuming 
process, the uniqueness and the rich information obtained from the open ended 
questions helped to fill up the gaps and the ambiguities.  
 
Miles and Huberman (1994) define data analysis with three concurrent flows of 
activity:  
(a) Data reduction: a form of analysis that sharpens, sorts, focuses, discards and 
organises data in a way that final conclusions could be reached and verified. For 
examples: the primary data obtained has been organised by the researcher, to show 
the flow of explanations/justifications, and information was managed and presented 
to ensure it appeared in a concise manner. Furthermore, the secondary data such as 
policies, corporate reports were organised to depict the chronological flow of 
biofuels deployment and development, while the political/corporate messages were 
                                                                                                                                     
the internet gateway.  
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focused to draw out the most important substance for such technological change. 
 
(b) Data display: an organised, compressed assembly of information that permits 
conclusion to be drawn. The displays in this thesis include many types of figures, 
tables and models; as all are designed to assemble information which could be 
presented in a clear/concise manner.  
 
(c) Conclusions are verified as the analyst proceeds. Verification may be as fleeting 
second thought crossing the analyst's mind during the writing-up phase, with a short 
excursion back to the field notes. Next, it may be thorough to elaborate 
argumentation and reviews to develop inter subjective consensus. Thus, the latest 
information for technological change has been searched. Information from the 
secondary data (that set up the basic knowledge) was combined with the primary data 
which strengthened the justifications to answer why such decisions were made and 
actions were taken. This information was substantial to construct a comprehensive 
overview, and to ensure a sound/concrete conclusion could be drawn. 
 
3.8.1 Analysing Data for Case Study 
Proposed by Yin (1994), there are four dominant analytic techniques:1pattern 
matching, 2explanation building, 3time series analysis, and 4program logic models. 
Each is applicable whether a study involves a single/multiple case design. The 
ultimate goal is to treat the evidence fully, to produce compelling analytic 
conclusions, and to rule out alternative interpretations. The researcher study was 
analysed through explanation building and time series analysis.  
 
In these cases studied, explanation building has appeared mostly in descriptive form. 
The driving forces, mechanisms, roles and responsibilities, interactions built between 
the regulators and the oil companies to implement biofuels deployment and the NGB 
development are under investigation. Mean while strategies implemented to 




A time series analysis was also adopted. According to Yin (1994), it could be much 
simpler in one sense, yet the pattern can be more complicated in another sense, 
because the multiple changes in this variable over time may have no clear ending 
point. With the focus on technological change which was centralised on the issue of 
biofuels deployment and development; clearly, there was a need to clearly divide 
these into two different periods of time. From this, the research could concentrate in 
biofuels deployment as well as in development stages, while the different R&U 
emerged through the different processes and the strategies implemented could be 
researched. Therefore the time series was a guide which allowed the researcher to 
build on explanation and description for the analysis. These time series were not 
rigidly apprehend in chronological sequence, but rather a conceptual flow which 
postulated different stages of biofuels, and segregated the mass of the information 
collected, to a more logical way of analysis and data presentation. 
 
Yin (1994) further comments, the logic underlying a time series analysis is the match 
between a trend of data points compared with (a) a theoretically significant trend 
specified before the onset of the investigation, (b) some rival trend, also (c) any trend 
based on some artefact or threat to internal validity. Due to the strength of case study 
which able to trace socio-technical changes over time106, it enables the study of 
relationship of events over time.  
 
3.9 Validity, Reliability and Generalisability 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) claim, there is an underlying anxiety among researchers 
of all persuasions that the research will not stand up to outside scrutiny. This is very 
understandable since research papers and theses are most likely to be attacked on 
methodological grounds.  
 
The technical terms for validity, reliability and generalisability are varies with the 
philosophical viewpoint adopted during the research design. Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2004) summarise some of the differences between positivist, relativist and 
                                               
106 which does not limited to cross-sectional or static assessments of a particular situation.  
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constructionist viewpoints. Due to the philosophical stand of this research was 
grounded on social constructivism, the researcher has picked up the elaborations as 
shown in Table 3.6. 
 
As Kirk and Miller (1986) point out, the language of validity and reliability was 
originally developed for use in quantitative social science, and many procedures have 
been devised for assessing different facets of each. Classic text books on 
methodology distinguish between three main kinds of validity: construct, internal and 
external validity. However, Easterby-Smith, et al. (2004) explain, their definition of 
validity is similar to the concept of construct validity, and the notion of 
generalisability is similar to the traditional definition of external validity. 
 
Table 3.6: Perspectives on Validity, Reliability and Generalisability 
Parameters Constructionist Case Study Tactic Phases of Research 










Does the study clearly gain 
access to the experiences of 




-Use multiple sources of 
evidence 
-Establish chain of evidence 
-Have key information review 
draft case study report 
 
-Do explanation building 









Reliability109 Is there transparency in how 
sense was made from the 
raw data? 
-Use case study protocol 
-Develop case study data base 
-Data collection 




Do the concepts and 
constructs derived from this 
study have any relevance to 
other settings? 
-Use replication logic in 
multiple case studies 
-Research design 
Source: Combination of Yin (1994) pp. 33 and Easterby-Smith et al. (2004) pp.33. 
 
                                               
107 whether the instruments are accurate measures of reality (Easterby-Smith et al., 2004). 
108 whether the research design is capable of eliminating bias and the effect of extraneous variables 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2004). It shows the establishment of a causal relationship, where by certain 
conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguish from spurious relationships (Yin, 
1994).  
109 Demonstrating that the operation of a study, where the data collection procedures can be repeated, 
with the same results (Yin, 1994). 
110 involves defining the domains to which the results of the study may be generalised (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2004). 
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3.9.1 Construct Validity and Internal Validity 
In terms of validity, some argue that qualitative research has higher validity, because 
it stays closer to the real meaning of social existence than quantitative research that 
produces numerical findings (Baker, 1999).  
 
For case study, according to Yin (1994), several tactics have to be used in dealing 
with these requirements, and the tactics should be applied throughout the conduct of 
the case study. Besides, the data analysis needs to be complemented with 
triangulation-a way of examining insights gleaned from different informants/sources 
of data. By drawing on other types and sources of data, observers also gain a deeper 
and clearer understanding of the setting and of the people being studied (Taylor and 
Bogdan, 1998). Furthermore, Lewis and Ritchie (2003) note that triangulation 
assumes that the use of different sources of information will help to confirm and to 
improve the clarity/precision of a research finding. This also allows the data to be 
explored from a different viewpoint/perspective, while the risk of bias could be 
reduced.  
 
Denzin (1978) and Patton (2002) provide a good understanding on triangulation 
which consists of: 
(a) Methods triangulation: Checking out the consistency of findings generated by 
different data collection methods. 
(b) Triangulation of sources: Checking out the consistency of different data sources 
within the same method.  
(c) Analyst triangulation: Using multiple analysts to review findings. 
(d) Theory/perspective triangulation: Using multiple theoretical perspectives to 
interpret the data. 
 
They insist that by triangulating with multiple data sources, methods, and analysis; a 
researcher can make substantial strides in overcoming the scepticism that greets 
singular methods, bias analysts, and single perspective interpretations. The 




(a) Interview: not only has it obtained primary information relevant to the SG, BP 
and Shell respectively on biofuels deployment and development, but it also gained 
cross information 111  from each of the respondents' views/opinions about other 
respondents or issues discussed. The cross information seeking provided some 
insights, enabled the researcher to understand the respondents' views and the 
interactions between two parties. The richness of the information generated has 
established a chain of evidence that strengthen the validity of the study. 
 
(b) Observation: from the media streaming, the researcher looked at a larger picture 
to comprehend the sociotechnological change which incurred R&U during biofuels 
adoption and development.  
 
(c) Document analysis: the documents which served as the sources of secondary data 
were highly reliable. They were published/produced from the organisation, which 
signified the quality of reliableness and trustworthiness. Besides, document analysis 
has bridged the logical link between facts and other evidence found through 
interviews and observations.  
 
3.9.2 Reliability 
The objective is to be sure that, if a later investigator followed exactly the same 
procedures as described by an earlier investigator and conducted the same case study 
all over again, the later investigator should arrive at the same findings and 
conclusions. The goal of reliability is to minimise the errors and biases in a study 
(Yin, 1994).  
 
One prerequisite for allowing this is the need to document the procedures followed in 
the case study. Baker (1999) advises, a research is required to strengthen the 
                                               
111 For example, opinion from the respondent A was used to gain feedbacks when interviewed the 
respondent B. The respondent B was free to comment what he/she thought about comments made by 
respondent A, as well as issues raised from media, and quotations from the significant representatives 
such as environmentalists, academicians, politicians and others. 
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reliability of a case study, where he/she must carefully document each step in 
research design and data collection in a case study protocol. According to Yin (1994), 
a protocol is a written plan (notes and audit trail), containing the instrument, 
procedure and general rules based on a comprehensive outline of how the study will 
be carried out.  
 
The researcher kept a case study protocol which accommodated information such as 
case study data base, case study materials and record for latest information. This was 
encouraged by the researcher's supervisors, to make sure records were clearly made, 
to testify the sources of information. 
 
3.9.2.1 Developing a Protocol for the Case Study 
Yin (1994) suggests, the protocol have the following sections: 
(a) An overview of the entire project, which includes the objectives, issues, and the 
literature reviews that are relevant to the case study. 
(b) A description of field procedures, including form of access, relevant credentials, 
sources of information and various reminders of how to operate in the field. 
(c) The questions to be answered in the study, which will guide the data collection 
and suggest sources of information for answering the questions. 
(d) The guide for preparing the final case study report. This written protocol guides 
the entire research efforts. 
 
The protocol then performed as a guiding instrument. It reminded the researcher 
what the case study is about. Yin (1994) advises, the preparation of the protocol 
forces an investigator/researcher to anticipate several problems, including of how the 
case study reports might be completed. The audience for such report will have to be 
identified, even before the case study has been conducted  
  
3.9.3 Generalisability  
Yin (1994) admits, the case study method has the critical limitation to prove whether 
a study's findings are generalisable beyond the case study. This is because the factor 
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of localisation has shaped the research, from the beginning of the research 
ideas/concepts to the conclusion which is going to make.  
 
Yin (1994) backed the case study method with “analytical generalisation”. This 
method allows a researcher to generalise a particular set of results to some broader 
theory. However, the generalisation is not automatic; whilst a theory must be tested 
through replications of the findings in a second/third study. Once such replication has 
been made, the results might be accepted for a larger number of similar studies. This 
replication logic is the same that underlies the use of experiments, and allows 
scientists to generalise from one experiment to another. Hence, through case study, 
the first step on theory building is setting up propositions to link the data to be 
collected (Baker, 1999).  
 
At the end of the analysis, the novelty is to produce a theory. According to Langley 
(1999) theory building involves three processes112, yet for this research it was the 
induction process, which empirical research generalisation towards theory building. 
According to Rose and Sullivan (1996), induction begins from particular 
observations from which empirical generalisations are made, as these generalisations 
then form the basis for the theory building. As such, Patton (2002) claims that 
inductive analysis involves discovering patterns, themes, and categories in one's data 
where findings emerge out of the data, through the analyst's interactions with the 
data.   
 
3.10 Conclusion  
In this chapter, the researcher has discussed the issues in deciding the appropriate 
methodology for this research. The researcher has identified the paradigm as a social 
constructionism-which provides a high degree of social interaction and involvement 
from the SG and the oil companies within the biofuels regulated market. This 
allowed the researcher to access different data sources and information, which has 
                                               
112 (a) Induction (data-driven generalisation), (b) Deduction (theory-driven hypothesis testing), and 
(c) Inspiration (driven by creativity and insight) (Langley, 1999). 
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the potential to obtain new insight into the research. Besides, the researcher 
concluded that the research falls into an exploratory type because it fulfilled the 
research purpose (explorative on green field), while case study approach was adopted 
to conduct the research-intensively helped the researcher to understand the research 
phenomenon of the technological change with attempts to deal with the cases in an 
in-depth study.  
 
Throughout the research process, the researcher opted for three data collection 
methods-interview, observation and document analysis; with two methods of 
analysis-explanation building and time series analysis. All of these methods of 
analysis enabled the researcher to link data to propositions and interpreted findings 
towards theory building, which complied with the requirements of validity, reliability 
and generalisability.  
 
The research outcomes have attained the research objectives and answered the 
research questions, within the process with a trying condition. If the researcher had a 
chance to repeat the research process-the social constructivism, qualitative, case 
study would still be opted. Yet, some other considerations would be taken into 
account to enable the research to be conducted in a more effective way. Then, more 
efforts could be spent to deal with the actual challenge of the data analysis and not 
the process of data collection which took long time to search for the right respondent. 
Some of the considerations include:  
(a) To conduct data collection a year after the RTFO execution. This longer period 
would allow more concrete information/feedback to be obtained, and would not 
require repetitive interviews to get further information.   
 
(b) To conduct a focus group rather one-to-one interview. The focus group could lead 
to more generated information, where the interactions among respondents could 
create momentum and be dynamic to allow the topic to be explored and expanded. 
Besides, the respondents' perceptions would be lowered, since the environment 
would be interactive-and more discussions rather than rigidly operated within modes 
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of question-and-answer session.  
 
Indeed, to conduct a successful interview, adequate preparation is the critical factor. 
Advocated by van Maanen (1983) and Strauss and Corbin, (1990), qualitative 
research requires thinking abstractly; critically analysing situations; avoiding biases 
in order to obtain valid and reliable information. Personally, a successful interview is 
not only enabling a researcher to answer the research questions, but is also benefiting 
the respondents at the same time. Through this research, it provided a platform for 
information sharing. It bridged between the academic knowledge and industrial 

























































Chapter 4 Governments Policies in Shaping the UK Biofuels 
Deployment and Development 
Preface 
Since the UK is a unitary state with a devolved system of government, the UK 
biofuels deployment is determined by the UK Government and influenced by the EU 
Government. However, biofuels implementation in Scotland is not a single cell 
decision of the Scottish Government (SG). The existence of the EU and the UK 
Governments’ influence the multiple roles the SG plays-not only as one of the 
regulators, but also as the executor of biofuels adoption and innovation in Scotland. 
Under the Devolved Matters, the defined scopes of function allow the SG to have its 
sovereignty over decisions made on the NGB development. As a result, numerous the 
NGB pioneering development projects are established and executed by the SG within 
its own political authority. Therefore, the EU and the UK Governments have 
influenced the SG's actions, and shaped most of the UK/Scottish biofuels policies. 
This is important to ensure that Scotland-as a part of the UK, is aligned with the 
national agenda and complies with the EU Single Market Principle under the 
European Economic Community. 
 
There are many policies formulated at the UN/EU/UK levels which are interwoven, 
and are driving forward the awareness for climate change. One of the targeted areas 
is for a low-carbon transport system. Under biofuels deployment/development, there 
are few significant policies which commenced them. This chapter will discuss the 
flow of the related policies, their proliferation leading to the UK biofuels 
deployment, and to the SG's pursuance on the NGB development.   
 
4.1 From Kyoto Protocol to EU Biofuels Directive  
On 31 May 2002, the EU Government ratified the Kyoto Protocol (refer appendix 
4.1.1). The twenty-five EU Member States 113  collectively agreed and obliged to 
comply with their respective national GHG emissions targets, in order to achieve the 
                                               
113 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the UK. 
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overall EU target of 8% GHG reductions (compared against 1990 as the base year) 
by 2012.  
 
After the Protocol ratification, it was the beginning of the EU policies formulation, 
which brought together different methodologies/plans/strategies in order to achieve 
the regional target. There are many sectors which needed to be catered for, mainly 
power generations, industrial/commercial/household energy use and transport 
system. According to the Commission of the European Communities (2006), 
emissions resulting from regional transport accounted for 21% of the total emissions 
of GHG in the period of 1990-2001. As a result, it is necessary to use fuels that are 
less polluting than oil. Two regional policies which focus for regional road transport 
GHG reductions are the Directive on the Promotion of Biofuels (DPB) 2001, which 
subsequently became the EU Biofuels Directive (EUBD) 2003. 
 
The DPB (2001) deals with the issues of energy security and the GHG reduction 
(refer appendix 4.1.2). To tackle these two considerations, the DPB (2001) suggests 
three potential alternative ranges of fuels-biofuels, natural gas and H2; that each 
could be developed up to the level of 5% (or more) of the total automotive fuel 
market by 2020. However, biofuels has been strongly favoured in preference to the 
other two alternatives. 
 
Analysing the EU policies, the driving force behind the long-term substitution of 
conventional diesel and gasoline is the need to improve the long-term security of 
energy supply; as well as to reduce the environmental impacts from the transport 
sector. Any future regional policy development will continue to give higher priority 
to these two areas, while any long-term political solutions/actions will have to offer a 
reduction in oil dependency as well as a reduction in GHG emissions (DPB, 2001). 
Even though natural gas produces a lower carbon emission, it is still a fossil product 
which will be depleted over time.  
 
Under the operation of the transport sector, the requirements of comfort, confidence, 
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performance of the vehicle (fuel efficiency), security/availability of the fuel supply, 
low environmental impacts, high level of safety and the overall low cost of driving 
are high on the list of requirements. Penetration of any new transport fuel technology 
is fundamentally dependent upon its broad availability, ease of accessibility and price 
competitiveness. Establishing a strategy covering a fuel supply system is expensive 
and only could be justified if there is sufficient demand. This situation makes any 
new fuel/engine technology take-off difficult. Comparatively, H2 fuel cell is the most 
complicated alternative, requiring an alternative engine technology, a large 
investment in plant to produce H2, as well as a totally new distribution system (DPB, 
2001). Thus, shifting to a H2 based transport system is a major decision, which is not 
only costly, time consuming, but also full of risk and uncertainty (R&U).  
 
As a result, it seems any radical change in the fuel/engine technology for road 
transport would face a number of challenges. This is because, any alternative 
fuel/engine technology will have to be made economically competitive in order to 
penetrate the market. Different alternatives (biofuels, natural gas or H2) will require 
different types/levels of investment in infrastructure and equipment. However, 
replacing a small percentage of diesel/gasoline with biofuels is the simplest method. 
Besides, establishing plants to produce biofuels is the long-term investment which is 
considered economically viable. Ever since the first oil crisis in 1973, biomass has 
been adopted; and in some cases promoted, as an alternative to hydrocarbon as a 
source of energy (DPB, 2001). 
 
In principle, the European Commission believes that biofuels offer an ideal 
alternative when based on EU grown crops/organic waste. Using biomass as a by-
product is practical and CO2 neutral since their carbon content is captured from the 
atmosphere. In addition, the EU Government believes that by creating an EU market 
for biofuels, this would offer an opportunity for the Candidate Countries 114  for 
increased regional trade. On average, these Candidate Countries have more 
agricultural land and less diesel/gasoline consumption per capita than the present EU 
                                               
114 Iceland, Croatia, the Former Yugoslavia of Macedonia and Turkey.  
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Member States (DPB, 2001). 
 
The European Commission also acknowledges that biofuels are expensive (at 
approximately €300/1000 litre). Besides, their direct/indirect energy consumption 
during the crops growing and fuels production mean that more than half of the CO2 
benefit is offset in the production process. However, the DPB (2001) is convinced 
that, these two problems could be reduced by tax incentives115, and also by fuelling 
the production process with waste material from the crops for example straw-which 
is one of the 2G biofuels feedstocks. Even though the 1G biofuels will hardly be seen 
as a long-term high volume solution for motor fuels due to the limitations of 
agriculture capacity and available land, the 1G deserves to be exploited in the 
medium-term while waiting for the 2G biofuels to be commercialised. This is 
because biofuels could be used in the existing hydrocarbon vehicles and hydrocarbon 
distribution system which do not require expensive investments (DPB, 2001). Until 
the next generation biofuels (NGB) is commercially available, the 1G is a medium-
term technology implementation, which allows transition to the NGB to take place.  
 
Finally, a requirement for a defined minimum percentage of biofuels against all fuel 
sold throughout the EU was outlined by the DPB (2001). As the first step, a 
minimum biofuels share up to 2% was suggested. This figure was suggested in order 
to create a stable market, require the gradual establishment of biofuels production, 
and to allow for valuable experience to be gained before the next steps on biofuels 
expansion become effective. The European Commission believed, the most effective 
way of promoting large-scale biofuels penetration would be through obligatory 
blending of a certain percentage of biofuels into gasoline/diesel marketed throughout 
Europe. This solution requires no modification of existing vehicles, and it takes 
advantage of the existing fuel distribution system with practically no additional cost.  
                                               
115 Tax incentives provide an effective way of promoting the development of biofuels by helping to 
reduce the differences in production costs with hydrocarbon fuels. The European Commission and the 
Council therefore have to adopt a framework, in order to reduce excise duty on biofuels under fiscal 
control. Article 14(1) (b) and (c) (biomass and waste), it gives Member States the option of 
reducing/exempting excise duty on biofuels (DPB, 2001). 
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After two years of planning by the DPB (2001), the EUBD (2003) was finally 
formulated. The use of biofuels for road transport forms a part of the package in 
order to comply with the Kyoto Protocol on the road transport GHG reductions, 
promote energy security and to prosper the agriculture industry. Since most vehicles 
currently in circulation in the EU are capable of using a low biofuels blend (5-10% 
by volume) without any problem, the European Parliament called for: 
i. A reference value for biofuels target shall be 2%, calculated on the energy content, 
of all petrol and diesel for transport purposes placed on their markets by 31 
December 2005. 
ii. A reference value for biofuels target shall be 5.75%, calculated on the energy 
content, of all petrol and diesel for transport purposes placed on their markets by 31 
December 2010. 
 
According to the Renewable Energy Progress Report (2009), tax incentives and 
biofuels obligations (targets) remained the two most common instruments used by 
the EU to encourage its Member States in biofuels adoption. Since 2005, the 
European Commission has started legal proceedings against Member States for non-
compliance with the EUBD (2003). The European Commission has the power to 
launch infringement proceedings against any Member State that fails to comply with 
reporting obligations (under the Article 4), or failure to set national objectives 
incompliance with the references values of the Directive.  
 
Even though the EUBD (2003) outlined the targets up to 2010; in the long-term, 
biofuels will still play a significant role in supporting the regional road transport 
system. This is further evidenced by the EU Renewable Energy Directive (EURED, 
2009), which obligated a 10% renewable energy in transport target to be met by 
2020. This target is primarily expected to be met through the use of biofuels (RFA, 
2008). The Department for Transport (DfT) is expected to incorporate the directive 





4.1.1 The UK Government Strategy to Promote Biofuels Deployment  
(a) Renewable Fuel Transport Obligation  
The Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RFTO) was commenced nationwide by 
the UK Government on 15 April 2008. It transposes the EUBD (2003), and places an 
obligation on suppliers of hydrocarbon (who supplies excess of 450,000 litres of 
hydrocarbon per year ); to provide evidence that a proportion of the road fuels they 
supply in the UK comprise biofuels. The effect of this was to require 5% by volume 
(5.75% by energy) of all UK fuel sold on UK forecourts will source from a 
renewable source by 2010/11. The initial target started at 2.5% by volume in 2008/9 
(RFA, 2008), will be increased to 5% in 2010/11.  
 
(b) Fuel Duty Incentives  
The UK government supports biofuels through fuel duty incentives. Biodiesel and 
bioethanol are taxed at 20p per litre less than petrol and diesel. From the interview, 
the Policy Manager commented: “The incentive is supporting the market. Biofuels 
have to be cost effective very quickly, as they have to be paid by their own way. I 
think we probably need to some extent, at the beginning, to sustain the fuel demands 
(of biofuels) by keeping the price artificially low. However, because of the subsidy, 
this is obviously is not cost effective.” The biodiesel incentive has been in place 
since July 2002, while the bioethanol has been in place since January 2005. The aim 
for this incentive is to keep the biofuels’ costs low, and thus affordable for the 
consumer (RFA, 2008). This incentive support is guaranteed until March 2010, to 
guarantee cost effectiveness. 
 
(c) Promoting the Benefits of Biofuels through Media 
The “blendable” characteristics of biofuels mean they can be mixed with 
petrol/diesel, and immediately used in the conventional vehicles, resulting in an 
immediate reduction in road transport GHG emissions. A 5% biofuels use could 
reduce between 2.5%-4% of CO2 emission from vehicle tailpipes. This is 
strengthened by the Post Note from the UK Parliamentary Office of Science and 
Technology (2007), “When the RTFO achieves 5%, the estimated reduction in GHG 
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emissions equates to taking 1 million cars off the road.” Since biofuels adoption does 
not require engine modification, while the prices are subsidised by the incentives; the 
urgency of GHGs reduction is justified by these economic concerns. The benefits of 
biofuels on environmental issues (to reduce GHGs), social issues (for better public 
health) and on economic grounds (more biofuels related jobs) have been promoted 
through the UK/Scottish Governments' organisational media (mostly on their 
website), and is highlighted by the policies formulated.  
 
(d) Promoting the Automobile Warranty of Biofuels Use through Media 
Scientific publications from the biofuels suppliers/oil companies, automobile 
manufacturers and the regulating bodies affirmed that, the low blend of biofuels used 
(approximately 5%) will not have an adverse effect for the existing internal 
combustion engines (ICEs).  
 
According to a public report from the Low Carbon Vehicle Partnership (LCVP, 2005) 
“A maximum of 5% bioethanol and 5% of biodiesel can be blended into conventional 
petrol and diesel respectively without invalidating vehicle warranties, or exceeding 
the limits in the European standards for petrol/diesel”. The limit for ethanol is also 
shown in the EU Fuels Directive 2003/17/EC and the UK Motor Fuels Regulations 
(on Composition and Content). Besides, there are some supporting publications from 
the reputable organisations which are highly reliable and regarded. The Frequent Ask 
Question from the RFA's (2009) website states: “Good quality biofuels (which 
comply to the biodiesel standard EN14214 and bioethanol standard EN15376) are 
used in low level blends for 5% presently showing no problems for engines”.   
 
The UK Petroleum Industry Association (UKPIA, 2009) states: “The EU Fuel 
Standards currently limit the concentration of biofuels content of conventional petrol 
to 5% ethanol by volume and diesel to 7% biodiesel by volume, without affecting the 
vehicle manufacturer’s warranty.” Meanwhile, the European Automobile 
Manufacturers' Association (2008) and Worldwide Fuel Charter Committee (2009) 
provide the warranty statement “It is an acceptable limit for lower level ethanol and 
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biodiesel blends; for blends between 5 to 10%.” Consequently, the warranties from 
the automobile manufacturers as promoted by respective bodies have increased the 
publics’ confidence on biofuels adoption. 
 
(e) Compliance to the European Biofuels' Standards 
The quality control of biofuels is important for the public acceptance. Since biofuels 
are newly adopted, most of the biofuels used in the UK are obtained through 
international trade. Motorists are particularly concerned about the quality of the 
biofuels they use in their vehicles to avoid engine damage.  
 
To standardise the specifications, the UK Government specifies two European 
Biofuels Standards: the Biodiesel Standard EN 14214 and the Bioethanol Standard 
EN15376 which the biofuels producers are obligated to comply with. According to 
the UKPIA (2009), the regional automotive and oil industries, along with some 
international biofuels producers, have developed a European standard since in 2001. 
This standardisation allows for the unification of quality, and to facilitate regional 
trade amongst member states by ensuring that biofuels meets the requirements of 
existing/modern ICEs performances.  
 
With these strategies in place, the introduction of biofuels as the new fuels has 
gained a high social acceptance at an early stage which subsequently eased their 
deployment. The fiscal policy for a tax incentive at 20p/litre is aimed at ensuring 
biofuels is cost effective. The compliance to the European Biofuels Standards is for 
technical and quality unification. Besides, the automobile warranty for low blend 
biofuels from the European, Japanese and Korean Automobile Manufacturers' 
Association, and the high frequency and wide coverage of media to promoting the 
benefits of biofuels have contributed to the social confidence for biofuels adoption. 
 
4.1.2 Renewable Fuels Agency to Manage the Renewable Fuel Transport 
Obligation 
The Renewable Fuels Agency (RFA) is a public body created by the DfT to 
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implement and manage the execution of the RTFO. The agency is responsible for 
awarding the Renewable Transport Fuels (RTF) Certificates to biofuels suppliers in 
the UK. These certificates act as a control mechanism, ensuring biofuels suppliers 
could meet their annual obligated targets and comply with the “carbon and 
sustainable” monthly reporting system.  
 
(a) The “Carbon and Sustainable” Monthly Reporting System 
The RFA requires details of Carbon and Sustainability reporting by the oil 
companies/biofuels suppliers under the RTFO scheme. The RTF certificates are 
issued to biofuels suppliers only if they submit their report to the RFA every month. 
These reports detail: the types of feedstock, the country of origin, land use 
information, biofuels sales data, sustainability standard, and the lifecycle carbon 
savings of the biofuels compared with the hydrocarbon they replace. Since biofuels 
can come from anywhere across the globe, the suppliers need to provide publicly 
available information on the information of the biofuels used. This is to encourage 
suppliers to source biofuels which genuinely have environmental benefits, rather than 
using the cheapest biofuels available which might not be sustainable.  
 
Meanwhile, the RFA also operates/administers an internationally acclaimed “Carbon 
and Sustainability” reporting system. The agency is responsible for publishing 
updates/progress the work of the RTFO, including progress on achieving compliance 
with sustainability criteria. This is achieved by publishing monthly and quarterly 
reports116 to the DfT and producing annual reports to the UK Parliament.  
 
(b) The RTF Certificates 
According to the RFA (2010a), operating under the RTFO, fuel suppliers can meet 
their obligation in a number of ways, either: 
                                               
116 According to the RFA (2010b), the RTFO reports include information on: 
- volumes of fuel by fuel type (biodiesel, bioethanol); 
- volumes of fuel by feedstock; 
- volumes of fuel by country of origin; 
- volumes of fuel meeting Meta/Qualifying sustainability standards (refer appendix 4.1.3); 
- life cycle GHG savings of fuels. 
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(i)   by supplying biofuels and claiming/redeeming certificates through the “Carbon 
and Sustainability” reporting system, or  
(ii)  by redeeming certificates obtained from other biofuels suppliers, or  
(iii) by paying a buyout price.  
 
Fuel suppliers are awarded the RTF Certificates (refer appendix 4.1.4) for each litre 
of biofuels, which the certificates can be traded. If suppliers fail to meet their targets, 
they will either have to buy more RTF certificates from a third party (other biofuels 
suppliers) to cover the shortfall, or pay a penalty buy out price 117  to the UK 
Government. These certificates set out the powers and duties of the RFA, as the 
administrator of the RTFO, and the civil penalties that it may impose following non-
compliance by any of the biofuels supplier.  
 
(c) Indicative Targets for Carbon and Sustainability Criteria in the UK 
The RFA (empowered by the UK Government) has set the following indicative 
targets for biofuels suppliers under the RTFO.  
 
Table 4.1 Indicative Targets for Biofuels Suppliers 
Annual target 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
Percentage of feedstock meeting a qualifying 
environmental standard 
30% 50% 80% 
Annual average GHGs saving of biofuels supplied 40% 45% 50% 
Data reporting on sustainability characteristics 50% 70% 90% 
Source: RFA (2010a). 
 
According to the recently published performance data (1 July 2010), the first nine 
months of the obligation period 2009/10 indicates some achievement of the targets. 
34% of biofuels are estimated to have met a qualifying environmental standard, 
compared to the 50% government target. The ability of suppliers to source certifiably 
sustainable fuels is currently limited, as there are a number of feedstocks for which 
                                               
117 The UK Government originally encouraged the use of biofuels through a duty differential for 
biodiesel and bioethanol of 20 pence/litre below regular fuel. For the first two years of the obligation, 
the buyout price was 15 pence/litre. It will rise to 30 pence/litre, once the fuel duty incentive is phased 
out in March 2010.   
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there is currently no operational sustainability assurance scheme. However, it is 
expected that certified sustainable feedstock should become increasingly available 
over time as feedstock standards are developing in response to the demand created by 
the RTFO. The data shows GHG savings of 51% were achieved against the 
Government target of 45%. Besides, 73% of the data captured from suppliers 
provided information on “carbon and sustainability” characteristics, compared to the 
70% Government target.  
 
The Climate Change Act (2008) assigns a new duty for the RFA to promote the 
supply of renewable fuel whose production, supply or use, contributes to the 
reduction of carbon emissions and to protect/enhance the environment in a 
sustainable manner. This duty came into force in January 2009, and recognises that 
the RFA has a role in encouraging transport fuel suppliers to supply green and 
sustainable (G&S) biofuels as guided by the Meta/Qualifying standards.   
 
4.1.3 The UK Government Response to Systemic Risks 
Two months after the implementation of the RTFO, biofuels' economic and social 
benefits have been questioned by international/local pressure groups. These 
questions arose because, the 1G biofuels deployment had created two systemic risks: 
the food-fuel competition and biodiversity threatened (refer appendix 7.3.1). These 
scenarios were further amplified by international/local broadcasting/print media. 
 
Due to growing concerns about the sustainability of biofuels, the UK Government 
has commissioned Professor Ed Gallagher-the Chair of the RFA, to carry out a 
review of the evidence concerning the indirect impacts of biofuels. The Gallagher 
Review of the “Indirect Effects of Biofuels Production” was published in July 2008 
(refer appendix 4.1.5). The report recommended that due to the risk of unintended 
indirect effects, the UK Government should reduce the rate of increase of targets for 
biofuels adoption.  
 
Since the systemic risks have been highlighted by the international/nationl media and 
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pressure groups, the UK Government has stepped in to slow down biofuels 
expansion by altering the RTFO targets. Based on BBC News dated on 7 July 2008, 
Ruth Kelly, the previous UK Secretary of Transport declared, that the UK 
Government had decided to slow down its biofuels adoption, admitted fears that 
biofuels deployment would raise food prices and harm the environment further. “We 
need to proceed cautiously until we can be certain that their expanded growth and 
use would maximise the benefits and minimise the risks to our world”, Kelly is 
reported to have said.  
 
Meanwhile the King Review (2008) highlights, “In the longer term biofuels have the 
potential to make a significant contribution towards reducing emissions in the 
transport sector”, the UK Government decided not to terminate biofuels use, but 
respond to the Gallagher Review by slowing down the increasing rate of the RTFO 
targets. This change resulted in the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligations 
(Amendment) Order 2009 (SI 2009/843) with the revised obligation levels118.  
 
To protect the high biodiversity area, according to the House of Commons 
Environmental Audit Committee (2008), the UK Government has been working 
actively with other negotiating partners under the UN Climate talks, to develop a 
mechanism on the Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD) in developing countries. Since 2005, the UK has committed £50 million to 
slow down the rate of deforestation in the Congo Basin. In Bali, the UK announced a 
contribution of £15m to the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility-a pilot 
programme designed to implement and evaluate a market-oriented incentive scheme 
for reducing deforestation rates in three to five developing countries, over a period of 




                                               
118 3.25% for 2009/2010, 3.5% for 2010/2011, 4% for 2011/2012, 4.5% for 2012/2013 and 5% for 
2013/2014 onwards.  
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4.2 The Scottish Government in Relations with the UK and the EU 
Government  
Since the UK is one of the member states of the EU, most of the decisions made by 
the EU and the UK Governments, would have an impact on Scotland. Evidenced by 
the publication by the SG (2008a), over 70% of its national legislation is directly 
influenced by decisions taken at the EU level. Transport, energy, environment and 
others119 are all policy areas in which the EU legislation directly affects the Scottish 
citizens. Although the EU affairs are reserved to the UK Government, Scotland must 
comply with the EU legislation incorporated into the UK Law in Reserved Areas. It 
is the SG's responsibility to implement the UK legislation into Scottish Law under 
the Reserved Matters, and to be the legislator for areas under the Devolved Matters 
(refer appendix 4.2.1).  
 
Membership of the EU does not just mean that Scotland and its citizens must live by 
EU rules. The Union's aim to equalise the standard of living throughout all of the EU 
member states, has a significant impact on Scotland. In order to protect Scotland's 
interests, the nation's voice is presented by the SG and the Scottish Parliament from 
the outset of the EU/UK legislative process participations. The SG has it 
responsibility as an “executor” to implement the RTFO execution in Scotland. 
Supported by the Renewable Action Plan (RAP, 2009-refer appendix 4.2.2), the SG 
is continuing to engage closely with the UK Government on the scope of RTFO 
legislation and the financial incentives which they both have created.  
 
4.2.1 The Scottish Government in the Next Generation Biofuels Development 
The SG, under the leadership of the Scottish National Party has made it clear that, the 
SG main role is working towards a sustainable green economic growth (RAP, 2009). 
The internationally debated issues of climate change and GHG reductions have put 
much pressure on many countries' economic activities-which ultimately relate to the 
GHG emissions. Yet, these two issues are perceived by the SG, as an opportunity for 
                                               




its national economic transformation, to pursue the green economy (refer appendix 
7.1.5) for RE generation and utilisation. 
 
Scotland has its competitive advantage at natural resources and geographical setting. 
The hilly landscape, strong wind, high precipitation, powerful tidal/wave, vast area 
of lands, rich biomass from forest residues-which could be used as woodfuels and 
biofuels; all of these are the natural advantages for many sources of RE generation. 
According to the RAP (2009), the benefits for Scotland in exploiting RE generations 
are very significant, and the rewards for green economy are tangible. Jobs are 
created-linking science, engineering and business with an environmental focused.  
 
Exportable RE technologies are being developed, ranging from fuel cells, biofuels, 
H2, marine energy and offshore wind. Direct financial benefit is flowing into 
Scotland from the generation and sale of these RE technologies. This is evidenced by 
the speech made by Mr. Alex Salmond-the First Minister of Scotland who was 
quoted by the local media as saying: “Scotland has an abundance of clean renewable 
energy resources: wind, wave, offshore wind, tidal, biomass and biofuels. Scotland's 
renewable potential is immense, enough to meet our energy requirements many times 
over” (BBC, 7 September 2007; 16 February 2009).  
 
The research points out, compared with the UK Government120, the SG demonstrates 
a more progressive effort in the NGB development under the Devolved Matters. 
There are some pioneer works being undertaken, like the UK’s first biodiesel plant, 
and the UK’s first biofuels research centre which have been established, and there are 
other ongoing R&D projects which foster the NGB development in Scotland. The 
general roles of the SG in the NGB development are to provide leadership, 
coordination and communication with other industrial players. It is focused on 
                                               
120 The UK Government is keen on ultra-low carbon energy. In April 2009, the UK Government 
released “Ultra-Low Carbon Vehicles in the UK”, a document that sets out the UK’s ambition to 
become a world leader in the R&D and demonstration of ultra-low carbon vehicles. The document 
includes a road map depicting various developments for the next five years, ranging from pioneering 
projects of electricity and H2, to illustrate the potential of these vehicles in a real world setting. 
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driving progress, ensuring business success, jobs growth and carbon reductions. It 
coordinates and facilitates the partnership working between the public (the EU/UK 
Government) and the private sectors.  
 
As one of the three focus of the RAP (2009) under low carbon vehicles, the section 
considers the impacts of GHG/CO2 emission from road transport to make better use 
of low carbon alternative fuels. The RAP (2009) sets that, by 2020, 10% of 
Scotland's transport fuels would come from RE. This is also tailored to match the 
EURED (2009) which have the similar 10% target for its member states by 2020. 
 
Subsequently, a Consultation on Low Carbon Vehicle (CLCV, 2009) is published. As 
part of the transport contribution to reduced emissions, the SG intends to set an 
ambitious target for the use of alternative road fuels. The CLCV (2009) proposes the 
use of biofuels and H2 powered vehicles121. It proposes a 100% use of alternative 
powered vehicles of public sector vehicles by 2020, combined with a Scottish 
national target of 30% for other road users. As part of this commitment, various 
incentives would be set for industry to develop the NGB in Scotland for road 
transport use. The CLCV (2009) reflects these ambitious targets which would be lead 
by the public sector in order to reduce emissions and to stimulate the Scottish 
economy through the NGB production.  
 
4.2.2 Milestones of the Scottish Government in the Next Generation 
Biofuels Development  
Apart from executing the RTFO in Scotland, there are works established or still 
being carried out by SG in the NGB development. According to the Policy Manager 
from the interview: “The Scottish Government has a very strong role in encouraging 
biofuels in Scotland. Our First Minister is very keen in the green economic 
development.” These completed/ongoing projects, demonstrate the SG's efforts in 
embarking on the NGB development.  
                                               
121 which the fuels would be developed respectively. The SG concentrates on the NGB, while the UK 
Government focuses on the H2. 
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(a) Established the UK’s First Biodiesel Plant, 2005 
Argent Energy Limited (Argent) was benefitted from the SG and the EU Government 
financial injections. The plant acquired £15 million investment in total. £1.2 million 
was granted from the Regional Selective Assistance (RSA-refer appendix 4.2.3) 
which was supported by the Scottish Executive. A further £2.18 million was granted 
from the EU for research and operational use. The venture capital from Cinven 
provided the remaining investment in the company.  
 
Argent is a waste-to-biodiesel business, operating a multi-feedstocks biodiesel plant 
near Motherwell in Scotland. The plant currently utilises animal fat/tallow and used 
cooking oil (UCO) from the catering industry as feedstock. Its production capacity 
achieves 45,000 tonnes of biodiesel a year or in excess of 50 million litres per 
annum. The company commenced production in March 2005, and is the first large 
scale producer of biodiesel in the UK (Argent Energy, 2008a).  
 
As explained by the Argent Public Relations Consultant from the interview: “Our 
product (biodiesel) is renewable and clean, synthesised from organic oil-based 
materials. Currently we use animal tallow and UCO which are supplied from farms 
nearby, factories and restaurant chains. It (biodiesel) is non-toxic, biodegradable, can 
be blended with mineral diesel and used in normal diesel engines. From our research, 
biodiesel can deliver benefits to both the environment and to vehicle engines where it 
acts as a lubricant.” 
 
The process technology used for biodiesel production (transesterification) was 
developed by Biodiesel International. This is an Austrian firm which collaborated 
with the Universities at Graz in Austria (Argent Energy, 2008b). According to 
Mittelbach and Gangl (2006), biodiesel is widely used in Austria. The city of Graz 
has its municipal bus fleet fuelled entirely by biodiesel. Therefore Argent has 
adopted the Austrian technology (through licensing) for its biodiesel production.  
 
The researcher was advised by the Public Relations Consultant, that Argent's 
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customers are Shell, Petroplus, Harvest Energy and Greenergy. They blend and 
distribute biofuels for the UK market. “Argent has supplied Petroplus 41.5 million 
litres of biodiesel since 2006. The product (neat biodiesel from Argent) is taken to 
Grangemouth and Teesside, blended with 95% diesel and marketed under the 
Petroplus's Bio-Plus brand,” said the Public Relations Consultant. Petroplus is a 
strong market leader which currently, it has 60% of the UK biodiesel market share 
(Argent Energy, 2006). “The Stagecoach West is also one of our customers. They 
have converted eight buses to operate on biodiesel. We are the sole supplier for this 
company,” added the Public Relations Consultant.   
 
The Policy Manager went on to say: “The process of producing biodiesel (from 
Argent) has no risk from the materials or environment and has a longer lifecycle. In 
the sustainability term, that is an excellent example. Biofuels sources are waste 
products, being reused and recycled, and then put back into society. I have not seen 
any criticism about using animal tallow. This project is a track record for the Scottish 
Government in supporting sustainable renewable energy.” 
 
Through using UCO and animal tallow as feedstocks in producing biodiesel, Argent's 
production technology hits three birds in one stone. Firstly, these feedstocks are 
cheaper compared with fresh vegetable oil, because they are unwanted 
industrial/agriculture by-products. By reusing/recycling and turning them into 
biofuels, Argent has reduced wastes significantly and attained economies of scale. 
Secondly, these feedstocks are sustainable, as they neither impact on biodiversity nor 
create food-fuel competitions like the 1G biofuels does. Since animal tallow and 
UCO would only be sent to landfill, by reusing/recycling them, Argent has created an 
added value on these wastes. Thirdly, Argent's waste-to-biodiesel production is well 
known among its peers. Thus, this business is sustainable for Argent, which 
consequently allows Argent to gain a higher recognition within the industry. 
Supported by Booth, et al., (2005), the use of UCO/tallow as feedstocks, provide a 




Research supported by the Life Cycle Analysis 122  conducted by the Technical 
University of Graz: in 2008, found that biodiesel from tallow and UCO is better for 
the environment than biodiesel produced from virgin oils such as rapeseed oil. 
Taking into account all the energy used in producing biodiesel from tallow and UCO, 
and adding the displacement of CO2, Argent’s production activities have a net 
positive effect on the environment (Argent Energy, 2008a). 
 
Argent plans to have more UCO collected from households and businesses through 
the local council recycling schemes. A visit to Argent plant by Stewart Stevenson-the 
Scottish Minister for Transport, Infrastructure and Climate Change has opened up an 
opportunity. This is because, too much of the used oil from homes and restaurants 
ends up going down the drain or into bins. In Austria, recycling domestic UCO is as 
commonplace as recycling paper, cardboards and glass in the UK. Jim Walker-
Managing Director of Argent commented: “We would like to see more domestic 
collection facilities established, and to stop households and businesses clogging up 
our drains with waste oil and fat. The government can provide a lead by working 
with councils to achieve this” (Argent Energy, 10 March 2009).  
 
In fact, the suggestion to the Scottish Minister was not a new idea. It was rather an 
extension of the previous partnership built between Argent and Stagecoach. Since 
October 2007, Argent has been involved in a mutually-beneficial-partnership 
whereby Stagecoach (a Scottish-based bus and coach operator) encourages its 
passengers to recycle their domestic UCO through East Ayrshire Council in return for 
discounted bus travel. Argent then turned the UCO collected into biodiesel which is 
used to fuel some of Stagecoach buses. 
 
If the UCO local council recycling scheme could be materialised, then Argent could 
                                               
122 The Life Cycle Analysis is aimed at assessing the environmental impact of Argent Energy’s 
production of biodiesel from UCO and tallow. It takes into account all the energy used in producing 
biodiesel from these materials and the displacement of CO2. The data generated describes the 




use more locally sourced UCO, and benefit from lower production costs. Walker 
explained: “Currently much of the used cooking oil we process comes from south of 
the border. We want to develop our capability to use more locally sourced used 
cooking oil, and so to reduce the distance our raw material has to travel. Apart from 
profits, we also want to do more to achieve a cleaner and greener Scotland” (Argent 
Energy, 10 March 2009). 
 
A year later, Argent won the award of “The Most Sustainable Biodiesel Producer in 
the World”, beating off large competitors like Nestle Oil and Mabanaft (World 
Biofuels Markets, 17 March 2009). Through Argent's newsletter (17 March 2009), 
Walker said: “We have been able to demonstrate that high quality biodiesel can be 
made sustainably by recycling by-products of other industries. We are delighted to 
bring the award for Sustainable Biodiesel Producer 2009 home to Scotland where we 
have received so much support and encouragement.” 
 
Talking about future plans, the Public Relations Consultant stated: “We plan to have 
our second plant at Ellesmere Port in Cheshire in 2011 to 2012. This plant is planned 
to have an annual production of 170 million litres, which is three times more than the 
capacity of the existing plant. It is expected to be built in two stages. The first phase 
will provide 85 million litres of production capacity, and the infrastructure to double 
that as the market develops. Our objective is to be a leading biodiesel producer from 
waste-to-product production. Most of the producers are still using fresh vegetable oil. 
We want to achieve this through investment in feedstock research and our production 
capacity.”   
 
(b) Setting up the INEOS Biodiesel Plant, 2006-Currently on hold due to Financial 
Crisis 
Information was obtained through the interview with the Policy Manager, where she 
mentioned another biofuels plant construction project was on-going, yet she did not 
have the latest information on hand. Sought the news releases through the SG 
website on 17 October 2006, Europe's largest biodiesel production plant was planned 
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to be built at Grangemouth in Scotland with funding support from the Scottish 
Executive. The investment has been backed by £9 million from the RSA Scheme, 
while INEOS Enterprises has invested £70 million in the production facility-which 
would supply around 35% of the UK's biodiesel needs. 
 
The aims for this plant would achieve three benefits. Firstly, it was aimed to place 
Scotland as the leader in large volume production of biodiesel. Secondly, the 
production not only could generate adequate supplies of biofuels needed for the UK 
(under the RTFO), but also could fulfil the EU on regional biofuels demand. Thirdly, 
the plant could provide more job opportunities for the local workforce in 
Grangemouth-which was the main criterion specified by the scheme for employment 
creations. This was supported by the speech made by the Deputy First Minister Nicol 
Stephen: “The Grangemouth facility will be the largest biodiesel plant in Europe, and 
will supply around a quarter of the UK's total biofuels needs by 2010. The RSA £9 
million is the largest we have ever made to a renewable energy project. This is a 
good news for the workforce in Grangemouth, a good news for our clean energy 
ambitious and a good news for Scotland's wider business growth potential” (The 
Scottish Government, 17 October 2006).  
 
Grangemouth is the centre of Scotland's petrochemical plants and crude oil 
refineries. Some of the world’s biggest oil players like Conoco Philips, Shell, BP and 
ExxonMobil could be found here. The hub plays a significant role in supplying 
refined oil and gas products to Scotland, Northern England and Northern Ireland. 
The researcher has been informed by the Policy Manager during the interview that, 
INEOS owned the Grangemouth refineries since 2005, after taken over from BP. 
Therefore this justifies INEOS’s ambitious to have its biodiesel plant at 
Grangemouth. 
 
Since the construction of biodiesel plant started in October 2006, the plant should 
start production in 2008 as planned. Unfortunately, further information obtained 
through the BBC News (27 November 2008)-the project has been on-hold due to the 
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current economic slowdown. The project would continue, but no further information 
has provided. The INEOS spokesman commented: “Plans to invest are on-hold until 
INEOS has a clearer picture of the economic outlook”. Additionally, Councillor 
Craig Martin-Convener of Falkirk Council's Economic Development Committee 
responded: “We are disappointed that this innovative idea isn't going ahead. 
However, we are willing to assist INEOS, particularly when it comes to preserving 
jobs.” Regrettably, at the end of 2011, there is still no news about this ambitious 
project. 
 
(c) Established the UK’s First Biofuels Research Centre, 2007 
The Policy Manager from the interview explained: “The Scottish Government has 
funded £500,000 as research funding to the UK first biofuels research centre in 
Napier University-named as the Biofuels Research Centre (BfRC) since December 
2007.” According to the Napier University's newsletter (11 December 2007), the 
BfRC is led by Dr. Martin Tangney who is committed to R&D the 2G biofuels from 
a potentially diverse range of non-food crops and waste matter. The BfRC is acting 
as a portal between industry, government, academia and the public.  
 
From the same newsletter, Jim Mathers-Minister for Enterprise, Energy and Tourism 
at the SG said: “We are exploring how we can best exploit technologies to make a 
real, sustainable and cost-effective contribution to tackling climate change, including 
the role of biofuels.” Professor Joan Stringer-Principal and Vice Chancellor of Napier 
University responded: “Sustainability is a hugely relevant issue and is one of 
Napier’s highest priorities. The opening of this centre not only shows our 
commitment to this, but also our dedication to lead new areas of research.”  
 
The £500,000 research funding showed the eagerness of the SG in advancing the 2G 
biofuels. Pachauri (2006) explains, a government has a responsibility for fostering 
R&D. Adequate funding should be made available for this purpose, as well as for 
demonstration projects covering various aspects of biofuels development. Apart from 
playing a role as funder, the SG also monitors the progress of the BfRC. The 
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collaboration between the SG and the BfRC, ensures the continuous political support 
by way of financial funding can contribute to successful research outcomes.  
 
After more than two years of research, the BfRC has finally tapped into the whisky 
industry to create biobutanol. According to the Scottish Enterprise webpage (17 
August 2010), the BfRC has filed a patent for biobutanol-which can be used in 
ordinary cars. An additional £260,000 research project has been funded by the 
Scottish Enterprise. The BfRC is working with the country’s whisky producers by 
using two types of whisky by-products “pot ale”123 and “draff”124.  
 
Tangney commented: “Using whisky by-products to develop biobutanol is a more 
environmentally sustainable option, and potentially offers new revenue on one of the 
Scotland’s biggest industries”. Lena Wilson, CEO of the Scottish Enterprise 
responded: “This research demonstrates how Scottish Enterprise helps to transform 
cutting-edge knowledge into successful high-growth sustainable businesses for 
Scotland”. Besides, Mather said: “The Scottish Government supports the 
development and the use of sustainable biofuels. This innovative use of waste 
products is supporting the economic and environmental objectives of the Scottish 
Government's new Zero Waste Plan.” Meanwhile, Susan Morrison-Director and 
General Manager at The Scotch Whisky Experience said: “Working in a tourism role 
to represent the Whisky Industry, the green agenda is moving forward at such a pace, 
both through the Green Tourism Scheme and innovations as this new whisky 
biofuels” (Scottish Enterprise, 17 August 2010).  
 
With 1,600 million litres of pot ale and 187,000 tonnes of draff produced by the malt 
whisky industry annually, these by-products set real potential for sustainable 
biobutanol production. Putting an added value on the industrial waste in order to 
                                               
123 the liquid from the copper stills. It is a residue left in the washed still after distillation. It is 
previously sold and used as liquid fertiliser or dried cattle food (Feeds Marketing, 2010). 
124 the spent grains, as the basis for producing the biobutanol. It is the residue which remains after 
the liquid “wort” (malted barley in hot water) is drained off to be fermented and distilled as alcohol. 
Nutritionally, draff is rich in digestible fibre and also contains concentrated protein and oil from the 
malted barley. It is moist and palatable to all types of ruminant stock (Feeds Marketing, 2010). 
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materialise the reuse-and-recycle, the SG is one step closer to prove the zero waste 
plan and green biofuels production is applicable.   
  
(d) £600,000 to Fund Scottish Crop Research Institute to Involve in the University 
Dundee for the Next Generation Biofuels Development, 2009 
According to the University of Dundee's (UoD) newsletter (27 January 2009), funded 
by the UK Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC-refer 
appendix 4.2.4), the £27M Sustainable Bioenergy Centre (SBC-refer appendix 4.2.5) 
is established to research and develop the NGB.  
 
The Minister of State for Science and Innovation-Lord Drayson, said: “Investing £27 
million in this new centre involves the single biggest the UK public investment in 
bioenergy research. The centre is leading the way in transforming the potential of 
sustainable biofuels”. The BBSRC Chief Executive-Professor Douglas Kell said: 
“The SBC draws together scientists from six universities to develop technology 
which supports the sustainable bioenergy sector. The Centre is examining all the 
relevant areas of science needed for sustainable bioenergy. Working closely with 
industrial partners, the Centre’s scientists will be able to translate their progress into 
practical solutions” (UoD, 2009).  
 
This information was first revealed by the Executive from the Rural Directorate 
during the interview: “The Scottish Government is setting a fund in conjunction with 
the Scottish Crop Research Institute (SCRI) to produce biofuels which is led by the 
University of Dundee.” The UoD has been named as one of the six research hubs 
(refer appendix 4.2.6). It is working with University of York and two Scottish public 
partners-the SCRI and the Rural and Environment Research and Analysis Directorate 
(RERAD). The Dundee-led programme is concentrating on improving barley straw 
for lignin properties, altering them to make it easier for biofuels production. Under 
this collaboration, the SG is contributing £600,000 as additional investment, over the 
next three years to fund the SCRI’s involvement in this programme. 
According to Professor Claire Halpin-Head of the College of Life Sciences the UoD: 
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“If we can find a way of accessing these key sugars in barley straw, it would have a 
significant impact on the types of agricultural waste, and dedicated energy crops that 
could be used to produce sustainable biofuels.” Peter Gregor-Chief Executive and 
Institute Director of SCRI said. “The programme will help for a significant change in 
energy use, leading to a secure future for both energy provision and food production” 
(UoD, 2009).  
 
The Executive of the Rural Directorate from the interview added: “This programme 
uses barley straw because the SCRI has done a few projects on barley straw research. 
They were very basic, to understand its biological structure. Now, this new 
programme (led by the UoD) can extend the previous works and making it 
commercially viable.”  
 
This series of research programmes which are funded by the BBSRC has created a 
strong interlinked between academic and industrial. Apart from research jobs 
creation, one of the most significant benefits from such collaboration is the 
innovative knowledge transfer between both sectors. The research institutions gain 
access into industrial resources, knowledge and networking. Meanwhile the 
industries obtain the advanced knowledge of their field. For the oil companies (BP 
and Shell) that have their own the NGB R&D projects, the new collaboration under 
this scheme would complement their ongoing industrial R&D. By pooling in the 
research capability of the academic/research institutions, while assisted by the 
industrial players; the potential research outcomes would become the assets for 
potential commercialisation.   
 
(e) Launching the 3G Biofuels (Biomara) Project, 2009 
Led by the Executive of Renewables Policy Team from the interview: “There is one 
algae biofuels happening in Oban, Scotland.” This information was not publicly 
available until June 2009. The project was then officially stated in the RAP (2009) as 
the Biomara project.  
The Scottish Association for Marine Science (SAMS) and its partners have secured 
161 
 
nearly €5 million from the EU's INTERREG IVA Programme for this project. The 
Biomara is a UK-Irish-joint-project which aims to demonstrate the 
feasibility/viability of producing the 3G biofuels from microalgae. This major 
research initiative is led by the SAMS but involves inputs from a number of partners 
from Ireland and Northern Ireland125.  
 
4.2.3 Promoting the Next Generation Biofuels through Organisational Media 
Since the emergence of the two systemic risks resulting from the 1G biofuels 
deployment, the UK/Scottish Governments are working towards seeding public 
confidence in the NGB. Three channels of communication have been utilised: print, 
broadcasting and internet media 126  to promote any political decision/information 
about the NGB development to the public (refer appendix 4.2.7). 
 
The SG utilises its own website the most to disseminate information to the public. 
The SG's website has a collection of images, videos, documents and archives-like 
policies which provide the full-text publications that are downloadable free of 
charge. This information is constantly being updated to show the latest development. 
The website is user friendly, allowing keyword string searches.  
 
Generally, the SG's website is a one-way information broadcaster. It allows the users 
to access/gain further information from the website, but does not allow users to 
comment on the page. However, the user is still able to leave any comments through 
email sent to the webmaster, or to fill in an electronic form with comments attached 
then submit to the webmaster. The SG also produces print publications of their 
policies that are available to be purchased from Blackwell's Bookshop.  
 
Meanwhile, the broadcasting/print media are not under the SG's control. These 
external media are disseminating the SG’s messages about biofuels from time to 
                                               
125 Dundalk Institute of Technology, the University of Ulster, Queen's University Belfast, Dublin City 
University and Sligo Institute of Technology. 
126 print media: newspapers, internal print publication like policies; broadcasting media: radio, 
television; internet media: website, YouTube. 
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time. The Executive of Corporate Service Team from the interview explained: “The 
Communication Directorate is the “mouth” of the government in disseminating 
information, “eyes” in monitoring the external media and “hands” in setting up the 
internal media (the SG's website and print publications). We have to monitor the 
external media, making sure they say what we want to say, to keep messages exact, 
accurate, short and concise. So that the media cannot take and choose; just pick one 
part of the message or manipulate our message. We also supervise the messages 
provided to the media. Some of our press officers are reading newspaper every day, 
watching and checking news. This is media supervision, making sure they (the 
external media) say what we want to say.”  
 
4.3 Conclusion  
The EUBD (2003) laid a clear direction for the regional biofuels adoption until 2010. 
This was then extended by the EURED (2009), which prolongs biofuels as one of the 
RE profiles to constitute a 10% share for the future transport by 2020. Both of the 
regional policies were then transposed into the UK RTFO (2008). The RTFO was 
commenced on 15 April 2008, places an obligation on fuel suppliers, that road fuels 
supply in the UK must comprise of biofuels according to the annually-increasing-
targets specified. The RTFO is expected to continue beyond year 2020. 
 
Since biofuels implementation in Scotland is influenced by the EU/UK Government, 
the SG plays its role as the biofuels executor in Scotland. Under the RTFO, the UK 
Government has a higher authority on biofuels implementation and of the related 
decisions. Biofuels deployment in the UK is promoted by fuel duty incentives to 
keep the overall costs effective. Different media was used to promote the benefits of 
biofuels adoption, helped to create social acceptance of biofuels. Warranties provided 
by automobile manufacturers are one of the most influential strategies which boosted 
social confidence on biofuels use in their existing ICEs.   
 
To control the biofuels suppliers, the RFA was established. The RFA manages and 
controls suppliers through the RTF certificates. Furthermore, the RFA requires 
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biofuels suppliers to comply with the “Carbon and Sustainability” monthly reporting 
system. Apart from the annual targets, the G&S of biofuels product and production 
are gradually emphasised, to make sure the biofuels suppliers/oil companies comply 
with both the quantity and the quality of biofuels supplied in the UK. In addition, 
European Biofuels Standards are adopted, to create the standards of unification 
among regional member states that would foster the regional trade. 
 
After two-three months of the RTFO execution, two systemic risks occurred have 
challenged the economic believes and social benefits of biofuels. The situation was 
further amplified by the pressure groups as well as the social media. The UK 
Government appointed Professor Gallagher to conduct a review. His conclusion 
suggested that biofuels could continue provided the rate of expansion is slowed 
down. Subsequently, the RTFO targets have been altered. The G&S biofuels criteria 
have also been stringent by the Meta/Qualifying standards, as well as the Indicative 
Targets for Carbon and Sustainability Criteria (2010). These criteria are encouraging   
the existing biofuels suppliers/oil companies to select biofuels that are G&S. To 
rebuild public acceptance of biofuels, the NGB which portrays more G&S criteria is 
promoted through their organisational (the regulators and the oil companies) media. 
  
Working under the Devolved Matters, the SG shows its affinity on the NGB 
development. Numerous the NGB projects are executed and established by the SG. 
The Argent waste-to-product for the NGB biofuels and the Napier University 
whiskey by products-to-biobutanol are two examples which made Scotland gained it 
reputation internationally as one of the leading G&S biofuels producing country. 
Additionally, there are a few on going the NGB R&D projects such as the 2G 
biomass biofuels and the 3G algae biofuels. The pursuance of the NGB development 
clearly signifies that, the SG's vision in RE generation, and working towards a 







































Chapter 5 BP in Biofuels Business 
Preface 
As one of the world’s six oil companies which is engaging on the next generation 
biofuels (NGB) development (refer appendix 7.1.1), BP is currently supplying 
biofuels in the UK under the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO). This 
chapter presents the rationales which stimulated the business interests of BP, to 
embark on the route of pursuing biofuels supply and innovation. Operating under the 
regulated market, the EU/UK Governments have established mechanisms which help 
to deliver biofuels deployment and development regionally/nationally. This study has 
provided an insight into the interactions generated between BP and the EU/UK 
Government, whilst examining BP’s response to the mechanism instituted. Since any 
technological change is a dynamic process, which incurs various types of 
expected/unexpected risk and uncertainty (R&U), this chapter also describes how BP 
has coped/strategised to deal with the R&U arose during biofuels deployment and 
development.  
 
5.1 Introduction  
Founded in 1908, with the headquarters located at the City of Westminster London; 
BP is one of the largest global conglomerates, has been supplying fossil energy 
products for more than a century. Operating in more than one hundred countries, BP's 
expertises cover three areas: exploration and production; refining and marketing; and 
alternative energy introduction and development (refer appendix 5.1.1). 
 
In 2005, BP started its biofuels business-operating as one of the biofuels distributors 
in the US under the US Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) 2005 (refer appendix 5.1.2). 
The home-grown maize and soy backed the biofuels production and supply. BP 
started supplying biofuels in the UK from 15 April 2008 under the RTFO. Until 
31/12/2011, BP still does not manufacture biofuels. Instead, BP buys them on the 
international market-mainly from Argentina, US, Brazil and blends these biofuels 
with conventional fuels before supplying them into the UK. It is expected that, the 
undergoing NGB R&D projects will be able to produce green and sustainable (G&S) 
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biofuels at commercial scale within five-to-ten years from 2008. 
 
5.1.1 Three Driving Forces for BP Biofuels Uptakes 
In 2007, BP blended 763 million US gallons of bioethanol and 1million US gallons 
of biodiesel in the US, which constituted approximately 10% of the global market 
(BP, 2008a). The blend is made in the US, mainly due to the availability of the home-
grown feedstocks: soy and maze; and also the manufacturing facilities127. The US not 
only can produce enough biofuels to satisfy its domestic demand, but also produce a 
surplus for exporting purpose. In 2008, BP blended and distributed more than one 
billion US gallons bioethanol and around 1.6 million US gallons biodiesel, which 
was partly exported to the UK for the RTFO. The message from this data is clear: 
demand for biofuels has increased dramatically from the growing international 
market including the member states of the EU, after the adoption of the EU Biofuels 
Directive (EUBD) 2003. 
 
“There are three drivers: energy security, environmental concern and prospering 
agricultural industry, all of which are pushing biofuels up for the agenda,” explained 
Philip New, CEO of BP Biofuels (BP, 2007a). These driving forces are shaping 
biofuels as one of the core business areas since 2007 (Knott, 2007).  
 
(a) Towards Energy Security  
Global energy demand looks set to increase at least 50% over the next twenty years. 
Currently, around 55% of the world's crude oil is converted into transport fuels (BP, 
2007a). However, many countries are highly dependent on importing oil to 
mechanise their economy. The Fuel Engineer from the interview commented: “It was 
a key concern during the big swings in energy markets for the past few years. This is 
driven by population growth, and rapid industrialisation in the developing economies 
                                               
127 The US is the world's largest producer and exporter of corn. The US share of world corn exports 
averaged at 60% during 2003-2008, which recorded 61 million metric tons in 2007/20081. Besides, 
the US is also the world's largest soybean producer and exporters, accounted 90% of the US total 
oilseed production2.  
Source1: United States Department of Agriculture. 18 February 2009.  
Source2: United States Department of Agriculture. 8 December 2008.  
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like China and India.” The global supply of fossil fuels is already consolidating, with 
70% of the world’s oil now sourced from just six countries, and 50% of natural gas 
produced in just three (BP, 2009b).  
 
According to Tony Hayward, the BP Group Chief Executive: “Energy security 
remains at the top of the global political and economic agenda. The need to balance 
energy security and economic development, while addressing the problem of climate 
change; all have contributed to the challenges that our politicians faced” (BP, 4 
February 2010). Therefore, governments particularly those in the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are striving to become less 
dependent on imported oil/gas, and are seeking alternative sources of supply.  
 
From the interview, the Fuel Engineer added: “Biofuels derived from plants, offer a 
partial solution that can be achieved in the relatively near term. At least biofuels can 
form a small portion for transport fuel components in powering road transport.” 
Hence, the growing plans for producing biofuels locally or in the non-oil producing 
nations could ensure a more secure supply of transport energy (Knott, 2007).  
 
(b) Environmental Concern in Combating Climate Change 
The total number of vehicles moving on roads around the world is predicted to pass 
the two billion mark by 2050. Whilst climate change and energy security concerns 
are already bringing forward changes in the way vehicles are powered, the internal 
combustion engines (ICEs) fuelled by petrol/diesel/liquefied natural gas (LNG) are 
still  expected to be remained as the dominant fuels for transport (BP, 2008b).  
 
As supported by scientific evidence, biofuels emit less CO2 into the atmosphere 
compared to conventional hydrocarbon-which account for 15% of total global 
emissions (Fuglestvedt, et al. 2008). This is further strengthned by biofuels' carbon 
neutrality-from growing to burning in the fuel tanks which could achieve near carbon 
neutrality, if the land use and production activities (refer appendix 5.1.3) are fully 
integrated to minimise the CO2 release.  
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(c) Prospering Agricultural Industry 
Many governments want to see their agricultural communities become more 
prosperous. The prospect of biofuels with increasing global demand offers a 
promising opportunity to the agriculture sector. According to New: “The emergence 
of a biofuels industry involves the coming together of two major value chains for the 
first time: the agriculture and energy. Both are mature and sophisticated industries 
with connections to national politics” (BP, 2007a). Thus, developing countries, such 
as India, Brazil, South Africa and South East Asia have opened their doors, and 
welcomed business opportunities from BP to invest in biofuels feedstocks farming. 
 
5.1.2 The UK Government's Interests in Biofuels   
These three drivers mentioned above, are identified as the generic forces in justifying 
biofuels development and deployment from BP's perspectives. From the interview, 
the Sustainability Strategy Manager commented: “When you look at the broader 
picture, biofuels stand out as the option that has the potential to help address of these 
concerns.”  
 
BP has been working with worldwide national governments. However, not every 
government is sharing the same three drivers equally. Supported by the interview: 
“The UK takes a very interesting approach on biofuels. In biofuels there are three 
main categories. You have those pursuing climate change, greenhouse gases 
reduction; those pursuing rural development or farming for farmers and land; and 
those pursuing energy security by reducing their dependency on oil. An example of 
pursuing energy security would be the US. The examples in pursuing rural 
development are Poland and the US; and an example pursuing climate change in 
emphasising greenhouse gases reduction is the UK,” said the Sustainability Strategy 
Manager. 
 
The research investigated further the other two driving forces (prospering agriculture 
and energy security), to find out the reasons why they have not been the main factor 
driving the update of biofuels in the UK. Firstly, due to the climate and the 
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availability of lands, agriculture activities are rather restricted in the UK. There are 
nine main types 128  of crops commercially farmed in the UK. They are being 
produced at a medium scale, which does not generate an absolute advantage for the 
UK. Consequently, food is still imported to fill up the gaps of demand. According to 
a report from the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) 2009: 
in 2008, the UK total crop output ranked in 8th place among the EU27 member states. 
This shows that the agricultural sector is one of the GDP contributors in the UK, yet 
still not sufficient for its domestic consumptions.  
 
Secondly, according to the Executive of North Western Europe Exchange Project 
(NWEEP) from the interview, due to the availability of oil and natural gas in the 
North Sea, the UK is one of the five nations129 that has the economic exclusive rights 
to these natural resource exploitations. As such, energy security is not the highest 
priority for the UK Government at this current stage. Therefore, the UK is prone to 
the environmental concern towards CO2/GHG reductions, which not only reflected 
from the interviews, but also (this message) appeares across the UK/Scottish climate 
change and related transport/biofuels policies.  
 
5.1.3 BP Dealing with the EU/UK Governments' Policies and Regulations  
BP is involved in the ongoing biofuels policy debate and formulation, by 
communicating directly with the EU/UK Government in promoting the need for 
sustainability standards. Besides, BP is closely involved with other bodies including 
the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) (refer appendix 5.1.4) and the 
UK Low CVP Partnership (refer appendix 5.1.5) (BP, 2009c). Supported by the 
interview: “Working with policy makers, is not only can help the governments to 
meet emissions targets, but also can provide a more defined characteristic required 
for a sustainable biofuels business,” said the Executive of NWEEP.  
Furthermore, BP supports the sustainable growth of the biofuels industry, as it helps 
address the challenges of energy security and climate change which have been 
                                               
128 wheat, barley, oilseed rape, sugar beet, potatoes, oats, peas, beans and grain maize (The UK 
Agriculture, 2009).  
129 the UK, Norway, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. 
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stressed globally as major driving forces of biofuels. As transport fuels demand is 
estimated to grow by over 55% by 2030, the EU/UK Governments are increasingly 
setting higher annual targets for biofuels use. BP foresees biofuels could represent up 
to 25% of the fuel pool by 2030 versus only 2% of world consumption in 2008 (BP, 
2009d). From the interview: “Once you know the legislation is clear to support 
(biofuels), we will move to targets like 10% (EURED year 2020 specification) over 
the next few years. However the current debate continues, whether the substantial 
increase in biofuels' targets, these feedstocks can be grown domestically in the UK, 
or will have to be imported,” explained the Sustainability Strategy Manager. 
 
In the UK, due to the scarcity of suitable land for farming (in other word, the UK 
land is far more expensive for agriculture activities), plus the climate which is not 
ideal for feedstocks growing, the UK is a large importer of biofuels under the RTFO. 
From 15 April 2010-14 July 2010, the UK produced 12% biodiesel and 24% 
bioethanol for its domestic market. Argentina contributed 34%, Germany 15% and 
the US 11% biodiesel to the UK130, while Brazil contributed 30%, France 14% and 
US 12% bioethanol131 to the UK (RFA, 2010). 
 
The UK demands a large volume of imported biofuels for its RTFO. Thus, the UK 
Government has been cautiously concerned with the source of the biofuels, the 
country of origin, the types of feedstock and land used. All of this information is 
important for the Renewable Fuel Agency (RFA) records. This is because, since the 
UK is consuming biofuels for the sake of national transport CO2/GHG reductions 
(internally), the UK Government is obliged not to cause the environmental 
degradation on the biofuels exporting countries. It is clear that, the oil companies 
operating in the UK (supplying biofuels) are controlled by the RFA’s regulation, 
which emphasis the requirement for social responsibility and environment 
                                               
130 Proportion of biodiesel used under the RTFO by country-Argentina 34%, Germany 15%, US 
11%, the Netherlands 8%, Indonesia 3%, France 2%, Malaysia 2%, Denmark 1% and Poland 1% 
(RFA, 2010).   
131 Proportion of bioethanol used under the RTFO by country-Brazil 30%, France 14%, US 12%, and 
Spain 6% (RFA, 2010).   
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conservation. Biofuels which could not demonstrate the G&S criteria; in other words, 
violate or fail to comply to both the Meta/Qualifying standards outlined, will not 
only cause the biofuels supply business to be terminated (as the RTF Certificate will 
not be granted), but also will leave a bad public impression on the oil company who 
had its business ended.  
 
Therefore for the sake of the continuation in biofuels business and profit seeking, 
these oil companies must obey “the rules of the game”132. The UK Government 
established the RFA, to monitor/control the domestic biofuels supply. The RFA has 
specified clearly the biofuels criteria required to be used under the RTFO through the 
establishment of the Meta/Qualifying standards. From the interview, neither Shell 
nor BP representatives made any negative statements about the RFA requirements. 
Both companies are complying strictly with the regulations set, in order to ensure 
that their biofuels businesses could be continued/sustained in the UK. 
 
Financially, the UK Government had been supportive before the commencement of 
the RTFO. According to the report from the Department for Transport, DfT (2008), 
biodiesel and bioethanol are taxed at 20p/litre less than fossil petrol and diesel. This 
support is guaranteed until March 2010 to ensure the supply of biofuels is cost 
effective. The biodiesel incentive has been in place since July 2002, while 
bioethanol's since January 2005. According to the Executive of Renewable Policy 
Team (the Scottish Government) from the interview, the RTFO will continue “at 
least” until year 2020. This provides crucial confidence to the oil companies for the 
NGB investments.  
 
As written in the BP corporate report (February 2007), the policy makers have been 
proactive in taking steps to support the industry for biofuels supply. The tax 
incentives and clear regulatory framework enable the oil companies to deploy and 
develop biofuels with confidence. To summarise the interactions between BP and the 
                                               
132 Supplying biofuels which could demonstrate the G&S criteria, comply to the Meta/Qualifying 
standards, comply to the European biofuels quality standards, follow the RTFO mandatory targets, and 
reporting to the RFA on monthly “Carbon and Sustainability” reporting system. 
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EU/UK Governments: “We are the first global energy company to call for action 
publicly over climate change. We continue to strive for energy efficiency in our 
operations. We are investing in low-carbon energy as well as engaging with 
governments and regulators (international level) to shape legislation that will 
facilitate progress towards a low-carbon economy and make it commercially viable,” 
stated Hayward  (BP, 1 April 2009). 
 
5.1.4 Biofuels are Opted as one of the Renewable Energy for Transport in the 
UK 
It has been nearly a century where petrol/diesel has been entrenched as the dominant 
world transport fuels. In the sphere of Renewable Energy for Transport (REfT), there 
are some possible options such as hydrogen (H2)/electricity, which have been 
suggested before the decision was made on biofuels. Thus, it is interesting to know 
why biofuels have been chosen as the front runner.  
 
As explained by the Fuel Engineer from the interview: “Hydrogen has been under a 
series of intensive R&D since 2000. We heard a lot about it, yet it is still hardly to be 
produced on a commercial scale.  This is because it (H2) does not comply with the 
criteria of efficiency at the principle of the first thermodynamic law. I don't 
understand why we would want to complicate the transport system, when there are 
easier routes (like biofuels). The entire fuelling system has to be changed if we use 
hydrogen.” 
  
“Currently hydrogen could be produced through water electrolysis in a small to 
medium scale. To produce hydrogen in a great scale, petroleum extraction via 
chemical path or thermolysis is the way. In the energy system, it (H2) is not an energy 
source, but an intermediate medium for storing and carrying energy. In other words, 
hydrogen only could be produced when energy is provided. Two units of electric 





From an economic logic, the production cost and the switching cost of the H2 based 
technologies are tremendously high. This is further supported by Hayward: “Electric 
vehicles and hydrogen fuel cells will have a part to play in the long term. But they 
need massive new infrastructure, and they need to be produced more sustainably” 
(BP, 4 February 2010). Thus, the exceedingly high costs have put off further 
investments from most of the oil/automobile companies. Furthermore, extracting H2 
from water will need energy as an input. By extracting H2 from petroleum will lead 
the problem back to square one: generating energy from a depleting and polluting 
source, which neither help in combating climate change nor for energy preservation.  
 
Backed by the interview: “Currently, the electric car is also facing the same problem 
(as H2 does), due to the limited infrastructures such as the electric charging points. 
You can't find them everywhere in the UK, apart from London and some big cities 
like Birmingham and Manchester. The technical supports and the expensive electric 
car itself; all have caused to low adoption. Besides it also being questioned where the 
source of electricity is from. Either from fossil fuels or renewables, would make a 
tremendous difference in GHG reductions. If, the electricity is again, sourced from 
fossil fuel (to power electric cars), we will back to square one, there will be no 
significant GHG reductions,” commented the Sustainability Strategy Manager.  
 
With the technical limitations of H2 and electricity, and the technical convenience 
provided by biofuels, it is clear that biofuels with lower switching cost and their 
compatibility with the existing hydrocarbon infrastructures133 are the factors which 
determined their front position. Besides, according to Steve Koonin the BP Chief 
Scientist: “It is no coincidence that biofuels are currently in the spotlight for transport 
energy. If you consider that all of life is based on carbon, and so too is 90% of the 
world's energy, there are bound to be synergies between biology and energy waiting 
to be discovered. Furthermore, the main pursuit for modern biological research, until 
now has been in the sphere of medicine. This means the field of energy bioscience is 
                                               
133 for both supplying infrastructure, as well as adaptability in the existing internal combustion 
engine (ICE) vehicles. 
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largely an open territory. Fostering the intersection of biology with energy is 
therefore likely to generate technologies that can benefit the energy industry” (Knott, 
2007).   
 
5.1.5 BP Embarking on the Next Generation Biofuels Development  
During the early commencement of the RTFO in 2008-2010, BP has not produced 
any biofuels for the UK supply. Currently, BP is buying biofuels from the 
international market, then blending and supplying for the UK market. There are three 
objectives which lead BP to embark on the NGB development (BP, 2009e):  
(a) produce biofuels from the most efficient134  feedstocks available today, while 
pushing for higher standards that bring cleaner, sustainably produced biofuels into 
the market, 
(b) invest in new feedstocks, including cellulosic biofuels made from energy grasses, 
that have minimal impact on food supplies and environment, 
(c) develop technologies to create advanced biofuels with higher energy content and 
greater environmental benefits135. 
 
As such, BP's biofuels strategy signifies that BP invests in the NGB R&D projects 
that can achieve tangible reductions in GHG emissions; can make a positive 
difference to energy security; and can offer commercial opportunities for the 
agriculture industry in growing biofuels feedstocks (BP, 2009f).  
 
Further from two interviews: “Today, biofuels are a strong start. To achieve 20-30% 
of market penetration, new technologies (NGB) need to be developed,” said the Fuel 
Engineer.” “Since 2006, BP has invested more than USD1.5 billion in biofuels R&D 
and operations. This includes partnerships with other companies to develop the 
technologies, feedstocks and processes,” mentioned the Executive of NWEEP. BP is 
                                               
134 highest output with lowest costs 
135 Non-food, low carbon/GHG emissions, low energy inputs, not polluting (no air/water/land 
pollutions by minimise agrochemical/fertiliser use), not pressure on high biodiversity areas, low water 




forming partnerships with biotechnology laboratories, academic institutions and 
agricultural industry to develop the advanced NGB (BP, 2009g). These partnerships 
are ranging from direct funding, equity joint-venture (JV) and strategic alliance (SA) 
collaborations.  
 
5.2 BP's Ten Next Generation Biofuels Development Projects  
Since from year 2003 (to 2010), through three main partnerships (direct funding, JV 
and SA), BP has established ten NGB R&D projects (refer table 5.1 and appendix 
5.2) which are spreading around the world. These projects set ways:  
(a) to increase the productivity of biofuels supply for the aim of economies of scale,  
(b) to switch biofuels away from the food chain,  
(c) to overcome the limitations of the 1G biofuels, 
(d) to emphasis the G&S criteria and to comply with regulations required by the 

























Projects Information Project Types 
February 
2006 
BP and TERI Funding Planting Jatropha in 
Indian States of Andhar 
Pradesh. Jatropha is the 


















R&D on the NGB and 
other biotech-energy 
related projects 
Biofuels innovation  
June 2007 BP and 
Mendel  
SA Application of genomics 
for high yield feedstocks 
Biofuels innovation 
June 2007 BP, British 
Sugar and 
DuPont  
JV Producing Vivergo fuels 
(biobutanol) 
Investing in production 
plant 
June 2007 BP and D1 
Oil 
JV Planting Jatropha in large 








Funding  Photosynthesis bacterium 
to produce biodiesel (4G 
biodiesel) 
Biofuels innovation  
2008 BP and 
Tropical 
Bioenergia 
JV Setting up refineries 
producing bioethanol 
from Brazilian sugarcane.  
Feedstock plantation and 






JV Develop and 
commercialise cellulosic 
bioethanol from energy 
grasses, and further 
building production plant 
in Florida. 
Energy grasses R&D 
and investing in 
production plants 
August 2009 BP and 
Martek  
SA Conversion from sugar to 
biodiesel 
Biofuels innovation 
Source: Summarised by the researcher  
 
5.3 Risk and Uncertainty Faced and Strategies Adopted by BP during 
the 1G Biofuels Deployment 
Based on the literature (refer Table 2.4.2), according to Rosenbloom and Kantrow 
(1982), Pearson (1991), Rosenberg (1994) and the report from SpecialChem (2011), 
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there are three types of R&U136 arising from technology deployment, which would 
be faced by a private company. Table 5.2 summarises R&U faced by BP during the 
1G biofuels deployment together with strategies adopted.  
 
Table 5.2: Risk and Uncertainty from the 1G Biofuels Deployment and 
Strategies Applied to Counteract 
R&U from the 1G biofuels deployment  Strategies applied  
Business operations: Sustainability of biofuels 
deployment  
-BP complies to the monthly biofuels reporting 
system and the Meta/Qualifying Standards-set by 
the RFA 
-BP communicates with the environmentalists at 
different levels 
-BP participates in four biofuels roundtables 
Technology: Socio-Environmental implications 
(a) Land use  
 
(b) Food and Fuel Competitions  (systemic risk) 
 
(c) Biodiversity threatened (systemic risk) 
 




(a) the NGB which can be grown from marginal 
land 
(b) Investment in Jatropha/energy grass as non-
food biofuels feedstocks 
(c) Sustainability Standards Compliance to avoid 
the 1G biofuels threatening biodiversity 
(d) Validate high carbon saving and carbon 
neutrality 
Two examples: Sugarcane and Energy Grasses 
Technology: Technical limitations of the 1G 
bioethanol  
-Biobutanol introduction 
-Promoting biobutanol property and performance 
through BP's websites and corporate video 
-Vehicle and infrastructure testing on biobutanol 
Social acceptance of biofuels -Utilise the corporate media, in educating public 
about biofuels, promoting good criteria of 
biofuels and in answering biofuels controversy 
Source: Summarised by the researcher. 
 
5.3.1 Risk and Uncertainty of Business Operations 
During the 1G biofuels deployment, BP faced a major challenge under the R&U of 
business operations, associated with the G&S criteria (refer appendix 5.3.1) of 
biofuels. This was further worsened by the emergence of two systemic risks (food-
fuel competition and biodiversity threatened). Therefore, the G&S criteria have been 
enforced by the EU/UK Governments and pressured by the outspoken 
international/national environmentalists/social movements, as well as the 
international/national broadcasting/print media. These pressure groups/media were 
                                               
136 business operations, technology and social acceptance.  
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pressing the regulators and the private companies like BP for the responsible of these 
two systemic risks. To counteract these R&U, BP responded through three strategies.  
 
5.3.1.1 BP Complies with the Renewable Fuels Agency Requirements   
To demonstrate its commitment in producing the G&S biofuels, BP as a company 
that imports biofuels into the UK does not use biofuels that come from unsustainable 
sources and violate the G&S criteria (guided by the Meta/Qualifying standards) 
required from the RFA. Furthermore, biofuels which do not have proper records and 
traceability are rejected from entering BP’s supply chain (BP, 2009k). Supported by 
the interview: “The RTFO goes for a comprehensive strategy. Effective from 2008, 
companies are required to report their products (biofuels). So we have to be sure that 
for every month, how many gallons have been produced, where they come from and 
et cetera,” commented the Sustainability Strategy Manager. 
 
To maintain the sustainability of the biofuels supply chain, BP complies with the 
RFA Meta/Qualifying standards for two reasons. Firstly, the RFA standards are acting 
as guidance for the G&S biofuels supply. These two standards (refer appendix 4.1.3) 
specify clearly the biofuels criteria required to be supplied under the RTFO. Only 
biofuels which comply with these standards (at least the Qualifying Standard), will 
have the RTF certificate granted. Secondly, these two standards are the first attempt 
to create global reporting standards for biofuels. In the near future, BP will be 
required to report to the EU under the EU Renewable Energy Directive (EURED). 
Similar standards are gradually being developed in other parts of the world in order 
to ensure biofuels businesses are sustainable and be environmentally concerned.  
 
Further explained by the Sustainability Strategy Manager from the interview: “We 
are currently developing ways to report on sustainability throughout our suppliers 
and supply chain, including the development of a management system for our 
biofuels operations. We have to include our joint venture partners. The management 
system will incorporate a number of parameters, including GHG emissions, 
biodiversity, water use, human rights etcetera.” Therefore the G&S are not only 
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emphasised on the product (biofuels), but also on the processes and resources 
utilised.  
 
Further explained by the Sustainability Strategy Manager from the interview, apart 
from the compliance with the standards and rules set by the RFA, BP continuously 
exercises internal management for G&S biofuels product and production. For 
example, an Environmental Impact Assessment on feedstock plantations is conducted 
for biodiversity screening/assessment before plantation is located, while satellite 
imaging is used frequently to analyse topography/land activities137. 
 
5.3.1.2 BP Communicates with Environmentalists 
BP's responsibility is to ensure that, its biofuels business can be greener and more 
sustainable. These messages have been delivered from its biofuels corporate policy 
(BP, 2009m) across the industry, to inform the related stakeholders, peers, JV-
partners, regulators and also the general public.  
 
Supported by two interviews: “We engage with other energy business partners, 
international bodies like the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation, WWF, 
European Environmental Agency (EEA) many roundtables, governments, academic 
institutions and local NGOs where we operate. We explore many issues raised by 
biofuels feedstocks cultivation and production,” commented the Executive of 
NWEEP. “We know the first generation biofuels have many pros and cons. We know 
that some of the activists will give opinions and this definitely will have some impact 
on us. We try to engage in as many kinds of work as possible, involve in a lot of 
development from local conservation to international preservation. So we do not 
work in isolation, instead we make sure we understand the bigger picture (for 
socioenvironmental conservation),” responded the Sustainability Strategy Manager. 
Since 2005, BP has advocated for mandated international sustainability standards 
which include the consideration of the GHG impacts and reductions with other 
                                               




socioenvironmental standards (BP, 2009l). This has been promoted through 
numerous roundtables participation and consistent communication with different 
levels of environmentalists. BP intends not only to gain the external supports for its 
biofuels business, but also to chart the path for a sustainable biofuels management 
system for global biofuels trading.  
 
5.3.1.3 BP Participates in Various Roundtables 
BP works with a range of stakeholders, including other organisations in the private 
sector138, the international bodies139 to the local public agencies or the NGOs140 in 
countries where biofuels are produced, to understand many diverse issues that have 
been raised about biofuels production. BP understands that biofuels, if produced 
responsibly, can contribute to reductions in GHGs, improve energy security and 
create opportunities for rural development, particularly in developing economies. 
Supported by the interview: “BP is seeking to ensure that the crops used in biofuels 
production are produced in a sustainable manner. By encouraging standards for the 
production of feedstocks, BP is working carefully with the stakeholders (industry, 
regulator, roundtables and environmentalists) to prevent negative environmental and 
social impacts,” said the Sustainability Strategy Manager. 
 
In 2008, BP continues actively supporting and working in the Roundtable for 
Sustainable Biofuels (RSB), which then the RSB has produced “version zero”141 of 
its sustainability standard for biofuels production. Subsequently, on 12 November 
2009, the “Version One Principles and Criteria” was produced, which was a 
                                               
138 Private sectors: BP, Shell, Toyota Motor Europe, Petrobras and Bunge. 
 They are part of the Founding Steering Board members of Roundtable Sustainable Biofuels (RSB). 
139 International bodies: WWF International, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), National Wildlife Federation, World Economic Forum, UN Foundation, Forest 
Stewardship Council, UN Environment Programme.  
They are of the Founding Steering Board members of Roundtable Sustainable Biofuels (RSB). 
140 Local GO/NGO: Swiss Energy Ministry, Fed of Swiss Oil Companies, Keio University, UNICA 
Sugarcane Industry Association Brazil, Energy Centre EPFL, TERI India, Brazilian 
Environmentalists, Mali Folkecentre, Dutch Ministry of Housing and the Environment.  
They are of the Founding Steering Board members of Roundtable Sustainable Biofuels (RSB). 
141 Version Zero is the first draft of the “Global principles and criteria for sustainable biofuels 
production” issued 13 August 2008 by the Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB). This version 
drafted the principles for the release of the first official standards Version One in 2009. 
Source: Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels. 13 August 2008.  
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refinement/extension of the Version Zero, aiming towards a more comprehensive 
Sustainability Principles and Criteria for biofuels production. The RSB is a multi-
stakeholder initiative aiming to drive the development of principles and criteria for 
sustainable biofuels production. Besides the RSB142 , BP is also member of the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), the Roundtable for Responsible Soy 
(RTRS) and the Better Sugarcane Initiative (BSI) (BP, 2009l) (refer appendix 5.3.2). 
 
In conclusion, through three strategies, BP (i) complies with the monthly biofuels 
“Carbon and Sustainability” reporting system based on the Meta/Qualifying 
Standards set by the RFA  (ii) communicates with the environmental activists, and 
(iii) participates in four biofuels roundtables, these strategies show BP's commitment 
to the G&S biofuels requirement. These G&S criteria are not only going to determine 
the types of biofuels for current/future supply, but also are the key criteria for long-
term biofuels business development.  
 
Further explained by New: “For a biofuels industry to endure sustainability, it must 
avoid negative environmental and social impacts. In building the biofuels business, 
BP gives a high priority to sustainability and considers issues such as water resource 
availability, biodiversity, forest conservation, local labour and employment, 
communities and land rights, as well as environmental protection of water, soil and 
the atmosphere. We are committed to working with regulators and relevant 
stakeholders to develop market-based regulations that balance environmental, energy 
security and rural development goals that face communities around the world” (BP, 
2007a). 
 
5.3.2 Risk and Uncertainty of Technology: Social and Environmental 
Implications by the 1G Biofuels Deployment  
From January 2008 to August 2008 (when the UK RTFO was launched on 15 April 
2008), there was a widespread of debate within the British public questioning the 
sustainability of the 1G biofuels and its socioenvironmental implications. This was 
                                               
142 BP as one of the Founding Steering Board members 
182 
 
driven by the occurrence of two systemic risks: food-fuel competition and diversity 
threatened; which were unexpected and carried great negative implications. Concerns 
were raised about whether using land to grow crops for biofuels may prevent 
growing enough food globally to feed a growing population. Other concerns raised 
were centered around biofuels leading to deforestation, contributing to soil erosion, 
farm land conversion into biofuels plantation, using excessive amounts of water and 
energy which lead to increasing CO2 emissions-compared with conventional 
petrol/diesel production (BP, 2009l; BP, 2009m). 
 
Supported by the interview, “The controversy is based on four misconceptions here. 
Firstly, biofuels necessarily mean all lands have to be sacrificed for their growing. 
Secondly, all food crops will turn into fuel. Thirdly, biofuels require the destruction 
of natural habitats such as the Amazon rain forest for growing; and fourthly, biofuels 
do not necessarily provide a significant reduction of full cycle CO2 levels. Whether 
there is substance in these concerns depends very much on where the feedstock 
comes from, how it is farmed, how it is brought to market,” explained the Executive 
of NWEEP. 
 
As highlighted the interview, there are four main issues which concerned the 1G 
biofuels production: the land use, food-fuel competition, biodiversity threatened, and 
the carbon neutrality. These are four environmental implications of the 1G biofuels 
deployment, and BP has set the counteracting strategies to mitigate them. 
 
5.3.2.1 Dealing with Land Use Issue 
Through the undergoing R&D, the NGB not only will be expected to produce higher 
yields per acre, efficiently utilising limited marginal/idle land for their growth, but 
their production will also prosper the local agricultural sector. Therefore these 
feedstocks can be grown from lands which are not suitable for food, consequently 
their growing will not create land competition for food.  
 
From the interview, “We carry out a biodiversity screening before we start every 
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project. We have to avoid high-conservation areas to protect local biodiversity. Our 
biofuels projects in Brazil, India and the US (for biofuels plantations) incorporate 
areas that are not food cultivated, to protect water, flora and fauna. We are also 
making the development of standards for biofuels plantation require biodiversity 
assessments, through the Roundtable for Sustainable Biofuels, the Renewable Energy 
Directive, the RTFO and other initiatives. The satellite imaging has been used to help 
us to analyse these (land use, topography) and other impacts on the farms, make sure 
we manage the land well,” explained the Executive of NWEEP.  
 
“Around 1% of the world’s arable land is used for biofuels production today, 
according to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation. This will increase towards 
4% by 2030. Biofuels, although only expected to occupy a small fraction of arable 
land (by 2030), they have the potential to act as a catalyst, by bringing skills and 
techniques to improve agriculture more widely. This catalysing effect is likely to be 
most pronounced in poorer parts of the world, where growth in farming has usually 
provided higher employments and increase local productivity, a win-win situation I 
could say,” commented the Sustainability Strategy Manager. 
 
Even though the NGB would only be materialised five to ten years from 2008, the 
1G has not be excluded from the G&S criteria. According to the Executive of 
NWEEP from the interview: “Look at the example of jatropha, they can be grown 
from marginal land and wasteland. Well, the energy grasses which also grew from 
set-aside land. Do not forget sugarcane which is grown away from the Amazon. 
These are fantastic examples as they are economically and environmentally 
sustainable.”  
 
The Brazilian sugarcane is one of the good examples which portrays its G&S criteria. 
This is one of the reasons which justifies BP have established a JV with Tropical 
Bioenergia since 2008. Brazil is producing around 22 billion litres of sugarcane 
ethanol per year, according to its industry organisation UNICA (refer appendix 
5.2.6). With two harvests per year, sugarcane is plentiful in Brazil, studies show that 
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there is enough arable land available to support the production of biofuels without 
having an impact on land for food crops, or on sensitive areas such as the Amazon 
rainforests. In fact the farming areas are distance 600 miles from the edge of the 
rainforest (Kolmar, 2009).  
 
For other types of biofuels feedstocks, the land use rules for growing biofuels are 
part of the twelve principles in the Version One of Roundtable Sustainable Biofuels, 
then extended to respective RSPO, RTRS and BSI. Therefore, even before the arrival 
of the NGB, some precautionary actions have been taken to control the land use and 
to avoid further negative implications from biofuels plantation which could threaten 
the ecology.  
 
5.3.2.2 Dealing with Food-Fuel Competition Issue 
After the emergence of food-fuel competition debate, the UK Government has 
slowed down the expansion of biofuels. The RTFO targets have been altered to delay 
the 5% until 2013/14 instead of 2010 originally proposed. However, in reality, the 1G 
biofuels is still largely derived from grains. Apart from the continuous 
encouragement of using waste materials, and the enforcement of the G&S criteria for 
biofuels product and production, most of the political/corporate information is 
promoting the criteria of the NGB, which is switching away entirely from the food 
chain.  
 
Through the NGB R&D, BP has concentrated on feedstocks that can make a big 
difference in reducing climate change without adversely affecting food security (BP, 
2009m). From the interview: “We deliberately select feedstocks that have minimal 
impact on food production. Food issues are too sensitive nowadays. The dilemma of 
food-fuel in biofuels is one of the reason BP is investing into non-food crops like 
Jatropha (refer appendix 5.2.2) and biomass (refer appendix 5.3.3). Both represent 
the opportunity to meet the growth in demand for environmentally responsible and 




“The ability to convert lignocellulose (biomass) could produce yield improvements 
of 25-100% in five to ten years from now,” observed Ian Dobson, Business 
Technology Manager. “But the process for converting lignocellulose to ethanol is 
more intensive, and it needs further technical development for this to become 
economically competitive. Lignocellulose conversion is a key area of work for the 
EBI which BP has invested in the research” (BP, 2007a). At the moment, Brazilian 
sugarcane is produced in a sustainable manner and which stands for more than 50% 
of the world bioethanol market share. The GM crops in the US (refer appendix 
5.3.4), including the soy and corn also provide high yield which could fulfil the food, 
as well as the biofuels demand.  
 
5.3.2.3 Dealing with Biodiversity Threatened Issue 
BP has been investing in the NGB R&D since 2003. However, the NGB biofuels 
would not be commercially available for five to ten years from 2008/2009. As most 
of the R&D projects are still ongoing, the current 1G biofuels deployment is 
continuing to comply with the obligations of the EUBD (2003) and the RTFO 
(2008). Even though the G&S criteria have been emphasised in the NGB, the 
existing 1G is not being left leniently. The 1G which is largely derived from food 
crops, has to comply with various G&S criteria which have been drawn up by 
different stakeholders-the RFA, the environmentalists/social movements and every 
roundtables that have been established.  
 
The fact is, every feedstock has different environmental performances (carbon 
savings) and implications: different degrees of fertilisation is required, different 
agrochemical are used and different impacts on water usage. Supported by the 
interview: “Some biofuels are good. They can improve energy security and reduce 
CO2. Some have done less well, may have negative impacts on biodiversity or on the 
environment, and may not be able to reduce greenhouse gas as we might have 
expected. So we need to chose and develop the right one (through various R&D 
projects). Our strategy is to develop feedstocks that provide clean and reliable 
biofuels for transport. We are investing in feedstocks that minimise competition with 
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food supplies and in technologies that are designed to create advanced fuels with 
higher energy content for environmental benefits,” explained the Executive of 
NWEEP.  
 
Further explained by the Sustainability Strategy Manager from the interview: “A 
certain sustainability standard that I am currently working on implies, for example, if 
biofuels comes from land that has been deforested, the product is technically illegal 
in Europe. When I buy ethanol from Brazil, the supplier needs to guarantee that, 
since November 2005 that land has solely been producing sugarcane. Let’s say that if 
sugarcane is grown from a reconverted forest, I can’t buy that product. It is a 
consequence of deforestation! So these are some kinds of thing that we will look at, 
in order to prevent people just chopping down the Amazon.” The Manager's view is 
also backed by the Forbes news which published “BP’s strategy is to focus on better, 
more sustainable biofuels only,” said Susan Ellerbusch, President of BP Biofuels 
North America. “Good biofuels can make significant contributions to reducing GHG 
emissions and can be produced in an environmentally and economically sustainable 
manner” (Thurmond, 2008). 
 
Reflected from the interview and published information, BP is seeking to ensure that 
the current 1G biofuels used is produced in a sustainable manner. By applying 
internal control 143  and by comply with the standards drawn at roundtables 
collectively; BP demonstrates its efforts to ensure that only G&S biofuels are 
permitted to be deployed within its supply chain. 
 
5.3.2.4 Dealing with Ambiguity of the 1G Biofuels Carbon Neutral Cycle 
In theory, the CO2 emissions of biofuels should be far less than the emissions arising 
                                               
143 Internal control includes: 
-only purchase G&S biofuels,  
-transparency in biofuels data reporting system to comply the RFA “Carbon and Sustainability” 
reporting system, as well as the Meta/Qualifying standards.  
-rejecting biofuels which are illegal, unethical (deforestation/farm conversion) and improbable (lack 
of appropriate data), 
-biodiversity assessment/screening before every project started, and satellite monitoring. 
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from crude oil production. This is particularly important for the UK, since the main 
objective of using biofuels in the UK is to reduce the GHG/CO2 emissions. The 
mechanisms of biofuels carbon savings are working in two ways: saving from 
tailpipe and carbon neutrality (refer appendix 5.3.5).  
 
Supported by the interview: “The concern over the environment continues to rise. On 
one hand we need to keep economies and societies developing while at the same 
time, we have to limit our carbon footprint. Biofuels covers all liquid fuels made 
from biomass, which is an organic plant material containing energy obtained from 
sunlight that the plant stored when it grew. This stored energy can then be converted 
into liquid fuels, provided this conversion process is efficient, and depending on the 
type of feedstock used. Biofuels can help reduce greenhouse gas. Biofuels crops can 
absorb CO2 that helps to offset the CO2 produced when burnt in vehicles,” said the 
Sustainability Strategy Manager. Therefore, the actual CO2 reduction achieved by 
biofuels is determined by two factors: the types of feedstock used and the activities 
conducted along the value chain.  
 
(a) Types of Feedstock 
There are good and bad biofuels. Good biofuels are non-food, and those which can 
be grown under low-quality conditions (wasteland), require no 
agrochemical/fertiliser and have a low water footprint; yet naturally produce a high 
yield. The example of good biofuels are energy grasses, sugarcane and jatropha, all 
of which have a low impact on natural habits, require low energy input and do not 
compete with food yet capable of a high yield to provide high energy content.  
 
(b) Activities along the Value Chain 
Energy is needed to grow and harvest raw materials, to convert them into biofuels 
and then to distribute them. Each biofuels can take a different path which then 
determines the amount of energy needed from growing, fertilising, harvesting, 
processing through to distribution. Explain during the interview, “In reality, biofuels 
must be compared with fossil fuels on a “crop-to-car” basis. This will take into 
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account, all the inputs required: their manufacture, their use of farm equipment and 
fertilisers, their energy use for transporting the crop, the plant and the conversion 
process, almost every stage of the process” said the Fuel Engineer. 
 
According to Koonin: firstly, to cultivate the crops, we use energy in farming and 
CO2 is produced from farm vehicles or fertiliser manufacture. Then, the process of 
converting the starches in the crop to biofuels also requires external energy to be 
used in the conversion process. Next, transporting and distributing the fuel to the 
market soaks up even more energy before the fuel actually gets into the automobile. 
The net effect is that to make one energy unit of corn based bioethanol in the US 
requires around 0.9 energy units of external energy (Knott, 2007). 
 
Secondly, on a crop-to-car basis, the full bioethanol life cycle takes account of the 
CO2 taken in by the plant as it is growing. However, as bioethanol is mainly used as 
a blend with gasoline, presumably at 10% maximum by volume for the current 
requirement, a tank of blended bioethanol would therefore deliver less than 2% 
overall reduction in emissions compared with a tank of gasoline. Given the fact that 
the world's transportation fuels account overall for 21% of total global emissions, the 
potential reduction in global emissions from bioethanol blended fuels is indeed 
limited. “It is an improvement in emission, no doubt, but not sensational,” observed 
Koonin (Knott, 2007). 
 
Dobson explained: “There is no one magic number which describes emissions 
reduction for all biofuels. These vary enormously depending on the feedstocks and 
processing involved. By way of illustration, the crop to car numbers, say, bioethanol 
made from US corn in a well-operated business, could show a 30%-40% reduction in 
CO2 emissions compared with gasoline on an energy equivalent basis. However, the 
Brazilian sugar cane bioethanol, which uses more of the original crop in the overall 
process for energy generation, could show a 85%-90% CO2 reduction” (BP, 2007a).  
 
Supporting by this research, BP has made careful choices about the feedstocks use, 
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such as jatropha, energy grasses (refer appendix 5.3.6) and sugarcane, because they 
can deliver significant life cycle GHG reductions of up to 90% (sugarcane) compared 
to fossil fuels. These feedstocks are also perennial crops that contribute to the carbon 
neutrality (BP, 2009o). “In summary, it would be fair to say that if biofuels 
manufacture is done well, then biofuels can make a contribution to emissions 
reductions,” said Dobson (BP, 2007a). A well done biofuels manufacture can help to 
reduce GHG emissions, improve energy efficiency and stimulate agricultural 
progress. If they are done less well, they can have potentially more negative impacts 
on natural habits and make little or no tangible difference to climate change (BP, 
2009n). The identification of Brazilian sugarcane which could have 85%-90% of 
CO2  reduction encouraged BP to have a JV with Tropical BioEnergia for the first 
sugarcane bioethanol production plant establishment in 2008 (refer appendix 5.3.7).  
 
5.3.3 Risk and Uncertainty of the Technology: Technical Limitations of 
the 1G bioethanol  
Bioethanol has a lower energy content than the fossil fuel counterpart. Bioethanol 
provides around 2/3 energy compare with conventional gasoline (BP, 2007a; Knott, 
2007). Low energy performance of bioethanol would reduce energy efficiency and 
obstruct higher bioethanol adoption. Explained by the Fuel Engineer from the 
interview: “As such, greater bioethanol volumes are required to match with the 
conventional gasoline. When greater volumes are required, it will result in using 
biofuels more, which will not help at energy efficiency, but will put more pressure on 
the feedstocks growing.” The Fuel Engineer from the interview continued: “Giving 
the limitations of current biofuels, biofuels are not capable enough to be adopted for 
neat use (100%). They are used commercially by blending with gasoline at levels 
which are dictated by chemical properties or handling considerations for the car 
warranty.”  
 
Apart from lower energy content, bioethanol is also carrying other limitations. 
Further explained by the Fuel Engineer from the interview, the volume of biofuels 
mixed with conventional fuels is limited by chemical properties or perhaps the 
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implementation issues connected with their handling. For use which is more than a 
10% blend requires engine modifications to be made.  
 
“Bioethanol could be corrosive to engine components such as seals and gaskets as 
well as certain alloys, if used at higher concentrations than 10%. In addition, it easily 
absorbs water, allowing it to separate out from the gasoline blend in storage tanks, 
fuel tanks or in the distribution pipelines. It also has a higher vapour pressure than 
gasoline. Hence, it can evaporate from vehicle fuel tanks. These are properties which 
are unwelcome in transportation pipelines, distribution depots and at retail sites,” 
said Dobson (BP, 2007a). “To counter bioethanol's undesirable properties, some 
automobile manufacturers make new vehicles with flexible fuel engines that can 
either run on blends containing up to 85% bioethanol (E85) or can be switched to 
100% gasoline. However there are relatively few of these vechicles in use on the UK 
roads as they are still expensive,” said the Fuel Engineer from the interview.  
 
5.3.3.1 Strategies to Solve Bioethanol's Limitations: Biobutanol Introduction 
According to Dobson, “There is a need to find a better performing bio-alcohol, one 
which can be blended at a greater percentage into conventional fuels, above the 
current 10% threshold. The alternative to this is to change the design and 
manufacture of all the world's automobile engines, which would be not only a 
massive undertaking but also a very slow process,” (BP, 2007a).  
 
Thus, BP has developed a better solution-to introduce biobutanol. BP has been 
working with DuPont since 2003 in developing biobutanol. BP and DuPont recognise 
that, while the existing bioethanol has proven to be a starting point for biofuels 
introduction, there are limitations of bioethanol that need to be resolved in order to 
increase market penetration (BP, 20 June 2006). “Our collaboration with BP, not only 
improve the bioprocess to produce commercial volumes of biobutanol, but also to 
pursue an integrated commercialisation strategy that incorporates building pilot and 
commercial scale facilities,” said David Anton, DuPont Biofuels Venture Manager 
(BP, 14 February 2008). 
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“The feedstocks144 for making biobutanol are the same as those used for bioethanol 
manufacture, and the front end of the process is also similar,” explained Dobson. 
“For the fermentation stage for converting sugars and starches to alcohol, DuPont's 
bioscientists have identified a different microorganism that produces biobutanol” 
(BP, 2007a).  
 
To date, biobutanol has been successfully developed in a laboratory. BP and DuPont 
are building a demonstration plant for biobutanol situated at Saltend, Hull (BP, 
2009h; 2009q). The biobutanol plant will be able to produce around 20,000 litres/a 
year from a wide variety of feedstocks. Another advantage of the biobutanol process 
is that, it can be adapted to existing bioethanol plants with only minor changes to the 
fermentation and distillation stages, therefore opening up the possibility for a full 
scale biobutanol production in the near future (BP, 2007a). 
 
5.3.3.2 Promoting Chemical Property and Performance of Biobutanol 
through BP's Websites and Corporate Video 
From 2006 to 2009, BP used its corporate websites145 and a corporate video146 not 
only to promote the good properties and performance of biobutanol, but also to 
educate the public about this new product. The websites and corporate video allows a 
24/7 accessibility which attract those who are interested in knowing the latest 
information about BP's biofuels business. It is forecasted that biobutanol will be 
available in the UK from 2013/2014.     
                                               
144 Biobutanol could be produced from variety of conventional feedstocks such as sugarcane, corn, 
sugar beet, wheat, cassava and sorghum, as well as future biofuels feedstocks such as lignocellulosic 
from energy grasses or agricultural by-products (BP, 2008e). 
145 These four BP websites are: 
(a) BP. 20 June 2006. BP and DuPont Announce Partnership to Develop Advanced Biofuels. [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7018942 
(b) BP. 2007a. Bringing on Biofuels. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9021004&contentId=7038907 
(c) BP.14 February 2008. DuPont and BP Disclose Advanced Biofuels Partnership Targeting Multiple 
Butanol Molecules. [Online]. Available at:   
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=4705&contentId=7041073   
(d) BP. 2009h. Biobutanol: An Advanced Biofuels. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9027831&contentId=7050737  




In general, biobutanol 147  is an organic alcohol having four carbon atoms in its 
structure with twice as many as in ethanol. It has been used in the chemicals industry, 
for example as a solvent for many years, but has not been considered for large scale 
use due to its high production costs. The development work undertaken by BP and 
DuPont looks set to lower the production costs by employing new biotechnology 
processes to produce biobutanol at maximum output and to achieve high production 
efficiency (BP, 2007a). 
 
BP considers biobutanol as an “advantaged molecule” when it comes to acting as a 
fuel. Biobutanol's energy content is nearer to petrol-86%, compared with bioethanol 
at 67%. This means in practical terms for the customer, a fuel tank of biobutanol 
blended gasoline will go further than a bioethanol blend, and offers better fuel 
economy by improving a car's fuel efficiency and mileage. Biobutanol can be used in 
conventional ICEs at higher concentrations, up to at least 16%. It has low water 
affinity, thereby removing the risk of phase separation in storage tanks and vehicle 
fuel tanks, and can also be transported in pipelines. Besides, it has a lower vapour 
pressure compare to bioethanol, which reduces evaporation losses and makes it 
easier to blend (BP, 20 June 2006; BP, 2007a).  
 
The successful R&D of biobutanol shows that the chemical property can be blended 
at 16% of biobutanol with 84% of petrol, which is a good start for a higher 
percentage of biodiesel use in the ICEs. The allowance of 16% biobutanol thereby 
displacing more gasoline per gallon of fuel consumer than the standard 5-10% by 
volume of a bioethanol blend (BP, 2009h). Hence, the 16% biobutanol blend has a 
greater potential to reduce more GHG emissions than the 5-10% bioethanol blend.    
 
5.3.3.3 Vehicle and Infrastructure Testing on Biobutanol 
Further explained by Jean-Charles Dumenil, Programme Manager for BP Biofuels: 
“For more than a year, BP Biofuels in conjunction with the company's fuels 
technology teams in the UK, USA and Germany; have been putting biobutanol 
                                               
147 butyl alcohol or C4H9OH 
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through a number of screening tests. Investigations have included health and safety 
aspects, blending attributes focusing on chemical and physical properties, 
compatibility with existing supply networks and the suitability of biobutanol to be 
used in the existing automobiles” (BP, 2007a).  
 
For in-situ automobile tests, a large fleet of new and used vehicles, having different 
engine sizes and from different technology generations are being tested-both in 
controlled test chambers and on public roads. By using different biobutanol 
concentrations, parameters are being checked include material compatibility, engine 
cleanliness, power and acceleration, fuel economy, emissions, and drivability in hot 
and cold weather. “All tests carried out to date have shown encouraging results, with 
no significant negative impact compared with conventional fuels, and key advantages 
compared to ethanol,” added Dumenil (BP, 2007a). 
 
According to Frank Gerry, BP Biofuels Program Manager: “Biobutanol formulation 
that meets key characteristics of good quality fuel includes high energy density, 
controlled volatility, sufficient octane and low levels of impurities”. He described 
testing data, indicates that biobutanol fuel blends at a nominal 10% level perform 
similarly to unleaded gasoline fuel148.  
 
According to the latest BP's corporate report, the fleet testing conducted by BP-
DuPont of biobutanol (in actual vehicles on roads), covering a distance of more than 
1.3 million miles, has confirmed the performance of biobutanol. Biobutanol blended 
at 16% into fuels demonstrated an excellent vehicle performance, affirmed the 
compatibility of biobutanol with the existing fuel infrastructure and pilot testing on 
consumer satisfaction with the product (BP, 2009h). Further commented by Dobson: 
“On the basis of the vehicle test results, we are now announcing that high octane 
biobutanol offers a way to break through the 10% limit with bioethanol in the current 
vehicle fleet” (BP, 14 February 2008).  
                                               
148 Bioethanol is ranged 21.1-21.7 mega joules per litre (MJ/L), Biobutanol is ranged 26.9-27.0 MJ/L 




BP is also working with Ford Motor Company, to substantiate the performance and 
environmental benefits of biobutanol as a gasoline blending component. Since 2007, 
BP and DuPont have been conducting vehicle and infrastructure product testing of 
biobutanol. 3 million litres of corn-based biobutanol has been used. The fuels are 
then blended into gasoline at a UK terminal.  
 
The testing has been built upon initial laboratory engine tests using biobutanol, 
which indicated that biobutanol has similar fuel performance properties to unleaded 
petrol. Richard Parry Jones, Chief Technical Officer, Ford Motor Company 
responded: “Ford welcomes this initiative and is optimistic that biobutanol will add 
significantly to the range of biofuels technologies available. BP and DuPont's actions 
are entirely consistent with our own aspiration to develop sustainable mobility 
solutions (BP, 2009h). 
 
5.3.4 Dealing with Biofuels Social Acceptance: Corporate Media Utilisation  
Apart from the UK/Scottish Government efforts in seeding public acceptance of 
biofuels, BP also, through its corporate website, set up a flash animation interactive 
“Watch and Learn”149  and “Biofuels Feedstocks”150  aimed to educate the general 
public about the general knowledge and the development of biofuels in order to 
create public acceptance of biofuels.  
 
The “Watch and Learn” website is an animated page, well-set up containts concise 
information on ten pages for the readers to browse through. It explains the biofuels 
supply chain, introduces the conventional biofuels feedstocks: beginning at the 
farms, processing factory, finally reaching the BP kiosk. There are several issues 
being addressed, such as: BP research work in the NGB development by using non-
edible crops and fast growing grasses with environmental sensitivity concerns; the 
                                               
149 BP. 2007c. Watch and Learn. [Online]. Available at:  
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/complex_flash/bp_compl
ex/bp_biofuels_animation_v7.swf  





good criteria of sugarcane; and BP working with DuPont and Verenium in producing 
biobutanol. The advantages of biobutanol have been highlighted as a product which 
has higher energy content, compatibility with petrol and better carbon neutrality. The 
“Biofuels Feedstocks” is another animated website, which explains seven different 
feedstocks151 that are used in producing biofuels. Sugarcane has been promoted by 
this website with a brief description about its good criteria which enable a 90% GHG 
reduction compare with petrol. Besides, wheat has also been explained; and details 
the work carried out by BP, DuPont and British Sugar have formed a JV, to construct 
a plant to produce bioethanol from wheat in the UK.  
 
These two animated websites are designed to provide short and brief information 
about BP's biofuels. The information is rather general and straight forward for 
readers without profound scientific knowledge of biofuels to understand the 
messages given. Apart from information/knowledge sharing, these two animated 
websites are promoting BP's environmental concerns regarding G&S biofuels' 
feedstocks cultivation, which demonstrates BP's commitments as one of the leading 
green biofuels suppliers/producers. BP is also sharing its continuing R&D in 
biobutanol-a new product from BP and giving readers more information about 
developing biofuels to gain public support. Interested reader who visit these two 
websites will not only gain a general knowledge about biofuels, but also will learn 
some basic information of BP's biofuels businesses, particularly will encounter the 
biobutanol as a new product after years of knowing bioethanol. The websites do not 
provide a section for readers/consumers' feedback. However, visitors to the website 
can write to BP using the “contact us” section on the website.    
 
5.3.4.1 Utilising Websites and Corporate Videos in Responding Biofuels 
Controversy 
In the UK, the strong debates on food-fuel competition, food price increased and 
biodiversity damaged (resulted from the systemic risks) have contributed to firing up 
                                               
151 The seven different types of feedstocks in the BP's Biofuels Feedstocks website are: sugarcane, 
corn, wheat, energy grasses, soya, rapeseed and jatropha.   
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the controversy and create further public anxiety on the biofuels issues. For the 
period January 2008 to September 2008152, the British public was subjected to a 
nearly daily update and continuing debate on these issues from all media sources: 
television, radio, newspapers and the internet. This period marked two stages-before 
and during the effectuation of the RTFO since 15 April 2008. Various media fuelled 
the debate and decreased the public confident on biofuels, which nearly ruined the 
RTFO effectuation and threatened the oil companies’ biofuels businesses.  
 
Supported by two interviewees: “What we can see from here is, how the 
mismanagement of biofuels has caused the trouble. There are so many speculations. 
Today biofuels is using up 1% of the world arable land but look how much noise the 
media made in the speculation,” said the Sustainability Strategy Manager. “What we 
can do is to explain and to educate, through our corporate media (homepage, 
publications, magazines, newsletters); and support this with scientific evidence to 
back it up. We do not have a broadcasting media which can keep on telling the facts, 
we use our homepage the most,” explained the Executive of NWEEP. 
 
5.3.4.2 Balancing the Business, Environment and Sustainability Commitment  
After the emergence of systemic risks, the UK Government amended the RTFO 
targets, but did not abandon biofuels deployment totally. This decision has reinstalled 
confidence within the oil companies to continue their biofuels business in both 
biofuels supply and the NGB R&D. From the interview, the Sustainable Strategy 
Manager explained: “Right now, we are in the process of dealing with the (RTFO) 
targets and the RFA's Indicative Targets. So everybody is kind of aligning towards 
these targets. If the UK Government terminates it (biofuels deployment), then it will 
send the wrong message to the public about biofuels, and it will discourage the 
industry. I think the current legislation has a very weak criterion concerning the 
definitions of sustainability, but I hope it will grow stronger in the future.” 
                                               
152 In September 2008, the British public is alarmed by the news of Lehman Brothers filing for 
bankruptcy, which marked the beginning of world financial crisis. This date could be traced through 
BBC (16 September 2008). The biofuels debates were cooled down, and the public attention switched 
towards this financial crisis.  
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“You have to realise one thing, that for some reason, biofuels are the scapegoat for 
environmental and social power. You might get cut out if you project the idea in 
conversation, that in reality this is going to correspond to biofuels. So, we need to 
tackle (these debates), let’s say how much land is available, how much we can use 
without touching any high value area and show how we do not take food to produce 
biofuels. Biofuels is taking the blame for it, but in reality is all about the agriculture 
and land management,” the Sustainability Strategy Manager from the interview 
added. 
 
The manager's view is supported by Hayward's corporate speech. In balancing BP’s 
business performance, environment and sustainability commitment, Hayward 
replied: “I don’t see a distinction between sustainability and performance. My aim 
for BP is that its performance should be sustainable; in other words everything we do 
each day should contribute in some way to the long-term economic health of BP and 
that of the environment and society. We measure performance accordingly, not only 
with financial metrics but also with the data on safety and the environment. We are 
looking to the future as well as the present and I believe that is the foundation for 
responsible and best-in-class performance” (BP, 1 April 2009). 
 
“If biofuels are introduced in a responsible and sustainable way, their growth could 
be phenomenal. For this to occur, biofuels must retain government support, public 
awareness and goodwill must be secured and maintained, and technology must play 
an effective and timely role. By accessing biofuels feedstocks that do not compete 
with food stocks, that do not encroach on the rainforest or other sensitive areas, and 
that take account of the biosphere and biodiversity, we believe biofuels can make a 
valuable contribution to the world's energy supplies, and do so in a manner that is 
sustainable and profitable,” New (BP, 2007a). 
 
5.4 Risk and Uncertainty Faced and Strategies Adopted by BP during 
the Next Generation Biofuels Development  
According to Hayward: “BP’s projections suggest we need around 45% more energy 
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in 2030 than we consume today, and double what we consume today by 2050. 
Currently, the 1G biofuels manufactured primarily from agricultural crops, account 
for only 2-3% of global transportation fuels. However BP estimates the demand for 
biofuels could grow up to a 30% share of the market by 2030” (BP, 2007a, BP, 4 
February 2010). Thus the future biofuels must comply with socially and 
environmentally acceptable ways. With several first mover actions already set in 
place by BP in the NGB development, BP has established itself at the forefront of 
this anticipated demand growth.  
 
Extending the three driving forces which led to the commencement of the 1G 
biofuels (discussed at 5.1.1), BP recognises that today’s biofuels deployment are just 
a start, which has provided an open door for a long-term business prospect. 
Supported by the interview: “One of the purposes for the next generation biofuels 
research, we believe that the new generation biofuels are the better solution. We are 
using the first generation as a stepping stone to create the necessary capacity and 
market alignment before we go into the second generation,” said the Sustainability 
Strategy Manager. Therefore, the potential of biofuels would only be unlocked 
through R&D, which aimed at expanding the potential of biofuels: solving the 
limitations of the 1G biofuels; complying with the G&S criteria and producing 
biofuels in the most efficient way (high volume at lowest production costs). By 
applying bioscience and biotechnology into the industry, various R&D projects will 
build BP's competitive advantage by creating a new generation of G&S biofuels.  
 
Based on the literature (refer Table 2.4.1), there are three R&U153 arising during the 
technology development. Using the theories advocated by Rosenbloom and Kantrow 
(1982), Pearson (1991), Rosenberg (1994), the researcher has identified various 
strategies which BP has adopted to deal with them. As shown in Table 5.3, these are 
the R&U of the NGB deployment together with the strategies implemented. 
 
 
                                               
153  innovation process, technology, and social acceptance.  
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Table 5.3: Risk and Uncertainty from the NGB Development and Strategies 
Adopted to Counteract 
The NGB development   Strategies applied  
Innovation process 
-Beyond BP's institutional knowledge and 
capability at the NGB development and 
production  
-BP established various partnership with 
(commercial and academic) biotechnology 
institutions and agricultural industry   
Technology 
-Limitations of the NGB to meet increasing 
demand  
-BP diversify the NGB innovations on feedstocks 
and process development  
Social acceptance of the NGB -Utilise corporate media, in educating public 
about the NGB biofuels, promoting good criteria 
of biofuels. 
Source: Summarised by the researcher. 
 
5.4.1 Dealing with Risk and Uncertainty of Innovation Process 
There are two R&U faced by BP. Firstly, the profound biofuels technology has 
challenged BP's existing institutional knowledge. Even centuries of fossil fuels 
business expertises could not answer the technical ambiguity of the NGB on both 
product and production innovation. Secondly, the incapability of BP in producing the 
NGB at commercial scale. This is because BP's existing infrastructure is at fossil 
fuels extraction and refinery. Hence, to go from an oil mining operation to biofuels 
farming, this has created a knowledge gap for BP. Supported by Koonin: “Changing 
from BP's core oil and gas exploration business is a slow process. We are trying (but) 
it is not easy to change things. You can't cut off the present. Deployment of energy 
innovations (from oil and gas to biofuels) is very hard because of entrenched 
interests” (LaMonica, 22 September 2008).  
 
As such, BP is collaborating with various cross nations biotechnology institutions 
(commercial and academic), and agricultural industry in order to achieve two 
objectives as below:   
(a) To access biofuels R&D and production facilities 
For the NGB development, some advanced research and production facilities are 
required. Since biofuels is a new business for BP, to build these new infrastructures 
alone would involve high costs and high risks. Though partnerships, BP could have 
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the direct and immediate access to its partners' existing R&D154  and production 
facilities155, or at least to share the building/operation costs together to have these 
facilities established. These partnerships could reduce BP to the risk exposure of high 
investments, and will help BP to move into the NGB development and production at 
a speedy manner.  
 
(b) Access and secure biofuels feedstocks 
The nature of the feedstocks growing is determined by the geographical factor. Due 
to the geographical advantage of some nations, like jatropha in India (BP funds 
TERI), jatropha (BP JV with D1 Oil) in Southern Africa and South East Asia; and 
sugarcane in Brazil (BP JV with Tropical Bioenergia), all of these countries have the 
absolute advantage in executing large scale feedstocks growing. These three cross-
border JVs reflect BP's objectives in securing these feedstocks, which allow BP to 
have a higher control in biofuels value chain (from source to production), and could 
build up its capacity for future supply.  
 
Two of the objectives mentioned above could be summarised as BP’s intention to 
access its partners' institutional knowledge and capability. Although BP has 
established156 different types of collaboration, all of them are concentrated on BP's 
main principle: the need for external expertises to complement the inadequacy of 
internal institutional knowledge at the NGB development and production within BP. 
Supported by New: “To understand the impact of technology on biofuels 
development, BP is learning the dynamics of the new biofuels value chain, enabling 
the company to inform its technology development programmes, to build key 
competencies and secure asset positions” (BP, 2007a). 
 
Looking at a bigger picture, the collaborations not only are benefiting BP, but also its 
partner under a symbiotic relationship. The implications of these collaborations will 
                                               
154  BP sets up EBI, BP-Mendel, BP-Arizona University, BP-Martek (refer appendix 5.2). 
155 This is evidenced by BP three JV projects: BP-Tropical BioEnergia; BP-DuPont-British Sugar, 
and BP-Verenium (refer appendix 5.2).  
156 direct funding, joint venture (JV) and strategic alliance (SA) 
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contribute to the social and economic gains for both companies, as well as for the 
location where the investments are made. BP could access its partners' expertises and 
capabilities at the NGB development/production, tap into its partners' resources 
(land, skilled workers, infrastructures), as well as strengthening the local market 
accession (to deal with the issues of different culture, regulations, economic and 
business system). Meanwhile, its partners could also access BP's knowledge and 
capabilities at fuel supplying, the brand of BP, obtaining investments from BP (for 
wealth creation and employments) as well as global fuel market accession which 
could assure profitable opportunities.  
 
5.4.2 Dealing with the Limitations of the Next Generation Biofuels to 
Meet Increasing Demand 
BP estimates that around 7-10% of current global transportation fuel demand can be 
met by the 1G biofuels feedstocks presently in use, along with the cultivation of 
additional land, without affecting food supplies. However, this is only valid for a 
short-term biofuels implementation within five-to-ten years (BP, 2007a). As such the 
NGB has to be developed further to increase the capacity for future supply to satisfy 
the future demand.  
 
Yet, there is one issue questioning the capacity of the NGB: How far can the NGB 
meet the world’s biofuels increasing demands? If the EURED (2009) has specified 
10% of renewables should form the transport fuel, how much could biofuels 
contribute to achieve this target? Recall the ten NGB projects (refer appendix 5.2), 
they range from biofuels research (on product and process technology), feedstocks 
plantation, and also investments in production plant; all signify the strong start in 
charting BP’s biofuels business for many years to come. The diversification of the 
NGB is important, to ensure each of the project from different generations, different 
types of feedstocks, as well as different production approaches could contribute 





5.4.2.1 Intensify the Next Generation Biofuels Research on Feedstocks 
Development  
According to Knott (2007), the pathway to increase biofuels lies in being able to 
access other substances in plants which are present in greater proportions than sugars 
and starches, called as biomass/lignocellulosic categorised under the 2G biofuels. 
Scientifically, under photosynthesis, most of the sun energy is converted not only 
into sugars and starches, but also into cellulose, hemicellulose and lignin157. These 
substances, collectively referred as lignocellulosic biomass, essentially form the cell 
walls, the structure and protective armour of the plant. In some agricultural crops 
such as corn and wheat, this type of biomass is contained in the agriculture residues, 
like corn stove and wheat straw (Knott, 2007). 
 
Energy grasses158 are one of the potential the 2G biofuels feedstocks. Such plant 
species produce biomass rapidly with the potential to more litres of biofuels per acre 
than other feedstocks. For example, 420 litres of bioethanol could be obtained per 
tonne of biomass. Some experts believe the dry biomass yields could be pushed up 
by perhaps another 40% on top of these volumes. Furthermore, these perennial grass 
species can grow well without the need for intensive inputs such as 
agrochemicals/fertiliser, and have the ability to thrive on marginal land where more 
conventional crops would not survive. In this regard, their mass cultivation would 
not pose a threat to the prime agricultural land and food production (Knott, 2007). 
Through a technology partnership with Verenium, BP-Verenium is developing the 
cellulosic biofuels made from energy grasses such as miscanthus, switchgrass and 




                                               
157 Cellulose is a polymer of glucose, a sugar containing six carbon atoms. Hemicellulose is other 
sugar polymers with five carbon atoms. Lignin is a refractory substance of aromatic carbon 
compounds. 
158 Miscanthus, a species of tall grass, can quickly grow to over 3m in height in densely packed 
fields.  Switchgrass, another tall, woody-stemmed grass, exhibits similar growth. Both of these can 
yield over 10 tonnes of dry biomass per acre in a year (BP, 2009k). 
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5.4.2.2 Intensify the Next Generation Biofuels Research on Process Technology  
To achieve higher efficiency on production, the NGB R&D is also focusing on the 
process technology. To date, there are three projects which BP has established with 
its partners. Firstly, BP-Arizona State University and Science Foundation Arizona. 
This partnership is aimed to produce biodiesel using photosynthetic bacterium. The 
advanced process eliminates the need for costly and complex processing 
infrastructure, allows a direct conversion from bacterium into biodiesel without 
going through the process of transesterification which could lower down the 
production cost. Furthermore, the direct conversion by using solar power could 
eliminate the energy inputs, which resulting in lower CO2 emission.  
 
Secondly, BP-Verenium and EBI. According to Koonin, genetic engineering has to 
be applied to the plants, to unlock their potential as biofuels feedstocks (Knott, 
2007). Since Mendel's core expertise is about plant gene, its institutional knowledge 
of gene function enables the identification of natural/synthetic chemicals that can 
improve plant productivity resulting in higher yields with minimal resources needed 
for growing.  
 
Koonin further commented: “We have to acknowledge that lignocellulose is tough 
for enzymes to break down into starch and sugar molecules for fermentation. To 
make this feasible, chemical and physical treatments of the biomass are currently 
required to break down the cellulose into fibres, which enzymes can decompose 
these fibres into component sugars, before the fermentation microbes can get to work 
in producing ethanol” (Knott, 2007). To enhance production efficiency, BP 
scientists/researchers are finding ways to make these enzymes more cheaply than is 
possible at present, and also to seek microorganisms that are capable of fermenting 
the five-carbon atom sugar molecules found in hemicellulose. At the moment, BP-
Verenium and EBI are actively engaged in enzyme development to materialise the 
production of cellulosic bioethanol.  
 
Thirdly, apart from BP's current investments in Jatropha-which will provide a 
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massive amount of biodiesel feedstocks for the near term, another division of 
biodiesel development is carried out through the Joint Development between BP and 
Martek. This collaboration is working on the process technology, by converting 
sugars into biodiesel. According to BP's corporate report (2009r), the technology 
uses microorganisms that convert sugars into lipids through fermentation. The oil 
that is produced can then be extracted and processed into biodiesel. There are a few 
advantages of the sugar-to-diesel pathway over conventional biodiesel made from 
food crop-feedstocks diversification, price stabilisation and high GHG/CO2 
reductions (refer appendix 5.4.1). 
 
Furthermore, BP justified the sugar-to-diesel technology by admitting it is reliant on 
technologies that are already proven at scale for its applicability, rather than 
technologies that are still in the lab-stage of development. Currently, a number of 
organisms for the conversion process have been identified. However, the challenge is 
to identify the most suitable one with high efficient manufacturing methods, to 
enable a cost effective production at a commercial scale. BP expected this technology 
will be viable in the market within five years (BP, 2009r). 
 
5.4.3 Dealing with Risk and Uncertainty of Social Acceptance 
After the emergence of the systemic risks, the 1G is under controlled by the RFA-
which set mandatory requirements on G&S biofuels supply and indicative targets for 
the oil companies/biofuels suppliers. While the NGB R&D is still ongoing, the ripple 
effects of the systemic risks that arose are eroding the social acceptance about its 
reliability on G&S criteria. BP through its corporate website and videos is promoting 
both the benefits provided by the NGB, as well as its latest the NGB development 
news. BP’s goald is to build a sustainable biofuels business which is based on 
proprietary technology, ownership of advantaged assets, logistics and feedstocks. 
With its current portfolio of activities in developing the G&S NGB feedstocks, and 
its active involvement in the current biofuels supply market and development of 
efficient the NGB process technology, BP has established a leading position within 
the industry (BP, 2007a). 
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“Today, we invest a significant amount in alternative energy technology compared 
with our peers. We are prioritising areas with significant long-term growth potential: 
biofuels (also wind, solar) and we directed the majority of our $1.4 billion 
investment in low-carbon energy in 2008 to these areas,” said Hayward   (BP, 1 April 
2009). Supported by the interview: “We have engaged on all these (R&D and 
investments), and obviously we agreed that second generation is the way to go. The 
last thing that we do not want to do is to allow biofuels to destroy biodiversity and to 
compete with food directly,” commented the Sustainability Strategy Manager. 
 
On 30 October 2009, BP’s biofuels business was voted as “Biofuels Corporation of 
the Year 2009” by the World Refining Association (WRA) 159  at its 4th annual 
Biofuels Conference dated on 27-29 October 2009 in Budapest, Hungary. The award 
acknowledged BP's efforts in biofuels deployment and development. BP Biofuels 
was elected as the first recipient of the award by more than 350 biofuels industry 
players, policy makers, related associations; and was endorsed by the Advisory 
Board of the WRA (BP, 30 October 2009). This award is important for BP, because 
as it acknowledges BP's contribution in G&S biofuels. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
The mechanisms that the regulators devised to deliver biofuels deployment and 
development, have built up a strong confidence for BP in executing biofuels supply 
and pursuing the NGB development, despite the high risks/investments involved. 
Backed by the three political driving forces 160  from the regulators (of different 
levels) for biofuels adoption, BP's rationales to engage in biofuels business are 
seamlessly matched with these driving forces, and which were also strengthen by its 
economic motivations. Biofuels are one of the RE profiles that could sustain BP’s 
energy business for many years to come.  
                                               
159 The World Refining Association (WRA) is an independent, information provider to the global oil 
and gas and energy sectors. Formed in 1997, has offices in Central London and Cheltenham in the 
UK, and operates a team of independent senior consultants based across Europe, Russia and the 
Middle East (WRA, 2009). 




Operating within a regulated market, the biofuels market has continuous intervention 
from the regulators. BP as one of the biofuels suppliers has to comply with the rules, 
regulations and requirements laid down by the regulators, in order to perform its 
function and to sustain its biofuels business. When technological change incurred 
R&U (some of which are expected), these were resolved by BP efficiently/effectively 
with the combined strengths, knowledge and resources which it had established with 
its business partners, as well as collaborations with the regulators at various level. 
 
The systemic risks occurred were unanticipated. Most of the solutions were provided 
by the regulators due to their political authority/position and roles they played. 
Consequently, biofuels targets of the RTFO were altered, in order to slow down 
biofuels expansion. Inevitably, biofuels deployment continues, and facilitated with 
stringent G&S criteria enforcement. This research highlights that, BP took these 
systemic risks as one of the events on its learning curve, to control/manage its 
internal biofuels supply chain. Besides, the G&S criteria have been adopted as one of 
the criteria for the NGB development. The message which BP wants to project is 
clear. BP is committed to the G&S biofuels supply, to ensure the existing biofuels 
can be produced in a socially and environmentally responsible way; while the 














Chapter 6 Royal Dutch Shell in Biofuels Business 
Preface 
There are some similarities between BP and Shell operating in the UK regulated 
market under the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO). As one of the world 
six oil companies which is pursuing the next generation biofuels (NGB) development 
(refer appendix 7.1.1), Shell is currently supplying biofuels in the UK under the 
RTFO (2008).  
 
This chapter begins with the rationales which have stimulated the business interests 
of Shell, to embark on the route of pursuing biofuels supply and innovation. 
Operating under the regulated market, the EU/UK Government have established 
mechanisms which help to deliver biofuels deployment and development 
regionally/nationally. This study has provided insights into the interactions generated 
between Shell and the EU/UK Government, whilst examining its response to these 
mechanisms instituted. Since technological change is a dynamic process, which 
incurs various types of expected/unexpected risk and uncertainty (R&U), this chapter 
also describes how Shell devised its strategy to deal with the R&U encountered along 
biofuels deployment and development. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Founded in 1907, with its headquarters located at The Hague, Netherlands; Shell has 
been one of the global oil players, supplying fossil energy products for more than a 
century. Operating in more than 100 countries, Shell's expertise covers the upstream, 
the downstream and technology development (refer appendix 6.1.1) (Shell, 2010). 
Since 1970s, Shell started its biofuels business, by acting as one of the biofuels 
distributors in Brazil due to the effectuation of 1974 Brazilian Proalcool 
Programme 161 , which was backed up by the vast home grown sugarcane for 
bioethanol production. Similar to BP, Shell started supplying biofuels in the UK from 
15 April 2008 under the RTFO. Therefore, Shell has been a biofuels distributor for 
                                               
161 The bioethanol use in Brazil is initiated by the Brazilian National Alcohol Programe-Proalcool 
since 1974. It has been in effect for 36 years (counting until 2010) by promoting the usage of 
bioethanol derived from sugarcane as an alternative fuel for cars. 
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nearly thirty-six years. Until 2011, Shell still does not manufacture biofuels, but 
instead buys them from international suppliers and blends them with conventional 
fuels. It is expected that, the NGB R&D projects would be able to produce a 
sustainable supply in a commercial scale, five-to-ten years from 2008.  
 
6.1.1 Three Driving Forces for Shell Biofuels Uptakes 
Shell distributed more than 6 billion litres of biofuels in 2008. Currently, Shell does 
not produce biofuels, but buys in162, stores, blends and distributes the 1G biofuels for 
the world demand (Shell, 2008). This is because, Shell started the 2G biofuels 
development (wheat straw bioethanol) since 2002, but this has yet to be 
commercially available.  
 
In 2007, over 80% of bioethanol was used for blending with gasoline, with the 
remaining 20% biodiesel being used for diesel engines. According to Shell (2009a), 
three-quarters of the biofuels purchased in 2007 were produced from corn/soy from 
the US and sugarcane from Brazil (Shell, 2009a). This was due to the competitive 
advantage of the US and Brazil, as the world biggest maize/soy and sugarcane 
producers, consequently leading to largest biodiesel/bioethanol productions. There 
are three driving forces which influenced Shell's decisions to enter biofuels business. 
 
(a) The Energy Challenge 
By 2050, the world will need twice as much energy as today, while regulated by 
many policies that allow emitting half of today's greenhouse gases (GHGs). As the 
global population heads for 9 billion in 2050, supplies of conventional oil and gas as 
the transport energy will struggle to keep up. Furthermore, the GHGs reduction will 
be one of the biggest challenges ever. “The world cannot support society's current 
habits forever. We need new sources of energy, less CO2, and more sustainable 
lifestyles in energy consumptions. Biofuels cannot be left out of the mix and have the 
potential to be an affordable, genuinely low CO2 fuel,” said Rob Routs-the Executive 
                                               
162 from the international market, like the USA, Brazil, Canada, South East Asia and South Africa, 
supplying for the UK under the RTFO. 
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Director Oil Sands, Oil Products and Chemicals (Shell, 29 October 2008). Due to the 
technical convenience provided by biofuels, particularly their capability for carbon 
reduction and their adaptability in the existing internal combustion engines 
(ICEs)/hydrocarbon infrastructure, biofuels become a vital part of Shell future energy 
mix163, serving the global increasing energy demand for road transport use. 
 
(b) Biofuels as Fuel Option for CO2 Reduction  
Since the world needs to double its energy supplies while simultaneously cutting 
CO2 emissions in half, to achieve more energy with less CO2, Shell has to conserve 
and diversify its energy sources, to secure the correct energy mix in preparing for 
future demands. “Bear in mind we need more energy, with less CO2. Biofuels can 
reduce CO2 emissions over petrol or diesel by up to 90% on a farm-to-wheels basis,” 
said Routs (Shell, 29 October 2008). Currently, road vehicles account for nearly 17% 
of global CO2 emissions and the number of vehicles on the road could increase to 
more than two billion by 2050 (World Business Council, 2004). Despite the future 
promises of electric/H2 cars, the largest proportion of existing vehicles running on 
ICE will still require liquid fuels164. Hence, to allow the ICEs could be operating on 
roads, biofuels which can be blended with petrol/diesel provide an economic solution 
without high switching costs involved.  
 
(c) Government Policy and Targets  
Many governments in developed countries such as the EU member states are 
supporting biofuels development and deployment with mandated targets for 
renewable transport fuels. The EU Biofuels Directive (EUBD) 2003 has laid down a 
target of 5.75% by 2010 of biofuels application among its member states. This is 
further extended by the EU Renewable Energy Directive (EURED) 2009 which 
proposes 10% of road vehicle fuel from renewables by 2020. In the UK, this has 
been transposed into RTFO as a mandatory target of 2.5% in 2008/9 will rise to 5% 
in 2013/14. According to the Engineer of the Renewable Energy Team from the 
                                               
163 Shell energy mix profile includes fossil energy: coal, oil, gas and RE of wind, solar, H2, biofuels. 
164 petrol, diesel, liquefied natural gas and biofuels blend with petrol/diesel 
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interview, biofuels percentage could be increased up to 10% after 2013/14. Such 
increase would largely depend on the political mandate, incentives, the fuel 
technological breakthrough165, the G&S criteria of biofuels166 and the availability of 
green cars167 which can adopt higher concentration of biofuels use.  
 
“Politics, economics and the environment, all of them do contribute by different 
degrees for biofuels (implementations) in the UK. At this moment, it is due to the 
policies that encourage the corporates to gain from the carbon trading. Shell 
distributes biofuels to meet specific government requirements in a few countries, like 
the UK for example. Biofuels is an energy landscape which has been directed by the 
policy makers. Furthermore, it is quantifiable with the biofuels in terms of 
percentage of greenness in the total fuel consumption,” explained the Executive of 
CO2 Abatement Project Team from the interview. Further commented by the 
Engineer from the Renewable Energy Team from the interview: “From the 
environment perspective, the concern of climate change as global issues has been 
emphasised. The EU is by far the leader in stretching their GHG reduction targets. So 
obviously whatever they could put their hands on (to reduce GHGs), they will strive 
to achieve this including a push for biofuels.”  
 
To summarise these three driving forces, Jan van der Eijk-the Group Chief 
Technology Officer commented: “As I see it, we are on the eve of an energy 
technology revolution, triggered by a number of factors. Firstly, concern about the 
security of energy supply. Society wants more energy sources so as to be less 
dependent on a limited number of energy exporting countries. Secondly, current easy 
oil will become exhausted in due course, already leading the industry to look at more 
difficult, unconventional resources. Besides, society simply expects that alternatives 
                                               
165 Biofuels are currently being constrained by the technical limitation of the ICEs. World automobile 
manufacturers would provide warranty for biofuels which are used up to 5% only.  
166 The expansion of biofuels which beyond 5% is also determined by the capability of biofuels 
production. Biofuels (or the NGB) should demonstrate they could be produced in a G&S manner (to 
comply with the Principles and Criteria outlines by respective roundtables); it does not create negative 
implications (as the 1G biofuels did, which rendered to the systemic risks occurrence) and it has to be 
environmentally and socially responsible.  
167 Such as hybrids which can adopt higher concentration of biofuels, or flex-fuels cars. 
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will be developed in response to climate concerns.” Inevitably, biofuels could 
contribute a significant difference to enrich the energy mix for the road transport 
sector and sustain Shell's energy businesses. In securing energy supply and lowering 
CO2/GHG, biofuels are one of the contemporary options, as they could be sustained 
in the long-term, to fulfil both the regulatory and market requirements (Shell, 13 July 
2007). 
 
6.1.2 Shell Dealing with the EU/UK Governments' Policies and Regulations 
There is an increasing interest from the EU/UK governments in adopting biofuels, as 
a response to the concerns on fossil fuel dependence associated with energy security 
and GHG reductions. The EUBD (2003), the EURED (2009) and the RTFO (2008) 
are policies which reflect the EU/UK Governments' interests. These messages were 
delivered to Shell-as one of the oil companies which is actively supplying biofuels.  
 
Both the EUBD and the RTFO have specified the annual targets which have to be 
attained in the overall market (for the EU and the UK market). “Shell supports action 
to address greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. We recognise the need for 
governments to reduce CO2 in transport. Clearly, such policies have been adopted in 
Europe and the UK. No doubt that clear and simple government policy support will 
be the absolute key to the success of biofuels,” said Lauren Iannarone-the Vice 
President of External and Government Affairs (Webchat, 2009b). In order to 
commence biofuels smoothly, the incentive of 20p/litre has been adopted in the UK 
since 2003. This incentive brings two benefits: Firstly it helps the oil companies to 
sustain their biofuels sales in order to motivate the course of execution. Secondly, it 
maintains the retail price at an affordable level for motorists, without burdening them 
with the actual full cost. Further explained by Routs: “The market for biofuels today 
is driven by government mandates, not a price advantage over oil. The UK’s 
Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation requires that 5% of the UK’s fuel be made up 
of biofuels by 2013/14” (Shell, 29 October 2008). 
 
To operate in the UK, Shell complies with the Renewable Fuels Agency’s (RFA) 
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Meta/Qualifying standards for the adoption of the G&S criteria on biofuels products 
and production. Routs commented: “Governments can do their part by regulating the 
sustainability of supply chains and creating market based incentives that reward 
biofuels with low CO2” (Shell, 3 July 2008). Every month, Shell reports to the RFA 
under the “Carbon and Sustainability” reporting system, on information about its 
biofuels sales data168. Then, the RFA will issue the RTF Certificate for every litre of 
biofuels Shell supplied.  
 
According to Shell Corporate Reports (2009a, 2010b), Shell started implementing its 
internal tracking systems to record information about biofuels purchased. Explained 
by the Quality Engineer from the interview: “Every month, we have to report to the 
Fuel Agency (RFA) on biofuels. We require our suppliers to submit monthly reports 
to us. Then we convey information on the carbon savings and sustainability issue of 
biofuels to the Fuel Agency. We require precise information of the biofuels source, 
from which country, what types of land use...almost everything wanted by the 
agency.” Inevitably, Shell though its representation on national/international 
standards bodies, has been supporting the work of the European Committee for 
Standardization (CEN) (refer appendix 5.1.4), which is developing sustainability 
requirements for the development of the EURED (2009) and the Fuel Quality 
Directive (2009) (Shell, 2009a). 
 
6.1.3 Shell Embarking on the Next Generation Biofuels Development 
During the interview, the Executive of CO2 Abatement Project commented: “Firstly 
we are looking forward to the sustainability of biofuels, which links to the social 
environment responsibility. Next, we want to be a leader in biofuels which will give 
Shell the strong leading position. Both of them provide the fundamental motivations 
for Shell to capitalise on the technology (biofuels).” Further explained by Peter 
Voser-the CEO of Royal Dutch Shell: “At Shell, social-environmental responsibility 
is the source of inspiration for our people. We will continue to produce efficient and 
                                               
168 the quantity sold on particular month, country of origin, feedstocks, sustainability standard, land 
use change and CO2 saved.  
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sustainable biofuels” (Shell, 13 October 2009). As explained above, the corporate 
social responsibility and the economic motivation are the two factors which led Shell 
to pursue on the NGB development.  
 
Currently, the 1G biofuels is largely derived from food. When choosing these 
feedstocks, people have looked primarily to plants that can be grown to provide the 
largest yield. In 2007, Shell's 1G biofuels was made up of 50% corn, 27% sugarcane, 
11% rape/soy beans, 5% wheat, and the remaining 7% of other feedstocks such as 
palm oil and sunflower oil (Shell, 2009a). Therefore, one of the objectives for the 
NGB R&D is to seek for feedstocks which are non-food and with high yield, yet 
could be produced at a lower cost. This view is supported by the Quality Engineer 
from the interview: “Cost is our main concern. We have to choose materials which 
are high in fuel (feedstocks which provide a higher yield) for our investments. The 
biofuels production cost is very high now. But, I think it can be reduced by 
technology enhancement when we do more on second or third generation. So, one 
day biofuels prices may compete with petroleum. I think, the second generation 
biofuels could be on the market in five-to-ten year time. To get there, we are 
investing in partnerships, targeted at technical breakthroughs and cost reduction for 
each of the R&D projects.”  
 
Through various types of collaboration with several biotechnology institutions 
(academic and commercial laboratories), Shell has the NGB developed. From the 
interview, the Engineer of the Renewable Energy Team explained: “Shell's interests 
in biofuels are focused on sustainable sourcing and to reduce greenhouse gases. Our 
investments in the next generation biofuels are to bring quality and cost effective 
products to market.” Besides, the Executive of CO2 Abatement from the interview 
commented: “Our researchers are working all over the world-India, Germany, the 
US; and there will more to come. As a global company, we take a global approach.” 
Therefore, it is clear that, Shell's research partnerships have been cross-border 
collaborations, and varied according to the expertise, infrastructure capability and the 
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geographical availability of the feedstocks169. The next section details an update for 
the NGB development projects which Shell has established with different partners.  
 
6.2 Shell's Seven the Next Generation Biofuels Development Projects 
From year 2002 to 2010, through three main types of partnerships (direct funding, 
joint venture-JV and strategic alliance-SA), Shell has established seven the NGB 
R&D projects (refer appendix 6.2) which are spreading across the globe. These 
projects set ways to increase the quantity of biofuels supply, to switch biofuels away 
from food chain, to achieve the G&S criteria, to solve the limitations of the 1G 
biofuels, and to comply with the regulations required by the EU/UK Government. 
Table 6.1 presents the summary of these seven NGB projects. 
 
6.2.1 Shell's Latest Achievement on the Next Generation Biofuels 
Development  
On 10 June 2009, marked an important event for Shell. Shell officially declared its 
wheat straw (the 2G) bioethanol, and commenced a pilot market testing in Ottawa, 
Canada. According to Sweeney-the Shell Executive Vice President of Future Fuels 
and CO2 “From today (10 June 2009) and for a month period (until 10 July 2009), 
customers at a Shell service station located in Ottawa, will become the first in the 
world to fill their tanks with gasoline containing the 2G biofuels made from wheat 









                                               
169 such as wheat straw in Canada and microalgae in Hawaii. 
170 Only one station in Ottawa was selected. The fuel contained 10% wheat straw bioethanol, which 
was produced from Iogen’s demonstration plant, named as E10. 
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Projects Information Project Types 
2002, 
extended 
on 15 July 
2008 
Shell and Iogen  JV Cellulosic ethanol from wheat 
straw, and a demonstration 










JV BTL from forest residues and 
waste wood/wood chips into 
biodiesel, and a demonstration 








JV Research of marine microalgae 
to produce biodiesel in Hawaii 







Development of biogasoline 
with the conversion from sugar 
to biogasoline 




Shell with Six 
Universities  
Direct funding  Seeking new feedstocks and 









JV Enzyme Conversion, working 
closely with Iogen to enhance 
the efficiency of enzymes used 
in the cellulosic ethanol 











Source: Summarised by the researcher  
 
Local news agencies such as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) News 
(11 June 2009) ran the announcement in their news bulletin, which then created some 
positive reactions from the locals. John Baird-the Transport and Infrastructure 
Minister of Canada commented: “This one small retail station in Ottawa is one big 
step forward for an advanced biofuels” (Deutscher, 2009). The one-month pilot 
selling scheme has raised Shell’s profile in the biofuels market. Besides, it also 
provided a testbed (for market response and the actual application on road) on its 
wheat-straw bioethanol. Besides, this launch is also aimed to examine the actual 
application of the 2G bioethanol on road. Such publicity was aimed as a signal to its 




6.3 Risk and Uncertainty Faced and Strategies Adopted by Shell during 
the 1G Biofuels Deployment 
Based on the literature (refer Table 2.4.2), according to Rosenbloom and Kantrow 
(1982), Pearson (1991), Rosenberg (1994) and the SpecialChem report (2011), there 
are three R&U171 arising from a technology deployment. Table 6.2 present the R&U 
faced by Shell during the 1G biofuels deployment together with strategies 
implemented to have these R&U resolved.  
 
Table 6.2: Risk and Uncertainty from the 1G Biofuels Deployment and 
Strategies Applied to Counteract  
The 1G biofuels deployment  Strategies applied 
Business operations: 




(b) Short-term biofuels contractual supply 
system. 
 
(ai) Shell's declaration for Social and 
Environmental Safeguards.  
(aii) Sustainable Sourcing Policy (SSP) 
formulation and implementation.  
(b) Prolong term contract and decrease spot 
contract.  
Technology: Socioenvironmental implications 
(a) Food fuel competition (systemic risk). 
 
(b) Land use and Biodiversity threatened 
(systemic risk). 
(c) Ambiguity of biofuels carbon neutrality. 
 
(a) The NGB development (wheat straw, BTL, 
algae) as non-food feedstocks. 
(b) Control by SSP, roundtables participations 
and the 2G/3G biofuels R&D. 
(c)The NGB development due to their high 
carbon savings. 
Technology: Technical limitation of the 1G 
bioethanol. 
-R&D for biogasoline.  
Social acceptance of biofuels. -Utilise corporate website, and YouTube to 
promote biofuels, educate public about biofuels 
and broadcast latest information.  
-Utilise webcasts and webchat to answer biofuels 
controversy. 
Source: Summarised by the researcher. 
 
6.3.1 Risk and Uncertainty of Business Operations  
During the early stage of the 1G biofuels deployment under the RTFO, Shell faced 
two challenges from its biofuels business operations: the complexity of the 1G 
biofuels supply chain, and the short-term contractual biofuels supply system. 
 
                                               
171 business operations, technology and social acceptance.  
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(a) Complexity of the 1G biofuels supply chain 
Previously, Shell found that it was difficult to assess its biofuels information due to 
the complexity of the supply chain. The usual public perception on biofuels supply 
chain is rather simple and straight forward as shown in figure 6.1 (Shell, 2009a). 
Figure 6.1: The Simplistic Biofuels Supply Chain Perceived 
Source: Shell. 2009a. pp.7. 
 
However, in reality, the supply chain is not as simple as the diagram shown above. 
Some feedstocks suppliers may simply market them, without identifying the source 
(from which farms/country they are from). While other suppliers/traders, (usually big 
biofuels operators/companies) are working across different markets and could 
intervene some parts of the supply chain. To complicate the situation further, the 
chain may span across the globe involving many countries. There are known cases 
traced where feedstocks purchased in one country, actually came originally from 
another. The actual complexity of biofuels supply chain is shown in figure 6.2.  
 
Figure 6.2: The Actual and Complex Biofuels Supply Chains 
Source: Shell. 2009a. pp.7. 
 
Consequently, there are three implications caused by the complexity of the supply 
chain. Firstly, biofuels feedstocks may come from many different sources/nations 
without proper identification. Secondly, there might have additional inputs at any 
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point through traders, which might have been sourced from unsustainable feedstocks. 
Thirdly, the possibility for co-mingled storage and transportation which never could 
demonstrate adequate traceability. All of these are a big challange for Shell's biofuels 
businesses. If these challenges have not been resolved, then they would violate the 
Meta/Qualifying standards set by the RFA. 
 
(b) Short-term contractual biofuels supply system 
Traditionally, in order to ensure the consistency of supply, Shell has established two 
types of contractual supply system: “Short-term” and “Spot” contracts. Explained by 
the Quality Engineer from the interview: “Biofuels purchased under a short-term 
contract, was an agreement to purchase regular quantities for a defined period of 
time. Furthermore, Shell also made spot contract-a one off purchases which was 
handy enough to meet shortfalls and short-term spikes in demand. Obviously both 
(the short-term and spot contracts) have pros and cons. You have to understand, 
producing raw materials (biofuels), mainly depends on weather and harvest, which 
could affect the yield. You hardly get any guaranteed supply (in quantity) if you just 
depend on one (type of contract).” 
 
Even though these two types of contract helped to stabilise the quantity of biofuels 
supply; yet, they also placed Shell in the insecure position to be exposed to numerous 
uncertainties in quality control. The Quality Engineer from the interview 
commented: “In many regions, information about spot market purchases can be 
sketchy. It is hard to know where the biofuels are made, by whom and under what 
conditions. Although the term and spot contracts were be helpful in stabilising the 
quantity, they could not guarantee the sustainability criteria of biofuels.” The 
complex supply chain and contractual supply system rendered a fundamental 
problem: limited record and traceability of biofuels supplied. The inadequacy and 
opacity of information, led to a higher degree of uncertainty for Shell.  
 
Besides, the short-term contractual biofuels supply system has failed to build up a 
loyal supplying relationship. This can make biofuels very difficult to be verified on 
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the types of environmental and social conditions the feedstocks are grown. 
Therefore, if the biofuels' information is remain unknown, this may cause Shell fails 
to report to the RFA. In order to overcome these R&U of business operations, Shell 
adopted three strategies: Firstly, the corporate mission statement to declare that Shell 
is interested only at G&S biofuels. Secondly, the Sustainable Sourcing Policy (SSP) 
formulation and implementation, and lastly to reduce the use of the spot contract for 
biofuels supply.  
    
6.3.1.1 Shell's Corporate Mission in Shaping the Green and Sustainable 
Biofuels  
Shell declared its stand openly/clearly through various corporate medium172, which 
emphasised its commitment and interest at G&S biofuels. Explained by the Biofuels 
Officer from the interview: “Shell determines its working practice to ensure that 
biofuels purchased for blending are produced in a sustainable way.” The corporate 
mission declaration brought two benefits. Firstly, solving the R&U of business 
operations (discussed at 6.3.1) and the socioenvironmental concerns173; secondly, 
shaping Shell's green business image. According to Routs: “We have an obligation to 
manage today’s biofuels responsibly. So we have been establishing social and 
environmental safeguards among our biofuels suppliers. We are trying to ensure 
sustainable sourcing, and working hard to influence others in the industry to raise 
their own sustainability standards. Sustainability is central to everything we do. It is 
written into our business principles, the backbone of the way we act. It motivates 
much of our R&D, and it shapes many of our policies and strategies: from our 
advocacy for government caps on CO2, to our investment in the next generation 
biofuels,” (Shell, 29 October 2008).  
 
                                               
172 Through its annual corporate report on biofuels1.2, corporate policy3,4 and through corporate 
website5 
Source1: Shell. 2009a. Source2: Shell. 2009b. Source3: Shell. 2007a. Source4: Shell. 2006. Source5: Shell. 2008.  
173 Social and environmental safeguard of sustainability clauses defined by Shell includes: feedstocks 
and biofuels which do not linked to the violation of human right like forced/child labours, biofuels 
which are not compete with food, not planted in high value areas (food farm, jungles, forests, any 
preserved areas, or any land conversions from high biodiversity), not polluting the land or a water 
source (minimise the use of fertilisers) and allows traceability (Shell, 2009a). 
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6.3.1.2 The Sustainable Sourcing Policy Formulation and 
Implementation 
In 2006, Shell set up a Biofuels Sustainability Team and appointed a few number of 
Biofuels Sustainability Compliance Officers (BSCOs), to develop a strategy for the 
sustainable sourcing of biofuels. These BSCOs were assigned to develop the 
Sustainable Sourcing Policy (SSP)-a corporate policy for G&S biofuels operations 
(refer appendix 6.2.4).  
 
In August 2007, the SSP was formulated. It explains Shell's corporate mission and 
outlines Shell's commitments to work with governments 174  and its suppliers, to 
incorporate G&S clauses into supply contracts. In 2008 (during the RTFO 
effectuation), Shell established a more manageable biofuels supply system, which 
allowed for a higher degree of control of its biofuels supply chain. With the 
manpower (BSCOs)175 in place, the biofuels business which guided by the SSP, and 
the supply contracts which incorporated the SSP; all of these were acting as the 
control mechanism for Shell to achieve its G&S biofuels business. The Biofuels 
Officer from the interview commented: “With SSP, we are working closely with our 
biofuels suppliers. We communicate with EEA (European Environment Agency), 
Roundtables176 members, policy makers and members in the industry (peers, the oil 
companies, the biofuels suppliers) to promote robust global biofuels standards for 
biofuels sustainability.” “The head office has appointed a team to visit overseas like 
Brazil, USA and South Africa to assess our suppliers from time to time. We visit their 
farms and processing plants, to make sure the requisite sustainable sourcing of 
biofuels can be obtained. The assessment is to examine the farms and the production 
plants which must comply with Shell's terms and conditions bound by the supply 
contract incorporated with the sustainability clauses (SSP). After that, we will report 
                                               
174 the EU Government, the UK Government, as well as any government which Shell is operating 
within that country.  
175 BSCOs are working as assessor and auditor, ensuring the biofuels farms operated sustainably (by 
visiting to the farm), and communicating with the farmers/producers/traders/suppliers to comply with 
the Shell's SSP requirements.  
176 Shell is a member of Roundtable for Sustainable Biofuels (RSB), Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO), Roundtable for Responsible Soy (RTRS) and Better Sugarcane Initiative (BSI). 
221 
 
the assessment in the company's sustainability report.”  
 
Inevitably, the SSP plays an important role in controlling Shell's biofuels supply 
chain. In September 2008, more than half 177  of the biofuels Shell bought were 
covered by contract clauses while the remaining 25% is working towards the 
compliance. Paloma Berenguer-the Sustainable Development Manager explained: 
“We are actively working to cover the rest of our volume (25%) with our 
sustainability contract clauses” (Webchat, 2009b). Furthermore, in order to validate 
the internal governance with its related records, Shell sought an independent 
auditor178 to verify its monthly biofuels reporting information to the RFA.  
 
To conclude how Shell is managing its biofuels supply chain, Berenguer commented: 
“In order to ensure a sustainable biofuels business, we must lay the foundations for 
sustainability. We established our own policy (SSP), and criteria place in our 
contract, to ensure our suppliers are not engaged in; for example, harmful 
deforestation or exploitative labour practices. We have also appointed a sustainability 
compliance officer and begin formal assurance of our standards. We have created a 
reporting system on our activities and track record so far in this specific area” 
(Webchat, 2009b). Evidently, Shell's internal BSCOs179 , the SSP oriented supply 
contracts, together with the KPMG and ProForest audits, all of these were 
complementing each other to provide a higher accountability and validity in biofuels 
reporting system.  
 
 
                                               
177 By the end of 2009, 56% of the biofuels Shell purchased (by volume) were from suppliers who 
have signed up in full to its sustainability clauses which appeared in their supply contracts. Shell 
purchased a further 19% from suppliers who have partially adopted its clauses and are moving 
towards full implementation. This means 75% of the biofuels by volume, at the end of 2008, were 
covered by Shell’s contractual sustainability clauses (Shell, 2009a). 
178 Shell has appointed KPMG, who has international experience in sustainability biofuels assurance. 
Besides, Shell has also appointed ProForest-a consultant that specialises in practical approaches to 
sustainability biofuels. They are helping Shell with technical advice in developing sustainability 
biofuels businesses (Shell, 2009a).  
179 regular visits to the biofuels plantations, engaging with the biofuels suppliers on the SSP 
execution, coordination between Shell and suppliers, and reporting their findings to senior executives. 
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6.3.1.3 Prolonged the Term Contract and Decreased the Spot Contract 
The spot contract has been terminated, while a longer-term contract (three-to-five-
year) is awarded to the eligible biofuels suppliers who can comply with the SSP 
sustainability clauses. The Biofuels Officer from the interview explained: 
“Nowadays, we do not purchase biofuels from the spot market. They do not have 
adequate information that we required. Before we decide our supplier, we will ask 
for (supplier's) company profile, to understand its background. We also ask our 
potential suppliers to fill in supply chain questionnaire, to help us assess the potential 
risks before we decide whether to enter into new contract with them.” Shell has 
incorporated sustainability clauses into new supply contracts since September 2007 
(Shell, 2009a). Further explained by the Biofuels Officer from the interview, the new 
contract with the sustainability clauses (as outlined by the SSP) provides a more 
secure business prospect for farmers, producers and traders. Only suppliers whom 
can comply with the sustainability criteria outlined, and have the capacity in 
producing more consistent supply, then contract would be awarded.  
 
6.3.1.4 The Sustainable Sourcing Policy Execution towards the 
Renewable Fuels Agency Compliance 
Both the Quality Engineer and the Biofuels Officer from the interview mentioned the 
RFA's Meta and Qualifying Standards obligated under the RFA. According to the 
Biofuels Officer, Shell not only emphasised these two standards in its internal 
business operations, but it also has extended the criteria to its suppliers through the 
SSP implementation. This was to ensure the whole value chain-starting from the farm 
to the petrol kiosk, every activity complies with the G&S criteria. The SSP oriented 
supply contract has specified that, adequate/accurate biofuels information must be 
reported every month to Shell. After that, the information gathered from the various 
suppliers is used to report to the RFA under the “Carbon and Sustainability” 
reporting system. If any of Shell suppliers breaches the terms of the contract, or 





Explained by the Procurement Executive from the interview: “Contract is a form of 
responsibility sharing, in a legal way, which ties Shell and the biofuels suppliers 
together, in order to ensure the sustainability biofuels process-from the early stage of 
production until they reach the market. We review their (suppliers) progress on a 
regular basis. They have to report to us every month. We have the right to terminate 
contractors who violates the terms of the contract.”   
 
The Procurement Executive from the interview commented: “We need to choose 
whom we want to do business with. We have a lot of suppliers who are international 
players and many of them have the credibility of supplying clean and sustainable 
biofuels. This contract is not just for the sake of business, the social responsibility is 
important for us too. If they (the suppliers) want to supply to Shell, they must 
commit (the sustainable criteria) to work with us. The contract has many terms and 
clauses which address the environmental concerns of biodiversity, sustainability, 
environmental friendly and social well being. We have introduced environmental and 
social safeguards into our contracts, and we will be continuously tracking the 
performance of our suppliers.”  
 
To date, Shell purchases feedstocks globally from approximately 100 biofuels 
suppliers (Shell, 2009a). From the interview, the Procurement Executive explained: 
“It is not easy to comply with the SSP and the contract sustainability clauses. 
Choosing the best (whom could comply with the sustainable criteria) is not easy too. 
But this is not impossible! If you can get the good players, then you are confident to 
play the game well. We could never take in those who are not fit (cannot comply 
with the sustainable criteria), and we are playing the game now.” As a result of the 
implementation of the SSP and long-term supply contract, the RTFO’s first interim 
quarterly report reported that Shell had one of the highest levels of data capture, and 






6.3.2 Risk and Uncertainty of Technology: Social and Environmental 
Implications by the 1G Biofuels Deployment  
Shell through its Corporate Report (2009) admits, “Biofuels are no silver bullet”. 
This means that biofuels could never provide the perfect solution and have total 
effectiveness in solving all prevailing problems as expected. Even though biofuels 
contribute to the GHG/CO2 reductions, their carbon neutrality and their adaptability 
into existing ICEs/hydrocarbon infrastructure; there are a range of issues which need 
to be addressed concerning with their use and the consequences of mismanagement.  
 
Firstly, the 1G biofuels can compete with food crops for its market share, either to 
feed mouths or to power vehicles. Secondly, for the available land, the cultivation of 
biofuels feedstocks has resulted in land competition for food crops and fuel crops 
farming. Thirdly, destruction of valuable/ high biodiversity areas like forests, 
displacement of local communities and unnecessary pollution (water/land pollution 
due to fertilizers used in growing biofuels crops) could happen if biofuels farming 
has not been managed appropriately. Fourthly, the validity of carbon neutrality since 
the CO2 performance of the 1G biofuels varies depending upon the feedstocks and 
the activities involved along the supply chain. 
 
From the interview, the Executive of CO2 Abatement Project commented: “Frankly 
speaking, I was at some point buying into the idea (of biofuels) after listening to the 
famous venture capitalists’ idea about biofuels. However, after seeing that basic food 
commodities have gone up tremendously throughout the years, I am changing my 
supportive view about it. If I am not mistaken, the current dedication of food crop to 
biofuels has already caused so much of the food shortages and price increases. 
However, the current biofuels have not contributed to even 5% of global petroleum 
consumption. The previous US government was strongly encouraging on biofuels, as 
it was perceived that the oil wealth would be transferred from Middle Eastern 
countries to their farmers.”  
 
It was rather a surprise since the Executive was not convinced with the potential of 
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biofuels at the early stage, due to the emergence of systemic risks which rendered a 
food-fuel competition and threatened biodiversity. The media/social 
movements/environmentalists have amplified biofuels negative implications openly 
which eroded public confidence in the UK. It was not until a second visit, in 
December 2009, that the Executive had his view changed on biofuels. “Reading 
more and knowing more, the scientific evidences are rather convincing. I could not 
ignore the fact of our Ottawa's pilot product,” said the Executive of CO2 Abatement 
Project. Therefore, an early prejudgment of biofuels, without adequate knowledge 
would result in the misconception of biofuels. Due to the international/national 
media/social movements/environmentalists have amplified (possibly exaggerated) 
the systemic risks, repetitively, for a period of time; it will take a long time to have 
the deep-rooted preconception/misconceptions changed. 
 
6.3.2.1 Dealing with Food-Fuel Competition 
During the early stages of the 1G deployment under the RTFO, the British Public felt 
the pressure of food price increased. From the interview the Engineer from the 
Renewable Energy Team explained: “One problem of conventional biofuels is that, 
they use food crops. If a biofuels business needs to be expanded, then food crops for 
biofuels are a no-no! That is why the non-food biofuels are needed. No matter how I 
look at it (biofuels), besides the fact that it is renewable, it’s still not economically 
viable at least for the time being. Of course you will hear most people disagree with 
this particularly the oil companies who vehemently denied that they were using the 
food crops for biofuels.” This few was further supported by Routs: “Three or four 
years ago, we saw that this technology, whereby food crops are converted, would 
have an impact on food supplies. You now see this is happening. We do play a major 
role in the supply chain, particularly in the USA and Brazil. But we do not want to 
get involved in a big way in the first generation production. I have no wish to hear in 
ten years time that the oil industry is the cause of hunger in the world” (Shell, 24 
August 2007).  
 
“In the meantime, we cannot just sit back and wait for the second generation biofuels 
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to come good. Instead, we work hard with industry and with governments to raise the 
sustainability standard of the currently available biofuels,” commented Routs (Shell, 
29 October 2008). From the conversation with the Engineer from the Renewable 
Energy Team, and reading on Routs' interview, both agreed that, the 1G biofuels, 
which is derived from food is not sustainable. These foodcrop biofuels, not only 
diminish human rights on food, but they also have their limitation that do not help 
Shell to scale-up the production capacity to meet the growing demand. Conversely, 
the NGB can provide a higher capacity of production180, and changing the fuel from 
food to non-food feedstocks fulfils what is now a mandatory requirement. Currently, 
Shell has three projects181 focusing on the non-foodstock NGB development  
 
6.3.2.2 Dealing with Land Use and Biodiversity Threatened 
One of the issues relating to biofuels is the direct/indirect land claims for biofuels, 
for example causing farmers and cattle breeders to invade deeper into the Amazon 
jungle (Butler, 2007). This has caused further jungle clearances in order to 
accommodate either new biofuels plantations; or new food plantations as the existing 
food farms have been converted to biofuels plantations (Hirsch, 2007; BBC, 29 June 
2007). Commented by the Engineer from the Renewable Energy Team from the 
interview: “The first generation biofuels puts more pressure on the land use. We are 
using more land than ever for the fuel crops, chopping more trees to give way, 
clearing more land, destroying more flora/fauna, and polluting more land. These are 
the consequences of unplanned land use.” In order to minimise the impact of land use 
for biofuels farming, Shell has implemented three strategies: SSP execution, 
roundtable participation and the 2G/3G biofuels development.  
 
(a) Control by the SSP 
Shell is currently supplying its 1G biofuels under the RTFO which is sourced from 
the international markets. As one of the main commercial biofuels suppliers, Shell 
has caused a direct impact on land used in the biofuels producing countries. Today 
                                               
180 due to the abundance of biomass found naturally, or from agriculture residues after the fruits have 
been harvested. 
181 Shell-Iogen (wheat straw), Shell-Choren (BTL), and Shell-HRBiopetroleum (Algae) 
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around 1% of the world’s total arable land (approximately 14 million hectares) is 
given over to biofuels production. However, it is estimated that by 2030 this could 
more than triple, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA) (Logan, 2007). 
Commented by Voser: “The IEA thinks biofuels might account for 11% of road 
transport fuel by 2030. Today’s biofuels will be critical in reducing the carbon 
intensity of road transportation over the next decade. Yet we also need to manage the 
social and environmental challenges of biofuels” (Shell, 26 November 2009).  
 
Further supported by the Biofuels Officer from the interview: “At Shell, we are 
guided by the SSP. We are investigating ways to identify and using idle land that 
could be used for growing biofuels feedstocks, without over stretching the farm lands 
or causing more jungle clearance. In late 2007, we sent all our suppliers our SSP, to 
be incorporated into new and renewed contracts. The SSP sustainability clauses 
include a specific clause regarding land use change.” Strengthend by the SSP, Shell 
requires it suppliers to ensure that their biofuels supplies are not sourced from areas 
of high biodiversity value. Besides, the sustainability standards being developed by 
multi-stakeholder groups at different roundtables also have such requirements on 
good agriculture practices in order to minimise the land use implications.  
 
(b) Invitation for Local Government Participation in Roundtables  
To date, gaining data to measure the instances of direct/indirect land use change 
remains a challenge for Shell, as it does not have the capability to have these data 
quantified and monitored continuously. This is because, Shell is purchasing biofuels 
on the international market. These biofuels feedstocks are not grown on Shell's own 
plantations/territory which Shell has full control. From the interview, the 
Procurement Executive commented: “Even though the supply contract (with SSP) is 
utilised to manage our suppliers, but we could not supervise nearly 100% of our 
suppliers on their daily operations. It is impossible to be 100% confident that our 
supply contract clauses are awalys being adhered to. We hope that the domestic 
governments can get involved. They can, for example, regulate the marginal land 
used for biofuels crop growing towards proper land use and planning.” 
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Explained by Berenguer on the Webchat (2009b): “The best way to avoid indirect 
land use change is by yield improvement (through the NGB development), and to 
encourage producers to expand on marginal/idle land via domestic policy incentives, 
and practice good government land planning at the domestic authority. There is still a 
lot of work that need to be done, to define marginal/idle land from an environmental 
and social perspective. We are engaging with experts from various scientific 
institutions on this topic.” Since then, Shell has been working on this specific issue 
(the definition of marginal/idle land) through biofuels roundtables, in order to bring 
the isses onto the agenda and communicate with the domestic governments.  
 
The Biofuels Officer from the interview agreed that the most effective control on 
land use, falls within the domestic authorities. The local authorities can adopt 
internationally sustainability criteria on land use, or promote the transparent and 
comprehensive land planning policies. Berenguer from the Webchat (2009b) further 
commented: “We have pledged our support to an international multi-stakeholder 
coalition, which is seeking to enforce a moratorium on rainforest and peat land 
clearance associated with the expansion of oil palm plantations in South-east Asia. 
We also support the actions carried out by the coalition working on soy moratorium 
in the Brazilian Amazon. The sustainability standards (such as the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil and the Roundtable on Responsible Soy) which we support 
have principles and criteria (and auditing systems) to ensure that crops for biofuels 
and other end users are not grown on land recently cleared of high conservation 
rainforests”. 
 
Apart from setting direct communications with the local government (where biofuels 
are sourced), Shell participates in different roundtables and engages in discussions 
about the land use issues within these roundtables. The efforts from roundtables 
resulted in the land use concern, to be formally formulated as one of the “Principle 
and Criteria (P&C)” (refer appendix 5.3.2), which guides related stakeholders on 




(c) The 2G/3G Biofuels R&D 
By switching from food to non-food biofuels through the NGB development, is one 
of the strategies which Shell has implemented in order to achieve a sustainable 
biofuels business. Taking the example of wheat, after the grains have been harvested, 
the agricultural residues such as stalk and leaves could be used to produce the 2G 
biofuels. Besides, Shell is also embarking on the 3G biofuels. It is currently working 
with HR Biopetroleum on marine microalgae for biodiesel production.  
 
Agricultural residues are by-products which do not compete with food and land. 
Meanshile, microalgae is a potential source of biodiesel because it can grow rapidly 
and is rich in oil. Furthermore, microalgae do not compete with food crops, thereby 
reducing the need for fertile land and fresh water. The water-borne microalgae need 
sea water, sun and CO2 in order to produce vegetable oil through photosynthesis 
(Broere, 2008). Through confined pond/sea farming techniques would have minimal 
impacts on the land use and a low fresh water footprint. It could also be possible to 
grow microalgae in a bioreactor-that could be located in areas which are unsuitable 
for agriculture such as deserts or coastal land. 
 
6.3.2.3 Dealing with Ambiguity of Biofuels' Carbon Neutrality 
There are conflicting reports questioning the capability of biofuels in GHG 
reductions. In reality, the activities involved in producing biofuels-if not well 
managed, may end up using more energy in the process/production cycle that causing 
more GHGs/CO2 emissions. The Executive in Shell CO2 Abatement Project from the 
interview explained: “Today’s bioethanol and biodiesel (feedstocks) are certainly not 
all the same. Some have a very good CO2 footprint compared to the conventional 
fuel, like sugarcane ethanol produced in Brazil; while others are not so good.”   
The Biofuels Officer from the interview added: “I am convinced we can make 
biofuels work without destroying food and forests. Not all biofuels are created equal. 
There are enormous differences in what’s used to make them and how much CO2 is 
emitted in their production processes.” The Quality Engineer from the interview gave 
some examples of this difference in biofuels. He explained that a corn ethanol 
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produced from America emits around 10-30% less CO2  than petrol on a well-to-
wheels cycle versus a farm-to-wheels cycle, whereas Brazilian sugarcane ethanol 
emits up to 90% less. This highlights the differences between the various biofuels 
feedstocks used in contributing to the carbon saving from the process cycle.  
 
According to Luis Scoffone-the Vice President Alternative Energies at Shell 
International “Ethanol derived from sugarcane has a number of benefits. It has a 
good farm-to-wheels CO2 footprint. This is partly because the waste (bagasse) can be 
used to power the conversion process” (Webchat, 2009b). The Engineer of the 
Renewable Energy Team from the interview commented:  “As the research goes by, 
biofuels are getting better. They have better energy efficiency, lower in CO2, and are 
more sustainable. We support biofuels which provide the best combinations of the 
highest energy density and the lowest CO2. Sugarcane is a good example for the 
current business. Our next generation biofuels will be improved and make the 
biofuels even better.”    
 
Routs commented: “We understand that the energy costs from farm-to-wheels should 
be taken into account, as well as the carbon emission along the process of producing 
biofuels. This is one reason why we have introduced contractual clauses and SSP 
with our suppliers to assess any potential sustainability risks in our biofuels supply 
chain” (Shell, 29 October 2008). The factors which determine carbon neutrality of 
biofuels rely on the types of feedstock and the activities along the value chain. Shell 
is focusing on the 2G biomass and the 3G microalgae biofuels, which promise higher 
carbon savings. Besides, the adoption of the SSP sustainability clauses in supply 
contracts would guide the activities along the value chain. Both strategies have the 
potential to reduce the carbon footprint on a farm-to-wheels. 
 
6.3.2.4 Dealing with the Technical Limitation of the 1G Bioethanol 
The current low blend mixture of bioethanol within a range of 5-10% is suitable for 
the existing hydrocarbon distribution infrastructure and the current ICEs. However, 
once a higher concentration of bioethanol is required (for example E85 which 
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constitutes 85% of ethanol), not only will the distribution infrastructure required to 
be modified, but also vehicles will need to be changed as well. Such a change would 
involve a massive switching cost. According to Sweeney “The technical properties of 
today’s 1G bioethanol pose some challenges to a widespread adoption. Our fuel 
distribution infrastructure and vehicle engines are being modified to deal with higher 
percentage of bioethanol, such as E85 or pure bioethanol. But new fuels such as 
Virent’s biogasoline with characteristics similar to petrol is promising” (Shell, 26 
March 2008).  
 
Shell and Virent announced a joint R&D project to convert sugars directly into 
biogasoline (refer appendix 6.2d). Virent's technology, patented as “BioForming” 
uses catalysts to convert sugars into hydrocarbon. Conventionally, sugars have to be 
fermented into bioethanol and then distilled. Compared with bioethanol, biogasoline 
has a higher energy content and delivers better fuel efficiency. It can be used in a 
pure form, or blended seamlessly with petrol. Biogasoline has the potential to 
eliminate the need for infrastructure modification, as well as to sustain the current 
ICEs use. The chemical properties of biogasoline are similar to petrol. If biogasoline 
could be commercially produced, this then will be one of the most important 
technological breakthroughs.  
 
6.3.3 Risk and Uncertainty of Social Acceptance of Biofuels  
Although biofuels are relatively new to the British public, they are not new to Shell, 
since Shell has been operating bioethanol in Brazil for more than three decades. In 
order to help creating social acceptance of biofuels, Shell takes on the responsibility 
to disseminate its biofuels information to the public, which not only promotes its 
own biofuels businesses (R&D, partnerships and products) but also builds the public 







6.3.3.1 Building Social Acceptance through Corporate Website  
In order to explain and promote biofuels, Shell set up a section covering Biofuels182 
on its website. The website is rather straight forward, with five sections to explain: 
what biofuels are, provide information about the 1G biofuels, explain Shell's SSP, 
discuss the NGB and finally share the press releases on various Shell biofuels 
projects. The website presents collective information about biofuels. It provides 
simple and easy to understand information about biofuels (the 1G, the 2G to the 3G) 
and disseminates this information183 to the general public in order to help built public 
acceptance of biofuels.  
 
In general, the website is designed to provide/disseminate general information about 
Shell's biofuels development and related business activities. The information is 
general and is aimed at the target audience where the specific/scientific knowledge of 
biofuels is not required to understand the materials further. To date, Shell is the first 
oil company that has created its own YouTube channel184, and utilises it as a 24/7 
broadcasting media channel. Compared with its website, the informational videos 
found in its YouTube channel are more comprehensive and addresses various issues 
(not only biofuels, but other technologies) and introduces Shell’s operations in RE 
generation and current fossil energy. The YouTube channel has become a 
new/modern media outlet for Shell.  
 
6.3.3.2 Utilising Webcasts and WebChat to Respond Biofuels 
Controversy 
In the UK, a strong debate arouse over food-fuel competition, food price increased, 
biodiversity damaged due to systemic risks, all of which was fuelled by the 
broadcasting media and the newspapers from January 2008 to September 2008. This 
                                               
182 Shell. 2008. Biofuels. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.shell.com/home/content/aboutshell/our_business/fuels/biofuels/biofuels.html   
183 From this website, there is a link which will direct to another new website titled Answer Column 
aimed, to educate public about biodiesel. This can be found on Shell. 2007d. Answer Column. 
[Online]. Available at: 
http://www.shell.com/home/FrameworksiteId=rotellaen&FC2=/rotellaen/html/iwgen/ask_our_expert/
2008/zzz_lhn.html&FC3=/rotellaen/html/iwgen/ask_our_expert/2008/answercolumn_Q9_2008.html   
184 Shell YouTube. 2009a. [Online]. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/user/Shell    
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nine-month period saw the duration before and during the effectuation of the RTFO 
in the UK. This constant almost daily media coverage caused a major reduction in 
public confidence on biofuels adoption. 
 
In order to counteract all this negative publicity, Shell published two webcast 
speeches (relating to biofuels) on its corporate website. The speakers were highly 
positioned and respected within the organisation/industy with the hope that the 
views/comments would ally the fears of the general public. Firstly, on 13 June 2007, 
a webcast speech with van der Eijk-the Group Chief Technology Officer was 
broadcasted, aimed at discussing the renewable energy prospects. Then, on 29 
October 2008 a Biofuels Debate185 with Routs-the Executive Director was held to 
explain the current biofuels issues and challenges. Next, on 7 April 2009, Shell 
invited to interested parties to participate in two live webchat sessions186 chaired by 
Sweeney and other five members187. This was aimed at any individuals who were 
either concerned about the systemic risks (that had been publicised by the media) or 
individuals interested in Shell’s biofuels business.    
 
Interested participants were required to pre-register for the webchat sessions and 
given two ways of asking questions: Firstly, questions could be submitted during the 
registration process for the webchat broadcast; or alternatively questions could be 
posted on-line during the live chat. These webchats showed the proactive approach 
taken by Shell, and demonstrated that a major oil company like Hell was willing to 
discuss with the general public their concern (on systemic risks), and to be open 
about their own business as wall as their R&D into the NGB. By holding the 
webchat, Shell not only promoted its biofuels business, it also strengthened Shell's 
                                               
185 Shell. 29 October 2008. Q&A on Biofuels. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.shell.com/home/content/media/news_and_library/speeches/2008/routs_biofuels_debate_2
9102008.html   
186 The Webchat session took place on 7 April 2009. First session was at 7am-8am BST, with 44 
questions being answered. Second session was at 4pm-5pm, with 60 questions being answered.  
187 The Webchat session was chaired by Sweeney, together with other five members: 1Paloma 
Berenguer: Sustainable Development Manager, 2Lauren Iannarone: Vice President of External and 
Government Affairs, 3Angus Gillespie: Vice President of Strategy, 4Mike Goosey: Manager Biofuels 
R&D at Shell, 5Luis Scoffone: Vice President of Alternative Energies at Shell International.   
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green image. The date set for the webchats was nearly a year after the introduction of 
the RTFO, and six months after the British media put a pause on the biofuels 
issues188.  
 
There were two reasons why Shell scheduled the webchat programme for nearly a 
year later. Firstly, Shell wanted to wait for a more appropriate time before having the 
open debate. It was Shell's strategy to let the current controversial and media hype 
cool-down before Shell picked up the related issues and responded accordingly 
supported by scientific facts and evidence. If the webchat was carried out during the 
height of the controversy and debate, there would have been higher possibility of 
social rejection.  
 
This was because, the messages given from the webchat might not be able to reach to 
the public effectively; therefore the efforts and resources invested by Shell would be 
wasted. Besides, if the webchat was launched during the height controversial period, 
it might be abused as a platform for reflecting the emotions of the public, rather than 
a genuine discussion held between the public and the Shell representative. The latter 
date also allowed Shell to have itself well-prepared before facing the public. The 
webchat broadcasted on 7 April 2009, was also utilised as a platform to promote the 
2G wheat straw bioethanol, which was planned to be test marketed in Ottawa on 10 
June 2009. Under these circumstances, the result of the broadcast was far more 
beneficial in restoring public confidence in biofuels. The outcome of the webchat has 
given Shell an added confidence and respect in answering most of the questions 
raised and defended its commitment on G&S biofuels.  
 
6.3.3.3 Balancing the Business, Environment and Sustainability 
Commitments 
Two months after the introduction of the RTFO, due to the systemic risks were 
amplified by international/national media, social movements and environmentalists; 
                                               
188 It began on 16 September 2008, with the Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy, which marked 
the beginning of world financial crisis 2008 (BBC, 16 September 2008). 
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Ruth Kelly, the previous UK Secretary of Transport declared, UK government's 
decision to slow down biofuels expansion in the UK. The UK Government amended 
the RTFO targets, but did not abandon biofuels policies altogether. This decision 
restored some confidence to the oil companies which were pursuing biofuels 
business supply and R&D.  
 
From two interviews: “Since the beginning, we knew that the conventional biofuels 
(1G) is not sustainable. We strongly believe that the second generation biofuels is the 
right technology, and we have made tremendous progress on our cellulosic 
bioethanol,” said the Executive of CO2 Abatement Project. “I think that is a right 
move. We need to send out the correct message about sustainable biofuels. Since the 
1G biofuels has pressured society and caused such disputes, it was good to have the 
progress slow down, at least to comfort and rebuild the social acceptance of biofuels. 
In fact the food-derived 1G biofuels is a transition technology, and the expected 
biofuels which are clean, green, sustainable and non-food will be presented from the 
second generation onwards,” said the Quality Engineer.  
 
The RTFO target change did not impact on Shell’s business operations. Shell 
continues its biofuels business and carrying on its role as the 1G biofuels supplier 
while embarking on the NGB developments simultaneously. In order to manage its 
internal business operations, the SSP is utilised to control the existing biofuels supply 
chain and to ensure the G&S biofuels are sourced within its contractual-operations. 
Shell's is confidence that the 2G biofuels is the right way forward. Shell is working 
forward to influence the wider biofuels industry 189  and in shaping sustainability 
standards. It is clear that the sustainability challenges related to biofuels production 
cannot be tackled alone.  
 
According the Biofuels Officer from the interview: “We already buy and distribute a 
lot of biofuels today to meet the government requirements around the world. We 
                                               
189 The business players within the biofuels industry are biofuels farmers, processors, traders and 
supplier and other oil companies. 
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participate in developing industry sustainability standards for the supply chain, with 
organisations such as the Roundtables on the development of robust standards which 
can be implemented on the ground.” Shell participates in the Roundtable for 
Sustainable Biofuels (RSB), the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), the 
Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RTRS) and the Better Sugarcane Initiative (BSI).  
 
These Roundtables are entirely voluntary, but are influential enough to ensure that 
the mechanisms are introduced within; which ensure the G&S standards are being 
followed by members. This is because these roundtables have robust auditing and 
monitoring process. “Shell has been advocating governments to tie biofuels mandates 
to CO2 performance and sustainability standards. We can see the EU Renewable 
Energy Directive (2009) and the UK RTFO (2008) are moving in this direction. This 
is critical to ensuring we get the best performing biofuels (from CO2 saving and 
sustainability perspective) for the market. In addition, the UK RTFO is leveraging 
the good work of the voluntary roundtables (such as the RSPO, RTRS and BSI) by 
recognising them in their legislation,” said Berenguer (Webchat, 2009b).  
 
Further from the corporate report 2009b, Shell is building on its long-term 
collaborative partnership with the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN)190 in order to exchange knowledge and expertise. The IUCN’s experience is 
in managing species and ecosystems, which could help Shell to address conservation 
and livelihood risks and opportunities in its decisions on biofuels operations and 
business expansions. Mentioned by Routs on the IUCN, “Obviously we are keen to 
look into any way that we can help with reducing CO2 emissions and building 
sustainable biofuels. We are continually working with governments and industry to 
                                               
190 IUCN helps the world find pragmatic solutions to environmental and development challenges. It 
supports scientific research, manages field projects all over the world and brings governments, NGOs, 
UN agencies, companies and local communities together to develop and implement policy, laws and 
best practice. Founded in 1948, it is the world’s oldest and largest global environmental network, a 
democratic membership union with more than 1,000 government and NGO member organisations, 
and almost 11,000 volunteer scientists in more than 160 countries. IUCN’s work is supported by over 
1,000 professional staff in 60 offices and hundreds of partners in public, NGO and private sectors 
around the world. The Union’s headquarters are located in Gland, Switzerland. 
Source: International Union for Conservation of Nature. 2009.  
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do that” (Shell, 29 October 2008). 
 
6.4 Risk and Uncertainty Faced and Strategies Adopted by Shell during 
the Next Generation Biofuels Development  
6.4.1 Driving Forces for Shell's the Next Generation Biofuels 
Development  
Based on the three driving forces which led to the commencement of the 1G biofuels 
(discussed at 6.1.1), currently, Shell is currently focusing on the NGB developments, 
which these NGB must comply with the G&S criteria, and must be able to fulfil the 
mandatory targets specified by the policy makers (on the EUBD 2003 and the RTFO 
2008). Besides, the NGB has to be efficient and cost-effective to ensure its viability 
for commercial scale production and the ability to build up capacity before supplies 
commence. 
 
Today's world biofuels is just the start, the business prospect is promising, as the 
biofuels application is not only just taking place in the UK and other member states 
in the EU. Other non-EU nations such as New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Canada, 
China and India, are gradually adapting biofuels for their road transport use. 
Supported by Jorma Ollila-the Chairman of Royal Dutch Shell “More than 50 
countries are developing or have renewable fuel mandates. The EU for example, 
insists that 10% of road vehicle fuel comes from renewable sources by 2020” (Shell, 
23 October 2009). As such, biofuels could grow from just 1% of the world’s 
transport fuel mix today to as much as 7–10% over the next few decades. In 2008, 
Shell quadrupled its rate of investment in biofuels and aims to build a significant 
biofuels business in the next ten years (Shell, 2009a).  
 
Comments made during the webcast (2007, 2008): “We are now spending USD1.2 
billion on technology, and that comprises the costs of generating options, developing 
technology and testing prototypes,” said van der Eijk (Shell, 13 July 2007). “At 
Shell, we see ideas and innovation as the lifeblood of our business. At USD1.2 
billion in 2007, our R&D spending is the highest of any of the oil majors. Biofuels 
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from straw, wood-chips or microalgae, we are working on all these. In the end, I 
want to see Shell builds a low-carbon biofuels business based on sustainable sources. 
It could take another ten years and require technical and commercial breakthroughs. 
But we are determined to get there,” said Routs (Shell, 29 October 2008). 
 
Shell's biofuels strategy is rather an ambitious leap into the NGB development. 
Based on the literature (refer Table 2.4.1), there are three R&U191 arising during a 
technology development. Using the theories advocated by Rosenbloom and Kantrow 
(1982), Pearson (1991), Rosenberg (1994), the researcher has identified various 
strategies which Shell has adopted to deal with them. As shown in Table 6.3, these 
are the current R&U of the NGB deployment together with the strategies 
implemented. 
 
Table 6.3: Risk and Uncertainty from the NGB Development and Strategies 
Applied to Counteract 
The NGB development  Strategies applied 
Innovation process 
-Beyond Shell's institutional knowledge and 
capability at the NGB development and 
production.  
-Shell established various partnerships with 
(commercial and academic) biotechnology 
institutions for: 
(i) The NGB feedstocks and process technology 
development.  
(ii) The NGB R&D and production facilities 
construction.  
Technology 
-Limitation of the NGB biofuels to meet future 
demand. 
 
-Diversification of the NGB R&D to scale up the 
future supply. 
Social acceptance of the NGB. -Utilise corporate media in promoting the NGB. 
-Testing 2G biofuels on motor racing event for 
their technical performance and to gain market 
confidence. 
Source: Summarised by the researcher. 
 
 
6.4.2 Dealing with Risk and Uncertainty of Innovation Process: Shell 
Established Partnerships with Biotechnology Institutions  
Like most of the major oil companies, currently, Shell does not manufacture biofuels 
but instead buys biofuels on the international market (through its approximately 100 
                                               
191 innovation process, technology, and social acceptance.  
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biofuels suppliers) and blends these into transport fuels, before selling in the UK 
market. There are two R&U faced by Shell. Firstly, the profound biofuels technology 
has challenged Shell's existing institutional knowledge on the NGB development. 
Secondly, the incapabilities/inability of Shell to produce the NGB on an industrial 
scale. This is because Shell's existing infrastructure is for fossil fuels extractions and 
refineries. Therefore, going from oil/natural gas mining to biofuels farming, this has 
created a major challenge for Shell. Shell is therefore collaborating with various 
cross nations biotechnology institutions (commercial and academic) in order to 
achieve two objectives: 
 
(a) For the NGB Feedstocks and Process Technology  
New solutions to enhance biofuels production efficiency, particularly the 
biotechnology knowledge acquisition is required. Shell has formed R&D 
collaborations with several biotechnology institutions. These collaborative projects 
are established between Shell and its cross-nation biotechnology institutions (both 
academic institutions and commercial-research organisations), in order to research 
and develop the NGB feedstocks and process technology.  
 
Explained by van der Eijk: “Energy transition requires R&D efforts and technology 
investments to exceed the capabilities of individual companies (like Shell). We are 
seeing rapid developments in several fields of science relating to energy production. 
Biotechnology, will give rise to new biofuels production processes in delivering new 
materials and catalysts for cleaner processes. In the oil industry the dominant 
principle is “own technology first”, backed up by a strong patents position. The 
strength in technology at Shell is partly reflected by the large and growing number of 
patents we hold, more than 26,000. We can be proud of our technology track record. 
Our patents will remain very important in the future.” (Shell, 13 July 2007).  
(b) To access biofuels R&D and production facilities 
For the NGB development, more advanced research and production facilities are 
required. Since biofuels is a new business for Shell, in order to build these new 
infrastructure alone would involve high costs and high risks. Though partnerships, 
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Shell can have the direct and immediate asses to its partners' existing R&D and 
production facilities, or at least to create the ability to share the building costs 
together in order to have these facilities established. These partnerships can help 
Shell to reduce the risk exposure on high investments, which can also help Shell to 
move into the NGB development and production in a shorter timescale. 
 
6.4.3 Dealing with the Limitations of the Next Generation Biofuels to 
Meet an Increasing Demand 
According to Broere (2008), the demand for biofuels is set to increase as the EU, the 
USA, and other countries gradually increase the requirements for the use of biofuels 
in transport. Through diversification of the NGB, each of the projects can contribute 
significantly in strengthening the capacity of the NGB. “We have been investing in 
many other potential biofuels solutions; cellulosic ethanol from straw, synthetic 
biodiesel from wood chips and petrol made directly from sugars. We increased our 
rate of spending on solutions like these,” said Routs (Shell, 29 October 2008). Since 
biomass is the most abundant biological material on earth, the potential of its 
production could be vast enough to support future demand. There are three types of 
biomass source under Shell's R&D: firstly the forest residues; secondly, the 
agriculture residues/agriculture by products (whole plants after fruits have been 
harvested, like wheat straw) and thirdly, the energy grasses.  
 
From the Webchat (2009b), Mike Goosey-the Manager Biofuels R&D at Shell 
commented: “If biofuels are to help meet the predicted level of demand for transport 
fuels, we are going to need non-food feedstocks that can be grown without 
competing with food. Perennial grasses are one of the options that we are looking at 
because it is possible to convert the tough molecules that make up the cell walls of 
grasses such as switchgrass and miscanthus into bioethanol using advanced 
processes.”  
 
For biodiesel, Shell is exploring the use of microalgae which can be grown in marine 
water and is capable of generating large amounts of oil per hectare. The most 
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important concept here is that, there is no single generation that could claim to be 
large enough to support the entire world/national road transport fuels demand. Only 
the combination of these different generations of biofuels and the diversification of 
different the NGB feedstocks can gradually build up biofuels' capacity, in order to 
fulfil both the government mandates, as well as the increasing future demand.  
 
6.4.4 Dealing with Risk and Uncertainty of Social Acceptance 
Apart from using its corporate media (as discussed at 6.3.3.1), Shell is also 
collaborating with the world’s major automobile manufacturers, in portraying their 
“halo” effect on its products. Ferrari and Ducati are two of the world most advanced 
automobile manufacturers in racing cars and racing motorbikes. These two 
companies are actively involved in three world recognised events: Formula One (F1), 
Moto Grant Prix (MotoGP) and Superbike Racing. These events are the highest class 
of automobile racing events which capture global attention in many aspects192.  
 
For many years, Shell is one of the key players for in these three motorsports. Shell 
has established strong relationships with a number of the automobile manufacturers, 
but has cemented the relationship with Ferrari and Ducati. Shell is the main fuel and 
lubricants supplier to the race contestants of Ferrari and Ducati. Besides, Shell has 
formed the technical partnerships with Ferrari (refer appendix 6.4.1) and Ducati 
(appendix 6.4.2) for a long-term race-fuel development.  
 
(a) Testing BTL Diesel, 5% Blends with Shell V Power Diesel at the 24 Hours of Le 
Mans Race in France 
Shell put the 5% Biomass to Liquids (BTL193 through its collaboration with Choren), 
blend into Shell V-Power Diesel as the race fuel, for the 24 Hours of Le Mans race in 
France on 14 June 2008, and again on 11 June 2009 (as the second time BTL test). 
                                               
192 the sophisticated automobile technologies applied, the cutting edge vehicles designed, the skilful 
racers, the challenges of the circuits, and the fuel technologies powering these racing automobile. 
193 BTL is a synthetic diesel fuel made from non-food biomass, such as forest residues and waste 
wood/wood chips. A small amount of this new biodiesel has been blended into the Shell V-Power 
Diesel race fuel (together with the established GTL-gas to liquid component in the Shell V Power 
Diesel) (Shell, 28 May 2008). 
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The 24 Hours of Le Mans race provided a test bed for this product (Shell, 28 May 
2008; 11 June 2009). 
 
(b) Testing Cellulosic Bioethanol, 10% Blends with Shell V Power Gasoline at the 24 
Hours of Le Mans Race in France  
Shell demonstrated the blending of its 10% cellulosic ethanol, into its Shell V-Power 
fuel, at the 24 Hours of Le Mans race, in France on 13 June, 2009. This was the first 
time the 2G bioethanol was used in the gasoline at the 24 Hours of Le Mans race 
(Shell, 11 June 2009). 
 
The 24 Hours of Le Mans race in France is one of the world’s sport car races which 
entirely challenges the endurance racing; testing not only the skills of the driver, the 
automobile technology, but also the fuel technology in supporting the 24 hour event. 
The event takes place annually in France, and runs on circuit comprising of a 
designed racing circuit and closed public roads. Since biofuels is a new business for 
Shell, and Le Mans is one of the world’s leading event, introducing the blends in this 
race allowed Shell to use this race event as a testing bed for its fuel products (twice 
testing for the 5% BTL diesel, and once testing the 10% 2G bioethanol), while at the 
same time promoting its biofuels to help gaining public confidence towards its 
products. 
 
(c) Shell Blends Advanced Biofuels into the Scuderia Ferrari Race Fuel for 2010 
Formula One (F1) Season 
On 13 March 2010, Shell announced that the F1 fuel supplied for the Scuderia 
Ferrari194 contained cellulosic ethanol made from wheat straw195. This was be the 
first time a 2G bioethanol has been used in the Shell V-Power race fuel used by 
Ferrari during the F1 Bahrian Grand Prix (Shell, 13 March 2010). On 19 October 
                                               
194 It is the name of the racing team division of the Ferrari automobile company.  
195 The cellulosic ethanol is produced at Iogen Energy’s demonstration plant in Ottawa, Canada, 
using wheat straw. 
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2010, Shell further announced that it blended biogasoline196 to the Scuderia Ferrari 
race fuel at the South Korea F1 Grand Prix (Shell, 19 October 2010).  
 
The partnership built among Shell, Ferrari and Ducati are sharing each others' “halo 
effects”, surrounding the “high quality” of Shell fuel and lubricant products in 
supporting the “high performance” of Ferrari and Ducati, resulting in many world-
recognised achievements. These messages and the big names presented, have gained 
wide public confidence and institutional trust, over the quality and performance of 
Shell’s products. For many years, Shell has utilised the racing events and 
collaborations with the automobile manufacturers to have its fuel products regularly 
tested under the extreme conditions of high performance racing. The NGB testing 
performed over recent years, is designed to promote its NGB even though they are 
not yet commercially available.  
 
6.4.5 Continuing the Next Generation Biofuels Development During the 
2008 Economic Recession 
The end of 2008 marked the beginning of the global financial crisis. Most of the 
companies opted for capital freezing, rather than the continuation of investments in 
the NGB R&D projects. The previous examples discussed by Elliott (2003) in his 
work, some of the RE projects were suspended due to the economic downturn, which 
caused by funding reductions. However, Shell is still proactively continuing its NGB 
R&D projects. Routs explained: “When times are tough as they are now, some 
companies may take a short-term view and cut back on research and development 
spending. At Shell we take the long-term view. We can maintain our significant 
investment in developing the next generation biofuels that we believe will be an 
essential part of the transport fuel mix. That is because the energy challenge will be 
with us a lot longer than turmoil in the financial markets” (Shell, 29 October 2008). 
 
Sweeney commented, “The demand for energy will continue to surge. Today’s period 
                                               




of economic slowdown may moderate demand growth for a while, but the longer-
term trend is still upwards. That is because 3 billion energy consumers will be added 
to the world’s population during the first half of this century. And those people would 
like access to personal transport. We think biofuels will be an essential part of the 
transport fuel mix, we have increased our investment in research and will be even 
more focused on biofuels in 2009 and 2010.” Talking about the near term demand 
which evidences the current biofuels consumption, Sweeney added “Europe, in 
particular, is a big consumer of biofuels, while in the US this is just starting to take 
place. We would expect growth leading to the long-term” (Webchat, 2009b). 
 
The determination of Shell, to continue its NGB R&D projects despite the financial 
crisis hitting the global economy badly is evident. Firstly, an understanding of the 
expected exponential growth of future energy demand, Shell has to be ready within 
five-to-ten years (from now) to materialise the NGB. Secondly, since USD1.2billion 
has already been spent for the NGB R&D projects, it would create devastating losses 
if these projects have to be called off before their completion. The 2008 financial 
crisis was unexpected, caused by the banking industry. Yet, the existing invested 
R&D projects have to continue, with the clear objective of achieving the 
commercialisation of the NGB. Thirdly, the financial downturn is expected to create 
a lower/stable level of energy demand. Saving energy has been desirable, not only to 
counter concerns about climate change, but also to reduce household/industry 
expenditure. Therefore, this down-turn period is the time for the oil companies to 
embark on the intensive NGB R&D, sharing the expected/unexpected R&U with its 
partners, and to be ready for the rapid growth in energy demand after the economy 
recovers.        
 
6.5 Conclusion  
The regulators' mechanisms instituted to deliver biofuels deployment and 
development, have built up a strong confidence for Shell in executing its biofuels 
supply, as well as pursuing the NGB development. Backed by three political driving 
forces from the regulators (of different levels) for biofuels adoption, Shell's 
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rationales to engange in the biofuels business are seamlessly matched with these 
driving forces, which are further supported by its economic motivations.  
 
Shell has enganged in some aggressive moves to promote its biofuels business. Shell 
began the NGB R&D in 2002 which resulted in an early pilot market testing for one-
month of its wheat straw bioethanol supply in Ottawa. Besides, Shell was innovative 
in utilising its organisational media to promote its biofuels products (particularly its 
NGB). It has used its coporate website, webcast speeches and webchat and social 
media sties (YouTube); all of which have been utilised to disseminate its corporate 
information. Shell participates in world-wide first class motor racing events and uses 
its partnership with race teams as a test bed for the NGB biofuels, as well as to 
promote its products, even before they are launched.  
 
Operating within a regulated market, the biofuels market has continuous 
interventions from the regulators. Shell as one of the biofuels suppliers has to comply 
with the rules and regulations, in order to be allowed to supply biofuels and to 
sustain its biofuels business. The G&S criteria have been adopted as one of the 
criteria for Shell's biofuels deployment and the NGB development. The message that 
Shell wants a G&S biofuels is clearly projected through its corporate missions, as 
well as its corporate publications. Its participation in various roundtables, and its 
internal SSP play a significant role to ensure that Shell's suppliers are committed to 
the G&S biofuels supply, and helping Shell to comply with the RFA Meta/Qualifying 












































Chapter 7: Discussion and Analysis 
Preface 
Recall the overarching research question “How the major actors-the Scottish 
Government (SG) and the oil companies interact with one and another to deal with 
risk and uncertainty (R&U) arising from technological change during a technology 
deployment and development?” This main research question is supported by five 
sub-questions, focusing on the SG and two of the oil companies (BP and Shell) 
respectively197 with the ultimate aim of to achieve the five research objectives set198. 
To present the progress of biofuels deployment in the UK and to detail biofuels 
development; this chapter has been arranged in a way to demonstrate the flow and 
proliferation of these two issues. This is to ensure the clear separations between 
biofuels “deployment” and “development” stages, to answer the respective research 
sub-questions, and ultimately to achieve each of the research objectives.  
 
There are five sections in this chapter. The first will focus on the actors (the SG and 
                                               
197 The sub-questions are divided into two categories of actors: The SG and oil companies 
The SG: 
(a) How biofuels became one of the current renewable energy sources for transport? 
(b) What are the Scottish Government's roles in biofuels deployment and development? 
(c) What mechanisms are in place to create a supportive environment for oil companies in pursuing 
biofuels deployment and development?   
(d) What are the risks and uncertainties that appear during biofuels deployment and development? 
(e) What strategies have been applied to counteract with the risks and uncertainties arising during 
biofuels deployment and development? 
Oil Companies: 
(i) What are the rationales that moved these oil companies into biofuels business? 
(ii) What are the oil companies' role in biofuels deployment and development? 
(iii) How the oil companies have been reacted to the government initiatives for biofuels deployment 
and development?  
(iv) What are the risks and uncertainties appeared during biofuels deployment and development? 
(v) What strategies have been adopted to counteract the risks and uncertainties arising during biofuels 
deployment and development? 
198 Research Objectives 
1. To investigate the driving forces for the government and the oil companies in taking biofuels as the 
current renewable energy source for transport.  
2. To determine the respective roles and responsibilities of the government and the oil companies in 
biofuels deployment and development. 
3. To understand the mechanism which delivers biofuels deployment and development, and the 
interactions that take place between the government and the oil companies 
4. To identify the risks and uncertainties faced by the government and the oil companies during 
biofuels deployment and development.  
5. To examine strategies adopted by the government and the oil companies to deal with risks and 
uncertainties arising during biofuels deployment and development. 
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the oil companies) who have been involved in biofuels deployment. It has to be 
stressed that, since the UK is a unitary state with a devolved system of government, 
the UK biofuels deployment is determined by the UK Government and influenced by 
the EU. Hence, biofuels adoption in Scotland is not a single cell operation of the 
SG199. The existence of the EU and the UK Governments influence signifies the 
multiple roles of the SG-not only as the regulator, but also as the executor of biofuels 
implementation in Scotland. Therefore, both the EU and the UK governments have 
determined/influenced the SG's actions, and shaped most of the UK/Scottish biofuels 
policies. This is important to ensure that, Scotland-as a part of the UK, is aligned 
with the national agenda and complies with the EU Single Market Principle under the 
European Economic Community. This answered the sub-question (b) the SG roles in 
biofuels deployment (shown at the footnote).  
 
Since the EU, the UK Governments and the SG have all had an involvement in the 
biofuels adoption, the commencement of biofuels was driven by the respective 
objectives of different regulators at different levels. The research findings shown 
that, these objectives were not unique to the different regulator, but were in fact, 
some common driving forces shared amongst these regulators. This answered the 
sub-question (a) (shown at the footnote). Besides, the oil companies mainly acting as 
the 1G biofuels supplier, are also driven by the economic interests of biofuels 
businesses, which has also answered the sub-questions (i), and (ii) (shown at the 
footnote). Through mechanisms applied, strategies implemented and the interactions 
generated, these actors have deployed the 1G biofuels. This then answered sub-
questions (c) and (iii) (shown at the footnote).  
 
Hence, the first section has analysed the respective roles and responsibilities of the 
governments and the oil companies in biofuels deployment. This section has also 
investigated the driving forces for the governments and the oil companies in opting 
for biofuels, while explaining the mechanisms and strategies put in place which 
                                               
199 Scotland has to comply with regulations and targets issued by a higher authority and cannot 
decide to issue their own guidelines (bind by the Reserved Matters) which fall short of 
international/national guidelines and targets. 
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deliver biofuels deployment. Since any new technology introduction into a new 
marketplace will face a certain degree of R&U; the EU, the UK Government, the SG 
and the oil companies, all have to ensure that the expected R&U were managed, in 
order to set a path for the ease of biofuels adoption. Several expected R&U during 
the technology deployment have been identified by Elliott (2003), Rosenbloom and 
Kantrow (1982), Pearson (1991) Rosenberg (1994) and SpecialChem (2011) report; 
subsequently made the identifications of R&U during biofuels deployment clearer.  
 
Looking at the mechanisms applied and the strategies implemented, these methods 
are playing multiple roles. On one hand, they are set to facilitate biofuels 
introduction, while on the other, they are also the methods established to resolve the 
anticipated R&U which might hinder biofuels implementation. Therefore, in section 
two, the research answered the sub-questions (d), (e), (iv), (v), for both the 
governments and the oil companies. This section has identified the expected R&U 
faced by these actors during biofuels deployment, and examined the strategies 
adopted to deal with them. 
 
The analysis from section one and two concluded that biofuels are shaped by 
different stakeholders' interests/objectives and various social forces. Biofuels 
adoption in the UK is tailored to suit the local requirements-which the UK adopts 
biofuels for the objective of reducing CO2/GHG in the domestic road transport 
system. The defined roles between the regulators and the oil companies are set to 
ensure that each of their responsibilities are carried out, to ascertain an efficient 
operations under the biofuels regulated market (BRM). The mechanisms and 
strategies are devised, to control biofuels deployment and to achieve the respective 
interests/objectives of the stakeholders; and most importantly to resolve the 
anticipated R&U arising during biofuels adoption. These are then summarised and 
presented in Model 1. 
 
The third section will explore two systemic risks that emerged from the 1G biofuels 
deployment. These systemic risks were unanticipated. Consequently, new actors 
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emerged, demonstrating the institutional/power switch with the new demand for the 
enforcement of green and sustainable (G&S) biofuels criteria on the existing and the 
future biofuels products, production and supply. The governments and the oil 
companies took action through restrategisation and by strengthening the existing 
mechanisms, brought the systemic risks under controlled/managed. The discussions 
were furthered developed with the identification of confluence factors which caused 
the systemic risks to happen, and some empirical suggestions made to avoid the 
systemic risks from reoccur.    
 
The fourth section will examine how the nine criteria/requirements for the next 
generation biofuels (NGB) were developed. These nine criteria/requirements were 
shaped by the various stakeholders 200  after the systemic risks occurred. 
Concentrating on the G&S criteria, the NGB has been largely shaped, not only to 
allow the pursuance of biofuels on political and socioeconomic benefits, but also to 
safeguard the socioenvironmental welfares. These are presented in Model 2.  
 
Finally, at section five, we will focus completely on the issues of biofuels 
development. This section answered the remaining sub-questions of the SG and the 
oil companies in the NGB development. The section has investigated the respective 
roles and responsibilities of the SG and the oil companies in biofuels development; 
the mechanism put in place to deliver biofuels development and the R&U identified 
along with the strategies adopted to deal with them.  
 
7.1 Governments and Oil Companies in Biofuels Deployment  
Biofuels adoption is fostered by these two actors (with their respective interests) 
under the regulated market. These interests can be seen as a combination of both 
external and internal motivations. The external motivations include the social, 
economic and environmental gains from biofuels adoption. Whereas, the internal 
motivations reflect the self-referential aspects of political stability for the regulators, 
                                               
200 The EU/UK and the Scottish governments, the oil companies, and the newly emerged actors like 
the international/national social movements/environmentalists and various biofuels roundtables.  
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and profit making for the oil corporations. Therefore, these two actors go together 
like bread and butter, collaborating along biofuels deployment; not only helping each 
other to achieve their objectives, but also protecting each other's interests. 
 
According to Mallon (2006), the energy market might need to be reformed as some 
renewables will be integrated into physical/management systems which have not 
been designed for this type of distributed generation. However, this does not happen 
to biofuels businesses since they are accommodated in a dominant position that 
vertically integrated oil companies in the fuel supply.  
 
The BRM is similar to the oil regulated market. It is, basically, one of the extended 
operations from the oil companies. The BRM is a market where there is a degree of 
supervision/intervention by the governments concerning permissible price 
movements and market behaviour for biofuels adoption. Meanwhile, the oil 
companies are responsible for a consistent biofuels supply201. Since biofuels and 
hydrocarbon are supplied through the oil companies-which seem to be a natural 
oligopolistic industry; therefore, biofuels have been concentrated in the hands of a 
few major firms, which have sought to influence the markets they operate. The 
existence and the apparent inevitability of oligopoly structure that lack of 
competitive pressure have proved a motive for a government’s intervention. The 
governments have to create a balance in protecting the economic interest of the oil 
companies, as well as to safeguard the public socioeconomic welfare.  
 
In the UK BRM, most policy making decisions are made at the highest level of the 
regional political authority-by the EU. This policy is then passed down to the 
member states of the respective national level like the UK Government. In reality, the 
EU is formed by the representatives from each of the member states. Therefore, most 
of the decisions made are nearly unanimous. Biofuels uptake was due to the EU/UK 
Governments' mandate. Through regional and national policies formulation, biofuels 
                                               
201 Biofuels have to be distributed which are convenient for accessibility, constant for availability and 
quantity, and consistent in quality. Under the RTFO, all oil companies are obliged to comply with the 
measurements, and to achieve the annually-increasing-targets of biofuels blend in petrol/diesel.  
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were implemented in the UK. This top-down pattern of political power reflects the 
institutional structure of the EU/UK, operating under the Single Market principle 
within the BRM.  
 
At the national level, the UK Government acts as the national principal-with 
executive legislative power, links with the devolved governments like the SG, and 
passes down regulatory decisions made202 to the agents (the oil companies as the 
biofuels suppliers). The UK Government is responsible for the national policy 
executions, must ensure the SG is adopting the national biofuels policy. Besides, the 
UK Government also monitors the oil companies' performance to ensure their 
biofuels supply comply with the state law-the Renewable Transport Fuels Obligation 
(RTFO). 
 
An agency created by the Department for Transport (DfT)-the Renewable Fuel 
Agency (RFA), is an agent of the DfT. The RFA is empowered by the DfT, to 
monitor biofuels deployment in the UK, through the monthly biofuels “Carbon and 
Sustainability” 203  reporting system from data fed back by the oil companies. 
Therefore, what is signified from this “principal-agent” relationship-as advocated by 
Gregory and Stuart (2004) is that, there are many overlapping roles taking place. One 
principal could also acting as an agent for another principal 204 . Thus, these 
identifications are merely to present the relationships, interactions and the 
responsibilities exist between the decision maker (principal) and the decision 
executor (agent).  
 
When interests generate motivations, they subsequently drive up the momentum and 
commitments to achieve the goals. Meanwhile rules (discussed in appendix 2.1.2) lay 
out the clear roles and responsibilities, which have been assigned to the governments 
                                               
202 Information appears in the form of policies, directives, acts, regulations, standards and mandatory 
targets.  
203 quantity sold on particular month, the source of the biofuels and the CO2 savings achieved. 
204 The UK Government acts as an agent for the EU, while it is also the principal in the UK. The RFA 




and the oil companies with regard to their respective operations/functionality. These 
roles and responsibilities, not only can facilitate efficient decision-making, to ensure 
an effective biofuels execution, but also can determine the appropriate action to be 
taken when problems/R&U arise during biofuels deployment.  
 
7.1.1 Governments' and Oil Companies' Motivations for Biofuels 
Deployment  
There was an increasing interest from the EU/UK Governments in adopting biofuels, 
as a response to concerns on oil dependence associated with energy security and 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) reductions. McNeely-the Chief Scientist of the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature summarised: “With soaring oil 
prices, and debates raging on how to reduce carbon emissions to slow climate 
change, many are looking to biofuels as a renewable and clean source of energy” 
(BBC News, 22 September 2006). 
 
There were three political backdrops to drive a regional/national biofuels adoption. 
Firstly, there was regional and national pressure to reduce GHGs in road transport as 
quickly as possible. This is because the GHGs emission is a daily problem. It is 
important to have the emissions cut as early as possible, in order to abide by the 
obligatory requirements of the EU Biofuels Directive (EUBD) 2003 and Kyoto 
Protocol 1997; and to avoid from being penalised by the regional/international 
community if any country fails to achieve such compliance. Secondly, it was in both 
the regional and national interests to achieve “partial” energy security and to lighten 
the high dependency on the imported oil from any politically unstable region.  
 
Accepting the fact, the exponential growing demands on energy for the transport 
system could be seen in the next decade. Consequently, oil and gas will struggle to 
meet up these future needs. Thirdly, to prosper the regional/national economies by 
gradually switching from the centuries old of oil-dominated-economy towards a 
green economy-that emphasises on renewable energy (RE) generations, carbon 
management and ecological conservation. Recent evidence shows that, most of the 
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agricultural industries in developed/developing countries were profited from biofuels 
feedstock growing. Due to the growing demand and the increase of biofuels 
international trade, this has generated more job opportunities and wealth creation for 
the agro-economy.  
 
Meanwhile, oil companies like BP and Shell are responding to the governments' 
vision of green economy, the mission of energy security, and the objective of 
GHG/CO2 reduction in road transport through their participation in biofuels supply. 
Apart from the fulfilment of the regulators' policies and agendas, the main 
motivation for the oil companies in the biofuels business lies in the economic 
benefits of profit making.  
 
There are also three corporate driving forces, which led BP and Shell to enter the 
biofuels businesses. Both BP and Shell have been discussed separately in Chapter 5 
and 6, are summarised in Table 7.1.1. From this presentation, we found that, most of 
them could be correlated, to explain the commonality in shaping both companies' 
interests in biofuels, as well as the alignment with the governments' motivations.  
 
Table 7.1.1: Summary of Three Corporate Driving Forces on Biofuels  
BP Shell Common Attributes 
Towards energy 
security 
Energy challenge  Both are related, due to the increasing road transport energy 
demands, rapid industrialisation, the depleting oil and gas 






Biofuels for  
CO2 reduction  
Both are related, as the characteristic of biofuels in 







They are not related, yet could justify the different 
directions for BP and Shell. To comply with the 
government's targets, Shell is embarking on the NGB 
development; while the rational of prospering agricultural 
industry led BP to invest in large-scale jatropha and 
sugarcane plantations.  





7.1.2 Matching the Governments' and the Oil Companies' Motivations 
To make sure a biofuels implementation could be successfully executed, both the 
regulators' and the oil companies' motivations have to be aligned, so that their 
collaborations could be coordinated within a regulated market. The research found a 
seamless match between these stakeholders that subsequently generated the 
momentum for commitments to the regional/national biofuels deployment.    
 
(a) Towards energy security  
Energy security is important for the EU and its member states. Oil and gas are 
commodities which are interwoven with political, social and economic stability. If 
any disruption caused a shortage, this could render in a dramatic increase in prices. 
This is because, apart from powering the transport system, oil and gas are heavily 
used for daily activities in manufacturing, commercial operations and household 
living205.  
 
Historically, the oil price fluctuations from previous years 206  harmed the global 
economy. Furthermore, oil dependency from the politically unstable nations like the 
Middle East, Persian Gulf and Nigeria; puts the oil companies’ operations in a 
vulnerable position. Accepting that demand for oil and gas will grow exponentially 
over the coming years/decades whilst oil and gas reserves are rapidly depleting 
resources; energy prices are getting more expensive. Thence, energy security has 
become one of the utmost political, social and economic concerns. Biofuels, which 
are derived from biomass, can be grown through agricultural power or at non-oil 
                                               
205 oil and gas are the main energy source in powering machineries for manufacturing, keeping the 
transport system running to foster trade, increase mobility and generating heat/electricity for 
households. Besides, the petrochemical industry which uses oil as a raw material would be largely 
affected when oil supply is insufficient or is too expensive.  
206 Oil crisis: 
(a) 1973 oil crisis as OPEC oil export embargo by many of the Arab oil producing states, in response 
to western support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War.  
(b) 1979 Iranian revolution.  
(c) 1990 spike in the oil price due to Gulf War.  
(d) 2000 inflation due to a world peak in oil demand.   
(e) 11 September 2001 attack in the US.  
(f) 2003, invasion of Iraq  
(g) forecasted 2014 peak oil crisis (Campbell, 2005).  
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producing nations; could insure a “partial”207 energy security or provide a small-scale 
of oil substitution208.  
 
(b) Using Biofuels for the Road Transport GHG/CO2 Reduction  
The threat of climate change has spurred a great interest in finding new energy 
sources that do not add to the amount of GHG/CO2 currently in the air. Regulated by 
the EU, many policies are capping today's GHG/CO2 emissions from various 
sectors209. Since the world needs to double its energy supplies, while at the same 
time cutting emissions in half, BP and Shell have to diversify their energy profiles to 
take in the lower emission sources like biofuels. Biofuels could reduce 2.5%-4%210 
of CO2 emission from vehicle tailpipes. Besides, the carbon neutrality is significantly 
helpful, if the activities along the value chain of biofuels operation could be managed 
properly to take in the G&S principles.  
 
(c) Prospering Agricultural Industry  
Many governments in the developed/developing nations want to see their agricultural 
communities become more prosperous. Biofuels feedstock farming is not only 
benefiting developed nations such as the US211, Canada, France and Germany; but 
also the developing countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Brazil which agricultural 
is their national economic pillar. Currently, there are three cross-border large-scale 
plantations (two jatropha projects and one sugarcane project) launched by BP, which 
signify BP's interest towards the agricultural sector.  
                                               
207 This is because, the capacity of oil and gas are far too far reaching. They have penetrated into 
many industries and dominated the world for more than a century. They are powerful in mechanising 
the global economy and fostering the social interactions. With this large capacity and dominant role, 
they could never be replaced by a single source of biofuels alone.  
208 by using flex-fuel/biofuels cars. However this is still remains a small-scale application due to: the 
expensive of a hybrid car, the low accessibility of the neat biofuels supply and the inadequacy of 
technical/maintenance support for such green cars. 
209 transport, energy generation, industrial, commercial and households energy consumptions. 
210 5% biofuels blend would result in a carbon reduction of around 2.5% (biodiesel) and 4% 
(bioethanol) (Whatagreencar, 2008). 
211 In 2006, biofuels added USD41billion to gross output, and created 160,231 jobs in all sectors of 
the economy. In addition to providing a growing and reliable domestic market for American farmers, 
the biofuels industry also provides the opportunity for farmers to enjoy some of the value added to 
their commodity. Farmer owned ethanol plants account for 43% of the US fuel ethanol plants and 
almost 34% of industrial capacity (Dinneen, 2007). 
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(d) Responding to the Governments Biofuels Policy  
Shell foresees the increasing targets from the EUBD (2003), the RTFO (2008) and 
the EU Renewable Energy Directive-EURED (2009). Although these targets are low 
in the early years, when 5% is required in 2013/14 (by the RTFO) and 10% 
alternative fuels in 2020 (by the EURED), these targets will pressure Shell into 
producing a consistent of biofuels supply. To support these regional/national targets, 
all of the NGB R&D projects conducted by Shell are aim to ensure a reliable and 
greater volumes of biofuels can be produced.  
 
7.1.3 Shift of the Hydrocarbon Paradigm towards Biofuels Deployment 
We observed the policy framework and the regulatory instruments established, many 
of them demonstrated some of the key features 212  of a successful RE policy 
advocated by Mallon (2006). This explained the rapid shift of the hydrocarbon 
paradigm towards biofuels implementation has been progressing well, according to 
what has been designed/planned. 
 
Biofuels deployment is operating under a regulated market. Both the regulators and 
the oil companies are committed to ensure the ease of the technology adoption. The 
regulators initiated biofuels introduction through policy formulation. These policies 
were transparent-as described by Mallon (2006) to minimise the R&U as much as 
possible. The political messages/objectives were delivered through policies213 which 
brought together both the regional and national governments' 
visions/mission/objectives, while being supported by measurable social, economic 
and environmental benefits. Since biofuels adoption in the UK/Scotland was not the 
decision of the UK/SG alone, instead, it was the result of the political decisions 
initiated by the EU which then delegated to the member states including the UK. 
Therefore, the interwoven political agendas of regional and national governments 
                                               
212 1energy market reform, 2high transparency, 3stable, 4well-defined objectives, 5appropriately 
applied incentives, 6well-defined technology and 7well-established contextual framework.  
213 The UK Powering Future Vehicles Strategy (2001), the EU Biofuels Directive-EUBD (2003), the 
EC Biomass Action Plan (2005), the UK RTFO (2008), the EU Fuel Quality Directive-EUFQD 
(2009), the EU Renewable Energy Directive-EURED (2009),  Scotland's Consultation on Low Carbon 
Vehicles (2009) and Scotland's Renewable Action Plan (2009). 
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were found in the UK/Scottish biofuels policies. This policy structure provided a 
stable/strong foundation-as depicted by Mallon (2006) for biofuels introduction since 
the national biofuels policy of the member states is backed by the regional regulators.  
 
The EUBD (2003) was first formulated which required a target of 5.75% blend of 
biofuels (on the basis of energy content214) on all member states' transport fuels by 
2010. This was then increased to a mandatory 10% of alternative fuels by 2020 under 
the EURED (2009). These political targets have then been transposed/incorporated 
into the UK RTFO. In order to achieve these regional targets, the UK RTFO has 
broken down these regional targets and laid out step-by-step annually-increasing-
national-targets. The RTFO was commenced on 15 April 2008, requires the suppliers 
of hydrocarbon to ensure that a specified percentage of the road fuels they supply in 
the UK is made up of biofuels. The target began at 2.5% in 2008/2009, and rises to 
5% in 2013/2014. We would expect the targets from the RTFO would be increased 
until year 2020, in order to align with the EURED (2009) mandatory 10% target by 
2020. Therefore, the EU/UK and the SG are setting ambitious targets to help biofuels 
claim a larger share of the regional/national road transport fuels.  
 
Compared with other EU member states, the UK adopts biofuels to reduce GHG/CO2 
for its national road transport. This well defined objective-explained by Mallon 
(2006), has appeared across all the UK/SG policies, ranging from combating climate 
change, RE generation to building a low-carbon transport system. Furthermore, the 
environmental concern has been prioritised as the central focus of many policies 
formulation.  
 
To achieve the objective of biofuels adoption, regulatory instruments have been 
facilitated/applied. These included rules and regulations, standards on biofuels 
quality215, mandatory annual targets (RTFO), the Renewable Transport Fuel (RTF) 
                                               
214 The correlation is 5% by volume which equals 4% by energy (Gallagher, 2008) 
215 Biofuels used in the UK, have to comply with the European Standards biodiesel EN 14214 (2003) 
and the bioethanol EN15376. This is important for quality control and standard unification which 
helps to foster international trade and regional/local market adoptions.  
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Certificate-which acted like a business licences enforced by the RFA216; and the 
vehicle manufacturers'217 standard warranty remains intact voluntarily, when biofuels 
are incorporated into mineral fuel at a rate of 5% by volume. Besides, financial 
incentives (20p/litre 218 ) are appropriately applied-as depicted by Mallon (2006), 
where the incentives were accessible and open to all biofuels commercial players 
who are supplying biofuels blends in the UK. Overall, the contextual framework-
described by Mallon (2006) for biofuels introduction was well-established. The 
policy makers and the oil companies are operating within the regulated market. The 
higher levels of cooperation and dissemination exist, the more effective the biofuels 
deployment was to be.  
 
7.1.4 The Existing Social Requirements and the Technical Constraints 
that Favoured Biofuels Adoption 
Finding alternatives for power generation is comparatively easier than finding 
alternatives for energy used by the road transport system. This is because, the 
upstream power sources could be changed by switching from coal/oil plants to 
appropriate RE; while the transmitting/distribution infrastructure downstream could 
be remained/unchanged and continue to support manufacturing, commercial and 
household activities.  
The alternatives for transport fuels are far more complicated, due to the technologies 
being entrenched by current social requirements and automobile technological 
constraints. This could be explained from the perspectives of the existing 
                                               
216 The RFA is established by the DfT to manage, control and monitor biofuels supply in the UK. 
Both Meta and Qualifying Standards of the RFA are emphasis on the G&S of biofuels on the products, 
the production and the supply process. All the oil companies operating in the UK have to report their 
monthly “Carbon and Sustainability” data to the RFA. The data consists of quantity sold on particular 
month, the source of the biofuels and the CO2 saved. This complies with the interactive approach 
advocated by Hood et al. (2004b), with the regulator imposing periodic reporting requirement on the 
oil companies to come forward with information, and then responding to the content of the 
information/data reported. 
217 Represented by ACEA-European Automobile Manufacturers' Association, JAMA-Japanese 
Automobile Manufacturers Association and KAMA-Korean Automobile Manufacturers Association. 
218 Biodiesel and bioethanol are taxed at 20p/litre less than petrol and diesel. This support is 
guaranteed until March 2010. The biodiesel incentive has been in place since July 2002, while the 
bioethanol was since January 2005 (DfT, 2008). The aim for this incentive is to keep the production 
cost and sourcing cost low, to ensure affordable prices can be passed on to the consumers. The tax 
concession is likely to be phased out in favour of the buy out after March 2010.  
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infrastructure which associates with high switching costs; and green automobiles that 
link with the manufacturers' capabilities and market responses. 
 
Firstly, the existing supply infrastructure is set for hydrocarbon. It consists of well-
connected pipelines, storage-tanks, oil trucks and gas stations which have been in 
operations for decades. Besides, the existing automobiles are powered by internal 
combustion engines (ICEs). These supply/distribution infrastructure and the ICEs are 
designed to handle “liquid fuels” only. Thus, the earlier technological choices have 
patterned the subsequent development (Rosenberg, 1994). Consequently, the oil 
companies were forced to look for alternative liquid fuels that are compatible with 
hydrocarbon. This is aimed to prolong the use of the existing infrastructure and ICEs. 
Besides, this could also avoid the high switching costs (from corporate and personal 
investment219 on new technologies) and allows for immediate applicability/use. 
 
Secondly, while the alternative engine technologies220 seem to be catching up, the 
world's billions of ICEs that fuelled by hydrocarbon are expected to remain for 
another thirty-to-fifty years. In order to produce a hybrid car, this would have to rely 
much on the technological know-how of the automobile manufacturer, combined 
with a positive social climate221 . To date, the world’s most advanced green car 
manufacturing nations are mainly concentrated in the US, Japan and the EU. 
However, there are still many automobile manufacturers who do not have an 
adequate institutional knowledge/capability to manufacture these green cars222. This 
is further hindered by the 2008 financial crisis, the current high cost of the green 
cars, the low accessibility of the alternative fuels and the inadequacy of the technical 
support for green car maintenance/service. Thirdly, even though the public has the 
                                               
219 switching ICE to a green car, constantly servicing the green car to maintain its performance 
220 flex-fuel, H2 , electric/fuel cell, neat biofuels and potentially solar cars. 
221 such as a clear political direction, the government fiscal support, social response on new 
technology adoption and various institutional involvement. 
222 There are fifty world automobile manufacturers (data based on the Organisation Internationale 
des Constructeurs d' Automobiles, 2008). Fourteen* manufacturers are embarking on R&D, and only 
four (Toyota, Honda, Ford and G-Wiz) have successfully marketed their products.  
*-Hybrid cars from Honda, GM, Ford, Toyota, Audi, Daimler and Nissan.  
*-H2 cars from GM, Ford, Honda, Fiat, BMW and Mazda.  
*-Electric/Fuel Cell cars from Daimler, Fiat, Ford, Hyundai, Mazda, Peugeot, Volkswagen and G-Wiz.  
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environmental awareness and the collective social responsibility in cutting GHG/CO2 
emissions from road transport; in reality, the market response is highly sensitive to 
the cost-benefit logic. Therefore, oil companies have to be efficient in supplying RE 
which can be done in a more cost effective way.  
 
Combined with social requirements and technological constraints of the alternatives 
transport fuels, biofuels provide some technical convenient as the effective solutions. 
Biofuels have been implemented in Brazil for more than three decades, while BP and 
Shell have been supplying biofuels in the US and Brazil for many years. The 
durations for biofuels implementation are credible in social, technical, economic and 
practical terms. Additionally, biofuels require low switching cost, since they are 
compatible with the current hydrocarbon distribution infrastructure and the ICEs; 
that allow them for an immediate execution. Furthermore, they could reduce 2.5%-
4% of CO2 from vehicle tailpipe. Hence these encouraging factors along with the 
technical convenience of biofuels (refer appendix 7.1.2) affirmed biofuels are well 
defined-as explained by Mallon (2006), and then selected as the front runner for the 
contemporary renewable energy for transport (REfT). 
 
7.2 Social Construction of Risk and Uncertainty on Biofuels 
Deployment  
Technology deployment is proceeds by the interaction of various social and technical 
elements. Therefore, technology, once implemented, not only reacts back upon its 
environment, but it also generates new implications (Clark and Staunton, 1989; 
Fleck, 1993). This section borrows the theory of R&U on technology implementation 
as advocated by Rosenberg (1994) and the SpecialChem (2011) report (discussed in 
2.4.1) 223 , to analyse biofuels adoption and the social implications, which 
subsequently rendered to counterbalance the expected R&U-on technology 
applications, business operations and market acceptance (summarised in Table 2.4.2).  
 
 
                                               
223 Rosenberg (1994) analysis from (i) to (vi), SpecialChem (2011) analysis from (vii) to (viii) 
262 
 
(i) Ex ante uncertainty about biofuels use 
Biofuels, which have been implemented in Brazil and the US for many years, would 
still appear in a primitive condition when operating within the EU/UK markets. This 
is because under the concept of “localisation”, new stakeholders are involved to 
establish a new set of regulatory and control mechanisms for regional/national 
biofuels deployment. Therefore, biofuels adoption in the UK needs the 
reconfiguration and localisation, in order to operate under these new contextual 
setting, and to comply with the regulatory requirements. This fits to Rip’s (1995) 
comments that introducing a new technology is not a straightforward matter, as there 
is no guaranteed recipe based on previous experience-even though both BP and Shell 
have years of experiences in Brazilian and American biofuels implementation.  
 
(ii) The need for infrastructure 
Certainly, biofuels are the new technology to the UK. They have the power of game 
changing, could switch the hydrocarbon-dominated-transport landscape towards low-
carbon renewable fuels use. Yet, the technical conveniences of biofuels provided 
(discussed in section 7.1.4) do not require biofuels for an entire new system to be 
established to support their operations-as concerned by the SpecialChem (2011) 
report. Their compatibility with the existing hydrocarbon supplying infrastructure 
and the ICEs, allow their adoption with immediate effect.   
 
(iii) Innovation causing competition between the new and the old technology  
Generally, any technology (new or old) (particularly the consumer technology) will 
face a series of competition in order to gain a bigger market share. The theory of 
substitution advocated by Smith (1996) highlights the process by which a new 
technology would threaten the traditional technology, or vice versa.  
 
Biofuels, since they are supplied by the same oil companies, they will not threaten 
the oil companies' conventional hydrocarbon business under the same economic 
objective. Furthermore, the oligopolistic structure of the oil market is naturally 
lacking of competitive pressure. Hence, this has eased the stiff competition between 
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biofuels and hydrocarbon (stiff competition as concerned by the SpecialChem 2011 
report) in serving the regional/national transport system. From the economic and 
technology perspectives, biofuels do not create a distinctive/entirely new and 
threatening technology. For the mid-to-long-term, they can provide the continuation 
of liquid fuel, either blended with petrol/diesel, or can be used in a neat form on 
specially-designed green cars. Besides, biofuels are one of the renewables, not only 
can sustain the oil companies' energy businesses, but also build up an alternative 
route, and gradually switch hydrocarbon to low-carbon energy supplies. Since oil and 
gas are depleting resources, most of the oil companies have begun venturing into RE 
business since year 2000. The political climate and social awareness are in place, to 
push the green economic evolution on RE generations.  
 
“America is addicted to oil” said President Bush (2006) when he delivered his State 
of the Union address. Yet in reality, is not only America, but the whole world is 
dependent/addicted to oil. The discovery of oil in 1900 has almost penetrated into 
every aspect of mankind activities, and subsequently dominated many industries for 
more than a century. Because of the consequences of climate change, the world 
community awares of the peak oil issues. Biofuels as one of the renewables is 
complementing the road transport energy mix, at least to alleviate the pressures of 
low-carbon energy use, while also capable of meeting the increasing demands.  
 
(iv) A new technology has the unanticipated applications 
According to Rosenberg (1994), one reason why it has been difficult to foresee the 
uses of a new technology, is that, many inventions had their origins in the attempt to 
solve a very specific defined problem, yet turns out to have significant applications 
in totally unanticipated contexts224.  
 
                                               
224 One example being studied is the laser technology. Laser, which its eventual use in an industry 
has turned upon an extended improvement process that vastly expands its practical usages for other 
industrial applications. Laser was started from an industrial use for precision measurement, navigation 
and chemical research. It then expanded to different industries such as music for CD/DVD production, 
surgical procedure, printing industry and others. 
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However, biofuels are different as they are a social utility-a large-scale technology. 
The laser technological diversification was mainly driven by the cost-benefit logic, 
market demand and the decision made among the industrial players. Biofuels 
however, are operating under the regulated market control, with the continuous 
interventions from regulators, while the technology is supplied by the oil companies. 
Thus, what makes biofuels different from other consumer technology: apart from the 
“scale” of the technology, the dissemination would largely depend on these two 
significant decision makers (the regulators and the technology suppliers). Biofuels, at 
the current-to-mid-term implementation stage should not create any unanticipated 
applications, apart from their potential expansions to fuel other modes of transport 
like aviation or shipping225. If this could be applied, then we would foresee a more 
efficient use of low-carbon energy to power a bigger transport landscape.  
 
(v) A new technology creates multiple impacts on other industries 
Innovations often arise as solutions to highly specific problems. In some cases, a new 
technological capability may have multiple points of impact on another industry. 
What Rosenberg (1994) worries are the impacts of one technology innovation might 
create negative a chain effect spreading to other industries.  Conversely, the 1G 
biofuels execution provided a profitable opportunity for agricultural based nations 
(refer appendix 7.1.4), and the related stakeholders (biofuels farmers, producers, 
suppliers and traders). This has created a new trend in fuel production-from a century 
of oil extraction that is completely based on the location of oil reserves, to biofuels 
production based on the geographical agricultural activities.  
 
Besides, the NGB R&D projects have also benefited economically some of the 
biotechnology (academic and commercial) institutions. These projects are 
                                               
225 Aviation and international shipping: 
-The Virgin Atlantic Jet flight took place between Heathrow and Amsterdam used biofuels (mixture of 
Babasu nuts and coconuts). This has opened an opportunity for biofuels adoption in airline (BBC 
News, 24 February 2008).  
-Besides, maritime transport has also opened another opportunity for biofuels use in sea cargos and 
ships. According to DfT (2007), the government is promoting biofuels use for international shipping.  
-In 2010, the DfT conducted one of the projects, to develop analysis on scope for biofuels to play a 
part in delivering 2050 aviation CO2 strategy (DfT, 2010a). 
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magnetising the oil companies, biotechnology institutions and agricultural industry 
for profit seeking and to achieve their respective economic objectives. Inevitably, the 
inter-industry flow took place for wealth creation among the stakeholders along the 
1G biofuels deployment and the NGB development. 
 
(vi) The identification of needs 
Rosenberg (1994) advocates, the implications of new technology are not just a matter 
of technical feasibility or improved technical performance. They are rather the 
matters of identifying certain categories of human needs and catering to them in a 
novel way. This is because a new technology needs to pass a socioeconomic test, not 
just a technological one. What shapes it depends on the ability to visualise how it 
might be employed in a new context.  
 
Since the introduction of the regional/national biofuels programme was initiated by 
political mandates, biofuels do not have the problems of gaining markets like 
conventional consumer technology does. This might give some advantages to the oil 
companies, since the entire region/nation could backup their sales. However, because 
of the massive scale of such technology and the huge markets that need to be 
satisfied, this technology would also generate R&U from the technological change, 
as well as during the deployment process. As such, most of the utilities like biofuels 
have to be placed under the context of a regulated market, with the involvement of 
government and the oil companies, to ensure the execution would be on track.  
 
The main function of a regulated market aims to create a balance-so that, while 
concentrating on the economic progression of biofuels (profit seeking, national 
wealth creation, and technology development for both regulators and the oil 
companies), the socioenvironmental obligations are not be overlooked. Nowadays, 
the British public has a strong environmental awareness of climate change and they 
are concerning on the social responsibility in minimising the impacts of the carbon 
foot-print. Thus, biofuels use in their automobile could at least alleviate the carbon 
pollution, by reducing the carbon emitted from their vehicles.  
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(vi) The economy climate 
Macro-economic risk such as the financial crisis since 2008 has delayed most of the 
technology introduction projects in the UK. Initially, we would expect the passive 
economic climate will jeopardise the biofuels introduction programme (the RTFO). 
Yet, todate, biofuels are still progressing under the RTFO.    
 
Biofuels application under the RTFO has a set of gradually-increasing-annual-targets 
for the biofuels blend with petrol/diesel use in the UK. Meanwhile the RTFO is also 
looking forward at the innovations of the NGB development that emphasises on the 
G&S biofuels, which are expected would be materialised five-to-ten years from 
2008. Consequently, all of these have generated two positive implications: Firstly, 
the targets have determined/guided the pace of the technological diffusion, which are 
entirely based on the regulators' mandates. Secondly, the achievement of biofuels 
adoption has been the first step in stimulating the economic transformation-from a 
hydrocarbon-dominated-economy, towards a green economy (refer appendix 7.1.5). 
What was worried by SpecialChem (2011) on insufficient resources allocation for the 
technology launch and the refusal of oil companies to commit in biofuels 
introduction/innovation did not happen. Although the oil companies have to deal 
with various costs226 in biofuels operations, the policy laid out has driven up the 
confidence of oil companies to participate/committed in biofuels businesses despite 
the huge investment involved.  
 
The regulators and the oil companies have a long-term view on biofuels progression 
since the RTFO does not have a cut-off date within the lifetime of its 
implementation. Therefore, oil companies were confidence on the political 
framework established-which is positively supporting biofuels for their long-term 
use/availability within the regional/national transport system. The financial resources 
were effectively managed/allocated. The UK Government is willing to provide the 
incentives and keep funding some local NGBs development projects, while the oil 
companies are using their private funds for the private NGB R&D projects. All of 
                                               
226 include the managerial costs, the hardware costs, the R&D costs, the exchange rates and so forth. 
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these have minimised the R&U of biofuels deployment and development, enable the 
oil companies to pursue biofuels introduction/innovation with higher confidence, 
regardless of the current world financial crisis occurred since 2008.  
 
(vii) Market acceptance of a new technology 
According to SpecialChem (2011), there are some of the characteristics which 
customers want to avoid as much as possible the R&U arising during a technology 
adoption. Each of them are explained and analysed as below: 
(a) Reliability: Biofuels have been adopted in Brazil for more than three decades 
which strongly demonstrates their reliability. Besides, the automobile manufacturers 
have provided a standard warranty for biofuels incorporated into mineral fuels at a 
rate of 5% by volume. This has strengthened the market confidence on biofuels use.  
(b) Scalability and future availability: Biofuels blends will follow the annually-
increasing-targets laid by the RTFO. The target will be increased till year 2020, to 
align with the EURED (2009) mandatory 10% target by 2020. Hence, biofuels 
introduction is for long-term.  
(c) Standards: Biofuels have to comply with the European standards: EN14214 
(bioethanol) and EN15376 (biodiesel). 
(d) Cost: Biofuels are subsidised with tax incentives of 20p/litre. This help to ensure 
an affordable price for the market. No engine modification is required (switching 
cost) to adopt biofuels in the existing ICEs.   
 
These benefits of biofuels technology were promoted. Baron (2011) suggests, mass 
education through media is one of the effective ways to reach the large population of 
the customer. Thus, the EU/UK Government and the SG, together with the oil 
companies are promoting the technical conveniences of biofuels through various 
media (print, electronic and internet) 
 
In summary, the analysis of the social construction of uncertainty on biofuels 
deployment using Rosenberg (1994) and SpecialChem (2011) frameworks, could 
lead to the conclusion: that biofuels adoption in the UK, until this stage the R&U 
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were expected and manageable on the technology applications, business operations 
and market acceptance. The analysis which was also built on Social Shaping 
Technology (SST) angle, took into the consideration a range of social factors, 
including institutional, social, political, environmental and economic, which have 
patterned the biofuels implementation, influenced the content of the technology and 
their social implications (Williams and Edge, 1996). 
 
7.2.1 The Expected Risk and Uncertainty Faced by the Governments 
and the Oil Companies during Biofuels Deployment 
Since the expected R&U can have a multitude dimensions, the divisions of R&U 
which were faced by the regulators and the oil companies respectively, could 
separate the overlapping of the R&U, and contextualise them accordingly from each 
of their different perspective. The mechanisms and strategies applied, not only 
helped to foster the 1G biofuels adoption (discussed at 7.1.3), but they were also 
characterised by the risk preventive objectives, to have the expected R&U 
mitigated/resolved in order to ease the biofuels deployment.  
 
Elliott (2003e) advocates a set of expected R&U from the regulators'227  on RE 
deployment, with the counteracting strategies applied to mitigate them (as 
summarised in table 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). Besides, there are three228 expected R&U from 
the corporate perspectives on technology adoption-advocated by Rosenbloom and 
Kantrow (1982), Pearson (1991) Rosenberg (1994) and the report from SpecialChem 
(2011) with the counteracting strategies to mitigate them (as summarised in table 
2.4.2). This research utilised both of these frameworks for biofuels deployment 





                                               
227 1Political support, 2funding, 3social acceptance, 4technology, 5institutional interests and 
involvements  
228 1Technology, 2business operations, 3social acceptance 
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Table 7.2.1: Risk and Uncertainty and Strategies Applied by Regulators 
during the 1G Biofuels Deployment   
Types of R&U  Findings  Strategies adopted 
Political support  
1. Lack of follow 
through when the 
project is under 
deployment. 
 





1. Compared with the previous RE projects which mostly 
failed in the UK, biofuels deployment gained clear 
political direction from the EU who has formulated the 
EUBD (2003) and the EURED (2009). These were then 
further obliged to its member states-including the UK, to 
deploy biofuels for the nationwide road transport system. 
The UK RFA is established to execute the RTFO (2008), 
and to monitor the G&S biofuels supply in the domestic 
market. The SG involvement for biofuels implementation 
is obligated under the UK Reserved Matters. Therefore, 
biofuels adoption is collectively executed amongst the 
member states under the regional Single Market Principle 
and to achieve the Kyoto Protocol ratification. The 
deployment process is guided by the targets, unified 
standards, and backed by the regional political decision. 
Any R&U and issues faced at the member states level 
could be brought to the EU for further discussion. Hence, 
biofuels deployment is stronger than the previous failed 
RE projects-which entirely depend on the UK Government 







2. Require vast 
investments of 











costs, with slow 
payback time.  
 








financial support on 
biofuels with tax 
incentives. 
 
2. Guided by 






does not require a 
large up front 
investments. 
 





4. Low switching 









2. The EU/UK biofuels targets have set proper guidelines 
for increasing regional/national biofuels adoption. These 
targets-starting from a low percentage and increasing, 
allow the supply infrastructure and capacity to be 
built/upgraded gradually, in order to ensure these targets 






3&4. Biofuels provide the most economic solution, due to 
the low switching cost involved, since there is no 
requirement for a new supply infrastructure establishment. 
The compatibility of biofuels with existing hydrocarbon 
supply infrastructure, not only secured low operation cost, 
but also allowed them to be adopted at the existing 
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and reports.  
 
1. Biofuels have been implemented in the US for nearly 
five years and in Brazil for more than three decades. 
Therefore, these technologies are not new and have been 
proven on their practicality and executability.   
 
 
2. Many of the OECD countries showed their support on 
biofuels deployment. This has attracted other nations, to 
work on biofuels adoption. In the UK, due to the 
incentives, quality control and warranties provided by 
automobile manufacturers, all of these have encouraged 
the public acceptance on biofuels use.     
 
3. The UK adoption of biofuels, is aimed at reducing the 
road transport CO2/GHG. Hence, the RFA is established to 
monitor the G&S criteria of biofuels supplied by the oil 
companies.    
 
 
4. The positive economic and environmental impacts of 
biofuels are promoted through corporate/government 
organisational media. These sources of information are 
convincing/highly reliable. The emphasised in 
safeguarding socioenvironmental responsibilities has 
appeared across most of the regional/national 
transport/biofuels policies, and corporate reports. Most of 
the information published is supported by consultants 
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1. Biofuels implemented in the US and Brazil by the oil 
companies signified the applicability/practicality of these 
technologies. Biofuels are compatible with the existing 




2. Since biofuels are compatible with hydrocarbon 
infrastructure and ICEs, biofuels have gained the global 
attention as the front runner. At this stage, there is no 
foreseeable competition of biofuels with others potential 
technologies like H2/electricity. In fact these various 
options are seen as complementing each other, to power 
the entire road transport system for the near future. The 
emergence of new REfT after biofuels, could provide 
several choices for consumers, and gradually shifting the 











which resists the 
further deployment 
of new technology. 
 
 
1. Biofuels create 




1. Due to socially shaped implications of biofuels 
adoption, biofuels could achieve the regulators' and 
corporate objectives, motivations and interests. The bottom 
line is, biofuels do not create any competition for oil 
companies under the same economic objectives. Besides, 
the implementation which could achieve respective public 
agencies' political agendas and bring positive implication 
for agricultural industry, environment, transport and 
economic planning.  
The 1G biofuels generates wealth on the agricultural 
industry. The NGB development magnetises the 
biotechnology institutions and the oil companies for profit 
seeking. Hence, biofuels create multiple positive impacts 
on other industries. 
Source: Summarised by the researcher  
 
Table 7.2.2: Risk and Uncertainty and Strategies Applied by Oil Companies 
during the 1G Biofuels Deployment   
Types of R&U  Strategies adopted  
 BP's approach Shell's approach 
Technology  
1. Weaknesses of  the current 1G 
bioethanol on  
-Low heating values 
-Low energy content 
-High water affinity 
(as discussed in appendix 7.1.2) 
 
1. Biobutanol R&D with 
DuPont.  
 
1. R&D for biogasoline with 
Virent. 
Business operations:  
1. G&S criteria of biofuels which 





-BP supplies biofuels 
according to the RTFO 
targets, and reports to the RFA 
monthly on biofuels carbon 
and sustainability in order to 
get the RTF certificate. 
-BP complies with the Meta 
and Qualifying Standards set 
by the RFA. 
-BP participates in various 
roundtables. 
 
-Shell's internally established 
its Sustainable Sourcing Policy 
(SSP) 
-Shell supplies biofuels 
according to the RTFO targets, 
and reports to the RFA 
monthly on biofuels carbon 
and sustainability in order to 
get the RTF certificate. 
-Shell complies with the Meta 
and Qualifying Standards set 
by the RFA. 
-Shell participates in various 
roundtables. 
Social/market acceptance on 
biofuels  
-Utilise corporate websites 
and corporate videos to 
promote the benefits of using 
biofuels. 
-Utilise corporate websites, 
corporate video and YouTube 
to promote the benefits of 
using biofuels. 
Source: Summarised by the researcher 
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7.2.2 The Interplay of the Governments and the Oil Companies for the 
1G Biofuels Deployment  
Bringing together the stakeholders (regulators and oil companies): the driving 
forces/mechanisms to deliver biofuels deployment and the interactions generated, all 
of these have been previously discussed in sections one and two, is 
summarised/demonstrated in Model 1 as below.  
 
Model 1: Summary of the Interplay of the Respective Stakeholders during the 
1G Biofuels Deployment 
Source: Summarised by the researcher 
 
A. Between the UK Government and the EU Government  
-The EUBD (2003) requires all member states to replace non-mandatory 5.75% (energy content) of all 
transport hydrocarbons with biofuels by 2010.   
-The EURED (2009) requires all member states to adopt a mandatory 10% of energy used in transport 
to be renewable by 2020. This will expand the long-term use of biofuels incorporated as one of the 
REfT. 
-The UK Government collects information from the RFA “Carbon and Sustainability” reports, and 










B. Between the Governments and the Oil Companies 
Table 7.2.3: Three driving forces of biofuels deployment      
From governments  From oil companies 
(a) Energy security Energy challenge, towards energy security and fulfil increasing 
energy demand. 
(b) Cutting road transport 
GHG/CO2 emissions 
Environmental concern in climate change, biofuels adopted as 
fuel option for road transport GHG/CO2 reduction. 
(c) Prospering agricultural industry  Prospering agricultural industry (BP) 
Source: Summarised by the researcher 
 
-The UK RTFO (2008): Sets annually-increasing-targets of biofuels blends with hydrocarbon. 2.5% in 
2008/09, 3.25% in 2009/10, 3.5% in 2010/11, and 5% in 2013/14. 
-Oil companies maintain the consistent supply for annually-increasing-RTFO-targets of biofuels 
blends with hydrocarbon, to comply with the European Standard of biofuels-biodiesel EN 14214 and 
bioethanol EN15376.  
-New sets of regulatory establishment. The RFA requires oil companies to submit a “Carbon and 
Sustainability” report every month to the agency on biofuels data, with an emphasis on the G&S 
biofuels criteria.  
-As a reward for this reporting system, the oil companies would be awarded with the RTF certificate-
which acts as a licence for biofuels supply and trade.  
-Biodiesel and bioethanol are taxed at 20p/litre less than petrol and diesel.  
 
C. Social Implications of Biofuels Adoption 
1. political: towards energy security, transition from a hydrocarbon-dominated-economy to a green 
economy. Biofuels adoption is the quickest/effective way to cut GHG/CO2 emissions, so that the UK 
could comply with the EU/UN mandatory on GHG reduction targets. 
2. social: better public health due to lower air pollutions, and combating climate change-which is a 
global concern. 
3. environmental: cleaner air with lower air pollutions, reduced GHG/CO2 emissions. Biofuels have 
less negative impacts on the environment because they are biodegradable. 
4. economic: transition from a hydrocarbon-dominated-economy to a green economy by creating more 
employment opportunities along the value chain/activities of biofuels farming, production, supply and 
trade. 
5. Impacts on drivers (biofuels user) 
(a) safer for drivers in reducing incidents of vehicles on fire, due to biofuels' lower flash point. 
(b) better fuel economies for consumer and cost savings due to lower evaporative emission. 
(c) effective CO2 reduction due to biofuels' natural carbon neutrality. 
(d) effective in cutting CO2/GHG (2.5-4% for 5% use) from vehicle tailpipes. 
(e) reduce air pollutants229  
(f) conformance blends with the ICEs, which does not require personal investment in ICE 
modification. 
 
D. The 1G Biofuels Deployment and the NGB Development 
6. Economic link to a prospering agricultural industry. Create profit seeking links with biotechnology 
institutions (academic and commercial institutions) 
 
E. Industrial Pragmatism of Biofuels Adoption 
7. BP is supplying biofuels in the US and Shell is supplying biofuels in Brazil, provide a 
convincing/proven experience on the practicality of biofuels adoption. 
8. Biofuels as an economical option: 
(a) Biofuels are compatible with the existing hydrocarbon infrastructure (storage, supply and 
                                               
229 benzene, NO, NO2, CO, CO2, lead ambient, aldehyde, SO2, Sulphates, Particular matter, aromatic 
and low carcinogenic compounds. 
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distribution). This provides an immediate executability with lower switching costs, as no new 
infrastructure is required for biofuels blended supply. 
(b)Biofuels using biomass (the sugarcane230, the NGB biomass) and also the NGB on wastes (animal 
fats, tallow and used cooking oil) moving towards recycling and reducing composite wastes. 
 
F. Weaknesses of the 1G Biofuels which need to be resolved in the NGB development 
(a)Bioethanol has lower heating values which generates lower energy content. It provides only 67% of 
the energy compare with petrol. Therefore it is not fuel efficient to the motorists. 
(b)Bioethanol shows a high water affinity which causes the components of ICE to rust. This could 
lead to a lower social confidence with a higher percentage blend of bioethanol use. 
(c)Biodiesel has strong solvent properties to natural rubber and soft plastic in ICEs. This could 
jeopardise the ICE components and lead to lower social confidence with a higher percentage blend of 
biodiesel use. 
(d)Fermentation and transesterification processes which are slow, inefficient and with high production 
costs. 
(e)The low capacity of biofuels which are derived from foodstocks and waste products will face a 
bottle neck of sustainable supply. This can cause failure in fulfilling the increasing future demand. To 
enhance productivity, new feedstocks from the NGB with higher yields are required.  
(f)The carbon cycle-from growing feedstocks to burning biofuels in the fuel tanks, would achieve near 
carbon neutral-if the activities along the value chain are fully integrated to minimise the CO2 release. 
However, there is no universal true for all biofuels types. The emission reduction from biofuels is 
varied depends upon the types of feedstock. Therefore biofuels types, land use and all activities 
involved along the value chain must play their part in the biofuels carbon equation.  
 
7.3 The Emergence of Systemic Risk 
Looking at Model 1, the setting for the 1G biofuels deployment portrays the 
encouraging context for the ease of the UK biofuels implementation. It was easy to 
assume that, the expected R&U were drastically reduced by the mechanisms and 
strategies put in place, to encourage biofuels adoption and to achieve the targets set 
by the RTFO. Yet, two months after the activation of the RTFO, biofuels' credential 
and social benefits were questioned by the international/local pressure groups-such 
as social movements231, and environmentalists232. The scenario was further amplified 
by the international/local broadcasting/print/internet media. The reason was, the 1G 
biofuels deployment had created two systemic risks: food-fuel competition and 
biodiversity threatened (refer appendix 7.3.1). 
                                               
230 Sugarcane plant residue, or bagasse, is reused to generate heat and electricity, making the process 
more cost effective and environmental friendly. It provides 90% of carbon saving compare with petrol 
from well to wheel basis.  
231 Also called the Learned Society such as: The Royal Society, British Academy, The Royal 
Academy of Engineering, The Royal Environmental Health Institute of Scotland and The Agricultural 
Economics Society.  
232  Some of the eloquent international/UK pressure groups. Action Aid, Carbon Trust, Energy 
Saving Trust, Forum of the Future, Friends of the Earth, Green Alliance, Greenpeace, Low Carbon 
Vehicle Partnership, Oxfam, and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds.  
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(a) Food-Fuel Competition 
Biofuels production distorted the food markets in two ways. Firstly, due to high 
biofuels global demands, this provided a more lucrative business opportunity than 
growing crops for food. According to Mitchell (8 April 2008; 2008), the US 
expanded its maize area by 23% in 2007, in response to high maize prices and the 
rapid demand for maize bioethanol. This resulted in a 16% decline in soybean area, 
which reduced the soybean production by 19% and contributed to a 75% rise in 
world soybean prices between April 2007 and April 2008. Besides, the European 
farmers were also cutting back on wheat, in order to plant rapeseed/oilseed crops for 
biodiesel. The eight largest wheat exporting countries233 expanded their rapeseed and 
sunflower growing area by 36% between 2001-2007, which caused total wheat area 
fell by 1%.  
 
Secondly, there were cases discovered, whereby large quantities of grains were 
converted to produce biofuels. Commented by Vidal (22 January 2010), 1/3 of all the 
maize and other grain crops grown in the US ended up as biofuels in cars. Therefore, 
these two factors had caused international food supply shortages, pushed up food 
prices, and resulted in world hunger (BBC News, 23 March 2007; Vidal, 15 February 
2010). Mitchell (8 April 2008; 2008) concludes: “Biofuels have forced global food 
prices up by 75%. This figure emphatically contradicts the US government's claims 
that biofuels contribute less than 3% to food price rises.”  
 
(b) Biodiversity Threatened  
Biodiversity has been reduced by the intensification of biofuels crops as mono-
cropping practices, which guaranteed by the increasing global market demand for 
profitable prices. Changes in land use have reduced diversity with the conversion of 
more wetlands/forests/jungles into large-scale fuel crop plantations. Supported by 
Atkins (1 September 2010), rainforest and wildlife in South East Asia are being lost 
in the US/EU drive for biofuels. The habitats of the orang-utan and the Sumatran 
tiger are being trashed in Malaysia and Indonesia to make way for palm oil. 
                                               
233 The EU, China, India, US, Russia, Canada, Pakistan and Ukraine (FAO, June 2009). 
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Furthermore, Kenneth Richter-from Friends of the Earth said: “Massively expanding 
sugarcane plantations to produce biofuels has significantly threatened Brazil's 
rainforest. The biofuels industry is pushing agricultural activity on forested land 
where trees are cut down to make space for fuel crops farming” (Mathiason, 1 
February 2010). 
 
7.3.1 Confluence of Factors Rendered to the Emergence of Two 
Systemic Risks 
(a) Political Rush for Biofuels Deployment  
From the pressure groups point of view (BBC News, 29 June 2007; 24 March 2008), 
those regional/national biofuels policies were running ahead of biofuels' science and 
technology, which caused the 1G biofuels has failed to provide a sustainability 
supply. In reality, what made these policies ahead of science and technology capacity 
was mainly due to the political rush by the regional/national regulators. Looking at 
this issue chronologically, we can obtain more evidence to understand what have 
caused such political haste.  
 
The EU and its member states ratified the Kyoto Protocol in late May 2002. The EU 
was committed to a legally binding target-whereby it has to achieve 8% GHG 
reduction by 2012. The period from 2008-2012 is called the first commitment period, 
and the EU has to work on the three largest GHG polluters: power generation, 
transport and energy consumption from households, manufacturing and commercial. 
 
In 2003, the EUBD was adopted. Although a non-mandatory biofuels target 5.75% 
was set for 2010, an intermediate target of 2% by 31 December 2005 was also set. As 
a result, the EU25 (25 member-states) collectively achieved 1.4% in 2005234. The 
UK officially launched the RTFO on 15 April 2008, initially set biofuels targets of 
2.5% (2008/9), 3.75% (2009/2010) and 5% by 2010 onwards. Looking at these 
                                               
234 with Sweden led the position (3%), followed by Austria (2.5%), then Belgium, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain (each 2%), while the UK only achieved 0.2% 




targets, the gap between each target is more than 1%. This demonstrates, the urgency 
of the UK Government to catch up/comply with the EUBD 5.75% by 2010. Knowing 
that the NGB would only be commercially available within five-to-ten-years from 
2008, the 1G biofuels derived from food had been activated. The desperation to 
attain the various regional/national targets resulted in tunnel-vision within regulators 
and caused them to overlook numerous obstacles along deployment process. 
Consequently, the political rush led to the emergence of these two systemic risks. 
 
(b) Inadequate Risk Assessment from the Socioenvironmental Dimension  
The emergence of these two systemic risks depicted the pre-assessment, appraisal, 
evaluation and management of R&U advocated by Renn's Risk Governance (2008) 
(refer literature section 2.6.2), particularly along the biofuels implementation process 
was inadequately assessed. This was because, the previous mechanisms in place were 
too focused on how to commence the 1G biofuels and how to achieve the RTFO 
targets as the ultimate objective. They had not consolidated risk precautionary 
principles within these mechanisms/strategies, which should have considered the 
socioenvironmental implications before biofuels deployment.  
 
The regulatory approaches were focused too much on limiting false positives. 
Explained by Page (1978) (refer literature section 2.7.5), the conventional political 
decision assumes that, any new technology like biofuels is safe/beneficial until 
proven otherwise. Yet, when any negative outcome is detected (two systemic risks of 
the 1G biofuels deployment), the damage had been done and the consequences were 
irreversible. Furthermore, the methodology of policy making has failed to address the 
implications of differences in the distribution of benefits and costs; especially when 
victims are exposed to the systemic risks but have not received a commensurate 
proportion of the benefits from biofuels adoption.  
 
The EU/UK published policies backed the 1G biofuels execution, by stated clearly 
their readiness to have this technology deployed. Most of the strategies to mitigate 
the R&U were focused largely at the technical aspects of biofuels, such as quality 
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standardisation and incentives provision, as the preparations before biofuels 
commencement. There are two features of a successful RE policy that suggested by 
Mallon (2006) on land use planning reform and equalising the community risk and 
cost-benefits distribution were seriously neglected. Although the RTF certificates are 
issued to suppliers (RTFO Order, 2007) which acts as a control mechanism for 
biofuels suppliers who have complied with the RTFO targets, the G&S criteria was 
not enforced rigorously as the priority.  
 
Supported by some evidence whereby the G&S criteria of biofuels have not been 
fully established by the RFA, even after the implementation of the RTFO on 15 April 
2008. Many roundtables were busy formulating sustainability Principles and Criteria 
(P&C) in the early years and have these P&C established in 2009-which was more 
than a year after the commencement of the RTFO, and six years after the EUBD 
2003 adoption. This showed the concerns of the G&S biofuels have been seriously 
neglected. Indeed it was unacceptable to have the EUBD/RTFO commenced, without 
having the P&C properly instituted beforehand by the EU/UK public agencies235. 
Inevitably, there was an impairment to look merely at one side of the coin, 
trumpeting the face value of biofuels on the social, economic and environmental 
gains, while ignoring the potential negative impacts on socioenvironmental losses. A 
good RE policy should be equipped with ten key features (refer literature 2.3.5) 
advocated by Mallon (2006). It is unwise to wait until problems emerge before 
seeking for solution. It would have been reasonable to expect that even a lay person 
would ask: “Producing biofuels from food, what will happen to our food? What will 
happen to our land?” If these issues have been seriously considered, then, the 
systemic risks on food-fuel competition and biodiversity threatened could have been 
prevented from happening.  
 
(c) Different Social Context for Biofuels Adoption 
Initially, biofuels were developed and tested in laboratories for their applicability. 
                                               
235 associate with the EU/UK environmental, transport, agricultural industry, rural development and 
RE agencies.  
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They were adopted in the US and Brazil and have been in domestic use for a number 
of years. However, biofuels which are successful in one social context have caused 
some serious problems in the UK.  
 
One of the main factors is that the UK could not produce an adequate supply of 
biofuels to enable greater self-sufficiency as the US/Brazil does. Even two years after 
the RTFO execution, the UK only produced 17% biofuels for its domestic use, while 
83% of biofuels were imported through international trade236 (RFA, 2010). Although 
the UK relied on its home wheat and oil seeds surpluses, the food-fuel competition 
still arose and resulted in domestic food price increased. Since the UK is dependent 
upon the imported biofuels, the UK is also responsible for the occurrence of these 
two systemic risks that arose in those exporting countries. Furthermore, the 
transportation of biofuels through international trade adds up the global GHG/CO2 
emission. Even though this issue has not been tackled by the regulators as at the time 
of writing, it should be considered in order to achieve a more comprehensive 
GHG/CO2 saving.  
 
Despite the scientific testing on the 1G biofuels has showed the applicability of this 
technology, the results in a laboratory do not reflect the real life context. Biofuels 
which are applicable to one social setting could not be generalised for other social 
implementation. Due to the fact that, there are different constraints imposed by local 
environmental factors, with different sets of rules and regulations, different 
institutional participations, a diverse culture, and differing objectives for biofuels 
adoption; all of which make the implementation complex/challenging.  
 
(d) A Limited Domestic Production Capability versus the Unlimited Global Biofuels 
Demands 
Two of the world largest biofuels producers-the US and Brazil have contributed to 
the spreading of two systemic risks. The US has pushed too far on its biofuels 
                                               
236 From 15 April 2010 to 14 July 2010, the UK produced 12% biodiesel and 24% bioethanol for its 
domestic market. Argentina contributed 34% biodiesel to the UK, while Brazil contributed 30% 
bioethanol (RFA, 2010). 
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production capacity. Although the Brazilian sugarcane did not contribute to the food-
fuel competition237, the Amazon forest has been intruded to give land for more 
sugarcane plantations. What we can see from both examples is that: when biofuels 
were expanded from a home-grown cycle of self-sufficiency to cater for an unlimited 
world demand, the elasticity of their domestic productivity is finally ruptured. The 
1G biofuels quantity was far below the theoretical expectations to fill the gap caused 
by the increasing demand. This indicated overconfidence in the technology and the 
false positives preconception, which has ignored the natural limitation of food-
derived biofuels production, while underestimated the principles of locality, 
geography and weather- that are directly influenced the yield of the 1G biofuels. 
Consequently, the food security and ecology became the victims for the greed of 
global biofuels businesses. Explained by Thomas (2007), although many see biofuels 
as a way to avoid the oil wars currently raging in the Middle East, going down the 
biofuels road may in the end provoke a wider series of resource wars: food, water 
and habitable land. This trend shows the prematurity of policy makers to put so much 
emphasis on biofuels, rendered to the emergence of two systemic risks. 
 
(e) Biofuels Producers/Suppliers Eyeing the Economic Gains 
Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) explain that, business lobbying is a form of 
advocacy, whereby the business firms organise themselves into groups, with the aim 
to influence and shaping future regulations in order to protect/enhance their profits. 
Recall the supportive statements made by the regional/national farmers and biofuels 
producers (reported in the media), their forceful messages were justified for 
regional/national biofuels adoption. They stressed the surpluses of the grain 
productions which could be value added, if they were converted into biofuels.  
 
                                               
237 Mitchelle's (8 April 2008; 2008) report points out that biofuels derived from sugarcane, does not 
have a dramatic impact on food prices. This is because Brazilian sugarcane production has increased 
rapidly, and sugar exports have nearly tripled since 2000. Brazil uses approximately half of its 
sugarcane to produce ethanol for domestic consumption and for export; while the other half is used to 
produce sugar. The increase in cane production has been large enough to allow sugar production to 
increase from 17.1 million tons/year to 20.6 million tons in 2007. Brazil's share of global exports 
increased from 20% in 2000 to 40% in 2007. 
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According to Matt Ware-the Policy Advisor of the National Farmers' Union: “We 
produce three million tonnes of surplus a year. Figures show that we currently have 
enough surpluses to produce 5% bioethanol” (BBC News, 18 April 2006). 
Furthermore Peter Kendall-President of the National Farmers' Union commented: 
“British farmers can meet the nation's demand for both food and fuel crops. The UK 
agricultural sector already has enough capacity to fill fuel tanks and dining tables. 3.5 
million tonnes of wheat surplus will account for the bioethanol. Using the UK's 
750,000 hectares of set aside to grow oilseed rape will comfortably take care of the 
biodiesel requirement,” (BBC News, 5 October 2006).  
 
For the benefit of the products added value, more jobs were created and prospered 
the agricultural sectors. Consequently, the 1G biofuels obtained the green light to be 
the front runner in the EU/UK. However, the reality was, during the effectuation of 
the RTFO, the empty talks of grain surpluses burst like bubble. The nation was 
awaken by the emergency call to slown down the biofuels expansion. The consumers 
realised the profit making agendas og the agricultural industry, and the effect of using 
food to burn in vehicle engines, resulted in domestic/international high food prices. 
The pressure groups began questioning whether there were there any genuine grain 
surpluses. If the answer was yes, then why just after two months of the RTFO 
implementation, did the high food prices strike the nation? The situation was further 
aggravated by evidence broadcasted by the BBC News on 22 April 2008 that the 
global price of wheat has risen by 130% during 2007 to March 2008.  
 
“Political leaders seem intent on suppressing and ignoring the strong evidence that 
biofuels are a major factor in recent food price rises. While politicians concentrate on 
keeping industry lobbies happy, people in poor countries cannot afford enough to 
eat,” said Robert Bailey-the Policy Adviser at Oxfam (Chakrabortty, 3 July 2008). 
The food markets have been distorted as we observed the profit seeking motives of 
the biofuels farmers/producers/suppliers, who have robbed the domestic/international 
food security for the sake of fulfilling biofuels’ increasing demands. Although 
sufficient/suitable land is probably available for biofuels crops growing; yet, 
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according to Gallagher (2008), the current policies have failed to ensure that 
additional production occurs in these areas. Invasion of farms and high biodiversity 
areas have happened to give way for biofuels crops.  
 
7.3.2 Institutional and Power Shift after the Systemic Risks Emerged 
The international/local communities have been awaken by the implications of the 
two systemic risks. More and more outspoken international/national/local social 
movements and environmentalists have eloquently criticised the EU/UK regulators' 
decision on the 1G biofuels adoption. They actively attacked the biofuels deployment 
process and publicised their views-which were mostly against biofuels 
implementation. With the power of their own organisational media-mainly their 
website, printed handouts and the public activities they conducted such as talks, 
seminars, campaigns and calls for demonstration238; all of these activities have been 
coordinated at different levels-from local communities, national, and up to 
international level.  
 
As well as the pressure groups making their voice heard, the UK’s domestic 
broadcasting239/print240 media were also playing a proactive role in the controversy. 
They were not only broadcasting their analysed news (from their own 
journalists/correspondents), but also cross disseminating/reporting on 
news/information/reports from the international/national social movements and 
environmentalists. They organised events like forums, made their own investigative 
TV241/radio shows and broadcasted the experts and public’s views/concerns. Both 
pressure groups and broadcasting/print media have amplified the systemic risks 
further, thereby heightening public anxiety, pressuring on the regulators/biofuels 
stakeholders, and vilifying the consequences of biofuels adoption.  
                                               
238 This could be found on a website, Biofuels Making the Climate Crisis Worse, Not Better, with 
many demonstrations and campaigns against biofuels expansion. The groups have gathered the British 
public to demonstrate in front of the UK Parliament and the Scottish Parliament. 
239 BBC, ITV Network, RTL and Channel 4 TV. 
240 Guardian, Financial Times, Telegraph, Independent and The Economist. 
241 The BBC has made a investigative documentary about biofuels titled: “The Great Green Fuel 
Gamble”, broadcasted on BBC 2, Friday, 14 March 2008.  
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To express my observation from April 2008 to September 2008: Apart from the 
existing well-known pressure groups, there were more and more local/small-
scale/new pressure groups were established (religious groups, human rights) sprung 
up like mushrooms after the rain, and they were everywhere and working like an 
army of ants. They were vocal. I read, hear and watch them in the print/internet 
media and seminars organised, mostly condemning biofuels. Biofuels ranked in the 
top ten searched topics of many search engines like Google, yahoo and MSN for 
nearly two months. I hardly heard/read any positive comments about biofuels 
through the broadcasting/print media from these pressure groups. The joint forces of 
the broadcasting/print media and the coalition amongst these pressure groups were 
powerful and vocal. Biofuels causing “food prices increased”, and “environment 
destroyed” were two of the slogans which I could hear everywhere, repetitively, and 
supported by more and more evidence as the days passed.  
 
The two systemic risks and heighten public anxiety made the R&U more 
complicated with a higher degree of uncertainty remained. According to Klinke and 
Renn (2002), to deal with risk which is highly uncertain, RM needs to incorporate 
hazard criteria, and pursue a cautious strategy that enables learning by restricted 
errors. The main philosophy for managing these R&U is to allow containment 
approach that enable risk to be stopped or the process could be reversed.  In order to 
respond to the heated biofuels controversies, a rescue work like a “fireman to put out 
fire” had taken to rectify the situation. The risk mitigation strategy-advocated by 
Dorfman (1997) is adopted to fix the flaw by providing control to mitigate the impact 
associated with the flaws.  
 
This was evidenced by the publication of the Gallagher Review (2008) (refer 
appendix 4.1.5), and the alteration of the RTFO targets242 in order to slow down 
                                               
242 The initial RTFO required the UK's transport fuel suppliers to ensure 5% of all road vehicle fuels 
supplied are from biofuels by 2010. However these targets have been modified after Ruth Kelly's 
statement broadcasted on media, which subsequently supported by the Gallagher Review published in 
July 2008-rendered the amended targets to 2.5% in 2008-2009, 3.25% in 2009-2010, 3.5% in 2010-
2011, while 5% in 2013-2014. 
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biofuels expansion. Besides, the EU/UK Governments began to emphasis the G&S 
criteria/requirements of biofuels. A more stringent biofuels “Carbon and 
Sustainability” reporting system is put in place which controlled by the RFA, in order 
to ensure that biofuels used within the UK comply with the G&S criteria of the RFA 
Meta/Qualifying standards, and to ensure higher transparency of biofuels information 
can be reported from biofuels suppliers (oil companies).  
 
Both BP and Shell responded to the governments' G&S biofuels 
production/production, by providing more detailed and higher transparent biofuels 
data when reporting to the RFA. Since the RTF certificate includes the G&S criteria 
(apart from the compliance of annual target), both companies are working to comply 
with the Meta/Qualifying standards outlined (refer appendix 7.3.2). Simultaneously, 
the organisational media owned by the regulators and the oil companies (mainly 
websites, online corporate videos and public reports 243 ) were concentrated in 
disseminating “below the line” content (refer appendix 2.7.1)-which intentionally to 
arouse more positive feelings in rebuilding public confidence/acceptance on the 
continuation of the 1G biofuels implementation after the occurrence of these two 
systemic risks. More information about the NGB R&D projects was introduced, to 
promote the G&S criteria/benefits of the NGB. 
 
The UK Government's reactions were quick, and had the desired effect of calming 
the public outrage and reassuring them as to the future of biofuels. The pressure 
groups took the RTFO targets changed as a victory which was published through 
their organisational media, and reflected in activities they organised. Although food 
prices remained high, they were at least under control, and no further price increases 
were detected (reported by the broadcasting/print media). The most important event 
that helped to cool down the controversy was the shift of the international/national 
broadcasting/print media attentions-away from biofuels to the world financial crisis, 
                                               
243 For example, the DfT report (2009a, 2009b) to highlight the importance of sustainable 
development and protecting environment that embedded within the national transport system. The DfT 




in an aftermath of Lehman Brother bankruptcy244. Since then, the strength of biofuels 
systemic risks amplification has halved. The pressure groups continue their agendas 
with the ultimate aim to abolish the grains-derived-1G biofuels, but also advocating 
more use of recyclable organic wastes, and behaviour change on personal transport 
(such as more public transport use, cycling, walking and car-sharing) while the 
broadcasting/print media were keen to follow up the global recession which has a 
higher news value.  
 
Looking at the bigger picture, these two systemic risks, not only have caused the 
subsequent biofuels implementation to be more difficult, but they have also created 
an opening for the pressure groups/media (watchdogs) to monitor on biofuels 
deployment. There was a significant institutional and power shift, whereby 
previously the authority was mainly confined to the regulators and the oil companies 
under the context of regulated market. Due to the power of the media and the 
pressure groups, their representations for general public’s socioenvironmental 
concern no longer can be ignored.  
 
Furthermore, some of the internationally recognised social movements and 
environmentalists are holding their memberships in various biofuels roundtables 
(refer appendix 7.4.1) to design biofuels G&S criteria/requirement. There was a 
substantial pressure from these social groups on the regulators, to have the G&S 
criteria on biofuels products, production and supply to be lawfully enforced. Such 
requirements not only will change the existing biofuels supply chain-by prioritising 
the socioenvironmental sustainability, but also will shape the NGB product and 
production criteria/requirements legitimately.  
 
7.3.3 Building Social/Market Acceptance on Biofuels through 
Organisational Media 
Reflecting back to the period of biofuels controversy, although the British public had 
                                               
244 16 September 2008 marked the beginning of world financial crisis 2008/10, after the Lehman 
Brother bankruptcy has been broadcasted worldwide (BBC News, 16 September 2008).  
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not seen the tangible results of deforestation/land change-as they happened in the 
developing/biofuels exporting countries; the expensive food prices has inflamed the 
public emotions. Many of the disputed issues were resulted by the media 
amplification or based on hear-say and word of mouth. Although many 
environmentalists rejected biofuels adoption, many did not adequately 
provide/suggest better solutions in reducing the GHG/CO2 emission from transport 
system.  
 
The Governments, BP and Shell did not launch a direct confrontation/media war with 
the pressure group. Strategically, they disseminated facts and the NGB information 
through their organisational media245, by corporate activities like Shell's webchat, 
and biofuels expo246. Due to the wide spread of information was largely based on 
individual and institution perceptions, a polarised view on pro-or-anti biofuels were 
rooted. The information published by the governments and the oil companies was 
perceived to be biased by some of the communities.  
 
To balance the debate, there were some independent and reputable internationally 
recognised organisations like WorldWatch Institute, The UK Royal Society, 
European Biodiesel Board, and paid subscription publishing companies like 
Nature.com and free subscription publications from Biofuels Digest (refer appendix 
7.3.3); were acting as unbiased scientifically knowledgeable broadcasters. Through 
periodical publications, they published the latest information about biofuels and 
sought to educate the general public with the latest biofuels technology and findings. 
These independent and esteemed organisations/learned societies, were acting as the 
educators by distributing the biofuels knowledge to the general public, and 
complementing publications from the oil companies and the governments. They 
provided a more comprehensive overview from the scientific angle about biofuels. 
Crucially, they do not represent any policy makers, and they are not the mouth-piece 
                                               
245 Print media like reports, or downloadable electronic reports and press releases. Electronic media 
like YouTube, websites and corporate videos. 
246 BP participated in the European Biofuels Expo and Conference 2008. Meanwhile Shell 
participated in the Biofuels International Expo & Conference 2009.   
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of the oil companies/biofuels players. The information published by them was factual 
and backed up by research. There were criticisms on the 1G biofuels, disagreements 
on government policies; yet, there were also positive messages to promote the G&S 
criteria of the NGB. Therefore information/publications from these organisations 
were balance and carried more weight for validity and reliability. From these 
scientifically enriched publications, the public could gain more information and to 
understand the debate further, rather than relied on the simplistic opinionated 
publications issued from a pro/anti biofuels.  
 
7.3.4 Empirical Suggestion for Social Shaping Technological Related 
Risk  
It is acknowledged that there are different approaches to the concept of risk (refer 
literature table 2.5.1). Although Denney (2005) has made a comparative study 
amongst these theoretical positions of risk, the concepts mainly contribute to the 
understanding of the definitions, classifications and types of risks. The richness of 
social construction of risk is centralised on the role of actors and cultural influences, 
which is in the construction of their perceived risk reality. Denney (2005) explain, 
the socially constructed risk advocates that the “risk perceptions” are socially 
constructed, while the pervasiveness of the risk consequences is takes place through 
social interaction. Therefore, what seem less obvious are the causal factors which 
result in technological related R&U. 
 
The conventional causal factors of technological risk mainly criticise the 
mismanagement247 of stakeholders, either intentionally/unintentionally violated the 
safety factors at design, testing, execution process, R&D and disposal which caused 
R&U to happen (Girmvall et al., 2009; Evan and Manion, 2002). Meanwhile, this 
research points out, both the systemic risks which stemmed from mismanagement248 
                                               
247 careless, mistakes, intended sabotage, irresponsible attitude, unqualified, beyond the capability of 
planning/forecasting and lack of preventative actions. 
248 Some evidence for mismanagement (refer 7.3.1b,c,d) show that, there was an inadequate 
assessment of socioenvironmental consequences, and disregarded the issue of locality and imbalance 
between agricultural capacity against global biofuels demands.  
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and the stakeholders' interests249. Apart from the interests of the regulators and the 
biofuels players250, the pressure groups emerged have also manifested their interests 
to lobby for socioenvironmental safeguards. The activities they organised and the 
information broadcasted through media, have amplified the systemic risks further 
which caused more public anxiety. Despite the fact that, the requirements to enforce 
biofuels G&S criteria strictly could protect the socioenvironmental benefits, these 
new understanding has put added pressure on the regulators/biofuels players to 
deliver the G&S compliance, and consequently has increased the costs of policy and 
management actions.  
 
The findings of various stakeholders' interests in shaping technological related R&U 
is an extended understanding from SST. In this respect, there are strong resonances 
between SST and Social Shaping Technological Risk (SSTR). SST refutes that 
technology is developed according to an inner technical logic. Instead, technology is 
a social product, which is patterned by the conditions of its creation and use 
(Williams and Edge, 1996). Extended to SSTR, since technology is a social product, 
the technological risk does not develop from a technical logic. Instead it is 
shaped/influenced by intricate social forces and the social network involved. Thus 
SSTR explains “how” and “why” the R&U could occur during the technology 
design, adoption, operation, innovation and termination, which these activities are 
parallel to SST processes.  
 
As such, to analyse SSTR means to analyse the influence of organisational, political, 
economic, social and technology in shaping risk. SSTR means identifying different 
types of risks251 through different theoretical positions; at every stage252 of a new 
technology, asking what are their causal factors resulting in such risk occurrence. 
                                               
249 Refer 7.3.1 a and e. They explain the regulators' political rush and biofuels 
farmers/producers/suppliers profit maximisation, have the agricultural limits been overly stretched.  
250  biofuels farmers, biofuels producers, biofuels suppliers and biofuels traders. 
251 From risk characterisation and evaluation to identify whether: individual/large-scale (systemic) 
risks; expected (low uncertainty)/unexpected (high uncertainty) risks; acceptable/tolerable/intolerable 
risk (HSE, 2001); linear/complex risk. 
252 the design, adoption, operation/implementation, innovation/development and termination. 
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Thus, we may use the label of SSTR to designate an alternative approach to the risk 
study, and signify a set of counteracting strategies that share the following sets of 
assumption and concern: 
(i)  SSTR explores the social processes relating to different types of risk generation. 
(ii) Negotiations, interactions and decision-making processes among different social 
groups (actors) are a focal point, emphasising concepts like varied interpretations of 
risk253 , with their perceptions, respective interests which produce R&U, and the 
counteracting strategies. This is where the risk governance analysis from Renn 
(2008a) is required.  
 
7.3.5 Empirical Suggestions for Converged Regulator and Public Risk 
Perceptions 
According to Sjoberg and Drottz-Sjoberg (2008), the regulators and the public’s risk 
perceptions are varied across a range of different risks studied. Normally, the general 
public perceives a greater risk than the regulator (refer literature 2.7.4). Examining 
the systemic risks created through the 1G biofuels implementation, the research 
points out that, the risk perceptions were different between governments and the 
public. This was mainly due to each of their own perceived risk, and not the risk they 
estimated others to perceive. The governments tended to base on their policy attitude. 
They feared the failure to achieve the mandatory GHG/CO2 reduction targets and 
biofuels targets; but not the views that the public had fears of food security and 
ecology protection. The regulators believed that they had the mechanisms instituted 
(messages projected through respective EU/UK biofuels policies), to facilitate 
biofuels deployment whereby most of the anticipated R&U were within control. 
Furthermore, the regulators perceived the benefits 254  that arise from biofuels 
adoption. However, after the systemic risks arouse, the public did not buy in these 
benefits, when the traded-off were high food prices and a destroyed ecology. In the 
end, pressured by social groups, the regulators and the public risk perceptions were 
                                               
253 Constructivism/realism of risk; interpretive/normative ambiguity (Renn, 2008); decision 
makers/stakeholders versus public risks perceptions (Sjoberg, and Drottz-Sjoberg 2008). 




finally converged. The regulators priorities were found to match those of the public 
and the pressure groups concerning the enforcement of the G&S biofuels products, 
production and supply. Yet, we have seen a delayed in such risk perceptions 
convergence, which should have happened earlier, in order to reduce the damage 
cause by the systemic risks, or it may have avoided them from happening.  
 
In order to have the converged risk perceptions built earlier, risk governance 
advocated by Renn (2008) is helpful. A pre-assessment to obtain public 
opinions/responses should be made in any stages along the decision-making and 
decision-execution process by the regulators. According to Renn (2008b), this could 
help to learn about public values/concerns, in order to detect new/emerging R&U 
while to provide some initial insight into the extent/severity of these R&U. The risk 
information collected from the assessment could be pre-screened and allocated to 
different management routes. Even though we could not expect both the public and 
the regulator's risk perceptions would come together at the early stage; listening to 
the public worries 255  and establishing risk communication 256  channels (two-way 
communication) would be highly recommended. This is to avoid the disparity 
between the regulator's and the public’s risk perceptions, which subsequently could 
avoid the emergence of unexpected R&U. In fact, the core responsibility for the 
regulator is to safeguard the socioeconomic and socioenvironmental benefits for its 
general public under the public order. Any political decision made to enact policy 
formulation/execution has to be based on that rule of thumb. After years of stressing 
the need/benefits257 for two-way communication; yet, this practice has still not been 
widely implemented. From this research, it seems to fit in the belief that, the biofuels 
policy had been determined in advance among the regulators and the biofuels 
                                               
255 getting information from broadcasting/print media, discussing with the social 
movements/environmentalists, conducting a public survey before the commencement of biofuels.  
256 Set up a platform like interactive homepage which allows the public to leave 
comments/feedbacks, a telephone hotline, campaigns to answer public queries, or collecting public 
opinions through survey.   
257 The benefit of two-way communication (between the general public and the regulators), 
according to OECD (2002), is to build up a mutual trust by responding to the concerns of the public 
and the relevant stakeholders. Besides, this could also assist the stakeholders to understand the 
rationales of risk assessed results, and to arrive at a balanced judgement that reflects the factual 
evidence about the matter in hand with relation to their own interests and values. 
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players, regardless of any public participation. This missing gap between the 
regulators and the public was one of the cracks which allowed the systemic risks to 
be slipped in. Therefore, the research highlights, it is improper if public views/values 
have not been taken into account within the political processes of decision-making 
and decision-execution.  
 
7.3.6 Empirical Suggestions for Public Interest Prioritisation 
Biofuels mean differently to different stakeholders involved-as they perceive biofuels 
from the respective knowledge and interests. Due to the different interpretations, 
which are then being conceptualised as different values and purposes; all these varied 
values result in some stakeholders being into agreement while some end up with 
conflicting interests. This is where the R&U might arise. Table 7.3.1 (advocated by 
Fischer 2004, refer appendix 2.7.3) illustrates the differing opinions taken by 
protagonists in the debate on biofuels adoption.  
 
Table 7.3.1: Different Standpoints on Biofuels Discourse 
Underpinning logic  
behind position taken 
Types of biofuels discourses 
Ideological Choice  
(Because of) 
Environmentalists/Social Movements: Irresponsible manipulation of nature for 
corporate profit and political gains, with evidential food-fuel competition and 
biodiversity threatened. Short-term effects-two systemic risks have spoken. Call 
for stringent G&S biofuels criteria to be legally enforced on biofuels products, 
production and supply; as well as extend the criteria to the NGB, in order to 
ensure the two systemic risks are resolved once and for all. 
Systems Vindication 
(Because of) 
Industry economists, oil companies, biofuels farmers/producers/traders/suppliers 
and biotechnology experts: A renewable criterion of biofuels is attractive. Biofuels 
help to increase the overall fuel supply towards fuel security (to fulfil an 
increasing demand since oil is a depleting resources), reverse the damage from 
climate change through road transport GHG/CO2 reductions and generate a wealth 
creation for agricultural sectors. Biotechnology should be seen as part of energy 
and environmental modernisation. The NGB which is green and sustainable would 
be developed through biotechnology. 
Situational Validation 
(Because of) 
Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs experts assured the aspects 
of biofuels introduction from domestic agricultural industry which correlates with 
the wealth creating opportunity for the economic growth. Besides, Department for 
Transport aims to cut the GHG/CO2 emission from road transport system. The 
RTFO targets are bottoms-up biofuels blends targets, mandatory require annually-
increasing-targets from 2.5% in 2008/9 to 5% in 2013/14.   
Warrant 
(since)  
Risk Analysts (before biofuels commencement): Guided by EU Biofuels 
Standards for existing ICEs adoption. No harmful effects are found due to high 
compatibility of biofuels with hydrocarbon on the infrastructure (oil companies), 
ICEs (automobile users), efficient for cutting GHG/CO2 on road. Besides, the 
292 
 
warranty provided by automobile manufacturers gave a confidence boost for 
automobile users in adopting biofuels. 
Risk Analysts (during biofuels deployment): Gallagher Review (2008) concludes 
that, the UK should not abandon biofuels as part of the low-carbon transport fuels. 
However, the G&S of biofuels criteria have to be facilitated for product, 
production and supply through oil companies/biofuels suppliers. Consequently, 
the monthly “Carbon and Sustainability” reporting system that managed by the 
RFA continues to emphasis on a higher transparency of biofuels data from the 
suppliers, while stringent G&S criteria have been gradually imposed. The biofuels 
targets have to be altered, which postpone 5% to 2013/2014 instead of 2010. 
Source: Modified from Fischer (2004) by the researcher  
 
This research points out that the environmentalists/social movements took an 
ideological standpoint which rejected the 1G biofuels for the reasons of 
socioenvironmental protection. The industrial economists, oil companies, biofuels 
players and biotechnology experts vindicated the benefits that biofuels may accrue. 
Departmental experts assured the positive aspects of biofuels introduction from an 
agricultural aspect-job creation, value added on agricultural products, as well as 
GHG/CO2 reductions from road transport. Risk Analysts viewed the problem/risk as 
an issue of execution, measurement of the risk and an assessment of whether the risk 
level is acceptable, therefore biofuels deployment continuous.  
 
As evidenced before biofuels commencement, the regulators decisions were largely 
influenced by the interest/pressure groups. Initially, the business interest groups (the 
oil companies, the risk analysts and the biofuels players) influenced the regulators to 
commence the 1G biofuels. However, after the two systemic risks occurred, the 
pressure groups (the international/national environmentalists and social movements) 
emerged. Their interpretations/perceptions on the systemic risks were in conflict with 
the regulators and the business lobbyists. Therefore, this scenario matched the theory 
advocated by Self (1985), Wilson (1990), Hood et al. (2004b), whereby the 
government's response is driven by interest/pressure groups (refer literature section 
2.7.3c). The difference between these individuals was not the estimates of the risks, 
but the values and belief systems, there were dissonant amongst the protagonists. It is 
frequently the case that there is hardly a unanimous agreement achieved among the 
different parties. According to Jaeger et al., (2001), when decision 
makers/stakeholders face with weighing collective/private benefits that impose risks 
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on public, this would create an inequitable situation.  
 
However, regardless of the different stakeholders with different standpoints, there 
always should be a prioritisation, particularly in large social technical system, which 
is associated with public general welfare. Apart from fulfilling each of the 
stakeholders' interests, the ultimate objective in any economic welfare project 
economic like biofuels introduction is to safeguard the general public interests on 
social, economic and environmental benefits. Any self-inferential conflicts, should 
give way to the public interest. Arguably, either at one extreme, a decision has to 
benefit “every member” of the society to be truly in the public interest; or at the other 
extreme, as long as it benefits the population at large. The bottom line is, at least full 
rational considerations have to be made for those who are vulnerable and those are 
living in poverty. Biofuels should not cause the expensive food prices that affected 
the poor and led them to hunger. Equally, biofuels should not destroy the ecology, 
where vulnerable flora and fauna living as their home.  
 
7.4 Social Shaping the Next Generation Biofuels 
Although biofuels are operating under the regulated market, this setting is not a 
close/isolated context. Apart from the regulators/oil companies involvements, their 
decisions made on biofuels deployment is also being monitored by the 
international/local pressure groups. After the emergence of two systemic risks, the 
representation of the local pressure groups in the British public was growing 
gradually and being strengthened significantly. There was a substantial institutional 
and power shift (as discussed in 7.3.2), with a new demand to pressurise the UK 
Government on the G&S criteria enforcement of the biofuels product, production and 
supply in the domestic market.  
 
The UK Government and the oil companies learned that, if the G&S criteria had not 
been instituted and enforced, the objections from these pressure groups/media would 
be endless. Besides, the public pressure which had been projected through 
broadcasting/print media and the pressure groups' campaigns had been forceful and 
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vocal. If the government was perceived not taken any action within a reasonable 
time, then the public's anxiety may have been heightened. A sense of crisis could 
have developed and would have taken on its own momentum, which could have 
resulted in the termination of biofuels adoption. This would have a seriously negative 
consequence for the government, and the oil companies who have invested heavily in 
the NGB development. From the viewpoint of public order and corporate social 
responsibility, the government and the oil companies would hope that their rapid 
response would allay the public tension in order to protect their reputations.   
 
Consequently, the assessment of biofuels deployment has changed. The regulatory 
concentration which initially focused at achieving various mandatory targets has 
been slowed down, to allow biofuels implementation to continue under a set of 
newly altered RTFO targets. Stringent G&S criteria on biofuels are legally enforced, 
through higher transparency of biofuels data requirements (guided by the 
Meta/Qualifying standards) which are reported monthly by the oil 
companies/biofuels suppliers to the RFA. The G&S message gradually appeared 
across regional/national for the updated/altered policies. The RFA has set stringent 
G&S criteria as one of the requirements to award its RTF certificate to the qualified 
biofuels suppliers who can prove that their biofuels are G&S in products, production 
and supply. Subsequently, a new trend is shaped, which kept emphasising at the G&S 
criteria on biofuels product, production activities along the value chain and supply. 
These new inputs have also constructed a new landscape for the existing biofuels 
deployment and the NGB development. 
 
Reflecting on the UK Government's decision to alter the RTFO targets in 2008, it 
was merely a “treatment” for the two systemic risks, to slow down biofuels 
expansion, and to enforce the biofuels supplied under a stricter regulatory control. 
However, this treatment still cannot ensure that these two systemic risks will not 
arise again. As long as the food-derived-1G biofuels is still in use, there is still a 
possibility of food-fuel tension and biodiversity damaged to reoccurred. Therefore, a 
better technology (the NGB) with robust G&S criteria is needed.  
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The NGB technology once developed, not only could shift biofuels away entirely 
from the food chain, but also could be grown on idle land/sea. These benefits have 
provided some positive solutions to prevent the reoccurrence of systemic risks. 
Besides, there is a prospect of achieving a long-term sustainability from the NGB, 
which would allow the fulfilment of the respective motivations 258  of both the 
regulators and the oil companies.  
 
7.4.1 Social Shaping Nine Criteria/Requirements for the Next Generation 
Biofuels 
This research points out, to date, the NGB has nine criteria/requirements-that have 
been contributed by the respective stakeholders, that involve the mixture of public, 
private and semi-public organisations as shown in Table 7.4.1 and Model 2.  
Table 7.4.1: Nine Criteria/Requirements of the NGB  
Criteria/Requirements of the NGB Required by 
1. Consistent supply to fulfil regional/national 
mandatory targets 
Regional/national regulators  
2. Non-food 
3. Environmentally green for social and environmental 
benefits 
Pressure groups, environmentalists, social 
movements, biofuels roundtables and regulators; 
all emphasis the G&S requirements on biofuels 
product, production and supply 4. Lower carbon footprint  (activities along biofuels production and supply chain) 
5. Higher yields  
6. High efficiency of conversion process  
7. Higher performance: better fuel efficiency, greater 
engine performance 
Oil companies 
8. Lower production costs  
9. Quicker tangible results  
Source: Summarised by the researcher  
 
According to Rip and Schot (2002), innovation starts with the identification of a 
technological opportunity, a new option/solution for an existing problem. Such 
options may derive from R&D findings which justifies why the NGB is under 
development. Since innovation is an uncertain process, it is not just a rational-
technical problem-solving process; but it also involves social, economic and political 
                                               
258 explained under the three respective driving forces at 7.1.1 and 7.1.2. 
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processes in building alliances of interests amongst all stakeholders; with the 
resources and technical expertise around certain concepts/visions, and as an 
unrealised technology for the point of future application (Williams and Edge, 1996) 
(refer literature 2.2.4).   
 
These nine criteria/requirements seem have provided a set of clearer and a more 
certaint yardstick for the NGB development. They have a few objectives: Firstly, 
solving the limitations/weaknesses of the 1G biofuels. Secondly, adopting new inputs 
which were learned from the emergence of two systemic risks. Thirdly, respective 
interests on respective stakeholders259 are found. These social actors are influencing 
the content of the NGB technology and its social implications. Meanwhile the 
development process involves the collaboration among these stakeholders through 
inter-organisational interaction which is patterned by various social factors: political, 
social, institutional, economic and environmental.   
 
During the process to develop these nine criteria/requirements, different types of 
mechanisms (encouragement 260 , control 261  and preventive 262 ) are used by the 
stakeholders involved, in order to affect the final decision, so that it matches their 
own perceived interests. The democratisation of these decisions is to combine the 
external interests-socioeconomic benefits, and the respective internal interests by 
reflecting the self referential aspects.  
 
                                               
259 The regional/national governments' political interest to achieve mandatory targets; the pressure 
groups, biofuels roundtables, environmentalists and social movement agenda to safeguard the 
socioenvironmental benefits, and the oil companies' motivation for the economies of scale. 
260 In April 2010, the UK Government started rewarding biofuels (through incentives) supplied under 
the RTFO based on the amount of carbon the fuel saves. This will be subject to compatibility with the 
EU and the WTO requirements. Then April 2011, the government rewards (through incentives) 
biofuels which they meet all the sustainability standards outlined by the RFA and respective 
roundtables (RTFO, 2008). 
261 Regional/national mandatory targets as one of the measurements, to control biofuels 
implementation. 
262 Non-food biofuels and G&S biofuels product/production. G&S criteria have been specified in the 
rules and regulations under the RFA, controlled by the RTF certificate, after being deemed as one of 
the core criteria at respective roundtables. This is to prevent the reoccurrence of two systemic risks 
that arose in 2008.  
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7.4.2 Nine Criteria/Requirements for the Next Generation Biofuels 
Development  
Model 2: Social Shaping Nine Criteria/Requirements for the NGB 
Development  
Source: Summarised by the researcher 
 
(1) The regional/national biofuels demands will follow an exponential growth for 
many years to come, as guided by the EUBD (2003) and the RTFO (2008) 
mandatory targets. Since the EURED (2009) requires 10% of energy used in 
transport to be renewable by 2020, this target would also count in biofuels as one of 
the RE profiles for transport use. Therefore, consistency of biofuels supply is vital, in 
order to ensure that these political mandates will be achieved within the defined 
period. 
 
(2) Since the 1G biofuels is largely derived from food, the food-fuel competition has 
caused food prices increased dramatically. To avoid this from reoccurring, the NGB 
feedstocks have to be switch entirely away from the food chain. Therefore, the NGB 
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feedstocks could be sourced from industrial/household wastes 263  and non-food 
vegetations264.  
 
(3) To stop the ecological deterioration and invasion on food farms, the NGB 
feedstocks farming must be able to safeguard the socioenvironmental benefits and 
minimise the negative impacts on land and water use. These include: 
i. Feedstocks which require minimum/no agrochemicals/fertilisers use to minimise 
land pollution.  
ii. Feedstocks which do not grown/produced from high biodiversity areas (jungles, 
forests, wetlands and preserved areas).  
iii. Feedstocks which do not create land competition between farms and biofuels 
plantations 
iv. Feedstocks which have lower water footprint, do not put added pressure on fresh 
water use and could be grown under natural irrigation.  
v. Plantation/production plant which do not employ forced labours or child labours.  
 
These criteria have been established by all the biofuels roundtables 265  (refer 
Appendix 7.4.1). The roundtables' P&C are acting as the control/preventive 
mechanisms, in order to ensure biofuels supplied are G&S. The P&C correlate to 
front-line people such as farmers, producers, traders do on the ground through the 
activities of growing feedstocks, manufacturing biofuels and trading.  
 
(4) The lower carbon footprint of biofuels is emphasised by four roundtables, on the 
ground of good agricultural practice266. According to respective roundtables, it is 
scientifically proven if a good agricultural practice (energy saving and environmental 
                                               
263 used cooking oil, animal tallow and agricultural/forest residues. 
264 energy grasses (miscanthus, switchgrass), non-food oil seeds (jatropha) and also algae. 
265 Up to date, there are four biofuels roundtables: Roundtable for Sustainable Biofuels (RSB), 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), the Roundtable for Responsible Soy (RTRS) and the 
Better Sugarcane Initiative (BSI).  
266 minimising energy input on production activities; low fertiliser/agro-chemical use; low water 
footprint; no high biodiversity lands are converted for biofuels plantations; and choosing feedstocks 
which portray a sustainable criteria for low energy demand. 
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responsible) are implemented, the activities along the biofuels value chain267 could 
result in low-carbon emission. This is because, each activity requires energy. The 
amount of energy input determines the amount of carbon emission.  
 
However, there is not universally true for all biofuels types, and carbon reduction 
from biofuels may vary depends on the feedstocks grown. Some feedstocks could 
produce a higher yield naturally which portray the sustainable 268  criteria, while 
others would require a higher energy input (fertiliser, agrochemical). Therefore, 
highly energy efficient fuel crops, well-planned land use and well-managed activities 
are playing their part in the biofuels carbon equation. If the activities can be managed 
well by employing the good agriculture practice and integrate to minimise the CO2 
release, these sum up would have a significant G&S biofuels products, production 
and supply.  
 
(5) Some of the feedstocks can produce a higher yield naturally. Yet, the natural 
capability is also affected by geographical factors such as: climate/weather, soil 
types, nutrients and water supply. One of the aims for the NGB R&D is to seek for 
higher yield feedstocks that can produce more biodiesel/bioalcohol269, yet at a lower 
cost (refer appendix 7.4.3). 
 
(6) The existing processes used for bioethanol (fermentation) and biodiesel 
(transesterification) production are extended from the conventional technologies used 
for wine/beer production and the synthesis of polyester respectively. The major 
weaknesses of these two processes: they are time consuming, suitable for 
small/medium scale production, and can only deal with simple inputs like 
                                               
267 The activities begin from seeding, fertilising, irrigating, growing the feedstocks, harvesting, 
transporting to the production plant, manufacturing into biofuels, transporting for trades and finally 
supplying through the distribution system.  
268 Sustainable feedstock, according to BP's definition is a feedstock that is produced in a way that 
conserves an ecological balance by avoiding depletion of natural resources (BP, 2006a). Refer 
appendix 7.4.2. For example Brazilian sugarcane has 90% of carbon saving from farm-to-wheel, when 
compares with petrol from well-to-wheel basis. It requires no fertiliser, less transportation where the 
processing plant is located near to the plantation, and the production plant reuses the by product 
(bagasse) to power the production (Worldwatch, 2008). 
269 with the unit of feedstock measurement in “litre per hectare” (L/ha).  
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starch/sugar or fat.  
 
Since the NGB cannot be extracted from the food chain, the input for bioethanol 
must not be from fruit (corn), instead the other parts of a crop (stem or leaves). The 
complex sugar found from the stem/leaves (lignocellulosic) requires a greater 
efficiency of conversion process, which has challenged the existing fermentation and 
transesterification technologies. Hence, the applications of super enzymes, new 
catalyst and a cutting edge production technology capable of producing higher 
quantities of biofuels (from lignocellulosic)270 are required.  
 
(7) Better fuel efficiency and greater fuel performance are the objectives to enhance 
the current performances of the 1G biofuels, by solving its limitations/weaknesses 
through the NGB R&D. First, there are three weaknesses271 on bioethanol (refer 
appendix 7.1.2a) which have captured the oil companies' attentions. Through 
R&D272, BP and Shell aim to breakthrough these limitations. Next, for biodiesel, one 
major problem is its strong solvent properties on the existing ICEs' (refer appendix 
7.1.2b). To date, BP273 and Shell274 each has two NGB R&D projects that aim to 
break through the solvent properties. 
 
(8) Economies of scale would be achieved if biofuels could be produced in a larger 
quantity with a lower cost. This could be achieved after taking into consideration of 
maximising the biofuels outputs and minimising costs/energy/inputs for each of the 
activities involved along the biofuels value chain.  
                                               
270 The current examples are: wheat straw to bioethanol (Shell-Iogen), biomass to liquid (Shell-
Choren), sugar to biogasoline (Shell-Virent), photosynthesis bacterium to produce biodiesel (BP-
Arizona State University) and sugar to biodiesel (BP-Martek). 
271 Low heating values, low energy content-bioethanol accounts only 2/3 of gasoline energy content, 
and high water affinity.  
272 BP JV with DuPont researching on biobutanol, while Shell joint R&D with Virent to convert 
sugar to biogasoline- which has some similarities of petrol. Both biobutanol and biogasoline will 
demonstrate better performance than existing bioethanol, with higher energy content, higher heating 
values and lower water affinity. 
273 BP funds Arizona State University to conduct bacterium produced biodiesel. BP joint 
development with Martek to convert sugar into biodiesel. 
274 Shell JV with Choren for biomass to liquid (BTL) conversion into biodiesel. Shell JV with HR 
Biopetroleum for the 3G algae towards biodiesel production.  
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The identification (through R&D) of naturally high yield crops which can be grown 
in areas of low economic activities (idle/marginal land), would contribute to a higher 
quantity of biofuels produced, yet, with lower costs of land/resources use. Crops like 
miscanthus and switchgrass275, sugarcane276, jatropha277 and algae278, are not only in 
high-yield naturally, but also require low energy for growing. They do not require 
additional fertilising and they have low water footprint.  
 
If a plant is located nearer to the plantation, the transportation costs would be 
reduced. Besides, like Brazilian sugarcane, if by-product (like bagasse) is used to 
power the production process, this could help to cut down the energy cost 
significantly. Furthermore, the research on super enzymes, new catalysts and cutting 
edge production technology, are contributing to speed up the manufacturing process 
and to produce biofuels cost effectively.  
 
What we can observe from this, although while some of the activities are largely 
dependent upon a good agricultural practice and machineries application (for 
seeding, harvesting, and transportation); some activities could be boosted by new 
technology developed through R&D, which can contribute to higher economies of 
scale. 
 
(9) Since the NGB technology is anticipated to be commercially available five-to-ten 
years from 2008, the biofuels market is awaiting a pioneering breakthrough from one 
of the leading oil companies to produce the tangible and reliable NGB results in the 
fastest time. The pioneer status is important for any oil companies operating within 
an oligopolistic market structure; as this status would subsequently secure a lucrative 
long-term business prospect, helping the oil company to conquer the untapped 
biofuels market as soon as possible. 
                                               
275 Perennial grasses require low fertiliser and agrochemical, and can be grown on set-aside land.  
276 In Brazil, the sugarcane residue (bagasse), is used to generate heat and electricity to power the 
production plant, thereby making the manufacturing process more cost effective and more 
environmentally friendly  (Knott, 2007; BP, 2007a). 
277 jatropha is drought resistant, which can be grown on marginal land. 
278 algae is cultivated through sea-farming, which would not put added pressure on land/water use. 
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7.4.3 Basic Features of Nine Criteria/Requirements for the Next 
Generation Biofuels  
There are three basic features of these nine criteria/requirements. Firstly, they are 
fabricated through the determinate process of technological design, expectations and 
lessons learnt from the 1G biofuels trials/explorations. We could see them as the 
collective decisions, resulting from the interactions among the various stakeholders, 
rather than as a single cell decision.  
 
These nine criteria/requirements have been portrayed as the prerequisites for the 
NGB development. They converge each of the stakeholders' interests279 which have 
been incorporated to achieve the goal of getting the NGB technology to work in a 
useful/practical way for future application. They are the guidelines for biofuels the 
industrial players and the policy makers. This has shifted the existing concentration 
from being solely to achieve targets (quantity driven) as the ultimate objective, to a 
more G&S biofuels as the new parameters (quality oriented) to measure and control 
biofuels products, production and supply. Currently, these nine criteria/requirements 
are being simplified to keep the overall picture manageable, and being classified to 
characterise activities: science/technology, market/society, environmental/economic 
and regulation. As a result, each of them works harmoniously in terms of 
intermediaries and interactions by various stakeholders.  
 
Next, these nine criteria/requirements are entities that have some degree of continuity 
over time. They do not appear as completely static or to be set in stone. This then 
complies with the nature of technological innovation, which is dynamic, evolving; 
and there are always debates about the direction of the NGB technology during its 
development. We would expect some continual reassessment from the 1G biofuels 
deployment, which the feedbacks will contribute to the expansion and more the G&S 
criteria to be fitted in the NGB development. If this situation takes place, we would 
anticipate some sudden climacterics changes, as well as incremental adjustments and 
steady trend. The dynamism and evolution will be due to either some minor 
                                               
279 needs, requirements, interests, values, goals, targets and guidelines. 
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adjustment in one of the nine criteria content, or will be an extra item/new input to be 
added which caused a step-change in the context. The rule of thumb is, technology, 
once developed and implemented, not only will react back upon their environments, 
but will also generate new implications (Clark and Staunton,1989;  Fleck, 1993) 
(refer literature 2.2.3.1). Therefore, it is important to enrich the innovation journey, 
by anticipations and social feedback. As Rip and Schot (2002) suggest, the 
anticipations of outcomes, including impacts of the technology on society must be an 
ongoing concern, rather than ad-hoc efforts to persuade the stakeholders within the 
dynamics of such developments in context (refer literature 2.2.4). The learning made 
possible through scenarios, is especially important for any development stages of the 
NGB.  
 
Thirdly, these nine criteria/requirements are seen as relatively bounded context that 
can be specified at different levels of breadth. While it could be described from an 
international perspective for the biofuels cross-borders trades; we can also conceive 
the context in a narrower sense as the system of control that centres at national/local 
level. This is particularly important for biofuels farming/exporting countries, in order 
to safeguard the local socioenvironmental impacts and maintaining the G&S criteria 
by “thinking globally and acting locally”. 
 
7.5 The Scottish Government and the Oil Companies in the Next 
Generation Biofuels Development  
Compared with the UK Government, the SG demonstrates a more progressive effort 
in the NGB development under the Devolved Matters. It has established some 
pioneering works, like the UK first biodiesel plant and the UK first biofuels research 
centre. There are other ongoing R&D projects to foster the NGB development in 
Scotland.  
 
The SG’s work has been discussed in section 4.2.2. There are obvious different 
affinities (reflected from the respective policies), where the UK Government favours 
H2/electricity as the REfT, while the SG prefers biofuels. Meanwhile, both BP and 
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Shell have a large transport fuels market share in the UK. BP has more than 1300 
kiosks (BP, 2010d) and Shell has more than 900 kiosks (Shell, 23 November 2009). 
Besides, BP and Shell are two of the world’s six oil companies which are currently 
embarking on the NGB research (refer appendix 7.1.1). Their progressive effort into 
the NGB R&D since 2003 and 2002 respectively, demonstrates their early 
involvement in the NGB development in building up their pioneer status.  
 
Looking at the nine criteria/requirements (discussed in section 7.4.1), there are three 
motivations for the SG and the oil companies to pursue the G&S NGB development. 
Firstly, the regional/national political mandates are demanding a consistent biofuels 
supply, in order to ensure these mandatory targets could be achieved. The NGB, 
which could be produced in larger/consistent quantities, would support the execution 
of these regional/national targets.  
 
Secondly, the economic interests of the SG in creating national wealth, through green 
economy activities and the profit making objective of BP and Shell. Their venture 
into the NGB development also builds up the national/corporate core competency by 
pioneering the untapped NGB global/domestic market. As such, the economies of 
scale of the NGB could be achieved by new feedstocks and novel process 
technologies. 
 
Thirdly, based on the EU/UK regulatory requirements, and pressure from the 
international/local pressure groups, the NGB must be switched away entirely from 
the food chain and be G&S. After the emergence of two systemic risks, the 
international/domestic community realised the importance of the G&S biofuels 
adoption. Therefore, the general public subsequently demanded the corporate social 
responsibility, as well as the accountability of public governance in protecting 
socioenvironmental benefits. Furthermore the P&C advocated by respective 
roundtables are promoting good agricultural practices, in order to ensure that every 
activity along biofuels value chain is properly managed and to achieve a lower 
carbon footprint. The NGB would be sourced from sustainable non-food crops, 
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grown on marginal lands and require a lower energy input all of these could 
safeguard the international/national socioenvironmental objectives. 
 
7.5.1 Expected Risk and Uncertainty Faced by Governments and Oil 
Companies during the Next Generation Biofuels Development 
Since the expected R&U have multitude dimensions, the divisions of R&U which are 
faced by the regulators and the oil companies, could separate the overlapping of 
R&U and contextualise them accordingly. The nine criteria/requirements of the 
NGB, and mechanisms put in place (discussed at 7.4.1), not only helped to deliver 
the anticipated results of the NGB, but they were also characterised by the risk 
preventive objectives, to mitigate the expected R&U for the ease of the NGB 
deployment.  
 
Elliott (2003d) advocates a set of expected R&U from the regulators'280 perspective 
on RE development, along with the strategies applied (as summarised in table 2.3.1 
and 2.3.2). Besides, there are three281 expected R&U from the corporate perspective 
on technology development, advocated by Rosenbloom and Kantrow (1982), Pearson 
(1991), Rosenberg (1994) and the SpecialChem (2011) report with the counteracting 
strategies (as summarised in table 2.4.1). This research utilised these frameworks to 










                                               
280 1Political support, 2funding, 3social acceptance, 4technology, 5institutional interests and 
involvements.  
281 1Technology, 2business operations and 3social acceptance. 
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Table 7.5.1: Risk and Uncertainty and Strategies Applied by Regulator during 
the NGB Development  
Types of R&U Findings  Strategies adopted  
Political supports: 





1. The SG has a strong 




biofuels policies.   
 
1. Strong political support from the EUBD (2003), 
the UK RTFO (2008) and the EURED (2009), are 
helping biofuels to claim a larger share as one of the 
profiles under the REfT. The SG has formulated the 
Renewable Action Plan (2009), taking in the NGB as 
one of the focuses for the RE development.  
These policies are building biofuels into a long-term 
business prospect, which ensured a high confidence 
level of various private sectors on their respective 
investments (oil companies, biotechnology 
institutions, agricultural industry, biofuels 
producers/traders/suppliers). The SG showed its 
progressive efforts in the NGB development. 
Evidenced by tangible results:  Construction of 
Argent Energy Plant (the first in the UK); 
establishment of a Biofuels Research Centre at 
Napier University (the first in the UK); and a 








1. Inevitably, the NGB 
R&D projects are time 
consuming and require 
enormous capital and 
resources. However, 
the NGB R&D 
projects are running 
independently, funded 
by the SG and the oil 
companies separately.     
 
1. The ongoing NGB R&D projects are working in 
parallel, but are separately funded by two different 
investors: the regulators and the private sector. 
Hence, there is no reliance by the private sector on 
government fund as the previous RE projects did-
and as a result which were mostly failed in the UK. 
At the political level, the combined financial strength 
from the EU/UK/SG funding resulted in the 
completion of Argent plant and supporting the 
ongoing Biomara project in Oban. Meanwhile, BP 
and Shell have pooled the resources from their 
partners, to conduct the NGB R&D projects.   
Social acceptance: 














1. Right time and right 
scenario on combating 
climate change, green 
economy evolution 
and to avoid the 









1. Biofuels development is set at the right time with 
right political, social, economic and environmental 
climate. The contemporary international attention is 
to avoid the occurrence of the two systemic risks by 
stressing the G&S of biofuels; to combat climate 
change through road transport GHG/CO2 reduction; 
and to achieve energy security. Mean while some 
countries are working intensively to switch centuries 








resulting in the 
low appreciation 
of the NGB 
technology.  
2. Accurate 
information from the 
reliable organisational 
media, websites and 
reports. 
2. The G&S criteria of the NGB are promoted 
through governments', oil companies' and 
independent institutions' organisational media. The 
political message “prioritisation on the G&S 
biofuels” appeared mostly across regional/national 
biofuels policies. Besides, the benefits of the NGB to 
counter-solving the limitations of the 1G biofuels 
(derived from food, threatening biodiversity) are 
published by oil companies/independent institutions 






1. Not understand 
the technical 









2. Unrealistic high 
expectations upon 
















3. Asking too 
much too soon 









1. The NGB finished 










2. Realistic expectation 

















3. Guided by the 








1. The NGB once successfully produced will still be 
categorised under the organic biodiesel and 
bioalcohol. They are not a completely new product; 
yet, they might appear in a more complex chemical 
structure, which would overcome the limitations of 
the 1G biofuels. This is because, for the near-term 
application, biofuels still need to be blended with 
petrol/diesel. The NGB is expected to have resolved 
the weaknesses of the 1G biofuels, to foster the 
market acceptance. 
 
2. The main function of biofuels use in the UK is to 
reduce road transport GHG/CO2 emissions. The 
NGB technology has to continue to perform this 
role, or even be better. Besides, the NGB should 
have the G&S criteria that could protect the 
socioenvironmental benefits, and would not recreate 
two systemic risks that occurred during the 1G 
biofuels deployment.  
However, the NGB could not be taken as the sole 
REfT, and expect it to substitute petrol/diesel. This is 
because, no single RE has the capacity of oil/gas to 
be substituted. A diversified REfT profile such as H2, 
electricity would help by complementing one and 
another, to fulfil the future energy demands, and also 
provide more choices for consumer on different 
types of green cars (biofuels/flex-fuel/H2/electric 
cars).   
 
3. The NGB technology has not been pushed too far 
at the early stage. The time gap of five-to-ten years 
from 2008 was set, which supported by the EURED-
by 2020, 10% of the transport fuels have to be 
sourced from the RE. Besides, the altered RTFO, 
demands 5% of biofuels to be applied by 2013/2014. 
This would allow for a gradual process of new 
technology innovation: from the NGB R&D, 
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innovation to solve the limitations of the existing 1G 
biofuels then moves to the full scale 
commercialisation. 
The bottom-up approach (gradually increasing 
biofuels targets) can ensure the NGB R&D projects 
are guided, allowing for piecemeal adaptation in 
order to obtain feedback and learn from the mistakes 

















1. Converged political 
interests at different 







2. Profit driven oil 
companies are eyeing 
on biofuels market. 
 
 
1. Due to the regional/national biofuels adoption is a 
political mandate, no evidence was found on the 
confrontation of biofuels between EU/UK/Scottish 
Government. There are a few biofuels development 
projects which obtained funding from the EU/UK 
Government that demonstrates their political interest 
and support.  
 
 
2. Biofuels is guided by the political aims and would 
be sustained for long-term application. Hence, the oil 
companies are eyeing on biofuels, as one of the most 
lucrative business opportunity which could sustain 
their energy businesses.  



















Table 7.5.2: Risk and Uncertainty and Strategies Applied by Oil Companies 
during the NGB Development  
Types of R&U Strategies adopted  
 BP Approaches Shell Approaches 
Technology 





The NGB R&D projects conducted by BP and Shell are working to 
match as closely as possible to the nine criteria/requirements laid out. 
These nine criteria/requirements seem to provide a set of clearer and 
more certain yardstick for the NGB development. They correlate to 
each of the stakeholders' needs, interests, values, goals, targets-which 
have been incorporated in order to get the NGB technology to work in 
useful/practical ways, at the point for future application (refer 7.4.2). 
Innovation processes 
i. Beyond oil companies 
institutional knowledge 









ii. Beyond oil companies 
institutional  capabilities 







i. Resolves the limitation of 
institutional knowledge in the 
NGB development  
-R&D collaborations with 
external biotechnology 
institutions and agricultural. 
-owns in-house R&D 
institution-EBI which is 
carrying various the NGB 
research.  
 
ii. Resolves the limitation of 
institutional capability in the 
NGB production, JV 
partnerships were established 
to set up a production 
infrastructure. 
-with British Sugar and 
DuPont for biobutanol plant.  






i. Resolves the limitation of 
institutional knowledge in the NGB 
development through: 








ii. Resolves the limitation of 
institutional capability in the NGB 
production, JV partnerships were 
established to set up a production 
infrastructure.  
-with Iogen for wheat straw bioethanol 
demonstration plant.  
-with Choren, Biomass to Liquid 
demonstration plant  
-one pilot demonstration plant with 
HR Biopetroleum (algae). 
-with Cosan for sugarcane processing 
facilities. 
 Generally, risk transfer strategy is applied from the oil companies. They 
are transferring the risks/inadequacy of knowledge and production 
capacity of the NGB to the research institutions 
Social/market 
acceptance on the NGB 
i. the ripple effects of 











i. Promotes the G&S criteria of the NGB 
technology (which are non-food, has 










i. Promotes the G&S criteria 
of the NGB technology 
(which are non-food, has 
low-carbon footprint and 
does not create land 
competition). Besides, a 
webchat session was 





ii. The public does not 
know about the NGB 
technology. 
ii. Educates the public on the latest 













-i and ii activities are generally 
conducted through organisational 
website, corporate online videos and 
published reports. 
ii. Educates the public on the 
latest information about the 
NGB technology. Meanwhile 
Shell is also building 
social/market acceptance on 
the NGB technology with 
two strategies: 
(a) one month market test 
run in Ottawa on the wheat 
straw bioethanol. 
(b) working with Ferrari and 
Ducati in racing 
competitions, to test the 
NGB performance.  
-i and ii activities are 
generally conducted through 
organisational website, 
corporate online videos, 
YouTube, and published 
reports. 
Source: Summarised by the researcher  
 
According to the oil companies’ representatives, since the 1G biofuels is just a start, 
it has provided a platform for the long-term NGB business prospect. The potential of 
biofuels could be explained through the NGB by stressing the high-yield/non-food 
feedstocks (biomass282/waste283) and the efficiency of the process technology. By 
applying bioscience/biotechnology to the NGB product and production, various 
ongoing R&D projects will put BP and Shell at the fore front in speeding up their 
market penetration and enhance the economies of scale through the NGB outcomes. 
 
7.5.2 Empirical Suggestion for the Oil Companies' Diversified Strategies 
for Biofuels Development  
Both BP and Shell are continuing the supply of the 1G biofuels while carrying out 
the NGB R&D. To date, these companies have similar strategies embarking on the 
NGB R&D. in order to ensure that they will gain the greatest potential for profitable 
growth from the NGB technology. Therefore, all collaborative R&D projects are 
established between BP and Shell with their respective cross-border biotechnology 
                                               
282 There are generally three types of biomass source: firstly the natural forest residues; secondly, the 
left over biomass/by products (whole plants after fruits have been harvested, like wheat straw, 
sugarcane bagasse and corn kernel); and thirdly, purposeful energy grasses, such as miscanthus and 
switchgrass.  
283 animal fat, used cooking oil and industrial/commercial/households wastes. 
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institutions/agricultural partners. This is because, BP and Shell do not have adequate 
institutional knowledge in developing biofuels from the biotechnology sphere. 
Besides, they do not have the capability to produce their own biofuels. Both 
inadequacies are the main risks that these oil companies are facing.  
 
Advocated by Dorfman (1997) (refer literature 2.4.3), risk transference is the strategy 
that both BP and Shell are using. They allow other parties (research institutions and 
agricultural players) to bear the risk on behalf. This strategy enables the oil 
companies to shift into higher gear to concentrate on one of their competencies 
(expanding the energy market share and the NGB marketing), while allow the NGB 
R&D projects to be transformed underway. These research institutions and 
agricultural partners have the absolute advantage of expertise and profound 
biotechnology knowledge. They help BP and Shell to materialise the NGB 
technology required. Consequently the structure between the oil companies and these 
R&D institutions has changed. Through the collaboration for biofuels development, 
both are now strongly connected by the economic motivations of profit making and 
wealth creation. 
 
The different modes of collaboration are aimed at the NGB commercialisation. In the 
end, BP and Shell can utilise their research findings as assets for profit making. 
These collaborations could result in two implications: Firstly, the knowledge transfer 
from the external laboratories/agricultural players to BP and Shell, enables them 
gradually build up their institutional knowledge associated with biotechnology for 
biofuels innovation and production.  
 
Secondly, these research institutions/agricultural industry could have the opportunity 
for profit seeking with BP and Shell. The research outcomes could be patented for 
commercial purposes, and this would lead to a lucrative profit sharing between BP, 
Shell and their biotechnology/agricultural partners. To date, BP has ten, while Shell 
has seven NGB development projects ongoing, which utilises three modes of 
collaboration: equity joint venture (JV), strategic alliance (SA), and direct funding. 
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All of these modes are aimed to transfer the R&U to the “experts” whom are suitable 
and capable to deal with them, mitigate the risk exposure and to pool the resources 
required from their respective partners to achieve wealth creation for both parties 
(refer appendix 7.5.1).  
 
7.5.3 Empirical Suggestion for Diversified Strategies Associate with 
Different Technological Confidence Levels 
Apart from costs sharing, the R&U and the resources sharing for the NGB 
development process, different strategies for the various modes of collaboration 
adopted by the oil companies could also signify the different levels of technological 
confidence for the oil companies in the particular NGB projects. By using Pearson 
Uncertainty Map (PUM) on different quadrants (Qs) (refer literature 2.4.2), this 
research suggests an extended interpretation on the PUM, correlates it with different 
technological confidence levels. 
Figure 7.5.1: Pearson Uncertainty Map 
Source: Pearson (1991). 
 
If one technology is applicable and promising, it would provide a higher confidence 
to the stakeholders. Therefore, the partnership would be strengthened through JVs. 
Hence the JVs projects agreed so far, are specified with defined technologies, 
whereby the results are clear but the processes are yet to be established. These 
criteria are fall into the Q2. Pearson (1991) explains, projects in Q2 require advanced 
technology, and the transition to manufacturing is complex. Besides they need large-




efforts in pursuing the development. This justifies the JVs taken place between the 
oil companies and the biotechnology institutions/agricultural industry, which show a 
large portion of their contributed resources, since they are confident on the lucrative 
returns. 
 
Meanwhile, SAs allow the combination of both parties know-how to innovate 
products of the NGB. The technological confidence level is moderate. This is 
because, the driving force is based on the assumption that, a process technology is 
known and has the potential to generate a new product. However, neither of the 
parties has certainty about the success of the research outcomes284. These criteria fall 
into the Q3. 
 
Since a potential/new NGB product might be produced by a known process, SAs 
enable the product to be developed within a defined period of time and under 
controlled resources, in order to avoid being trapped in a black hole effect 285 . 
Meanwhile, each partner remains independent without pulling their parent company 
into this collaboration. Therefore SAs permit cooperation to be specifically tailored 
for both the researcher's capability and the oil companies' requirements, thereby 
bridging the scientific ability to the commercial possibilities.  
 
Finally, funded projects have two distinctive confidence levels of technology. For 
simple technology which gives a high confidence level, the project fall within the 
Q4. For example, the BP-TERI jatropha project. Since the operations in plantations 
are general (seeding, growing and harvesting the jatropha), they do not require BP's 
continual involvement in the daily activities on site. Instead, BP entrusts the 
capability of TERI (controlled by the agreement) to have this project run efficiently 
and effectively. Therefore, this demonstrates that BP has a higher confident in the 
technology and allows its partner run the project. 
                                               
284 Questions to be considered: Would it be successfully developed within an acceptable period of 
time? Will the outcomes be usefully deployed for commercial purposes? 
285 requires unlimited financial injections which would jeopardise the entire company and result in 
the possibility of bankruptcy. 
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On the other hand, funded projects also fall in the Q1, which demonstrate a low 
technological confidence of the stakeholders. The Q1 activities often involve 
working with product and process technology that is not fully understood 286 . 
According to Pearson (1991), this is largely the domain of university research 
laboratories. Increasingly, the oil companies have the necessary resources to fund 
such exploratory studies. It is suggested that Q1 might best be left to the scientists. 
BP and Shell funding projects are fall into Q1. These projects show that, there is a 
significant insufficient knowledge about the product/production technology, which 
necessitates the need for the basic/applied research. What BP and Shell want from 
the collective of funded research projects, are to investigate new feedstocks and 
novel production processes, to focus on the technology options that give a feasible 
set of commercial solutions. 
 
For example, BP is funding the Arizona State University while Shell is funding six 
universities research projects. Geographically, Arizona has rich natural resources for 
forest, desert and park land. Meanwhile, Shell-six universities projects are spreading 
across four continents: US, Brazil, China287 and the UK. These research projects 
have one thing in common: these projects, not only based on each universities' 
expertises, but also the different locations could have the potential new feedstocks 
found.  
 
To conclude, the PUM helps to understand uncertainties about means (process) and 
ends (output). The arrangement of the quadrants with the types of research addresses 
precisely the solution needed under the contextual constraint of these two 
uncertainties. Furthermore, it could be used to reflect the different technological 
confidence levels, which could determine stakeholders' diversified strategies to opt 
either for JV, SA or direct funding. Although PUM's characteristics have been briefly 
                                               
286 We know the nine criteria/requirements of the NGB, but we do not know which types of 
feedstock are the most efficient (as every vegetation has its own unique yield capacity), where to find 
these feedstocks (geographical habitat), and how to have these feedstocks largely produced. 
287 Two locations in China: Beijing which is the capital of China and Qingdao which is located on the 
coast line, which could provide a potential feedstock according to the location advantage.  
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described, its real value lies in its ability to help identify important characteristics, 
which if taken into account will reduce the R&U of innovation/technology 
development. It could be of great help since it focuses on the nature of the R&U and 
raises issues of technology, organisational structure, interests, capabilities and 
strategy.  
 
7.5.4 Empirical Suggestions for the Unresolved Risk and Uncertainty  
(a) Cross-Border Plantations  
BP and Shell large-scale sugarcane plantations and BP's jatropha plantations, would 
initially assume that, most of the anticipated R&U have been resolved. For example 
site investigations have been conducted to identify the most suitable location for the 
plantation, in order to overcome the nature restraints. The operations would be 
equipped with adequate facilities by pooling their partners' resources of capital, 
infrastructure and manpower. Even though with the most prepared strategies in place, 
there are still many unanticipated factors which might render to the emergence of 
R&U. For example the unpredictable weather which could cause a low harvest.  
 
Furthermore, growing feedstocks in a cross-border project with a large-scale 
plantation for a long-term period could cause the project to be exposed to a number 
of challenges. This includes political influence from the host country 288 , real 
economic impacts on local communities289  and social reaction290  would generate 
some unexpected R&U. 
 
 
                                               
288 Host government changes through a general election could invite new regulatory obstructions. 
There is no guarantee the new government would continue to support the large-scale plantation. There 
is also a risk when the host government acquires land under its new community development. 
289 Some socioeconomic concerns could be helpful for reflection: Is there any equal employment 
opportunity provided to the community? Are these employment opportunities long-term or short-
term? How to solve problem if child/forced labour is detected in the plantation? What need to be done 
if various unions have been set up to demand higher wages? What if retrenchment is needed because 
the plantation harvest is low? 
290 might have strong opposition from the social movements if the plantations would cause any unfair 
treatments to the community such as health issue, illegal/child/forced labour detected, disqualifying 
environmental issues due to agrochemical pollutions, or the opposition party of the host government 
who is against the plantation projects due to the massive change on land use. 
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(b) Land Use for the 2G Biofuels 
Although, it is scientifically proven that the 2G lignocellulosic biofuels like 
miscanthus, switchgrass, jatropha could be grown on marginal/idle land; the fact is, 
these biomass still acquired land for growing. Besides, the oil companies might not 
have the full authority to decide on the exact idle land use for biomass growing as it 
is still much depend upon the host government in land planning (policy and 
execution), as well as their involvement in ensuring that the genuine set-aside land 
has been utilise for feedstock growing. Therefore, this raised another challenge for 
oil companies on the large-scale 2G feedstock plantations. Collaboration between the 
oil companies and the local government is vital, in order to ensure what has been 
claimed for the G&S of the 2G biofuels could be really achieved. The idle land has to 
be measured and then occupied for the feedstocks growing. 
 
(c) Environmental Implications for Algae 
Algae is an advanced technology which could be grown through a sea farming 
technique. Even though algae has the potential to produce biofuels with higher GHG 
savings, the large-scale growing of algae; if mismanagement took place, it could 
result in ocean pollution that would threaten the marine life 291 . Therefore, a 
precautionary principle has to be in place, in order to access the socioenvironmental 










                                               
291 Algae have killed entire reef structures. The mats of algae suffocated coral, sponges and other 
marine life underwater (Fine, 18 July, 2010).  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
This research is aimed at gaining an insight into a large social technology (biofuels), 
which is experiencing a dynamic technological change, when it is under the 
processes of deployment and development. Consequently, different types of R&U 
(expected/unexpected R&U) emerged. Evidenced by counteracting strategies 
implemented by the regulators and the oil companies, their aims were to ensure the 
resolution and to mitigate these R&U, by setting a path for the ease of biofuels 
execution and innovation.  
 
8.1 Driving Forces for the Governments and the Oil Companies in 
Biofuels Adoption 
Biofuels activation was due to the EU/UK Governments' mandate. Through regional 
and national policy formulation, these governments have implemented the 1G 
biofuels. Since the EU/UK and the Scottish Government (SG) were involved in the 
regional/national biofuels adoption, the commencement of biofuels was driven by the 
respective objectives of these regulators. This research shows, there were three 
political motives to drive regional/national biofuels adoption: 
(a) The regional/national aim for greenhouse gases (GHGs) reduction from the road 
transport system. 
(b) The regional/national interest to achieve “partial” energy security. 
(c) To prosper the regional/national economy, gradually switching from an oil- 
dominated-economy, towards a green economy.  
 
The oil companies' involvement in biofuels businesses was mainly driven by their 
economic interests. There were three driving forces identified, which led BP and 
Shell to enter the biofuels businesses.  
(a) Challenges in energy sourcing 
Since hydrocarbon is sourced from politically unstable regions, this could affect their 
long-term business operations. Besides, hydrocarbon is a depleting resource. 
Therefore, the renewable criterion exhibited by biofuels is an attractive option, which 
can help to alleviate the pressures on increasing energy demands. Besides, biofuels 
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can prolong the oil companies' energy business, to be included as one of the energy 
profiles.  
 
(b) Increasing pressure on combating climate change through low-carbon energy 
supply 
The international/regional/national policies are emphasising on combating climate 
change. Therefore, cutting GHG/CO2 emissions is one of the core objectives of 
energy providers. The oil companies are obliged under the regulations and driven by 
corporate social responsibility-to ensure the energy product they supply, as well as 
the processes to generate the energy product are low-carbon, less polluting and more 
environmental friendly; in order to improve their green image.  
 
(c) The long-term business interest of biofuels is supported by the mandatory 
requirements from the regional/national regulators.  
Since biofuels implementation is guided by the regional/national mandates, biofuels 
are one of the most lucrative energy businesses. Facing a range of possible new 
energy sources, the oil companies have many practical reasons 292  to invest and 
pursue the next generation biofuels (NGB) R&D for their long-term business 
objectives. This is to ensure that the NGB will comply with green and sustainable 
(G&S) criteria, and have higher productivity to meet the increasing demand. 
 
The research points out that, biofuels are at the conjunction of interests between the 
regulators and the oil companies, on which these two actors are working hand-in-
hand to have biofuels implemented and further developed. Given the commitments 
of the EU/UK governments to biofuels as the regional/national policies; in the UK, 




                                               
292 Lower switching cost, compatibility of biofuels with the existing hydrocarbon infrastructure, 
biofuels can be blended with hydrocarbon (petrol/diesel), and adopted in the internal combustion 
engines (ICEs) without any modification. 
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8.2 Roles and Responsibilities of the Governments and the Oil 
Companies in Biofuels Deployment and Development  
Since the UK is a unitary state with a devolved system of governance, the UK 
biofuels deployment is determined by the UK Government and influenced by the EU. 
Therefore, biofuels adoption in Scotland is not a single cell operation of the SG. The 
influence of the EU/UK Governments signifies the multiple roles the SG plays-not 
only as the regulator in Scotland, but also the executor of biofuels implementation in 
Scotland. 
  
During the policy-making processes, most of the decisions are made at the EU. Then, 
decision is transposed to the respective member states like the UK. At the national 
level, the UK Government liaises with the devolved governments like the SG, and 
passes the regulatory decisions made293 to the oil companies-whom are acting as the 
biofuels suppliers. The UK Government is responsible for the planning and the 
execution of the national biofuels policy. Besides, it also has to ensure that the SG is 
adopting the national biofuels policy; while monitors the oil companies’ 
performance, in supplying biofuels which comply with the Renewable Transport Fuel 
Obligation (RTFO) 2008. 
 
Compared with the UK Government, the SG adopted a more progressive approach in 
the NGB development. Various major research projects taking place in Scotland, as 
well as pioneer works established294 are supported jointly by the EU/UK/SG which 
reflected by various Scottish policies295.  
 
Meanwhile, the oil companies, like BP and Shell, have been responding proactively 
to the biofuels demands by the UK Government. Both companies are committed to 
consistent biofuels supply, which is guided by the mandatory targets of the RTFO. 
                                               
293 Information is appeared in the form of policies, directives, acts, regulations, standards and 
mandatory targets of biofuels under the RTFO (2008).  
294 the UK first biodiesel plant and the UK first biofuels research centre in Napier University. 
295 Biomass Action Plan for Scotland (2007), Scotland's Consultation on Low-Carbon Vehicles 
(2009) and Scotland's Renewable Action Plan (2009). 
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Funded by their own (private) investments, BP and Shell are two of the world six oil 
companies which currently are embarking on the NGB research. The pioneering 
status is important for both BP and Shell. This is because, such status would enable 
them to secure the lucrative long-term biofuels business prospects. This research 
points out that, operating under the current regulatory framework and the market 
system, political and business forces have been converged at the context of regulated 
market which allows biofuels to be implemented and developed. This collaboration 
is operating efficiently to achieve the predetermined targets. 
 
8.3 Mechanisms which Deliver Biofuels Deployment and Development 
Apart from the RTFO which acts as a guidance for biofuels deployment, an agency is 
established by the Department for Transport (DfT). The Renewable Fuel Agency 
(RFA) is empowered by the DfT, to monitor biofuels deployment in the UK. In order 
to control biofuels deployment, various regulatory instruments have been instituted. 
These include: 
(a) The RFA rules and regulations, requires all the oil companies/biofuels suppliers to 
report monthly on the “Carbon and Sustainability” reporting system;  
(b) The RFA enforced the Renewable Transport Fuel (RTF) Certificate which acts 
like a business licence for biofuels trade and supply within the UK market; 
(c) European standards on biofuels quality control-Biodiesel EN14214, and 
Bioethanol EN15376;  
(d) Mandatory annual targets of the RTFO (2008);  
(e) Fuel Duty Incentives-20p/litre on biofuels. 
 
Furthermore, the vehicle manufacturers provide the standard warranty to be remained 
intact voluntarily, where biofuels are mixed with mineral fuel at a rate of maximum 
5% by volume used in the ICEs. The oil companies/biofuels suppliers gained the 
incentives to achieve cost efficiency. Meanwhile, they ensure their products comply 
with the biofuels European standards, follow the RTFO targets and submit their 
biofuels report every month to the RFA for the “Carbon and Sustainability” reporting 
system.   
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For the NGB development, the UK and the SG are leading by example, by investing 
in the nationwide NGB R&D projects. Combined funds from the EU/UK/SG are 
injected into academic institutions, public agencies and local private sectors, to carry 
out the NGB research and infrastructure set-up, such as production plants and 
research centres. Besides, updated national policies 296  are published and made 
available to the general public, in order to highlight the importance of the G&S 
biofuels as one of the Renewable Energy for Transport (REfT).  
 
The EURED (2009) requires 10% of transport fuels must consist of renewables by 
year 2020, has enhanced the corporate confidence in biofuels businesses, despite 
large amount of resources and high risks involved in the NGB R&D projects. 
Furthermore, the stringent biofuels G&S criteria are gradually required for the 
“Carbon and Sustainability” reporting system, which is guided by Meta/Qualifying 
standards and controlled by the RTF certification. In order to reward the genuine 
G&S biofuels, by year 2011, the UK Government will incentivise biofuels that meet 
all the G&S criteria (Meta standard) outlined by the RFA. Looking at the 
mechanisms applied and the strategies implemented, these methods were playing 
multiple roles. On one hand, they are set to facilitate biofuels introduction and 
innovation; while on the other hand, they were established as the risk preventive 
strategies to mitigate any anticipated R&U to ease the processes of biofuels 
execution and innovation.  
 
8.4 Risk and Uncertainty Arising during Biofuels Deployment and 
Strategy Implemented to Counteract  
This research is aimed at gaining an insight into a large social technology (biofuels), 
which is experiencing a dynamic technological change, when it is under the 
processes of deployment and development. Due to the dynamic technological 
changes, different types of R&U (expected/unexpected R&U) emerged during these 
two processes. Several expected R&U have been identified by Rosenbloom and 
                                               
296 The UK Powering Future Vehicles Strategy (2001), the UK RTFO (2008), Scotland's Consultation 
on Low-Carbon Vehicles (2009) and Scotland's Renewable Action Plan (2009). 
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Kantrow (1982), Pearson (1991), Rosenberg (1994) Elliott (2003) and the report 
from SpecialChem (2011). These literatures helped to make the identifications of the 
expected R&U during biofuels implementation and innovation easier. The R&U 
faced by the regulators during biofuels deployment and the strategies taken to 
counteract were: 
 
(a) Political support 
Strategy: Strong political support and adequate follow through during biofuels 
deployment.  
Biofuels deployment gained clear political direction from the EU which has 
formulated the EUBD (2003) and the EURED (2009). These then being transposed 
to its member states-the UK, to deploy biofuels for the nationwide road transport 
system. The RFA was established to execute the RTFO (2008), and to monitor the 
G&S biofuels supply in the domestic market. The SG involvement for biofuels 
implementation is obligated under the UK Reserved Matters.  
 
The deployment process is guided by the national/regional targets, biofuels unified 
standards and is backed by the regional political decision. Therefore, this show that 
the EU/UK Governments and the SG have undertaken vigorous measure to establish 
the biofuels policies which are stable, transparent and with well-defined objective 
that executable/implementable under the energy market (criteria as advocated by 
Mallon, 2006). The requisite R&U involved the allocation of responsibilities 
between the regional/national policy makers to deal with various aspects of strategy. 
Any R&U faced by the member states, could be brought to the EU for further 
discussions.  
 
(b) Investment  
Strategy: Adequate an adequate financial support on biofuels adoption. 
Biofuels are taxed at 20p/litre less than petrol and diesel, which aimed to ensure that, 




Strategy: Low investments/switching costs required for biofuels adoption.  
Biofuels provide the most economical solution, with low switching costs involved. 
The compatibility of biofuels with hydrocarbon, not only have secured the low 
operation costs, but also allowed them to be adopted/used at the existing hydrocarbon 
infrastructure and ICEs. The technical convenience encouraged biofuels adoption 
with immediate effect. 
 
(c) Social acceptance 
Strategy: Many of the OECD countries have showed their support on biofuels 
adoption. In order to promote the benefits of biofuels, the positive social, economic 
and environmental impacts of biofuels are being promoted through 
government/organisational media as the public education-advocated by Baron 
(2011).  
 
(d) Biofuels Technical performance 
Strategy: High reliability of biofuels performance. 
Biofuels have been proven on their practicality and executability. They have been 
implemented in the US for nearly five years and in Brazil for more than three 
decades. Biofuels are compatible with the existing hydrocarbon supply infrastructure 
and ICEs, which allow for an immediate adoption. 
 
(e) Institutional interests  
Strategy: Biofuels create some positive impacts on other institutions. 
Biofuels do not compete with other types of REfT such as H2 and electricity. They 
are complementing each other to support the future transport energy demand. The 1G 
biofuels generates wealth on the agricultural industry. The NGB development 
magnetised the biotechnology institutions and the oil companies for profits seeking.  
 
Meanwhile, the R&U faced by the oil companies during biofuels deployment and the 




(a) Weaknesses of the 1G bioethanol 
Strategy: To overcome the limitations of the 1G bioethanol, BP is developing 
biobutanol with DuPont, while Shell is developing biogasoline with Virent. 
 
(b) Stringent requirements on the G&S biofuels 
Strategy: To comply to the G&S criteria of biofuels, BP and Shell supply biofuels 
according to the RTFO targets, and report monthly under the RFA “Carbon and 
Sustainability” reporting system. Both companies are complying with the 
Meta/Qualifying Standards set by the RFA. Furthermore, both companies have 
participated as the members in various roundtables.  
 
Shell has a stricter control for its biofuels product, production and supply. It 
established the Sustainable Sourcing Policy (SSP) in order to control its biofuels 
suppliers adhere to the stringent biofuels G&S criteria. This allows Shell to obtain 
more reliable information, and could provide more accurate information when 
reporting to the RFA.  
 
(c) Low social acceptance of biofuels adoption 
Strategy: Biofuels which are renewable and capable to reduce GHG/CO2 emission 
from vehicle tailpipe are promoted through corporate websites. Besides, the technical 
conveniences have overcome the consumer worries advocated by SpecialChem 
(2011) report on reliability, scalability and future availability. 
 
8.4.1 Two Systemic Risks Incurred during Biofuels Deployment  
There were two systemic risks: food-fuel competition and biodiversity threatened, 
occurred during the 1G biofuels deployment, and resulted in pressure on the 
regulators and the oil companies.  
 
During this period, these systemic risks were amplified by pressure groups and the 
international/local broadcasting/print media. Facing the challenges from the systemic 
risks resulted by the 1G biofuels deployment, the oil companies and the policy 
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makers have been finding new strategies to mitigate them. The regulators (the 
EU/UK/Scottish Government), BP and Shell did not launch a direct confrontation or 
media-war with the pressure groups and the media. Strategically, through their own 
organisational media (mainly websites), they focused on disseminating of the NGB 
information. Furthermore, they concentrated to ensure the existing 1G biofuels is 
produced and supplied in the G&S ways. This information was supported by the 
independent/reputable organisations-learned societies (such as WorldWatch Institute, 
The UK Royal Society and others) that are acting as the scientific knowledge 
broadcasters. These learned societies periodically publish the latest 
information/development about the NGB technology. 
 
To deal with these two systemic risks, an investigation was called by the UK 
Government. Consequently, the investigation that led by Professor Gallagher resulted 
in the Gallagher Review (2008) was published; which subsequently rendered to the 
alteration of the RTFO targets to slow down biofuels expansion. Because of the 
systemic risks, new forces emerged. This research shows an institutional and power 
switched from the regulators and the oil companies, to pressure groups such as the 
international/national social movements, environmentalists and the media. These 
pressure groups expressed new demand for the enforcement of the G&S biofuels 
criteria emphasised on biofuels products, production and supply. Such requirements 
not only changed the existing 1G biofuels supply chain (in order to prioritise 
socioenvironmental objectives); but have also shaped the NGB development (on 
products and production) to be more G&S oriented. 
 
In addition, the EU/UK Governments started to enforce the biofuels G&S criteria. A 
more stringent biofuels “Carbon and Sustainability” reporting system with 
“Indicative Targets” (refer section 4.1.2) was established. This was to ensure that 
biofuels used in the UK are capable to exhibit/fulfil the G&S criteria which specified 
by the RFA Meta/Qualifying standards. In order to rebuild social acceptance of 
biofuels, more information about the NGB R&D projects, as well as the G&S 
criteria/benefits of the NGB have been introduced through organisational media (the 
326 
 
regulators’ and the oil companies’ own websites). Besides, the monthly “Carbon and 
Sustainability” report was published by the RFA, whereby these reports297  were 
available to the general.  
 
8.5 Risk and Uncertainty Arising during Biofuels Development and 
Strategy Implemented to Counteract  
The R&U faced by the regulators during biofuels development and the strategies 
adopted to counteract were: 
(i) Political support  
Strategy: The SG has a strong vision for the NGB development, which was backed 
by the regional/national biofuels policies. The SG has formulated the Renewables 
Action Plan (2009), took in the NGB as one of the focuses for national RE 
development. 
 
(ii) Funding  
Strategy: The NGB R&D projects are running independently, being funded by the 
regulators (the EU/UK/SG combined financial strength) and the oil companies 
separately. There was no reliance by the private sector on government funding. 
 
(iii) Situational 
Strategy: Right time and right scenario in combating climate change, green economy 
evolution, and to avoid the occurrence of systemic risks through the NGB 
development. The G&S criteria of the NGB are promoted through the governments', 
the oil companies' and independent institutions' organisational media to inform the 
general.  
 
(iv) Technology expectations and performances 
Strategy: The main function of biofuels used in the UK is to reduce road transport 
GHG/CO2 emissions. The NGB technology has to continue to perform this role, or 
                                               
297 to show the data/information/results of biofuels executed by the biofuels suppliers/oil companies, 




even be better to reduce the carbon footprint from farm-to-wheel cycle. Ultimately, 
the NGB must demonstrate the better G&S criteria to safeguard the 
socioenvironmental benefits. 
 
(v) Institutional interests 
Strategy: Since biofuels adoption was a political mandate, no evidence was found on 
the confrontation of biofuels among the EU, the UK Government and the SG. On the 
other hand, there were a few of the NGB R&D projects in Scotland which obtained 
funding from the EU/UK Governments. These showed the EU/UK converged 
political interest and financial support on the NGB development in Scotland. 
Besides, the oil companies were seeing biofuels as one of the most lucrative business 
opportunities that could sustain their energy business.  
 
Meanwhile R&U faced by the oil companies during biofuels development and the 
strategies implemented to counteract were: 
(i) Uncertainty about the NGB technological outcomes 
Strategy: BP and Shell are working as close as possible to the nine 
criteria/requirements laid out.  
 
(ii) Beyond the oil companies’ institutional knowledge and capabilities in the NGB 
development/production. 
Strategy: BP and Shell collaborated on a few R&D projects with their respective 
biotechnology and agricultural partners. This is one of the risk transfer strategies, 
which the oil companies are transferring their inadequacy in knowledge and 
production capability to the experts-the biotechnology institutions and the 
agricultural industry who are capable in doing so.  
 
(iii) Low social acceptance of the NGB technology. 
Strategy: In introducing the NGB to a risk adverse market, the oil companies are 
promoting the benefits and the G&S criteria of the NGB to the general public 
through their own organisational media (mostly website). The latest information on 
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the industrial research and the NGB research are also shared to the market through 
their websites. Additionally, Shell is using motor racing events as the test bed for its 
NGB. By providing information about the technical specificities of the NGB, 
consumers are well-informed with this technology and be confident on the NGB 
adoption in the near future.  
 
8.6 Social Construction of Technological Risks  
Since technology is a social product, the technological risk does not develop from a 
technical logic. Instead it is shaped and influenced by intricate social forces and 
social network involved. A new technology which is innovated and then 
implemented in a large social technical system carries various R&U may generate 
many negative consequences. Although the new technology is meant to reduce the 
existing R&U298 or to overcome particular problems, it may create new R&U to 
society and the environment if mismanagement takes place. 
 
This research provides a social discourse of the R&U involved in the processes of 
biofuels deployment and development. Hence, this research demonstrates: 
(a) R&U are socially constructed.  
(b) Politics and economic systems are powerful mechanisms to deliver technology 
implementation and innovation. However, mismanagement299  together with other 
regional/national social disparities300 are shaping R&U from a specific technology. 
(c) The perceptions about R&U are different among different stakeholders. 
Misunderstanding and gaps in current knowledge may contribute to the creation of 
new R&U. 
 
It is evidenced that the prioritisation of biofuels as one of the REfT is derived from 
                                               
298 For example biofuels adoption is to reduce the risk of climate change and to restore energy 
security. 
299 Political rush for biofuels implementation, inadequate risk assessment which have failed to 
consolidate risk precautionary principles. Besides, many of the policies have ignored the issues of 
land use planning as well as to equalise the community risk and cost-benefit distribution. 
300 Different social context for biofuels adoption. Biofuels which are successful in one social setting 
might not as successful in another social context. 
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the converged interests of the governments and the oil companies. Given a wide 
range of possible alternate REfTs associated with social and technical R&U, the 
assessment and the perceptions of R&U are largely determined by political, social 
and economic systems which are influenced by these powerful stakeholders. The oil 
companies’ pursuance on the 1G biofuels is focusing on the grains-derived fuels. 
Driven by economic motivation to maximise profit through the economies of scale, 
this has resulted in a large-scale production of biofuels. A limited domestic 
production capability was stretched to fulfil the unlimited global biofuels demands. 
This then caused the emergence of systemic risks at food-fuel competition, and 
biodiversity threatened in biofuels farming/producing countries.  
 
8.7 Risk Perceptions and Precautionary Principle  
Under a large social technology deployment and development, the scope and nature 
of the expected/unexpected R&U are becoming more complex. Consequently, 
strategies adopted to deal with them are getting more challenging. The research 
points out that, the stakeholders/decision makers need to consider different risk 
perceptions, and to facilitate mechanisms with more precautionary principles for 
decision-making and decision-execution.  
 
This research shows that, the risk perceptions were different among the 
stakeholders301. This was mainly due to each of their-own perceived risk, but not the 
risk they estimated others to perceive. Biofuels mean differently to different 
stakeholders involved. Each of them perceives biofuels based on their knowledge 
and interests respectively.  
 
The governments tended to focus on the impacts on their policies formulated. They 
feared the failure to achieve the mandatory GHG/CO2 reduction targets and the 
regional biofuels targets (EUBD 2003 and EURED 2009). Meanwhile, the oil 
companies worried about the possible losses in taking up this new business, 
                                               
301 the regional/national policy makers, the oil companies, the biofuels producers/farmers/suppliers, 
the general public and the pressure groups. 
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particularly the NGB R&D projects which involve high risks and high investments. 
What these two actors concerned with their own political and economic gains 
respectively, had not envisaged the fear which the general public had regard to food 
security and ecology protection. 
 
In order to build up the converged risk perceptions at an earlier stage, as well as to 
facilitate the precautionary principles, Renn (2008) advocates that risk pre-
assessment shall take into account the public opinions/responses in all stages along 
the decision-making and decision-execution processes. Knowing the public 
values/concerns helps to detect new/emerging R&U earlier, to provide some initial 
insight into the extent/severity of these R&U and also to determine whether a 
decision should be executed after considering the implications.  
 
The precautionary principle allows the policy makers to adjust their decisions in 
situations where there is the possibility of harm/risk from following a particular 
course, or making a certain decision when the extensive scientific knowledge on the 
matter is lacking. The principle implies that there is a social responsibility to protect 
the public from exposure to harm/losses. The risks information collected could then 
be pre-screened and allocated to different assessment and management routes. For 
this reason, the regulators should establish a risk communication channel in order to 
collect public response. A two-way communication (between the general public and 
the regulator) is important to avoid the disparity between the regulators' and the 
public risk perceptions. If this could be performed beforehand, the unexpected R&U 
or systemic risk occurred during the 1GT biofuels deployment could have been 
avoided.  
 
Regardless of the different stakeholders with different standpoints on particular 
decisions, there should always be a prioritisation, particularly in a large social 
technical system that associates with the public general welfare. Apart from fulfilling 
each of the stakeholders' interests, the ultimate objective in welfare economics (like 
biofuels adoption), is to safeguard the large public interest in social, economic and 
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environmental benefits. When there is a conflict among the stakeholders, then the 
public interest should be prevailed in order to protect the poor and vulnerable. 
 
8.8 Social Shaping of Criteria/Requirements for the Next Generation Biofuels  
This research shows that during the process of biofuels deployment and 
development, the UK Government, the SG and the oil companies (BP and Shell) had 
to respond to pressure from social groups, to launch the strategies in meeting the 
G&S biofuels criteria. After the systemic risks, the scenario showed an institutional 
and power switch-from the regulators and the oil companies, to pressure groups such 
as the social movements and the environmentalists. These pressure groups came out 
with a new demand for the enforcement of the G&S biofuels criteria, targeting on 
biofuels product, production and supply. This requirement not only changed the 
existing biofuels supply chain, by prioritising on the socioenvironmental 
sustainability; but also in shaping the NGB products and production which are still 
under the development process. 
 
The nine criteria/requirements (refer 7.4.1) seem to provide a set of clearer yardstick 
for the NGB development. They cover the areas of:  
(a) Solving the limitations/weaknesses of the 1G biofuels.  
(b) Adopting new inputs learned from the emergence of two systemic risks which the 
biofuels G&S criteria have to be prioritised and enforced. 
(c) Respective interests of stakeholders. 
 
Generally, these nine criteria/requirements are shaped by the various stakeholders-the 
regulators, the oil companies, the biofuels players and the pressure groups. 
Concentrating on the G&S criteria for biofuels, the NGB has been largely shaped, 
not only to allow the pursuance of biofuels for political and socioeconomic benefits, 
but also to safeguard the socioenvironmental welfares. Along with this, these social 





8.9 Lessons Learnt from Biofuels Deployment and Development  
The purpose of this section is to bring together any lessons learned during the 
technological change under biofuels deployment and development processes. This 
information could be usefully applied to any similar RE project which may also 
encounter a technological change for its technology implementation and innovation. 
The values lie, not only for the current application, but also for future practices, to 
give recommendations and to highlight precautions on issues which require further 
enhancements/modifications. 
 
8.9.1 Capacity, Green and Sustainability 
We would foresee biofuels are possible to be expanded and fuelling other modes of 
transport include an aviation and shipping after some duration of biofuels 
implementation. If this could be achieved, the more efficient use of low-carbon 
energy in powering a bigger transport landscape could be materialised.  
 
However, there are three important criteria for a REfT: Capacity, Green and 
Sustainability. Biofuels are currently being challenged on their G&S criteria. The 
systemic risks provide the evidence of-not only the inadequacy of the G&S criteria, 
but also the limited agricultural capacity of the 1G biofuels to fulfil the unlimited 
demand. Consequently, food security and the environment were victimised. Although 
after the NGB were commercially available-which “theoretically” promises to 
deliver the G&S biofuels; we could foresee the issue of growing demand would still 
continue to pose a challenge to the capacity of the NGB.  
 
Consequently, the existing biofuels and the forthcoming NGB should not be expected 
as the sole energy source, which could support the entire world/national transport 
system. This is because no single REfT would have such capacity, be able to 
replace/substitute the hydrocarbon totally. The bottom line is, since RE is the energy 
generated from natural resources, the RE generation should not cause any negative 
impact on social and ecology. RE once developed and deployed, not only needs to 
surpass the technical constraints, but also has to sieve through the social 
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requirements, at least to safeguard the socioenvironmental benefits.  
 
8.9.2 Towards a Sustainable Transport System  
Due to the major R&U surrounding technological change, forecasting the future of 
biofuels production-and-use with confidence is extremely difficult. This highlights 
the importance of adopting an approach that ensures sufficient flexibility has to be 
remained for the market to respond to any changing circumstances.  
 
For the long run, a range of different fuels will be in operations, simultaneously 
supporting the EURED (2009) which requires 10% of renewable transport fuels by 
2020. Currently, solar/electric/H2 powered vehicles are still a long way from 
achieving significant market penetration. Despite the front runner position of 
biofuels, they are unlikely to represent the dominant part of a fuel mix, due to land 
and agricultural constraints. Perhaps, it is not only the “types of vehicle” that would 
determine “the types of fuel” used. Firstly, different fuels may suit different 
purposes. For example, the concentrated availability of electric charging points in the 
city centre and the frequent recharging required of an electric car may make it more 
suited to city trips. Meanwhile large trucks/buses/air planes may require H2 for long 
journey use since the fuel could be compressed and do not put an additional weight 
on the vehicles. Biofuels are there to cater for the shipping industry, to power the 
existing ICEs and the flex-fuel vehicles.  
 
Secondly, the niche availability of energy sources may make some of the fuels suited 
to certain geographic areas. For example, areas that are equipped with RE resources 
like Scotland, might find it more cost effective to use electric and flex-fuel vehicles. 
Brazil and the US could continue their biofuels vehicles, while in equatorial 
countries; solar vehicles could be more suitable. Therefore, a diversified REfT 
profile consisting of H2, electricity, solar power and biofuels would enable the energy 
sources to complement one another. Their existence could fulfil future energy 
demand and provide more choices for consumers (based on different types of 
vehicles which require different types of REfT). 
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Even though, theoretically, different types of RE could potentially meet the 
increasing global energy demands for transport, and reduce the overall GHG/CO2 
emissions; the energy consumption must also be paired with greater efficiency of 
automobile technologies, as well as consumers’ attitudes. Consumers should have a 
higher sense of energy sensitivity, and show a willingness to make minor behavioural 
changes based on environmental ethics. Any actions to reduce energy use, such as: 
cycling/walking for short distance travel, or opting for public transport when 
undertaking a longer journey is encouraged. These willing efforts, combined with the 
low-carbon fuels and the efficient automobile technologies, all would contribute to 
the low-carbon equation and ensure the overall sustainability of the transport system 
is achievable.  
 
8.9.3 Marginal/Idle Land Utilisation for the 2G Biofuels  
According to Gallagher (2008), the current policies have failed to ensure that 
biofuels feedstocks are genuinely grown from the set-aside/idle lands. The invasion 
on farms and high biodiversity areas happened to give way for biofuels crops.  
 
Theoretically, the 2G lignocellulosic biofuels like miscanthus/switchgrass/jatropha 
could be grown on marginal/idle land, which can eliminate competition with farms. 
Yet, these biomasses still acquire land for growing. In any case, the oil companies as 
the cross-border project investors, mostly do not have the full authority to decide 
which idle land could be used (in the host countries) where plantations are set. 
Furthermore, it is hard to ensure that every litre of biofuels is sourced away from 
high biodiversity areas, and genuinely being produced on specific land that set aside 
for this purpose. As such, this poses another challenge for the oil companies on a 
large-scale/cross-border plantation. 
 
Hence, much remains dependent on the host government’s land planning, to ensure 
genuine marginal land has been utilised for the feedstocks growing. Collaboration 
between the oil companies, the local government and the roundtables is vital. This is 





To stop this from happening, there is a need for more comprehensive rules and 
regulations set by the host country to be instituted. The feedstocks growing process 
has to be monitored by the third party such as roundtables, apart from their current 
roles merely in formulating Principle and Criteria (P&C) for sustainable biofuels. 
The roundtables should be independent, aggressive and put those P&C into action. 
Only through the participation of these stakeholders, the actual marginal lands can be 
appropriately utilised, to materialise the G&S biofuels production. 
 
8.9.4 Transportation of Biofuels in Trade 
Compared with other types of REfT (H2/electricity), biofuels exhibit the positive 
carbon neutrality which can absorb CO2 from the atmosphere during photosynthesis. 
Despite having very low emissions, alternatives such as H2/electricity do not recycle 
CO2 in the atmosphere. 
 
To equip biofuels with carbon neutrality, highly energy efficient fuel crops, well-
planned land use and well-managed farm-to-production activities are playing their 
part in the carbon equation. If these activities can be managed well with full 
integration: to minimise the CO2 release (by minimising energy input); by avoiding 
the conversion of high biodiversity lands for biofuels plantations; and choosing high-
yield feedstocks which portray a sustainable criteria; all of these would lead to 
significant carbon savings. 
 
However, until this stage, there is still one missing activity which has not been 
accounted for in the carbon equation-the transportation of biofuels through 
international trade. Moving biofuels across borders is not only expensive, but it also 
increases global GHG/CO2 emissions during the transportation. This issue should be 
tackled by the related stakeholders, and it needs to be considered for more 




8.9.5 Corn Roundtable  
The roundtable’s principle and criteria (P&C) is to act as a control mechanism, to 
ensure biofuels supplied are G&S in products, production and supply. The P&C 
guide the front-line people such as farmers, producers, traders do on the ground in 
the activities of growing feedstocks, manufacturing biofuels and trading, in order to 
comply with the G&S criteria laid out.  
 
To date, there are four biofuels roundtables 302  established, but there is still no 
roundtable for corn. The researcher proposes, in near future, any kind of feedstocks 
should establish its own roundtable; or at least, to adopt the general P&C advocate by 
the Roundtable for Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) in order to materialise the G&S 
biofuels products, productions and supply.  
 
8.9.6 The Socioenvironmental Implications of Algae 
One of the main benefits of algae-an advanced 3G biofuels technology is that, it 
could be grown through a sea farming technique that minimises the land use. 
Although algae has the potential to produce large quantities of biofuels with higher 
GHG savings; the massive scale of growing algae, if mismanaged, could lead to 
ocean pollution and pose a threat to marine life. Therefore, the precautionary 
principle has to be instituted, to assess the socioenvironmental implications 
thoroughly before this technology is used for commercial scale production. This is to 
avoid algae pollution, another form of systemic risk from happening.  
 
8.9.7 Expansion of Criteria/Requirements for the Next Generation 
Biofuels Development  
The NGB technology within the nine criteria/requirements presents a set of 
prerequisites for the “eligibility”, the achievement of which poses numerous 
challenges for scientists/engineers involved. They must try to balance the global 
advantages of renewables against the local impacts, and come up with technically 
                                               
302 the Roundtable for Sustainable Biofuels (RSB), the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), 
the Roundtable for Responsible Soy (RTRS) and the Better Sugarcane Initiative (BSI).  
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workable, economically viable and environmentally acceptable compromises. The 
bottom line is, a new technology like the NGB needs to pass a socioenvironmental 
test, not just an economic and a technological one.  
 
Generally, these nine criteria/requirements have some degree of continuity. They do 
not appear as completely static or set in stone. This complies with the nature of 
technological innovation/change, which is dynamic and evolving. Therefore, for the 
time being, these nine criteria provide a yardstick for the NGB R&D. We can expect 
further expansion of these nine criteria/requirements through continual assessments 
from the 1G biofuels deployment, and any new requirements from any related 
stakeholders. 
 
8.10 Limitations of this Research  
The processes of biofuels deployment and development are continuous, dynamic and 
evolving. These show that, the technological change that takes place within these two 
processes is complex, highly uncertain and challenging. Even though the validity and 
reliability of this research have been assessed (in Chapter 3), the study has its 
limitations. The study examined the SG (with its relationship with the EU/UK 
Governments) and the two oil companies (BP and Shell) on biofuels deployment and 
development. As such, these findings cannot be over-generalised.  
 
Theoretically, the concept of a biofuels regulated market is extended from an oil 
regulated market. In fact, the biofuels regulated market is still under-researched. The 
research was slightly impaired by the lack of relevant literature-which study a RE 
adoption/innovation from a social science and management perspective. In addition, 
there was a scarcity of literature to investigate the large-scale risk associates with the 
deployment and development processes of a new technology.  
 
All of these left some loopholes, where many theoretical concepts were either under-
researched, restricted to ordinary market technology, or based on conventional 
corporate risk strategy. Therefore, using this literature that available to understand a 
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large social technology execution/innovation under a regulated market; R&U 
associated with technological change, the emergence of systemic risk and the 
political/corporate strategies required to deal with them; was indeed challenging.  
 
Since this research is a green field, in order to strengthen the research concepts, 
different types of literature were searched to complement one another. Social 
Shaping Technology (SST) is used to help the understanding by mapping out the 
actors; to examine the interactions between these actors; to investigate the content of 
technology; the processes of technology implementation/innovation, and to identify 
R&U arising during technological change.  
 
The Risk Governance advocated by Renn (2008) and the Risk Regulated Regime 
advocated by Hood et al. (2004) were integrated with SST. Consequently, an 
interdisciplinary concept was developed. This concept was built, to correlate the 
social shaping of one technology, and social construction of technology related R&U 
rendered by technological change. Meanwhile, risk governance and political 
strategies were integrated, to deal with these expected/unexpected R&U in a more 
systematic manner. In other words, the application of SST is to broaden the risk 
governance and risk regulated regime, thereby to facilitate the study of R&U 
associated with technological change from a social dimension. 
 
This research which investigated technological change during a large social 
technology deployment and development processes was indeed complex, uncertain 
and continuously evolving. The research could be analogised as “trying to collect 
these riches, is like holding a bucket under a waterfall”-Hamish Handerson (1960). 
What the researcher has captured and presented in this study was indeed limited. Yet 
the researcher believes, the potential/contributions of RE development and 
deployment under the theoretical sphere of SST, risk governance and risk regulated 





8.11 Suggestions for Future Research  
Since a single PhD research project is, by nature, restricted to what can be 
accomplished in four-year-time, this section highlights some potential areas that can 
be used as ideas for further research. 
(a) There are two models resulting from this research. Model one depicts the 
interplay of the respective stakeholders to commence the 1G biofuels deployment in 
the UK. Meanwhile, Model two describes the social shaping nine 
criteria/requirements for the NGB development. Both have pictured the existing 
scenario leading to biofuels implementation in the UK, as well as the future context 
which is guiding and shaping the NGB.  
 
These two models would provide some potential topics in the near future. Model one 
could be used, to investigate additional mechanisms, or the emergence of any new 
actor (for example automobile industry, independent agriculture industry), which 
would influence the regional/national biofuels continuation. Meanwhile, Model two 
allows for further examination on emerging criteria for the NGB development. We 
could expect some new criteria to be added to the existing one, not only to 
materialise the respective interests of the stakeholders, but also to ensure that the 
NGB could be technically workable, economically viable and environmentally 
acceptable.  
 
(b) The regulators' political authority and the oil companies’ business strategy in risk 
governance would also evolve over time. Some new types of R&U would emerge, 
which would require different types of strategy and control/preventive mechanism.  
 
This research has investigated the 1G biofuels deployment, while analysing the NGB 
development which is currently ongoing. It is estimated that after the year 2015, 
when the NGB technologies are commercially available, we can expect a new 
landscape on the NGB deployment which will cause new political, social, economic 
and environmental implications. The rule of thumb is: technology, once developed or 
implemented, not only react back upon their environments, but also generate new 
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implications (Clark and Staunton, 1989; Fleck, 1993). Thus, the various stages in the 
NGB development to its deployment, provides some interesting topics where further 
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Appendix 1.1 Technological Change  
The notion of induced technological change (TC) was firstly introduced by Hicks 
(1932). He noted that, changes in relative prices of production factors such as 
labour/capital, would spur the development and diffusion of new technology in order 
to economise on the usage of more expensive production factor. Starting from 1960s, 
this notion of induced TC has been used by the “endogenous” or “new” growth 
theory to account for economic growth and TC endogenously within a macro 
economic model. Subsequently, the idea of induced TC has been applied to a variety 
of other disciplines. More recently (since the mid-1990s), it has also been used in the 
field of energy, environmental economics and climate policy modelling (Sijm, 2004). 
 
According to Sijm (2004), the process of TC covers the widely used Schumpeterian 
trilogy of invention303, innovation304 and diffusion305. In his paper, the induced TC is 
defined as the component of TC that is brought about in response to government 
climate policy. Climate policy is primarily aimed at reducing the GHG/CO2 
emissions, and includes both market-based instruments (taxes, subsidies and tradable 
permits) and command-and-control regulations (setting performance, targets or 
technological-based standards for firms).  
 
Appendix 2.1.1 The Value Chains of Oil and Biofuels  
Figure 2.1.1 The Value Chains of Oil and Biofuels (Shell, 2010b). 
 
There is a rudimentary strong correlation between biofuels and hydrocarbon. During 
the introduction of the UK Renewable Transport Fuels Obligation (RTFO306) in 
2008-2010, BP and Shell started buying biofuels on the international market, 
blending biofuels with petrol/diesel and then supplying to the UK market. Therefore, 
the downstream activities of biofuels blending with hydrocarbon have been in place 
since the execution of hydrocarbon supply.  
 
                                               
303 the first development and demonstration of a scientifically/technically new product or process. 
304 the first regular commercial production of a new technology. 
305 the spread of a new technology across its potential market. 
306 The RTFO requires the UK's transport fuel suppliers to ensure 5% of all road vehicle fuels 
supplied are from biofuels by 2013/2014.  
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Appendix 2.1.2 Types of Rules and the Means of Enforcement for the 
Government and the Oil Companies under the UK Biofuels Regulated Market  
Supported by Voigt and Engerer (2002), five types of rules and enforcement are 
given in Table 2.1.1. 
 
By operating within the UK BRM, rules are steering a complex series of profit 
maximising aims for the oil companies; while also guiding the government's 
responsibilities to achieve public socioeconomic welfare (conventional). Both the 
government agencies and the oil corporations have established sets of internal rules 
(private) which lead towards better performances307, and which can then be evaluated 
by the public (customs). The oil companies are adopting state laws into their 
operations, while contributing in some socioenvironmental instances under their 
corporate social responsibility (ethical).  
 
In addition, the regional laws from the EU are influencing the UK Government (as a 
member state of the EU) in some of the UK policy formulations, as well as   
 
Table 2.1.1: Rules as Guidelines for the Government and the Oil Companies under 
the UK Biofuels Regulated Market (BRM) 
Rules Enforcement  Relevance to biofuels development and deployment 
Convention Self- 
enforcing 
The government (the ruling party) tries to sustain its ultimate political authority 
(to be reelected) for sustainable governance, while the oil companies strive for 
profit maximisation. However, apart from fulfilling their respective goals, both 
institutions are obliged to achieve socioeconomic development and 
environmental protection. Therefore, they have to collaborate with each other in 
order to execute biofuels supply and biofuels development in the UK, for the 
sake of social, economic and environmental benefits. 
Ethical  Self- 
commitment 
Gradually being practised by the oil companies as a corporate social 
responsibility. By showing a more humanistic business attitude308 which differss 
from their previous motive-which was solely profit maximisation. Inevitably, 
practising ethical rules will build a more positive image for the oil companies, 
whom are morally and ethically responsible to the social, economic and 
environmental implications. This will raise the oil companies’ social stature, and 




The British public empowers the government (through ballot box) to run the 
country, while at the same time buying the oil companies' biofuels and therefore 
materialising the companies’ profit making aim. Hence, a society has a forceful 
influence if it acts collectively as one entity. In addition, some social 
representations (environmentalists/social movements and media) are scrutinising 
the government policies (formulation and implementation) and the private 
companies' business executions. These social groups are acting as the third force, 
by lobbying their diversified interests, and justifying their roles in protecting the 
public’s welfares on social, economic and environmental issues. 
                                               
307 Financial performance for the oil companies, which is to generate wealth for the shareholders and 
to secure employment for its members who are working in the company. The government is 
responsible to safeguard social harmonisation, environmental protection, national/local economic 
development, returns on public investments, higher employment opportunities and others. 
308 In biofuels plantation, the oil companies are showing concerns to the local environment (by not 
polluting the biodiversity) and assuming responsibility for their employees (health and safety, no 
forced/child labours). For the NGB development, the oil companies funding R&D projects generate 
knowledge transfer (from academic/commercial biotechnology institutions to the public), employment 
opportunity (research jobs) and safeguarding the social and environmental concerns (by seeking non-






Public agencies and the oil companies have a number of sets of private rules to 
ensure their efficient execution and their operations can be measured such as: 
Quality and Standard, ISOs, Codes of Conduct, Business Principles, 
management, corporate rules and others. Some of them will publish their 
performances using corporate annual reports, civil service and efforts 
accomplishment reports. The recently established biofuels roundtables have 
pulled in both public agencies and the oil companies, in order to working on 






The contributions of biofuels had some positive effects on national economic 
growth. Thus, sets of regulations have been enforced through policies, 
directives309, mandatory targets and regulations, all of which are in place to 
control the oil companies’ biofuels supply. After the emergence of the systemic 
risk, the G&S requirements have been prioritised by the UK Renewable Fuel 
Agency (RFA), whilst the oil companies are obligated to comply with these two 
requirements in their monthly reporting system to the RFA.  
Source: The researcher utilised Voigt and Engerer (2002) framework. pp. 132. Ch. 2 and adopted it for the UK 
BRM 
 
governance and administration (state). Therefore, rules provide clear roles and 
responsibilities, and fundamentally assign the government and the oil companies into 
their respective responsibilities of operations and commitments. This will not only 
ensure effective executions, but will also handle any problems/R&U encountered 
during routine operations as well as the processes of decision-making. 
 
Appendix 2.1.3 Five General Types of Institution for the UK Biofuels Regulated 
Market   
The UK BRM has two main actors: the UK Government (linking with the EU and 
the devolved government like the Scottish Government, SG) and the oil companies. 
The political character of the regulatory actions and the socioeconomic motivations 
are mediated through the domestic market.  
 
The BRM is a market, where there is a degree of supervision/intervention by the 
governments concerning permissible price movements and market behaviour for 
biofuels adoption. The oil companies are responsible for the consistent biofuels 
supply310  according to the obligated annual targets of the RTFO. Therefore, the 
operations of the BRM are guided by rules (as discussed at appendix 2.1.2), and 
motivated by the respective interests of the actors and secured by commitments.   
 
By using five general types of institution (FGTI) advocated by Gregory and Stuart 
(2004): the structure of BRM, mechanisms in place, institutional arrangements, and 
the interactions between the governments and the oil companies could be explained 
further (summarised in Table 2.1.2). 
 
(a) Principal versus Agent 
The UK BRM at the policy-making level, most decisions are made at the highest 
                                               
309 Directive is a European statute adopted by the Council of Ministers, and must be enacted by 
member states through a national Act of Parliament or an equivalent measure. Directives typically set 
out a framework of principles and legislative objectives, which is given in greater detail as it is 
transposed into national law, regulations or collective agreements (Edmund and Noon, 2008). 
310 Biofuels have to be distributed which are convenient for accessibility, constant for availability and 
quantity, and consistent in quality. Under the RTFO, all oil companies are obligated to comply with 
the annually increasing targets of biofuels blend in petrol/diesel.  
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level of a regional political authority-the EU. These decisions are then passed down 
to the respective member states of the espective national level like the UK 
Government to enact. In reality, the EU is formed by the representatives from each of 
the member states. Therefore, most of the decisions made are near unanimous. 
Biofuels activation was due to the EU/UK Governments' mandate. Through regional 
and national policies formulation to have biofuels implemented. This top-down 
approach to political power reflects the institution, and is influenced by the market 
structure of the EU under the Single Market principle.  
 
At a national level, the UK Government acts as the national principal, with the 
executive legislative power and links with the devolved governments like the SG, 
and passes regulatory decisions made311 to the oil companies (agents) as the biofuels 
suppliers. The principal-the UK Government is responsible for the national policy 
executions, and for monitoring the oil companies' performances, in order to ensure 
the SG is adopting regional biofuels policies and the oil companies are supplying 
biofuels, which specifically comply with the state law.  
 
An agency created by the Department for Transport (DfT)-the Renewable Fuel 
Agency (RFA), is an agent of the DfT. Therefore the RFA is empowered by the DfT, 
to monitor biofuels deployment in the UK, through the monthly biofuels carbon and 
sustainability312 reporting systems feedback by the oil companies. What is signified 
from these principal-agent relationships is that, there are many overlapping roles 
taking place. A principal could be also acting as an agent for another principal. For 
example, the UK Government acts as an agent for the EU Government, yet it is also 
the principal in the UK. The RFA acts as an agent for the DfT, simultaneously also 
playing a role as the principal for the oil companies.  Thus, these identifications are 
merely to present the relationships, interactions and the responsibilities which 
separate the decision makers and the decision executors.  
 
(b) Market and Plan 
Gregory and Stuart (2004) advocate, market and plan are two mechanisms for 
providing information and to coordinate decisions within biofuels deployment and 
development. Plan is a tool to control biofuels execution; while market is to manage 
a supply-and-demand function. Utilities like biofuels involve very high transaction 
costs which need the participation of both regulators and the oil companies, in order 
to ensure the effective implementation within a nation. Therefore, the UK BRM has 
the combination of both plan and market mechanisms. This could be justified as 
follow: 
 
Biofuels are an important commodity. Without them, the initial UK target for quicker 
road transport CO2/GHG reduction would not materialise. The production of biofuels 
affects other sectors of the economy, by generating wealth in agriculture, biofuels 
manufacturers and biofuels research institutions. The benefit of a regulated market 
versus a free market is that, many times a free market works less than perfectly, and 
fails in some cases when dealing with such a large social technology like biofuels.  
                                               
311 Information is appeares in the form of policies, directives, acts, regulations, standards and 
mandatory targets of biofuels.  
312 the quantity sold on particular month, the source of the biofuels and the CO2 savings achieved. 
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Firstly, the security of biofuels supply is important to the domestic consumer. This 
requires that biofuels capacity must be consistently available, at all time for road 
transport use. To solve the security problem, some regulations have been 
implemented; which require the oil companies to provide appropriate levels of 
investment and commitment of supply. Secondly, externalities arise when the private 
costs of production and consumption are not equal to those of society. The solution is 
the incentive provision, which partially absorbs and lowers the production cost, while 
maintaining an affordable retail prices so that domestic consumers will be able to 
afford their products.    
 
Thirdly, the time scale associated with the decision and execution on biofuels is for 
long-term. It also follows from the sheer size and the scope of projects: R&D, 
infrastructure development and production plants construction are among the largest 
investments in biofuels economies. Therefore, market forces alone might not be 
capable of dealing with the long-term planning that these decisions require. 
 
The current decisions on biofuels deployment are mainly made by the policy makers 
and reflect the interests of future consumption, price and the concerns over 
safeguarding the socioenvironmental in a sustainable manner. Many corporate 
biofuels R&D projects run over an extended period of time, and the longer the 
investment time period, the greater the degree of R&U over future returns. This is 
where the role of the government is required. The government intervention could 
ameliorate the R&U situation by supporting the future of biofuels through positive 
political messages (biofuels would sustain to 2020 and beyond under the RTFO) in 
order to convince the oil companies of promising biofuels business prospects after 
their huge investments have been incurred. 
 
Fourthly, even if a competitive market in biofuels were desirable, it is still not yet 
feasible. Many areas of biofuels and hydrocarbon are supplied through the oil 
companies seem to be naturally oligopolistic. Therefore, biofuels have been 
concentrated in the hands of a few major firms, which have sought to influence the 
markets they operate. The existence of an oligopoly structure with the absence of 
competitive pressure has proved a motive for a government intervention.  
 
Furthermore, under the free market principles, the costs of investment by the oil 
companies could be recouped, by imposing extremely high future prices when the 
company’s investments have been brought into operations. The oil companies might 
be induced to provide a margin by the prospect of the revenues they could gain, once 
the results of their R&D projects have been attained. Since biofuels comprises a 
substantial proportion of the household budgets of the poor, the pricing policy of 
biofuels is likely to have a considerable impact on poverty, and the poor should be 
protected directly through lower fixed prices for affordability (Helm, et al., 2000). In 
order to do so, the government is required to play its role in safeguarding those who 
might find it unaffordable.  
 
Because the free market setting has its limitations, it could be challenged for security 
of supply, externalities, long-term commitment and the degree of competitiveness 
which might lead to social exploitation and inequality. The government is required in 
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order to manage, control and monitor, ensuring that the utility could reach everyone 
while protecting the social interests. This is supported by Stiglitz's (2000), the 
government must take an active role in balancing the economic system and 
alleviating the worst aspects of energy poverty, while private enterprises should be 
allowed to play the central role in the economy.  
 
(c) Control and Income 
Under the UK BRM, the economic system is mixed which consisting of both private 
and public decisions. Biofuels supply is carried out by a few oil companies operating 
in the UK market, while the government grants the licences to the oil companies to 
run their businesses on oil extraction, refinery and supply. In return, the oil 
companies are paying excise duties and sales taxes to the government. This is where 
the oil companies make a major financial contribution to the government treasury. 
These royalties are often the main source of the government revenue, and the taxes 
collected are used to achieve the desired socioeconomic distribution. Besides, the 
government will support the product (biofuels blend with hydrocarbon) through 
taxes, incentive system and the retail prices are set through subsidies313. Under this 
framework, consumers with a high preference for price stability can purchase 
biofuels blend with hydrocarbon with ease of mind.  
 
There are three control components under the UK BRM: Firstly, some international 
structures which follow the natural characteristics of oil industry and its cross border 
market setting, such as the biofuels quality control314. Secondly, a respective national 
regulatory system (like the RFA) to manage, control and monitor the market with 
biofuels blends supply, but which would not interfere the oil companies' businesses 
operations, unless the objections raised were from the social control. Thirdly, an 
information system which allows for the inter-monitoring between the government 
and the oil companies, as well as both parties generating information to the society 
for the public concerns. 
 
The oil companies' lucrative financial contributions have enriched the government's 
treasury for so many decades. Hence, the leeway of the oil companies’ business 
operations is fitted into capitalist principles. This freedom would ensure the oil 
companies could run their businesses with the highest efficiency and generate more 
revenues for the companies/shareholders, as well as for the government. This 
explains that, even though under the regulated market, it is the market context of 




Ideally, if the government (principal) had perfect information, incentives would not 
be necessary. However under the BRM, the complexity of biofuels production 
sources and supplies, the principal typically lacks such perfect information. The oil 
companies (agents) know much more about local circumstances, and have higher 
                                               
313 Biofuels subsidies cost approximately £550m annually (BBC News, 26 August 2008). 
314 The biofuels standards have to be complied with the European Standards: on the biodiesel EN 




control on the biofuels value chain than the principal. Therefore, the agents gain local 
decision-making authority in a number of realms. The government, thus, needs to 
devise an incentive system that will induce the oil companies to act in the interests of 
the government (mandate of biofuels). This is because, if the principal's incentive 
system is flawed, then the agent will not act in the interest of the principal.  
 
Under the UK BRM, the UK Government utilises financial incentives to motivate the 
oil companies. According to the Department for Transport (2008), the UK 
Government’s support is through fuel duty incentives. Biodiesel and bioethanol are 
taxed at 20p/litre less than fossil petrol and diesel. This support is guaranteed until 
March 2010. The biodiesel incentive has been in place since July 2002, while 
bioethanol’s was introduced in January 2005. The aim for this is to keep the biofuels 
production cost low, in order to pass on to the market, ensuring affordable prices to 
the consumers. 
 
(e) The Role of the Government 
Several EU/UK broad biofuels policy areas are prioritising some regional/national 
political, social and economic agendas. The collective aims are to reduce imported 
oil demand, develop the next generation biofuels (NGB) technologies, cutting GHG 
emissions and increase domestic supplies of biofuels from home agriculture power. 
However it is more complex than it might first seem. There are some other options 
that have been suggested such as reducing the use in the transportation sector, to 
keep further improvements in automotive fuel efficiency and to encourage alternative 
technologies for automobile.  
 
Since biofuels execution is under the EU/UK Governments' mandate, effectuating the 
biofuels programme regionally and the RTFO nationally would challenge the 
institutional knowledge and experiences of the EU/UK Government for such a new 
and large scale of technological application. The good news is that, there is 
consistent collaboration and support from the oil companies, which allow both to 
work together to ensure the effective execution of biofuels. The government is 
playing its role as the principal. Through policies formulation, biofuels standards are 
set up and incentives provided to ease biofuels execution, while passing the baton of 
the execution roles to the oil companies for biofuels supply.  
 
Summary  
The analysis of using FGTI (summarised in table 2.1.2), even though simple, it could 
describe some of the basic mechanisms, interactions, structures and operations taking 
place within the UK BRM (shown in figure 2.1.2). The BRM allows private 
businesses to pursue their own private economic objectives; simultaneously 
accepting the influence/interventions of the governments to achieve the public's 









Table 2.1.2: Adoption of the FGTI in the UK BRM 
FGTI Energy Economics Explanation on the UK BRM 
(a) Decision-making structure 
-Rules as guidelines (refer 
appendix 2.1.2) 
-Principal versus agent 
Primarily 
Decentralised 
The oil companies formed an oligopolistic 
market structure, operating under regulated 
mechanism intervenes by the political 
authorities. The UK Government and the SG 
act as the principals, while the oil companies 
are the agents-the suppliers for biofuels 
execution. Generally they are tied by the rules-
as guidelines of their respective roles and 
responsibilities (refer appendix 2.1.2).  
(b) Mechanisms for 
Information provision and 
Coordination 
-Market and plan 
Combination of 
market and plan  
Regulations, legal setting from the UK 
Government in order to execute consistent 
supervising. However, the oil companies are 
allowed to operate under capitalism for their 
profit seeking objectives. 
(c) Property Rights 
-Control and income: Control 
biofuels national price through 
biofuels subsidies. Besides, the 
quality is also under control in 
order to comply the European 
Standard (both technical 
compliance and environmental 
conformity) 
Public limited 
company  (the 
privatised oil 
companies) 
Regulations, legal setting from the UK 
Government to the oil companies to ensure that 
the biofuels commencement would achieve the 
initial objectives. The UK Government is 
collecting royalties and taxes from the oil 
companies.  
(d) Incentives Primarily Market Financial incentive from the UK Government 
to the oil companies 
(e) Public Choice Regulated Continuous management, monitoring and 
control from the UK Government, as well as 
the influence from the EU Government (under 
the single market principle). 













Figure 2.1.2: The UK BRM with FGTI Analysis 
Indicators: a to e are Five types of institution linking the interactions between the governments and the 
oil companies 
-The arrows at both ends represent relationship established between the government/oil companies 
and their respective stakeholders-such as social movements, environmentalists, roundtables and 
others.  
 
Appendix 2.1.4 Roles of the Government in the Mixed Economy 
According to Stiglitz (2000), while many economic activities are undertaken by 
private firms, others are undertaken by the government. In addition, the government 
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alters the behaviour of private sectors through a variety of regulations, taxes and 
subsidies. This then generates another question, why the government intervenes in 
economic activities? One dominant view in the 18th century, particularly among 
French economists was that: the government should actively promote trade and 
industry. Advocates of this view were called mercantilists. It was partly in response 
Adam Smith-the founder of modern economics whom argued for a limited role of the 
government in economic activities. Smith attempted to show how competition and 
the profit motive would lead individuals in pursuing their own private interests as 
well as to serve the public interest. The profit motive would lead individuals, 
competing against one another, to supply the goods other individuals wanted. Only 
firms that produced what is wanted at a low possible price would survive.  
 
Smith's ideas had a powerful influence both on the governments and on economists. 
Many of the most important 19th century economists: John Stuart Mill and Nassau 
Senior promulgated the doctrine known as laissez faire. In their view, the 
government should leave the private sector alone. It should not attempt to regulate or 
control private enterprise, as unfettered competition would serve the best interests of 
society. However not all 19th century social thinkers were persuaded by Smith's 
reasoning. The grave inequalities in income that they saw around them: the squalor in 
which much of the working classes lived and the social problems, unemployment 
that workers frequency faced had concerned them. While 19th century writers like 
Charles Dickens attempted to portray the plight of the working classes in novels, 
social theorists such as Karl Marx, Sismondi and Robert Owen, have developed 
theories that not only attempted to explain what they saw but also suggested ways in 
which society might need to be reorganised (Stiglitz, 2000). 
 
Many attributed the evils in society to the private ownership of capital-what Adam 
Smith saw as a virtue they saw as a vice. Marx was certainly the most influential 
among those who advocated a greater role for the state in controlling the means of 
production. On one hand, private ownership of capital/unfettered free enterprise, 
while the other, the government control of the means of production. These contrary 
principles were to become a driving force for international politics and economics in 
the 20th century. Today, the countries of the former Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc 
are in the midst of a monumental transition to a market system. There is now 
widespread agreement that markets and private enterprises are at the heart of a 
successful economy, but the government has to play an important role to complement 
the market (Stiglitz, 2000). 
 
The free market concept which operates based on the supply-and-demand 
mechanism has shown some critical evidences of market failures. Since the Great 
depression in 1925, to the current World Financial Crisis 2008-2012, there is a 
widespread view that market has failed in an important way. The public has put an 
enormous pressure on the government to do some corrective actions for the 
aftermaths. In responding to the economic crisis, various nations not only take a 
more proactive role in attempting to stabilise the level of economic activities, but 





Appendix 2.3.1 Branches of Renewable Energy Study 
There are few branches of the RE study. The classification below, are a simplification 
to show some examples. 
(a) Science:  
-Bockris (2009) covers six sources of RE (solar, wind, waves, tides, geothermal and 
hydro). The feasibility in each case is analysed, stressing how the inexhaustible 




-Bent (2007) provides strategies for the efficient conversion, transmission and 
storage; all forms of processes for RE such as geothermal, biological/liquid fuels, 
wave energy and photovoltaic.  
-Twidell and Weir (2006) emphasis on science and engineering, the environmental 
benefits and impacts of each technology (solar, photovoltaic, wind, hydro, biofuels, 
wave, tidal, ocean and geothermal). His work is a numerate and quantitative text 
covering subjects of proven technical and economic importance that supported by 
modern applications and case studies.  
-Kaltschmitt et al. (2007) present the physical and technical principles of utilising 
RE. The technologies of heat provision from passive and active solar systems, 
ambient air, shallow and deep geothermal sources, working together with electric 
generation from solar, wind, hydro and ocean energy. 
-Wengenmayr and Buhrke (2008) give a concise overview in obtaining energy from 
RE (solar, geothermal, wind, waves and solar cooling). They also explain methods 
for energy storage, transportation and conversion to useful forms. 
 
(c) Policy Study 
-Assmann et al. (2006) provide a review of RE from world authorities including 
policy recommendations and best practice examples. An emphasis on policy and 
actions contributed from internationally renowned organisations to form an overview 
on the current status, impacts and the future potential of RE.  
-Mallon (2006) outlines how RE can be promoted at political level, through 
encouraging the expansion of current market and the establishment of new industries.  
There are various levels of policies:   
-Defra. June 2009. 
-Department of Energy and Climate Change. 2006. 
-European Commission. January 2006 
-Scottish Executive. 2006 
-UNFCC. 2008 
 
(d) Environmental Preservation  
-Sorense (2004)'s work address different types of RE from technical descriptions of 
the devices that can be used to transform the energy into useful forms, to decrease the 
environmental impacts. 
-Girardet and Mendonca (2009) treat the subject of climate change and RE as an 
ethical problem to be addressed on behalf of future generations. It has integrated 
much of the research and campaign work being done by the World Future Council: 
the work on feed-in tariffs, energy efficiency, sustainable agriculture, sustainable 
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cities, future justice and the KidsCall campaign.  
 
Appendix 2.3.2 Branches of Biofuels Study 
There are few branches of the biofuels study. The classification below, are simplified 
to show some examples. 
(a) Nature Science 
-Lal and Stewart (2009) review the ecological consequences of biofuels and evaluate 
land use in the production of raw material for biofuels. Their work spotlights issues 
related to corn and cellulosic ethanol, and offers advice for achieving economic 
balance in the competition for arable land between food and biofuels. 
-McBrewster et al. (2009) discuss types of biofuels which derived from algae, 
vegetable oils, soybean and seaweed. Besides, introduction of biogasoline, methanol, 
butanol from chemical and physics disciplines also being discussed.   
 
(b) Technology/Engineering 
-Soetaert and Vandamme (2009) discuss about the past accomplishments and future 
needs in developing biofuels industry. Their work highlights the significance of 
producing biofuels from biobased feedstocks and the technological developments in 
agriculture sector.  
-Westermann et al. (2006) discuss the integration of Biomass Fermentation and Fuel 
Cells technology towards making fuels from wastes. 
-Drapcho et al. (2008) describe the concepts, systems and technology involved in 
biofuels production. 
-Demirbas's (2008) discusses the production of biofuels from wood, straw and 
household waste by using Fischer-Tropsch synthesis. 
-Nag (2008) describes the latest refining processes and issues involved in producing 
fuel derived from recently living organisms/by-products. His work offers a 
discussion of theory and the actual experimental procedure used to economically 
manufacture biofuels on a commercial scale. 
 
Appendix 2.3.3 The UK Wave Energy Programme 
In 1974, the Labour Government launched a RE development programme, the wave 
power was initially seen as a front runner. When a Conservative Government came to 
power in 1979, it was evidently supportive. John Moore, the Energy Minister, 
commented in September 1980 “Whatever other problems wave energy researchers 
may face, lack of Government support will not be among them”(Moore,1980). The 
device teams in universities and elsewhere worked enthusiastically with some scale 
prototypes were tested in open water (Elliott, 2003d).  
 
However, in 1982, views had changed and the wave R&D funding from £14 million 
to £11-12 million, following assessment from the Advisory Committee on Research 
and Development (ACORD) (Elliott, 2003d). The justifications for cutting was 
economic, due to the aftermath of US early 1980s recession, and aimed in saving 
public expenditure. Besides, the generation cost of 20p/kWh or more were 
mentioned, although the Energy Technology Support Unit (ETSU) reviewed, wave 
power put the likely cost of generation at 4p-12p/kWh. Even so, it concluded that 
“Wave power is likely to be economic only in future more favourable to RE 
technology” (ETSU, 1982). This story opened up some general issues, concerning 
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the way technological innovation is handled (Elliott, 1995). The approach adopted in 
the UK government's initial programme on wave power (from 1976 onwards), was to 
establish a 2GW reference design target, and asked the wave power device learns to 
develop proposals for devices on that scale. Given that only small tank-tested models 
were available at that stage, it was quite a jump to try to come up with designs for 
full scale systems (Elliott, 2003d). 
 
It has been argued by some innovation theorists that, large scale projects like this are 
inevitably inflexible. They do not allow an opportunity for piecemeal adaptation, 
incremental development feedback and learning from mistakes (Elliott, 2003d). In 
1993, Audley Genus argued, the 2GW wave system design target reflected the UK 
energy establishment obsession with large scale units, as having all the hallmarks of 
inflexible technology. Thus, “lead times appear to be long, capital intensity high, unit 
size large and enormous investments of time, capital and other resources would have 
to be made before any learning about actual performance and improvements of these 
systems could be realised” (Genus, 1993). “This in turn made it very hard to come up 
with sensible cost estimates, and even harder to make sensible decisions about the 
future of the technology,” commented Stephen Sailer (Sailer, 1981). 
 
There have been allegations that errors were made in ACORD's assessment, and 
some of the assessments conducted by external consultants were suppressed. Some 
critics suggested that there had been a pro-nuclear bias, which the way wave power 
had been treated. There were also concerns expressed about the stand of ETSU at the 
Atomic Energy Authority's Research. For its part, ETSU strenuously protested its 
independence. Other critics claimed that, the technology had been assessed at too 
early stage in its development (Elliott, 2003d).  
 
As all party House of Commons Select Committee on Energy put it in 1984, the 
suspicion was that wave energy was effectively withdrawn before the race began 
(Select Committee 1984). There was considerable pressure from the Select 
Committee and from RE lobbyists for a reassessment. In 1989, a new review by 
ETSU was set in motion (Elliott, 2003d). However, in November 1992, the 
conclusions were similar: “Deep sea wave energy was still not seen as economic and 
inshore/onshore wave energy systems were not viewed much more favourably” 
(Thorpe, 1992). Of course very little new work had been done in the ten years since 
the 1982 decision to cut R&D financial support, this conclusion might not be 
surprising, because the 1982 decision certainly put a halt to work on deep-sea wave 
power (Elliott, 2003d). 
 
It was not until a change of the government, in 1998 that the wave power issue was 
revisited seriously. Although not much new work had been done on wave energy in 
the UK, the political climate had clearly changed, in part because of growing 
concerns about climate change (Elliott, 2003d). A series of reassessments of wave 
energy was carried out. Initially, as part of the UK Technology Foresight programme, 
culminating in March 2001 with an admission by the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) that the decision in 1992 to abandon wave energy was wrong: “With 




Clearly, the fortunes of wave energy were changing, and the same happened in 
relation to tidal power. The favoured tidal technology now involving the extraction of 
energy via free-standing turbines mounted in the flow, rather than by large expensive 
and environmentally invasive tidal barrages (Elliott, 2003d). In May 2001, the House 
of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee commented: “Given the 
UK's abundant natural wave and tidal resource, it is extremely regrettable and 
surprising that the development of wave and tidal energy technologies has received 
so little support from the government” (Select Committee, 2001). Subsequently, 
ministers have increasingly keen to be seen as pro wave and tidal current projects, 
even though the level of funding that has emerged may not have reflected the 
rhetoric. So far only around £6 million has been allocated to new wave and tidal 
projects. Of course, the validity of these reassessments has still to be demonstrated. 
However, rather than trying to pick winners at an early stage, it seems wiser to allow 
a range of developments to proceed; especially since the level of expenditure at the 
R&D stage is relatively small (Elliott, 2003d). 
 
The wave power story indicates that new technologies face major problems in getting 
accepted-there can be institutional biases and lack of vision (Elliott, 2003d). Given 
the uncertainties and the way wave power was treated in the UK, it is obviously hard 
to decide how to develop which new technologies. Much of the basic data is just not 
there, especially with novel technologies like renewables (Elliott, 2003d).  
 
Appendix 2.3.4 The Wind Power Project 
The second case study concerns the way wind power was developed, mainly on the 
approaches adopted in the UK, USA and Denmark. From the mid 1970s, the USA 
has adopted a high-tech aerospace approach with the emphasis on large/complex 
prototypes of the 2.5MW Boeing/NASA series. When the UK started its own wind 
programme in the early 1980s, a large 3MW machine (with the cost £17million) was 
built by the Wind Energy Group on the Orkney Islands. However, the large machines 
were not successful. There were some technical failures due to the great stresses on 
the giant blades, as they were too big, complex and expensive, pushing the 
technology too far too soon, which ended up these projects then have to be 
abandoned (Elliott, 2003d). 
 
Around the world, commercial has shifted to smaller machines of around 300-400k 
rated power. Denmark had already taken a lead by emphasising relatively small, 
simple, robust machines, which subsequently proved to be a world beater. The 
Danish machines sold in great numbers to the USA and later to the UK (Elliott, 
2003d). Part of the problem with the top-down, large scale, high-tech approach was, 
aerospace engineering concepts were not as relevant as expected when it came to 
devising systems that had to operate with varying wind loads315. As one US wind 
turbine engineer put it: “We were guilty of steady flow aerospace thinking and 
                                               
315 Solely taking the most established aerospace and aviation technology, to venturing the wind 
power, has misjudged that: fundamentally both technologies are totally different, and also will be 
applied into a dissimilar surrounding; at least different in altitude and knots. In general sense, wind 
farms can only offer power intermittently, as we cannot expect the wind keeps blowing constantly 
from one direction. Therefore, solely a high-tech push with a simple thought: high-tech products 
guarantee commercial success could hardly match with the actual social acceptance.  
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largely did not appreciate the range and difficulty of the wind environment” 
(Stoddard 1986). 
 
Interestingly, in recent years, machine sizes have increased dramatically with 1-2MW 
machines now being in use, and some even larger units are being developed. 
Incremental development seems to be the order of the day. Overall it seems that the 
initial focus on small machines, developed on an incremental “bottom-up” approach, 
has clearly triumphed over the top-down and high-tech approach which laid the bash 
for expansion (Elliott, 2003d). 
 
Appendix 2.3.5 the UK Geothermal Programme 
The UK's hot dry rock programme involved an experimental well at Camborne, was 
funded by the UK government. A double well system was created316, but the initial 
results were disappointing: less power was produced than expected due to problems 
with the geology. Furthermore, establishing an efficient heat-extracting well 
configuration is difficult and expensive, even assuming the basic concepts are sound 
(Elliott, 2003d). 
 
Nevertheless, the initial failure of the Camborne well led to a loss of confidence in 
the project, which by this stage had cost some £42 million. In 1994, the UK 
programme was halted, with the government concluding that the technology was not 
likely to generate electricity economically. Work on geothermal power has continued 
elsewhere in the world, but the Camborne project has been portrayed as a failure 
(NAO, 1994).  
 
Appendix 2.3.6 Tidal Barrages in the UK 
The UK tidal power is not a new concept due to the geographical advantage of the 
UK. The barrage has been operating successfully on the Ranee Estuary, France since 
1968. However, obtaining finance for major tidal projects proved to be difficult in the 
UK (Elliott, 2003e). When the UK renewables research and assessment programme 
started in the mid 1970s, the tidal option was seen as significant, because the UK had 
some of the best sites in the world, notably the Severn Estuary.  
 
A government-backed Severn Barrage Committee was set up to review the potential 
and reported back in 1981, confirming the results and indicated that a tidal barrage 
on the Severn Estuary would be technically feasible and could generate power at 
competitive costs once built. Although the Severn barrage scheme was seen as 
technically viable, the capital cost of building it would be very large-around £10 
billion. The Severn Tidal Power Group-an industrial consortium consisting of many 
of the UK's leading construction and engineering companies has developed a 
proposal for an 11-mile long barrage, which could meet about 6% of the UK 
                                               
316 The basic idea is to create a fissure system between the bottom ends of the two wells to act as 
means of collecting heat, with cold water being pumped down one well and hot water/steam emerging 
up the other. The fissure system is created by exploding a small charge at the bottom of the wells and 
this has to be done in exactly the right way. Technically, if the fissure system created allows water to 
pass through too easily, the flow through is too high and not enough heat is picked up. While if the 
artificial heat exchanger created by the fissure offers too much resistance to the water being pumped 
though, the flow rate is reduced and again not enough heat is absorbed. The fissure connections have 
to be just right and that depends on the precise geological nature of the strata (Elliott, 2003d). 
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electricity requirements (Department of Energy, 1989). 
 
As it turned out, the main problem to face tidal power was the changed economic 
environment that emerged following the privatisation of the UK electricity industry 
in 1989-90. The Central Electricity Generating Board-the UK's nationalised utility, 
was broken up and the smaller private companies that replaced it were unlikely to be 
interested in a major project of this sort. A project on this scale might have been 
viable as a long-term publicly financed national investment, or via partnership 
arrangement with industry. However, following the privatisation of the electricity 
industry, it became clear that the government was not going to provide any further 
funding and the Severn barrage project was stalled. The private sector would be 
unlikely to want to take it on single-handedly, since in the economic climate of the 
time, it would be looking for much higher rates of return over shorter periods (Elliott, 
2003e). 
 
Appendix 2.3.7 Public Reactions to Wind Farm in the UK 
By using the case study of the UK wind farm, Elliott (2003f) elaborates the actual 
scenario from the public reactions towards this project. It provides an example of the 
social needs, when seeking to new projects introduction, to be sensitive to local 
concerns and try to balance local environmental costs against global environmental 
benefits. New energy technologies are inevitably unfamiliar and their deployment 
can lead to public concern. There were some battles as the wind farm programme got 
underway with local oppositions.  
 
The response from the environmental groups was mixed. Friends of the Earth 
maintained their long held support of wind power. So did the Labour Party affiliate 
Socialist Environment and Resources Association (SERA) and Greenpeace. The 
WWF and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds were also supportive. 
However, some other major conservation groups, such as the National Trust were 
more critical of wind farms, while the Campaign for the Protection of Rural Wales, 
which initially adopted a supportive if critical stance, subsequently changed sides. So 
did the Ramblers Association, while the Welsh Tourist Board's 1994 “Tourism 2000” 
report expressed concern over the wind farm impact on tourism (Elliott, 2003f).  
 
The Countryside Council for Wales (CCW) came out with a strong opposition line, 
arguing that: “While wind turbines are welcome as one of the sources of RE, the 
scale of their contribution to meet energy needs does not justify overturning 
established planning policies and safeguards.” Wind power projects tend “to threaten 
areas that CCW is charged to protect”. They also added that, there “should be a 
presumption against wind turbine development in areas of which close to sites with 
the benefit of statutory landscape designation status” (CCW, 1992). Besides, the 
Council for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE) also expressed its critical views. 
In 1991, evidence to the Department of Energy's Renewable Energy Advisory Group, 
CPRE called for greater scrutiny of projects and suggested that wind power should 
not be seen as a technical fix for the key political, social and economic problem 
(CPRE, 1991). Subsequently, Tony Burton from the CPRE told the Guardian (11 
March 1994) that, while they were not opposed to wind power in principal, “The 
system is putting pressure to build wind farms in quite inappropriate places/remote 
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landscapes that have been protected for decades” (Elliott, 2003f). 
 
During 1993, objections emerged in Devon, Cornwall, Yorkshire and Wales. The 
UK's largest wind farm at Landinam, proved to be something of a turning-point has 
worsen the debate. There had been objections to its scale, on visual intrusion 
grounds. However in the event, it was noise that proved to be the major problem. 
Several local residents claimed to be suffering from major disturbance and there does 
indeed seem to be a significant noise problem for some residents in the valley below 
the ridge on which the 103 Mitsubishi machines are sited (Walker 1993). Even so, 
some colourful allusions have emerged. The Ecogen wind farm at Landinam was 
claimed by a resident to sound like a “twin-tub” washing machine. National Wind 
Power's wind farm at Llangwyrfon was alleged to sound like “an old wheelbarrow 
being pushed along continuously”, while their Cold Northcott project in Cornwall 
was described as sounding like “a huge washing machine gathering speed to spin 
dry” (NATTA 1993). 
 
Clearly, noise was the major issue for these people and this is a difficult matter to 
address. Visitors are usually surprised at how quiet wind farms sound, just a slight 
blade swish even close up, together with occasional gear train rumble. However, 
some machines are noisier than others. In some topographical situations these sounds 
can evidently be amplified by resonance effects within valleys. People's responses to 
the result can also vary. Some are very sensitive to low-grade background noise. 
 
Certainly, once noise starts to be annoying, it can be detected even at very low levels. 
Some individual machines may have been particularly noisy during their run-in 
periods. The developers have been trying to respond to noise problems by installing 
noise insulation materials in the housing of the machines. More recently, the 
development of more advanced variable speed direct-drive machines has 
significantly reduced noise levels, since there are no longer any gear trains to rumble, 
and movement of the blades is better matched to the airspeed, so there is less noise 
from air turbulence (Elliott, 2003f). 
 
However, less can be done by the designers and developers about visual intrusion 
and this has become the main problem. “Lavatory brushes in the sky” was how Sir 
Bernard Ingham described the wind farm near Hebden Bridge in Yorkshire-an 
allusion which has subsequently been repeated in various forms by the media. As the 
press secretary to Margaret Thatcher and public relations adviser to British Nuclear 
Fuels, Ingham has extensive media contacts and has been very outspoken on the 
wind farm issue. With the involvement of major public figures, the wind farm issue 
began to take on a national perspective and gained considerable national media 
coverage. Perhaps the key event was the setting up early in 1993 of a national anti-
wind lobby group. Subsequently, a campaign against the proposal to site forty-four 
turbines at Flaight Hill near Hebden Bridge, has also attracted national media 
attention and the involvement of a number of celebrities, including pop star Cliff 
Richard and many notable literary figures. They wrote a letter, with sixty-two 
signatories, to the Times Literary Supplement, complaining about what they saw as 
an “assault on our literary and artistic heritage”, given that the wind farm would be in 
Bronte country (Elliott, 2003f). 
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The press generally showed considerable interest in the local debate over wind farms. 
All of the major national newspapers317 have carried reports with coverage increasing 
as objections mounted and the emphasis mainly on the negative side. The broadcast 
media also have generally adopted a fairly critical and in some cases, hostile 
approach. The BBC's “Country File” programme (24 April 1993) included a quite 
critical review, while BBC Radio 4's “You and Yours” programme (30 July 1993) 
presented a more or less unremittingly negative view. A Radio 4 “File on Four” 
programme (8 March 1994) was a little more hopeful, although it did suggest that the 
development of wind farms might turn out to be harder than the developers, and 
some environmentalists had initially hoped (Elliott, 2003f). The local press in the 
relevant areas carried regular news stories and features plus extensive letters. A rough 
survey of local press coverage in Wales during the period between March and 
December 1993, although in no way exhaustive, may indicate the general pattern: 
there were sixty-two news items, nearly all reporting “problems”, and thirty-eight 
letters, with only eight being pro-wind (NATTA 1994). 
 
Most of the objectors cited specific local problems: noise and visual intrusion, but 
some reflected wider conservation and preservation concerns, as well as fears about 
the impact on tourism. Some of the supporters complained about the lack of balance 
in the media debate. Ian Mays from the British Wind Energy Association complained 
to the Guardian (5 November 1993) that “a small but vociferous number people have 
generated a disproportionate amount of press coverage”. Nevertheless, the campaigns 
clearly had some effect.  
 
According to the Guardian (9 March 1994), Tim Eggar, the Energy Minister, is 
believed to be alarmed by the number of objections to proposed wind farms by 
groups who claim that their turbines impose noise and visual blight on the landscape. 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has been inundated with protests as part 
of a campaign at local and national level orchestrated (Elliott, 2003f). Mike Harper, 
the director of the British Wind Energy Association, asserted that “the controversy to 
date has largely revolved around misconceptions and misinformation318 distributed 
by groups aiming to stifle wind energy development completely” (Harper, 1994). 
 
Although “Not in My Back Yard” (NIMBY) type responses seem to predominate, 
there are also sometimes wider regional preservation and conservation concerns. 
Certainly, along with the issue of visual intrusion, wind projects might be expected to 
have some impacts on wildlife and the environment. The issue of bird strikes has not 
been seen as very significant in the UK (the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
has generally backed wind projects). Some damage can be done to the local 
ecosystem during construction and by the foundations for the concrete bases of the 
turbine towers. However, the wind turbines and their bases can be removed if 
                                               
317 The Times, Guardian, Independent, Telegraph, Observer, Financial Times 
318 Certainly, there have been cases of misrepresentation and even disinformation. For example, the 
10% fossil fuel levy has sometimes been cited by wind farm objectors as being the extra cost imposed 
on electricity consumers by the wind farms. In fact the bulk of this 10% is due to the support provided 
for nuclear power. Even given the initial artificially high level of support that had to be provided to 
wind projects as a consequence of the 1998 Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation deadline, the wind farm 
element so far has still only added around 0.1% on an average consumer's bills (Elliott, 2003f). 
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necessary, leaving the site unscathed.  
 
Wind farms are not allowed in the statutorily defined Areas of Outstanding Natural 
Beauty and Sites of Special Scientific Interest, although some objectors have 
complained about wind farms spoiling the view from such locations. Some objectors 
accept the global argument (in relation to GHG emissions) but claim that wind farms 
could not help that much, so the local impact is not justified. For some others the 
central issue is what they see as “profiteering” by greedy developers who make use 
of the extensive subsidies, being concerned with the impact on the local 
environment. On the local proponents' side, strong support for wind farms is seen as 
part of a positive commitment to the future, with the threat of global warming often 
being cited, along with the dangers of nuclear power. Many supporters also say they 
like the look of the wind farms. Whilst those who do not, obviously feel strongly 
about it (Elliott, 2003f). 
 
Appendix 2.4.1 Examples of Scholars in Risk Management  
There are far more leading scholars in the field of risk management. The descriptions 
below are being simplified to show some examples.  
 
-Pitblado and Turney (1996) analyse risks to investigate the industrial factors which 
leading to environment and financial implications.  
-Courtney et al. (1999) look at technology competition in the future, using planning 
techniques and game theory to help decision maker to be prepared with business 
uncertainty.   
-Phillips (2001) discusses market-oriented technology and develops the 
understanding of technology cycles, technology acquisition, technology management 
and technology policy. These understanding enable managers to find, acquire, 
develop, add value to technologies, and make a profit in the environment of short life 
cycles with rapid price reductions (for example in the electronics/semiconductor 
industries).  
-Trott (2005) brings together the areas of innovation management and new product 
development in order to keep a strong emphasis on challenges face on innovation of 
management process. 
-Bhattacharya's (2006) wait and see-is one of the strategies recommended to confront 
with business risk and uncertainty. Rather to confront the risk with enormous 
resources, the postponement would result better understanding of the risk, so that 
counteracting strategies could be applied.  
 
Appendix 2.4.2 Examples of Managing Specific “Subject” of Risk and 
Uncertainty  
There are few subjects of risk management. The classifications below are being 
simplified to show some examples. 
 
(a) Managing risk on construction projects 
-Institution of Civil Engineers (1998) focuses on the evaluation and controlling risks 
in major construction projects. It provides methods to enable a structured and 




(b) Managing risk on general projects 
-Aven (2008) suggests methodology for project planning, execution and use of risk 
analysis in various projects such as road tunnel construction, offshore installation, 
manufacturing production, cash depot and municipalities’ projects. The methods 
include: quantitative risk analysis, financial risk analysis, probability calculus with 
statistics and reliability analysis.  
-Cooper and Chapman (1987) are prone to engineering projects by using different 
approaches such as Common Information Model for risk analysis, subjective 
probabilities and economic risk evaluation. 
 
(c) Managing risk in R&D projects 
-Doctor et al. (2000) consider the issues of decision-making under uncertainty 
reference to R&D by using two techniques: the decision tree approach and the option 
pricing theory. 
 
(d) Managing risk in Banking/Finance 
-Saita (2007) presents the measurement of market risk and credit risk to improve a 
bank decision-making processes. 
-White and Fan (2006) examine various approaches to incorporate measurement of 
risk into the appraisal of an international investment. They integrate existing theories, 
including the global capital asset pricing rule of financial theory and theories of 
strategy making; to show how risk should be incorporated into the present value 
formula to produce a clear decision rule.  
-Dale (1996) focuses on “contrasting approaches” to the regulation of investment 
firms in the major financial centres, while highlighting the underlying policy 
differences in the countries concerned.  
-Korath (1998) uses auditing technique to identify risk factors, and allocate resources 
to deal with risk and uncertainty.   
-Banks' (2009) work presents an in-depth discussion of the nature and consequences 
of financial disasters; as well as the pragmatic solutions that should be considered to 
deal with such crisis. 
-Moore (1999) advocates a systematic approach to risk arbitrage techniques that 
work in today′s market. Because of the growth in hedge funds and the changing 
nature of the merger and acquisition, business has been affected. 
 
(e) Managing risk in Insurance 
-Culp (2006) details the structured finance and insurance solutions which provide 
alternatives for managing today's corporate risks. 
 
Appendix 2.5.1 Examples of Scholars in Individual Risk Context  
There are far more leading scholars in the individualist risk context. The descriptions 
below are being simplified to show some examples.  
(a) Personal Circumstances 
-Adams (1995) addresses cultural construction of pollution and road safety.  
-Green (1997) discusses accidents, rationality and the emergence of accidents, also 
preventing accidents. 
-Barton's (2006) work helps with the planning and management of outdoor activities 
for young people. He explores the issues that need to be considered when 
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developing/implementing outdoor policies and procedures, for Health and Safety 
Officers to improve their understanding of adventure education. 
 
(b) Corporate  
-Chapman's (2006) Enterprise Risk Management discusses the way businesses 
approach risk. As the economy becomes globally oriented, risk and uncertainty such 
as currency fluctuations, human resources in foreign countries, cultural differences, 
evaporating distribution channels, bureaucratic corporate governance and 
unprecedented dependence on technology are just a few of the risk and uncertainty 
which businesses cannot afford to let them remain unidentified.   
-Samociuk et al. (2010) discuss about fraud risks, either in any organisation/business 
unit where managers would like to add value by building fraud resistance into their 
organisation. This is to demonstrate to shareholders, regulators/other stakeholders 
that they are capable in managing fraud risks for prevention measures, rather than 
just reacting to incidents. 
 
Appendix 2.5.2 Examples of Scholars in Societal Risk Context  
There are far more leading scholars in the risk management. The descriptions below 
are being simplified to show some examples.  
-Luhmann (1991) discusses protest movement, demands on politics, risk in the 
economic system and risky behaviour in an organisation. He shows how the modern 
society, with politics, law, science and economy react to the hazardous situations.  
-Doughlas (1992) addresses scientist disagreement between science versus policy 
and border issues in America. Her findings concluded that, any analysis of risk 
perception that ignores cultural and political bias is worthless. This is because, the 
study of risk needs a systematic framework of political and cultural comparison.  
-Doughlas (1994) discusses risk and justice, AIDS, British and Swedish labour 
market, autonomy versus opportunism and the issue of women priests. She argues 
that the prominence of risk discourse will force upon the social sciences of rethinking 
and consolidation, which will include the anthropological approaches studied. A 
culture is viewed as a way of life which standardises concepts and values. It is held 
steadily by the institutions in which it is articulated. Hence, questions of autonomy, 
credibility and gullibility, the social origins of wants and the recognition of 
distinctive thought styles are at present only beginning to be treated systematically in 
a society. 
-Doughlas (2002) reveals the cognitive psychology treats decision-making as a 
private personal act, but in real life dangers are presented in standardised forms 
which pre-code the individual's choice. This is particularly obvious since the gap has 
been increasing between those who participate in the decision-making and those who 
are excluded from the process-but who nevertheless have to bear the consequences of 
the decisions made. 
-Leiss and Chociolko (1994) study roots of disagreement/conflicts and how to 
manage risks. 
Both of them look into controversies over how to manage health and environmental 
risks, trying to determine what is in the public interest at the heart of these 
disagreements. Their findings explain that controversies arise, because many 
participants try to avoid full responsibility for the consequences of the risk-taking 
they advocate.  
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-Lupton (1999) examines why risk has come to such prominence, and how risk has 
been constructed over time from pre-modernity to the later modern era. She covers a 
wide range of issues including discusses cultural perspective on risk perceptions that 
emphasising the importance of sociocultural beliefs on risk.  
-Lupton (2000) uses the recent social and cultural theory. She reflects the fact that, 
risk has become integral to contemporary understandings of self-hood and the social 
relations with a diverse range of topics including: drug use, risk in the workplace, 
fear of crime, pregnant embodiment, the social construction of danger in childhood, 
anxieties about national identity and the relationship between risk phenomena and 
social order. 
-Boyne's (2003) work explores the measurement of risk in its social context, the idea 
that the mass media or the political opposition always exaggerate risk, and the 
reliability of the risk expert. 
-Tulloch and Lupton (2003) examine how people respond to, experience and think 
about risk as part of their everyday lives. Their work bridges empirical research and 
sociocultural theory, examines how people define risk and what risks they see as 
affecting them from the issues of immigration, unemployment, family life and 
contemporary crimes. 
-Ericson and Doyle (2003) examine how decisions about risk and uncertainty relate 
to moral principles and ethical conduct.  
-Sunstein's (2004) work is based on the global concern/interest of risks to safety, 
health and the environment impacts. He discovers that, in general too much of the 
time we fear for the wrong things. Sometimes we make the situation even worse. 
Rather than investigating the facts, we respond to temporary fears. The result is then, 
a situation of hysteria, neglect with unnecessary illness and death. Sunstein explains 
the sources of these problems and explores what can be done about them. He shows 
how individual thinking and social interactions lead us in foolish directions. To 
resolve this, he proposes a more sensible system of risk regulation, embodied in the 
idea of a cost-benefit state which could save many resources and lives. 
-Kasperson and Kasperson (2005) acknowledge that we are living in a “risk society” 
where the identification, distribution and management of risks-from new technology 
adoption and the subsequent environmental impacts are crucial to the individual and 
social existence.  
Volume I collects their work on how risks are communicated among different 
stakeholders, including local communities, corporations and the larger society. They 
analyse the problems of lack of transparency and trust, and explores how minor 
effects can be amplified and distorted through media and social responses. The final 
section investigates the difficult ethical issues raised by the unequal distribution of 
risk depending on factors such as wealth, location and genetic inheritance with 
examples from worker and public protection, transporting hazardous waste and 
widespread impacts such as climate change.  
 
Volume II centres on the analysis and management of risk in society and in 
international businesses. Their work clarifies the structures and processes for 
managing risks in the private sector and the factors that produce/impede effective 
decisions. The authors demonstrate that corporate culture is crucial in determining 
risk management, where they analyse the transfer of corporate risk management 
systems from industrial to developing countries through the force of globalisation. 
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Some of the issues being discussed are Bhopal disaster, industrial crisis, technology 
transfer, hazards in developing countries and environmental degradation. 
 
-Titterton (2005) emphasis on risks and health issues on social welfare. His work 
offers an innovative model for risk assessment and management, examines the 
dilemmas frequently faced by professionals working with elderly, the homeless, 
people with physical/learning disabilities and people with mental illness.  
-Smith and Petley (2009) establish the basic concepts of hazard, risk, vulnerability 
and disaster. The critical attention is given to the scale of disaster impact and the 
various strategies that have been developed to minimise the impact of damaging 
events.  
 
Appendix 2.5.3 Redefining Systemic Risk 
Presentation in a table form could clearly demonstrates, the characteristic, the causal 
factors and the implications of systemic risk. 
 
Table 2.5.1 Characteristic, Causal Factors and Implications of Systemic Risk  
Characteristics Causal Factors Implications  
-Systemic risk is 
volatile/evolving risk. It 
involves a high degree of 
uncertainty because it is 
new/unpredictable, and it 
does not have a track record 
which can be used to 
estimate and anticipate the 
likely probabilities of 
occurrence and losses. 
 
-It is complex, and beyond 
any particular/single party’s 
capability to control. Hence, 
combined strategies from 
related stakeholders are 
needed in order to provide 
more comprehensive 
solutions to counteract it. 
-Natural events, human action, 
economic, social, technological 
developments and policy driven 
actions, mismanagement and 
failure of technological design. 
 
-Modernisation of society which 
interwoven with complicated 
technology applications and 
mutual dependence, putting the 
basic human needs like air, food, 
water, shelter, security, financial, 
transport, energy, health, 
employment, environment etc. 
under vulnerability.   
 
-It might also be caused by 
interests, motives of stakeholders 
in maximising gains to satisfy 
their benefits.  
-Large implication on social, 
environment, economic, politic 
structures, and may be prolonged 
with long-term effects which 
pervades to national/international 
level. 
 
Source: Summarised by the Researcher 
 
The descriptions of systemic risk above are wide and general, in order to depict the 
characteristics, possible causal factors and implications for a general, yet 
comprehensive understanding, without implying a particular consensual orthodoxy, 
clear boundaries or claims of ownership to the field. Much of the strength in this area 
lies in the diversity of work which it encompasses and the future works would enrich 
the concept and context of systemic risks.  
 
Appendix 2.6.1 Examples of Different Functions under Risk Management  
There are far more leading scholars in different functions under risk management. 




(a) Risk Assessment  
Hester and Harrison (2006) raise concern over the adverse environmental 
consequences from the use of chemicals; which led to a steady increase in national 
activity towards greater regulation, as well as voluntary agreements with 
manufacturers for risk management of certain products. Their work reviews the 
current framework of legislation for the regulation of chemicals in the UK and 
reports expert views on both the current situation and future developments. There are 
many scientific and technical issues have been addressed. These include pollution 
risk appraisal, cancer risk assessment, environmental risk assessment, human health 
from land filling and aquatic risk assessment for pesticides.  
 
(b) Risk Perceptions 
-Baruch, et al. (2009) study investigate psychometric procedures were used to elicit 
quantitative judgements of perceived risk, acceptable risk and perceived benefit for 
each of 30 activities and technologies.  
-George, et al. (2009) argue, most of the current theories of choice under risk and 
uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the 
desirability/possible outcomes of choices, integrate information through expectation-
based calculus to arrive at a decision.  
The work proposes an alternative theoretical perspective-the “risk as feelings” 
hypothesis which highlights the role of emotions affecting the moment of decision-
making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological and other sub-fields of 
psychology, the finding shows that emotional reactions to risky situations often 
diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, 
emotional reactions often drive behaviour.  
-Renn (2008a) reveals, a vast majority of studies on risk perception and concerns 
tends to show, most of the worries are not related to blatant errors/poor judgement, 
but to divergent views about the tolerability of remaining uncertainty, short-term 
versus long-term impacts, the trustworthiness of risk managing agencies. This is why 
the risk governance framework emphasises the need for comprehensive risk 
understanding. 
 
(c) Risk Communication  
-Morgan, et al. (2001) advocate, people today make decisions about health, safety, 
and environmental risks. To make sound choices they need to get good information. 
As such, information has to be carefully selected and clearly presented. Their work 
provides a systematic approach for risk communicators and technical experts, hoping 
to serve the public by providing information about risks. The procedure uses 
approaches from risk and decision analysis to identify the most relevant information. 
Then the procedure uses approaches from psychology and communication theory to 
ensure that it is understood.  
-Lundgren and McMakin (2008) work addresses, because health, safety and 
environmental risks take centre stage in our daily living, communicating risk 
information can be a great challenge. As such, risk communication must be targeted, 
understandable and effective without inadvertently provoking hostility and mistrust.  
 
The book is divided into five parts. Part I provides background information to 
understand basic theories and practices of risk communication. Part II explains how 
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to plan a communication effort. Part III describes how to put risk communication 
into action. Part IV discusses how to evaluate risk communication efforts, including 
techniques to measure success. Part V discusses communicating risk during and after 
a health/environmental emergency, from bioterrorism attacks to mad cow disease. 
 
(d) Risk Management  
Office of Government Commerce (2007) advocates, every organisation must find the 
right balance between opportunities and threats in managing its risks, across 
organisational activities (from strategic, programme/project to operational 
perspectives). The work provides practical approaches, which offers a structured and 
effective framework for risk management. Its aim is to help organisations to achieve 
their objectives by first identifying the risks, and then choosing the right response to 
the threats and opportunities that are created by risk and uncertainty.  
 
Appendix 2.6.2 Examples of Quantitative Risk Management  
-Korath (1998) applies auditing concept to identify risk factors and allocate resources 
(through decision-making) to high risk areas. This approach increases the probability 
of detecting misstatements that caused by errors and irregularities.  
-McNeil et al. (2005) concentrate on four categories of risk: financial markets, 
consumer markets, credit and operational risks. Their work draws on diverse 
quantitative disciplines (mathematics, statistics and econometrics) which discusses 
on loss distributions, risk measures, risk aggregation and resources allocation.  
-Vose (2008) provides a comprehensive guide for risk analyst/decision maker in 
order to solve real world risk problems. The analysis is based on the quantitative 
approach, using Monte Carlo simulation and numerical techniques. These techniques 
are aimed to produce an accurate risk analysis model, and offers general/specific 
modelling to risk problems. A wide range of solved examples is used to illustrate the 
effectiveness of these two techniques, and how it can be put together to make the best 
possible risk-based decisions. 
 
Appendix 2.6.3 Four Components of Pre-assessment  
The pre-assessment would vary, depend upon risk source and risk target. However, it 
does not mean that pre-assessment is always taken before. Rather they are logically 
located at the forefront of assessment and management. Pre-assessment can be 
viewed as an opportunity for early prevention of more serious threats. Careful 
framing, warning, screening and selection of rules are essential for reducing overall 














Table 2.6.1: Four Components of Pre-assessment  
Four Components  Indicators 
(a) Problem framing 
-Different perspectives of how to conceptualise  
the issue 
-Dissent/consent on the goals of the rule selection  
-Dissent/consent on the relevance of evidence  
-Choice of frame (risk, opportunity, fate) 
(b) Early warning 
-Systematic search for new hazards 
 
-Unusual events/phenomena 
-Systematic comparison between modelled and 
observed phenomena 
-Novel activities/events 
(c) Screening  
-Establishing a procedure for screening 
hazards/risks, then determining an assessment 
and management route. 
-Screening in place?  
-Criteria for screening: hazard potential, 
persistence, ubiquity, etc.  
-Criteria for selecting risk assessment procedures 
for: known risks, emergencies, etc.  
-Criteria for identifying and measuring social 
concerns 
 
(d) Scientific conventions for risk assessment 
and concern assessment 
-Determining the assumptions and parameters 
of scientific modelling/evaluating 
methods/procedures for assessing risks and 
concerns. 
-Definition of no-observed-adverse-effect-levels 
(NOAELs)  
-Validity of methods and techniques for risk 
assessments  
-Methodological rules for assessing concerns 
Source: Renn (2008b) pp. 51. 
 
Appendix 2.6.4 Complex, Uncertain and Ambiguous of Risk Appraisal  
Complexity refers to the difficulty of identifying and quantifying causal links 
between a multitude of potential causal agents and specific observed effects. The 
nature of this difficulty may be traced back to interactive effects among agents 
(synergisms and antagonisms), long delay periods between cause and effect, inter-
individual variation and intervening variables. Risk knowledge therefore can be 
classified according to the degree of complexity of the assumed causal relationship.  
 
Uncertainty refers to a lack of clarity over the scientific/technical basis for decision-
making. It is essential to acknowledge that human knowledge is always incomplete 
and selective, thus contingent upon uncertain assumptions, assertions and predictions 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992; Laudan, 1996; Bruijin and ten Heuvelhof, 1999).  
 
Interpretative and normative ambiguity arises when differences exist in how actors or 
stakeholders value some input or outcome of the system as a result of divergent or 
contested perspectives on the justification (Stirling, 2003). In relation to RG, it is 
understood as “giving rise to several meaningful and legitimate interpretations of 
accepted risk assessments results”. It can be divided into interpretative ambiguity 
(different interpretations of an identical assessment result) and normative ambiguity 
(different concepts of what can be regarded as tolerable). A condition of ambiguity 
emerges where the problem lies in agreeing on the appropriate values, priorities, 
assumptions and boundaries to be applied to the definition of possible outcomes 





Appendix 2.6.5 Tolerability and Acceptability of Risk  
The distinction between tolerability and acceptability can be applied to a large array 
of risk sources/events. This could be demonstrated through a risk diagram, with 
probabilities on the y-axis and extent of consequences on the x-axis (Figure 2.6.1). 
This is also known as the “traffic light model”, representing acceptable risk in green, 
tolerable risk in amber and intolerable risk in red. To draw the line between 
intolerable and tolerable; as well as tolerable and acceptable is one of the most 
difficult tasks of RG. However, difficult still possible to be implemented, provided 
the judgement on acceptability versus tolerability is contingent upon making use of a 
variety of different knowledge sources (Renn, 2008d).  
Figure 2.6.1: Acceptable, Tolerable and Intolerable Risks 
Source: Renn, 2008d. pp.150. 
 
(a) Acceptable situation 
The risks are so small, even regarded as negligible that any risk reduction effort is 
unnecessary. However, risk-sharing via insurance and further risk reduction on a 
voluntary basis present options for action that can be worthwhile pursuing even in 
the case of an acceptable risk.  
 
(b) Tolerable situation 
The risks need to be reduced/handled in other ways within the limits of reasonable 
resource investments. This can be done by private actors, public actors or both 
public-private partnerships. 
 
(c) Intolerable situation 
Either the risk source needs to be abandoned/replaced; or in cases where that are not 
possible to abandon, vulnerabilities need to be reduced and exposure restricted. Renn 
(2008d) adds, the traffic light model might represent an oversimplification. However 
it reflects the actual need for a judgement at the end of an evaluation process. This 
allows for these alternatives at a particular time: either to take no management 
action319, or to initiate actions for mitigation. The model emphasises this evaluation 
be made as transparent as possible to all interested stakeholders. The organisations 
which responsible for this judgement should have the skills, assets, background 
knowledge and the sensitivity to arrive at an informed, balanced and fair judgement.  
 
                                               




On the collective/societal level, risk evaluation should consider positive external 
effects: the labour market, the competitiveness of an economy and the effects on 
social. The RG framework anticipates the need for deliberation during risk 
evaluation. This is the point which risk acceptability and tolerability are addressed 
(Table 2.6.2); and the likely benefits to society-whether in whole/in part, must be 
included in the balancing procedure. The delicate nature of balancing benefits and 
risks is also the reason why, in the process of risk evaluation, all relevant 
stakeholders need to convene for making the necessary trade-offs between 
conflicting objectives and values (Renn, 2008d). 
 
Table 2.6.2: Tolerability versus Acceptability Judgement 
Assessment Components and Definitions Indicators 
(a) Risk characterisation 
-Collecting and summarising all relevant evidence 
necessary for making an informed choice on tolerability 
versus acceptability of the risk; and suggesting potential 





(b) Risk evaluation 
-Applying societal values and norms to the judgement 
on tolerability versus acceptability, consequently 






-Range of legitimate interpretations 
-Risk perceptions 
-Social and economic implications 
 
Judging the severity of risk: 
-Compatibility with legal requirements 
-Risk trade-offs 
-Effects on equity 
-Public acceptance 
 
Conclusions and risk reduction options. 
Suggestions for 
-Tolerable risk levels 
-Acceptable risk levels 
-Options for handling risks 
-Choice of technology 





-Potential for social mobilisation 
Source: Renn (2008d) pp. 155. 
 
Appendix 2.6.6 Six Classical Decision Theory for Risk Management 
Hammond, et al. (1999), Morgan (1990; 1995), Keeney (1992), Aven and Vinnem 
(2007) discussed and provided new inputs on six classical decision theory. These six 
steps follow a logical sequence, yet could be arranged in different order, depending 
upon both situation and circumstance. In fact the steps are not as a linear progression, 
but as a circle forming an iterative process which reassessment phases are 
intertwined with emerging options. Table 2.6.3 summarises the steps of RM (Renn, 
2008e). 
(i) Identification and Generation of Risk Management Options  
Generic RM options include risk avoidance, risk reduction/mitigation, risk transfer 
and self-retention. Avoiding a risk means selecting a path that does not touch on the 
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risk (like abandoning the development of a specific technology). Reducing a risk is 
taking actions to eliminate a certain risk of its implications. Risk transfer deals with 
ways of passing the risk on to a third party. Self-retention means taking an informed 
decision to do nothing about the risk, but to take full responsibility both for the 
decision and consequences occurring thereafter (Renn, 2008e).  
 
(ii) Assessment of Risk Management Options Regarding to Predefined Criteria 
Each of the options will have desired and unintended consequences, relate to the 
risks that they are supposed to reduce. Hence, measuring management options 
against two criteria “desired” and “unintended impacts” may create conflicting 
messages and results. Many measures that prove to be effective may turn out to be 
inefficient, or unfair to those who will be burdened. Other measures may be 
sustainable, but not accepted by the public/stakeholders. What appears to be efficient 
in one country may not work at all in another country. Therefore risk managers are 
advised to make use of the many excellent guidance documents on how to handle 
risk trade-offs, and how to employ decision/analytic tools for dealing with 
conflicting evidence and values (Viscusi, 1994; Wiener, 1998; van der Sluijs et al., 
2003; Goodwin and Wright, 2004).  
 
(iii) Evaluation of RM Options 
This step integrates the evidence on how the options perform in terms of predefined 
evaluation criteria, with a value judgement about the relative weight that each 
criterion should be assigned. Ideally, the evidence should come from experts and the 
relative weights from politically legitimate decision-makers. Thus, the evaluation of 
options is conducted in close cooperation between experts and decision-makers. This 
is the step where direct stakeholder involvement and public participation are 
important (Rowe and Frewer, 2000; OECD, 2002). 
 
(iv) Selection of RM Options 
Once the different options are evaluated, a decision has to be made as to which 
options are selected and which rejected. This decision is obvious if one/more options 
turn out to be dominant, otherwise, trade-offs have to be made that require 
legitimisation (Graham and Wiener, 1995). A legitimate decision can be made on the 
basis of formal balancing tools (like cost-benefit analysis), by the respective 
decision-makers or in conjunction with participatory procedures (Renn, 2008e). 
 
(v) Implementation of RM Options  
It is the task of RM to oversee and control the implementation process. In many 
cases, implementation is delegated while outcomes are monitored (Renn, 2008e). 
 
(vi) Monitoring of Option Performance 
This refers to the systematic observation of the effects (from the options made) once 
they are implemented. The monitoring system should be designed to assess 
intended/unintended consequences. Often, a formal policy assessment study is issued 
in order to explore the consequences of a given set of RM measures on different 
elements of what people value. In addition, to generate feedback, the monitoring 
phase provides new information on early warning signals for both new risks and old 
risks viewed (Renn, 2008e). 
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Table 2.6.3 Summary of Generic Components of RM 
Management  
Components and Definitions 
Indicators 
(i) Option generation 
-Identification of potential risk handling options, risk 
reductions, prevention, adaptation and mitigation, as 
well as risk avoidance, transfer and retention. 
-Technical standards and limits 
-Performance standards/rules 
-Restrictions on exposure/vulnerability  
-Technical prescriptions  
-Governmental economic incentives 
-Third party incentives 
-Compensation schemes 
-Insurance and liability 
-Cooperative and informative options 
-Voluntary agreements 
-Information/education 
(ii) Option assessment 
-Investigation of the impacts of each option 
(economic, technical, social, political) 
-Effectiveness 
-Efficiency 
-Minimisation of external side effects 
-Sustainability 
-Fairness 
-Political and legal implementation 
-Ethical acceptability 
-Public acceptance 
(iii) Option evaluation and (iv) selection 
-Evaluation of options  
-Assignment of trade-offs 
-Incorporation of stakeholders and the public 
(v) Option implementation 




(vi) Monitoring and feedback 
-Observation of the effects of implementation 
Ex-post evaluation  
-Intended impacts 
-Unintentional impacts  
-Policy impacts 



























Appendix 2.6.7 Risk Management Strategies Based on Risk Characteristics 
Table 2.6.4: Risk Characterisation and Implications for Risk Management 
Risk 
Characterisation 
Management Strategy Appropriate Instruments Stakeholder 
Participation 
(a) Linear risk   





-Applying conventional decision-making 
*Risk-benefit analysis 
*Risk-risk trade-offs 
*Trial and error 
*Technical standards 
*Economic incentives 








(risk agent/causal chain) 
-Characterising the available evidence 
Expert consensus-seeking tools 
*Delphi/consensus conferencing  
*Meta-analysis 
*Scenario construction   





-Improving buffer capacity of risk target 
through: 
*Additional safety factors 
*Redundancy and diversity in designing 
safety devices 













-Using hazard characteristics: 




*ALARA (as low as reasonably 
achievable) 
* ALARP (as low as reasonably 
practicable) 






-Improving capability to deal with 
surprises 
*Diversity to accomplish desired 
benefits 
*Avoiding high vulnerability 
*Allowing flexible responses 




Discourse-based -Application of conflict-resolution 
methods, for reaching consensus or 
tolerance for risk evaluation results and 
management option selection 
*Integration of stakeholder involvement 
in reaching closure 








Appendix 2.7.1 Elements of Regime Context and Content 
(a) Type of Risk 
Type of risk involves the inherent features of the hazard. It includes risk source, 
cause, how familiar risk event is, how it could be quantified such as-the probability 
of occurrence, timing, its impacts/consequences (Hood et al., 2004b).  
 
(b) Public Preferences and Attitudes  
This is related to the public perception on risk event. In a democratic society, the 
government is expected to deal with public risk, while citizens should be kept fully 
informed by their governments. The reactions are due to the government's perception 
of public opinion. This may be determined by the source of information such as 
opinion polls, the media, constituents and lobbyists (Andreeva, et al., 2009). As such, 
risk event vary in terms of the level of overall public concern, varying from high 
anxiety to deep apathy, how “hot” or “cold” they are in media coverage, and how the 
political authority would shaped socioeconomic communication either at “above”320 
or “below” the line content321.  
 
According to Hennessy (1990), interest groups 322  are with legitimate purposes 
wholly in the public interests. These different groups have their own agenda to be 
lobbied, and from this would generate their own reactions to public risks. Besides, 
lobbying brings more information into the system. Yet, the question arises whether it 
is resonant with political agenda or with public concerns? Explained by Andreeva, et 
al. (2009), the views which these interest groups offer, may be supporting the 
regulators, or in conflict with the government's view. Besides, in practice, they 
usually use the media or opposition parties as a vehicle to increase their pressure on 
the government. This creates a potential of uncertainty which might lead to 
heightened public concern and escalation of the public risk. Thus, regulation in a 
context of media silence and public apathy is very different from regulation 
conducted in the heated atmosphere of high media attention and public salience. 
 
(c) Organised Interests  
The risk event is varying in who/what creates and who is exposed to the hazard 
(victim). This leads to a question: “How is risk distributed between the creator and 
the impactor?” Such distributional questions are often central to risk regulation, since 
they raise issues of relative power on the group affected (Hood et al., 2004b).  
 
(d) Size 
This is broadly how much regulation is brought to bear on any risk. Size can be 
conceived in two ways: aggression323 and overall scale of investment-which goes 
into the regime as direct tax-financed state spending. Regulatory size is at issue for 
those who are concerned about the balance between the state and the market, the 
threshold of risk toleration, and the degree of “anticipationism” in risk regulation 
                                               
320 Above the line refers to the actual content of the message (Andreeva et al., 2009). 
321 Below the line refers to the more subjective and implicit communication designed to arouse more 
positive feelings towards the message sender (Andreeva et al., 2009). 
322 lobbyists, social movements, public representatives and environmentalists.  
323 Denoting the extent of risk toleration in standards and behaviour-modification; how far regulators 
go in collecting information about the risk (Hood, et al., 2004b).  
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(Hood et al., 2004e).  
 
(e) Structure 
It refers to the way regulation is organised, institutional arrangements that are 
adopted and the resources invested. Structure can be conceived in two ways: the 
extent which regulation involves a mix of public324  and private sector; and how 
densely populated the regulatory space/policy community is by separate institutions 
(Hood et al., 2004b).  
 
(f) Style  
Style denotes the operating conventions and attitudes of those involved in regulation, 
and the formal/informal processes through which regulation works. Style can be 
conceived in two ways: familiar in socio-legal discussions 325 , and the 
attitudes/beliefs of the various regulatory actors, in particular the pursuit of policy 
objectives. Although style may seem less tangible than size and structure, it is the 
central issue for those who see culture and attitudes as all important in the way 


























                                               
324 In the UK, there are a number of interacting bodies: Westminster Parliament, Scottish Parliament, 
Welsh Assembly, Northern Irish Assembly and Local Authorities. There are also a number of 
institutions outside UK: UN, European Parliament. Thus, the political structure of the UK government 
is mixed, comprises of different levels of authority (Andreeva, et al., 2009).  
325 It is the question of how far the operation of regulation is rule-bound, and how far it is based on 
direct command and control approaches (Hood, et al., 2004b). 
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Appendix 2.7.2 Disaggregating Regime Context and Content  
Table 2.7.1: Disaggregating Regime Context and Content 
Basic Elements Second disaggregation Third disaggregation 
Regime Context   
Type of risk 
 
 
-Degree of residual risk: risk which has 
not handled by other regulatory system, 
or arise under situation without 
regulation 
 
-Degree of market and tort law, failure 
-Overall level of risk: probability and 
consequence 
-Certainty, disputed and uncertain 
nature of risk 
 
-Degree of information failure 






-Degree of uniformity or coherence of 
opinion 
-Media salience 
-Mass public opinion salience 
 
-Degree of consensus 
-Degree of coherence 
Organised interests -Presence of dominant organised groups 
 
-Degree of mobilization of affected 
stakeholders 
-Degree of business capture 
-Degree of professional capture 
 
-Level of mobilization 
-Level of militancy 
 
Regime Content   
Size -Policy aggression: how active 
regulation is, how much risk is tolerate-
able and how much change is aimed at 
 
-Overall regulatory investment: the 
overall scale of resources going into 
regulation from all sources 
-Extent of policy proactivity 
-Degree of policy ambition 
 
 
-Level of money costs 
-Level of time, skill and attention 
Structure -Non-state share of regulatory resources: 
how regulatory costs are distributed 
between the state and regulatees 
 
-Organisational fragmentation and 
system complexity: interfaces with other 
regimes 
 
-Level of compliance costs 
-Level of third-party contributions 
 
 
-Number and density of regulator 
organisations 
-Degree of jurisdictional overlap and 
system complexity 
Style -Rule-orientation: the overall extent to 
which regulation is governed by rules 
 
-Regulatory zeal: the extent to which 
regulators are ‘zealots’ for policy 
positions rather than neutral and 
detached in their approach 
-Density of formal regulatory rules 
-Degree of operational rule-following 
 
-Extent of regulator commitment to 
policy 
-Extent of regulatory lifetime 
‘vocation’ 









Appendix 2.7.3 Different Opinions between Various Groups in GM Products 
Table 2.7.2 Different Standpoints on GM Food Discourse  
Underpinning logic behind position taken Types of GM Food Discourses 
Ideological Choice (Because of) Environmental Movement: Irresponsible manipulation 
of nature for corporate profit and unknown health risks. 
Long-term effects cannot be measured today. Call for 
more organic foods. Hunger from misdistribution, 
inadequate supply of food in the world. 
Systems Vindication (Because of) Industry Economists: Increase the overall food supply 
and protect the environment from dangerous pesticides. 
Biotechnology should be seen as part of ecological 
modernisation. Increased food supplies will help feed 
the hungry in the Third World. 
Situational Validation (Because of) Medical and Nutrition Experts: Organise farms need 
special protection again seed contamination. There is 
also a need for protective labelling of GM foods for 
people with allergies. Farmers in developing countries 
are unable to buy the modified seeds and compete with 
those who can, thus leading to increases unemployment 
and poverty. 
Warrant (Since) Risk Analysts: Measured again acceptable safety 
standards no harmful effects are found 
Model for reason for specific groups Data--Technical Verification--Conclusion 
Source: Fischer (2004). 
 
Table 2.7.3 illustrates the differing opinions that taken by protagonists in the debate 
on genetically modified (GM) foods. Environmentalists take an ideological stand, 
reject GM foods for the reasons of public health. The industrial economists vindicate 
the situation of increasing food supply that may accrue. Health and Nutritional 
Experts need reassurance about aspects of the introduction of the GM foods. Risk 
Analysts may view the problem as an issue of measurement of the risk, and an 
assessment of whether the risk level is acceptable. Hence the difference between 
these individuals is not the estimates of the risks, but the values and belief systems 


















Appendix 2.7.4 Various Models for Public Risk 
The threshold is the level at which the risk enters the public agenda. By studying  
Figure 2.7.1 Public Risk and Time 
Source: Andreeva, et al. (2009), pp.15. 
 
four cases, it is easier to see the difference in the threshold levels. In the case of 
Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) (example A), there has always 
been a backdrop of the infection. It will not be possible to eradicate MRSA totally. 
However, over time, it is hoped that it will fall to controllable/manageable levels. 
Events, such as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)326 (example B), tend to 
be more abrupt and rising quickly in public concern. This caused hard prediction and 
forecast of its impacts.  
 
Some events repeat over time, such as the risk of dangerous dogs (example C), either 
in exactly the same form or with subtle differences. Action may be taken at each 
occurrence. It is likely the issue will continue into the future, but handling the 
concerns are easier. Finally, in the case of example D, it may be that the level of 
anxiety rises even after the government intervention. The collapse of Northern Rock 
is such an example. In this case the intervention is seen failed to be taken quickly 
enough. Equally it may arise due to the alternative voices creating uncertainty and 
split authority. This provides the public with an unclear direction with no obvious 
resolution, and uncertainty led to higher levels of anxiety (Andreeva, et al., 2009). 
 
After sometime, consumption of beef returned to a normal level after the crises. 
There was an interesting support for the UK approach in 2001 when the European 
Commissioner for Heath Consumer Safety commended UK tackling of the disease. 
Although the UK still had the highest rates of BSE in cattle, beef consumption was 
rising. The Commissioner told the European Parliament that sales had risen because: 
“People see that the incidence of BSE is falling. Consumers concluded that 
somebody is in charge, and they are doing something about it.” Other countries were 
criticised for years of denial which lead to shock reaction and dramatic falls in the 
consumption of beef by up to 50%. This illustrates both the diminishing of public 
anxiety with trusted behaviour, also the consequences of not acting appropriately 
(Andreeva, et al., 2009). 
                                               
326 commonly known as mad-cow disease 
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Appendix 3.2.1 Relativism (Ontological Position)  
A more recent variant of the relativist position is the idea of “critical realism”. It 
starts with the realist ontology of Bhaskhar, and then incorporates an interpretative 
thread (Sayer, 2000). Critical realism makes a conscious compromise between the 
extreme positions. It recognises social conditions (such as class/wealth) as having 
real consequences, whether they are observed and labelled by social scientists; but it 
also recognises that concepts are human constructions.  
 
Appendix 3.2.2 Positivism  
The positivist (which links with representationslism) assumed, there is a reality 
which exists independently/externally of the observer. Hence, the job of the 
scientist/researcher is to identify this pre-existing reality. This is most readily 
achieved through the design of experiments, which key factors are measured through 
objective methods, to test predetermined hypotheses (Easterby-Smith et al., 2004). 
 
Appendix 3.2.3 Relativism (Epistemological Position) 
The relativist position assumed difficulty of gaining direct access to “reality”, means 
that multiple perspectives will normally be adopted-through triangulation of methods 
and surveying viewpoints/experiences of large samples of individuals. Even so, it is 
only a matter of probability that the views collected will provide an accurate 
indication of the underlying situation (Easterby-Smith et al., 2004). 
 
Appendix 3.3.1 Five Types of Research under the Qualitative Method 
(a)Exploratory: An attempt to determine whether a phenomenon exists. Central Question: 
Does it happen?  
(b)Descriptive: Examining a phenomenon in order to define it (more) or to differentiate it 
from other phenomenon. Central Questions: What is it? How is it different? 
(c)Predictive research: Identifying relationships that enable us to speculate about one thing 
by knowing about something else. Central Questions: What is it related to? What next after 
this? 
(d)Explanatory: Examining the cause-effect relationship between two/more phenomena. 
Central Question: What causes it? 
(e)Action: Refers to research conducted to solve a social problem. Central Question: 
How can research be put to use? 
Source: Omerod (1996).  
 
Appendix 3.4.1 Online Journals 
Social Shaping Technology  Risk/Risk Management Biofuels  
-Science and Public Policy -Risks Management: An International 
Journal 
-Renewable Energy: An 
International Journal 
-Science, Technology and 
Human Values 
-International Journal of Risk 
Assessment and Management 
International Journal of 
Renewable Energy Technology 
-Social Studies of Science -Journal of the Society for Risk 
Analysis 




-Biotechnology for Biofuels 
-Journal of Biofuels, 
Bioproducts and Biorefining 





Appendix 3.4.2 (a) Questionnaire for the Scottish Government Representative   





Job functions  
1. How biofuels become one of the current renewable energy sources for road 
transport? 
 
2. Why do you think biofuels have been opted to dominate the UK market, rather than 
other alternatives resources? 
*Is there any political, social, economic, technological or environmental factors involved for 
such consideration? Please explain. 
 
3. Since the UK is a unitary state with a devolved system of government, what are the 
Scottish Government's roles and responsibilities in:  
(a) biofuels deployment? 
(b) biofuels development? 
 
4. What are the mechanisms instituted in order to create a supportive environment for 
the oil companies in pursuing: 
(a) biofuels deployment and  
(b) biofuels development in Scotland?  
*Any rules and regulations set? Any incentives or funding allocated to the oil companies to 
carry out biofuels implementation and R&D? 
 
5. What are the risk and uncertainty faced by the UK/Scottish Government during:  
(a) biofuels deployment? 
(b) biofuels development? 
*Political support, funding, social acceptance, environmental, technology, institutional 
interest (Elliott, 2003), or environmental impacts? 
 
6. How does the UK/Scottish Government deal with such risk and uncertainty 
occurring during:   
(a) biofuels deployment? 
(b) biofuels development? 
 
7. How far do you think these risk and uncertainty would affect biofuels deployment 
and development in Scotland or the UK as whole?  
*Do you think these risk and uncertainty would jeopardise the progress and cause the failure 
of biofuels implementation and innovation? 
 
Section B: Specific Questions 
8. How does the UK/Scottish Government ensure that, biofuels deployment is under 
control; while the next generation biofuels is going to be successfully developed?  
 
9. How does the Scottish Government respond to the:  
(a) UK RTFO (2008) 
(b) EU Biofuels Directive (2003) 
*Any direct involvement of the Scottish Government during the decision-making at the UK 
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and the EU level?  
*Or it is merely the Scottish Government follows what is instructed by the UK and the EU 
Government? 
 
10. In your opinion, which is the most important factor for biofuels implementation in 
the UK market? Why? 
*Generally there are few driving forces such as energy security, climate change, prospering 
agriculture, green economy. However, we believe, there is the factor of localisation, which 
determines the local needs/requirements for biofuels commencement. 
*Any particular policy or evidence which signifies the importance of the factor that you have 
mentioned? 
 
11. How far do you think biofuels could be implemented? 
*Is it until 2010, since the EUBD (2003) specifies the target of 5.75% by 2010? 
 
12. What are the consequences if the RTFO targets fail to be achieved? 
 
13. Since biofuels are any kind of fuel made from living things or waste they produce; 
has the UK/Scottish Government specified which types of feedstock should be used for 
existing supply and future production? 
*If yes, which feedstock? If no, why not? 
 
14. Does the UK/Scottish Government enforce the biofuels standards on bioethanol and 
biodiesel?  
*If yes, which standard? If no, why not? 
 
15. Do you think Scotland will able to produce sufficient biofuels for its own market 
consumption? Why? 
*If not, then how will Scotland fulfil the future demand? 
 
16. What are the implications of the RTFO execution in Scotland? 
*social implications/economic implications 
 
17. How does the Scottish Government gain public acceptance of biofuels 
implementation in Scotland?  
 
Issues of Systemic Risks  
1. What do you think about the comments made by the pressure groups, that biofuels 
have caused pressure for: 
(a) food-fuel competition? 
(b) biodiversity destroyed? 
 
2. How does the UK/Scottish Government deal with these issues in 
(a) sustaining the public interest and,  
(b) supporting the industries for further participation in the progression of biofuels 
deployment and development? 
 
3. How does the UK/Scottish Government response to the pressure from social 
movements, media and environmentalists? 
 
4. Why does the UK Government not wait until the next generation biofuels is 




5. What do you think about the claim from environmentalist that “biofuels is a quick 
fix for energy demand”? 
Some other quotations which could be used: 
(a) Lester Brown, founder of the Washington-based Worldwatch Institute: “The competition for grain 
between the world's 800 million motorists, who want to maintain their mobility, and its 2 billion 
poorest people, who are simply trying to survive, is emerging as an epic issue.” (Earth Policy 
Institute, 2008). 
(b) Jean Ziegler, Vice-President of the UN Human Rights Council’s Advisory Committee: “The effect 
of transforming thousands of tons of grains into biofuels is absolutely catastrophic for the hungry 
people. So it's a crime against humanity to convert agricultural productive soil into soil [which] will 
be burned into biofuels. What has to be stopped [is] the growing catastrophe of the massacre [by] 
hunger in the world” (Ziegler, 2007). 
(c) “While Europeans maintain their lifestyle based on automobile culture, the population of Southern 
countries will have less and less land for food crops and will lose its food sovereignty. In other cases, 
energy crops will be grown in Latin America, as well as in Asian and African countries, at the expense 
of our natural ecosystems. The problem of climate change generated by the countries of the North 
cannot be solved by creating new problems in our region. We are therefore appealing to the 
governments and people of the European Union countries to seek solutions that do not worsen the 
already dramatic social and environmental situation of the peoples of Latin America, Asia and 
Africa” (Latin and South American Network, 2007). 
(d) Bill Sutherland, Chair in Conservation Biology, Cambridge University: “We need to have the 
science ready before policies are made, and products are on the market. The necessary science was 
not done before the introduction of biofuels. In terms of the environmental consequences and societal 
concerns, we should have through of all these things before” (Sutherland, 2008). 
 
Issues of Global Financial Crisis 
1. How does the Scottish Government envisage the future of biofuels and evaluate the 
prospects? 
*Since we are now in the recession.  
 
2. Do you think that the current economic climate would affect biofuels 
implementation and R&D? 
*Any projects which have been put on-holdt due to investment cuts? 
 
3. Overall, do you think the biofuels policy has gained success in implementation? 





















Appendix 3.4.2(b) Questionnaire for the Oil Companies Representative 





Job functions  
1. What are the roles of your company in: 
(a) biofuels deployment  
(b) biofuels development 
 
2. What has stimulated your company’s interest to embark on the route of 
pursuing: 
(a) biofuels supply and  
(b) biofuels innovation 
 
3. Why has your company prioritised biofuels supply and development over 
other types of renewable energy?  
*Is there any political, social, economic, technological or environmental factors involved for 
such consideration? Please explain. 
  
4. Has the knowledge and experience of petroleum products been directly 
applicable to biofuels? 
 
5. How does your company react to the government initiatives to effectuate 
biofuels deployment and biofuels development in the UK/Scotland?  
*Policies formulated such as the RTFO (2008). 
*Requirements from the RFA on reporting system and Meta/Qualifying standards. 
*Does your company have direct/indirect involvement for decision-making at the UK and EU 
regulatory level?  
*Or is your company merely followin what is instructed by the EU/UK/Scottish Government? 
 
6. What do you think about the government's mechanisms instituted for biofuels 
deployment and development in the UK/Scotland? 
*Adequate mechanisms to facilitate biofuels implementation and innovation? 
*Clear rules and regulations set? *Are they helpful? 
 
7. What are the risk and uncertainty your company face during:  
(a) biofuels deployment 
(b) biofuels development  
*Technology, business operations, technology innovations, social acceptance advocated by 
Rosenbloom and Kantrow (1982), Pearson (1991) and Rosenberg (1994) 
 
8. How does your company deal with risk and uncertainty occur during:  
(a) biofuels deployment 
(b) biofuels development  
 
9. How your company is going to ensure that biofuels deployment is under 
control; while the next generation biofuels is going to be successfully developed?  
*Any strategy? Any tangible results? Any corporate policy which defines so? 
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Section B: Specific Questions  
10. How does the involvement of biofuels affect your company’s current business 
(in oil and gas)? 
*Do biofuels compete with your existing business profiles? 
 
11. Which factor is currently being prioritised by your company in the UK 
biofuels adoption? Why? 
*Energy security? Climate change? Prospering agriculture? Transition to  
green economy? Shareholders/management decisions? Corporate social   
responsibility?  
 
12. How far do you think biofuels could be implemented? 
*Is it until 2010? Since the EUBD specifies the target of 5.75% by 2010. Would it be 
implemented until year 2012 as being specified under the Kyoto Protocol? 
 
13. What consequences arise if your company fails to achieve the RTFO targets? 
 
14. Which types of the next generation biofuels is your company currently 
pursuing? Why? 
*the 2G-lignocellulosic biomass 
*the 3G-algae 
 
15. How does your company respond to the technical developments in biofuels-
changes between generations in feedstock? 
 
16. If the feedstock can be wide in range, then:  
(a) How can the feedstocks' quality be controlled? 
(b) How can the quality standardisation of biofuels be confirmed? 
*This is due to the fact that if the quality of biofuels does not meet industry standards or 
being standardised, it can create problems or cause significant damage to engine 
components. 
 
17. Do you think there is an opportunity for inviting non-petroleum players 
(agricultural) in producing biofuels which could compete with the oil companies? 
 
18. How does your company compete with other the oil companies in biofuels? 
 
19. How does your company manage the supply chain of biofuels? 
 
20. Do you think biofuels are the absolute solution for transport energy? Why? 
*or perhaps it is one of the options? 
 
Issues of Systemic Risks  
1. Do you agree that biofuels have caused pressure for:  
(a) food-fuel competition  
(b) biodiversity destroyed 
 
2. What do you about think the claim from environmentalists that “biofuels is a 
quick fix for energy demand”? Some other examples: 
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(a) “The accelerated destruction of rainforests due to increasing biofuels production can already be 
witnessed in some developing countries. Sustainable production outside Europe is difficult to achieve 
and to monitor” (European Environment Agency's Scientific Advisory Body, 2008). 
(b) John Beddington, the UK Chief Scientist (2008) “It is very hard to imagine how we can see a 
world growing enough crops to produce renewable energy and at the same time meet the enormous 
increase in the demand for food.”  
(c) Robert Zoellick World Bank President (2008) “While many are worrying about filling their gas 
tanks, many others around the world are struggling to fill their stomachs. 
(d) Hartmut Michel, 1998 Nobel Prize winner for Chemistry (2008) “When you convert into biofuels, 
you add fertilizer, and then harvest the plants. There’s no real energy gained in biofuels. When you 
burn the forest, you produce too much carbon dioxide, which you can’t save in the next several 
hundred years.” 
(e) Sir David King. the UK Former Chief Scientific Officer (2008) “There is enough evidence now 
that the White House having introduced to favour biofuels in the US has created quite a massive 
diversion of food crop products into biofuels production and hence pushed up prices of food, 
particularly in developing countries.” 
(f) Louis Michel, European Development Commissioner (2008) “It is clear the use of forests for the 
manufacture of biofuels is dangerous. The use of arable land to produce the resources necessary for 
biofuels could be detrimental to agricultural production.” 
 
3. How does your company resolve these issues?  
(a) food-fuel competition  
(b) biodiversity destroyed 
 
4. How does your company respond to the pressure from social movements, 
media and environmentalists? 
 
Issues of Global Financial Crisis 
1. How does your company envisage a biofuels future and evaluate the 
prospects? *Since we are now in the recession.  
 
2. Are there any particular government policies which have influenced your 
corporate strategy in pursuing biofuels? 
*Any helpful policies which stimulate your company's business? 
*Any policies are forceful which might affect to your company's business? 
 
3. Do you think the current economic climate will affect biofuels 
implementation and R&D? 
*Any projects which have been put on-hold? 
*Any strategy implemented to deal with this economic climate? 
 
4. What is important to your company in order to stand out amongst other 
biofuels suppliers? 
 
Appendix 3.4.3 Interviewing Under a Field Condition  
There are some important points which need to be considered when interviewing 
designated people. The ultimate objective is to maximise the information obtained 
through the limited time allocated.  
 
(i) Before the Interview 
-Courteous, being well prepared and self-confidence are important.  




-“Speaking their language” (do not sound too academic/theoretical sound) is 
important to create coherence.  
-If he/she is interested, he/she will agree to to the appointment. If he/she refuses, then 
the researcher has to respect his/her decision.   
 
(ii) Contacting Respondents and Setting up the Appointment 
-Many times, the researcher reviewed the respondent's information: his/her name, 
designation and scopes of their job in advance. If this information could not be 
obtained, the researcher would obtain it from his/her introducer. 
-Knowing his/her position and the scope of his/her job are important. This is to 
ensure the questions set are appropriate to his/her job function. 
-Be prepared for no second chance or returned interview. Thus, within the time 
available for the appointment, maximising the quality of information obtained is 
important. 
-The researcher used email to make the initial contact with the prospective 
interviewees. This signified a more interpersonal touch and could receive a decision 
in a quick manner.  
-Sending letters through post was an alternative option. This was used only if the 
researcher has been requested to demonstrate his identity-by providing supporting 
letter written by the principal supervisor.  
-If the researcher has the opportunity to fix an appointment date and time, then he 
would: 
(a) Avoid an appointment set on Monday or Tuesday. An appointment set on Friday 
is a good option. Psychologically, the respondent would appear to be more relaxed, 
since generally Saturday is not a working day.  
(b) Propose that the interview would begin at 10am. This is aimed to leave at least 30 
minutes to an hour before lunch time. Hence, a time set close to 12noon, or early in 
the morning (8am/9am) is not encouraged.  
(c) Avoid interview set after lunch time. Besides, a time closes to 4:30pm/5pm (end 
of normal office hours) is not encouraged.  
-A follow up telephone call was used to remind the respondent, a week and then 
again one/two days before the interview.  
-Good preparation was important to understand the basic information. The interview 
was aimed to get answers of “why” and “how” type questions for justification and 
update which the secondary data could not answer.  
-Thus, questions like “what”, “when”, “who”, “where” and “which” were the 
researcher's responsibility to comprehend beforehand. 
 
(iii) During the Interview 
-Time management, being efficient and being professional is important during this 
process.  
-Punctuality is important.  
-Time management is not only about the promptness of starting the interview, but 
also how well the researcher ends the interview on time as previously planned. 
Usually the researcher requested 1½ hours for the interview. 
-If the respondent is keen to share more, the researcher would welcome the extra 
time, since more information could be obtained. 
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-A copy of questionnaire (with 15-20 questions) was given to the respondent, in 
order to guide the interview. Yet his/her copy would not have the *part shown. 
-The *parts were set as a guide for the researcher and helped the researcher to probe 
further, and to maintain the momentum of the conversation. 
-5 minutes were allocated to the respondent, so that he/she can read through these 
questions. This was to make him/her feel comfortable and helped prepare for the 
interview process. This was also one of the main reasons that the respondent agreed 
to have our conversation recorded by dictation phone.  
-Every respondent had to answer questions from section A. Section A was related to 
the research questions. 
-Since each respondent had different expertise and knowledge, each of the 
respondents would get different questions, which were selected from section B.  
-Triangulation took place. The researcher intended to get new feedback/responses 
after previous interviews have been conducted. For example, opinions from the 
respondent A were used to gain feedbacks from the respondent B interviewed. The 
respondent B was free to comment on what he/she thought about comments made by 
respondent A. 
-Besides, issues and comments that rose from the media and quotations from other 
significant representatives such as environmentalists/academicians/politicians were 
also used.  
-This could enrich the information, as well as to understand the interactions between 
one stakeholder and another. 
-Questionnaire (refer appendix 3.4.2a and 3.4.2b) demonstrates the questions which 
were asked during the interview.  
 
(iv) Flexibility and Sensitivity in the Interview  
-The questionnaire was set and pilot tested and could be finished within 1 to 1½ 
hours.  
-A duration longer than 2 hours is not suitable. The respondent might show tiredness. 
If this happens, then the quality of the information get could be low.  
-Apart from body language, the repetition of the answers, responses which do not 
answer the question, answers which are diverted too far away from the question, or 
any quick “I don’t know” answer might signal that the interview has begun to lose its 
momentum. Therefore, time is very important. This was also one of the reasons why 
the interview was set to last between 1 to 1½ hours.  
-The researcher expected interruptions, incoming calls or colleagues walk in during 
the interview process. Therefore, the researcher has to be clear which part the 
conversation was interrupted. Therefore, shorthand was helpful in this respect.   
-Important questions first, relating to the research questions were set first. Even 
though the questionnaire has been designed in advance, it should not be rigidly fixed 
and would turn the interview into a question and answer session.  
-The questionnaire was merely a tool to guide the interview process. The 
conversation was built on the flow of the information sharing. The researcher was 
alert and flexible in asking questions to drive the continuity of the conversation.  
-The researcher played a proactive role to guide the conversation, ensuring that the 
answers obtained could achieve the objective of the study. Sometimes, respondents 
elaborated more than what was required. Therefore, it is important that the researcher 
keep the process moving in the right direction and keep within the allocated time.  
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-The researcher respected non-disclosure answers. For those questions which the 
respondent declined to reveal, the researcher respected his/her decision.  
-Gaining trust during interview is important. Subsequently, the researcher gained 
many classified and internal circulated publications which are not accessible to the 
public.  
 
(iv) After the Interview  
-The researcher sent an email to thank the respondents for their time and 
participation in the research project.  
-For those with whom a good rapport had been built, a thank you card was also sent.  
-Transcribed information was sent to the respondent to allow him/her check the 

























































































Appendix 3.7.1 Interviews Date 















The Scottish Government     
Executive of Corporate Services Team   22/09/08 
Executive of Renewable Policy Team 30/05/08  16/03/09 
Executive of the Rural Directorate 12/06/08   
Policy Manager of Cleaner Vehicles & 
Alternative Fuels 
17/04/08  01/07/09 
Argent    
Public Relations of Argent Energy   10/08/09 
BP    
Sustainability Strategy Manager    08/10/08 
Executive of North Western Europe 
Exchange 
  01/03/09 
Fuel Engineer   09/12/08 
Shell     
Engineer of the Renewable Energy Team   20/10/08 
Executive in the Shell CO2 Abatement 
Project 
  17/02/09 
02/12/09 
Procurement Executive   18/10/08 
Quality Engineer   20/05/09 
Biofuels Sustainability Compliance Officer   30/06/09 
Source: Summarised by The Researcher.  
 
Appendix 4.1.1 The Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol, which follows the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), is one of the instruments for tackling climate change. It 
is an international agreement linked to the UNFCCC. The major feature of the Kyoto 
Protocol is, it sets binding targets for thirty-seven industrialised countries (including 
the EU) for reducing six major GHGs 327  emission. The total reduction of the 
developed countries are set to be at least 5% against the 1990 level over the five-
year-period of 2008-2012-which also known as the first commitment period (Europe 
Publications Office. 4th January 2007). 
                                               
327 1Carbon Dioxide CO2, 2Methane CH4,  3Nitrogen Oxide N2O, 4Sulphur Hexafluoride SF6, 
5Hydrofluorocarbons HFCs, 6Perfluorocarbons PFCs.  
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Recognise that developed countries were principally responsible for the current high 
levels of GHG emissions-as a result of more than 150 years of industrial activities; 
the Protocol placed a heavier burden on developed nations under the principle of 
“Common but Differentiated Responsibilities”. The Kyoto Protocol is adopted in 
Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005. In 
2008, 184 Parties of the Convention have ratified the Protocol. The major distinction 
between the Protocol and the Convention is, while the Convention encourages 
industrialised countries to stabilise GHG emissions, the Protocol commits them to do 
so (UNFCCC, 2008). 
 
Under the Treaty, countries must meet their targets primarily through national 
measures. However, the Kyoto Protocol offered them an additional means of meeting 
their targets by way of three market-based mechanisms:  
(a) Emissions trading-known as “the carbon market” 
(b) Clean development mechanism  
(c) Joint implementation 
These mechanisms helped to stimulate international/national investments, and 
supported countries to meet their emission targets (UNFCCC, 2008). 
 
Under the Protocol, countries’ actual emissions have to be monitored, while precise 
records have to be kept. The registry system tracks and records transactions by 
countries under the mechanisms. The UN Climate Change Secretariat, based in 
Bonn, Germany, keeps an international transaction log to verify transactions which 
are consistent with the rules of the Protocol. Meanwhile, reporting is done by 
countries through submitting annual emission inventories and national reports at 
regular intervals. A compliance system is in place to ensure that countries are 
meeting their commitments (UNFCCC, 2008). 
 
The Kyoto Protocol was also designed to assist countries in adapting to the adverse 
effects of climate change. It facilitated the development and deployment of 
techniques that can help increase resilience to the impacts of climate change. The 
Adaptation Fund was established to finance adaptation projects and programmes in 
developing countries. The Fund was financed mainly with a share of proceeds from 
Clean Development Mechanism projects (UNFCCC, 2008). The Kyoto Protocol is 
generally seen as an important step towards a truly global emission reduction that 
will stabilise GHG emissions and provides the essential architecture for any future 
international agreement on climate change. By the end of the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012, a new international framework needs to be 
negotiated and ratified, to ensure that the stringent emission reductions could be 
continued. 
 
Appendix 4.1.2 Energy Security and GHG Reductions Concerned by Directive 
on the Promotion of Biofuels (2001) 
(a) Energy security 
In the coming twenty to thirty years, the EU oil production is expected to decline. 
Whereas consumption will increase, and transport demand is continue to grow. The 
coming decades of increased import dependency world oil demand is expected to 
show strong growth, and the global distribution of known oil reserves leaves the 
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Middle East OPEC members as the only possible suppliers to fulfil this increased 
demand (DPB, 2001).  
 
(b) GHG reductions 
It is recognised the necessity of reducing global GHG emissions, particularly with 
the Kyoto commitments for industrialised countries like the EU. This objective poses 
a challenge well beyond what has been asked from the car and oil industry, as drastic 
reduction of emissions of conventional air pollutants, virtual elimination of lead and 
sulphur from automotive fuels or significant improvement of fuel efficiency (DPB, 
2001). 
 
Appendix 4.1.3 Meta and Qualifying Standards 
The RTFO is built around seven sustainability principles which consist of five 
environmental and two social principles as shown in Table 4.1.1 
 
Table 4.1.1 Seven Sustainability Principles 
Environmental principles  
1. Biomass production will not destroy or damage large above/below ground carbon stocks  
2. Biomass production will not lead to the destruction or damage to high biodiversity areas  
3. Biomass production does not lead to soil degradation  
4. Biomass production does not lead to the contamination or depletion of water sources  
5. Biomass production does not lead to air pollution  
Social principles  
6. Biomass production does not adversely affect workers’ rights and working relationships  
7. Biomass production does not adversely affect existing land rights and community relations  
Source: RFA (2010b) 
 
These seven principles have been used to define the RTFO Sustainability Meta 
Standard. The Meta standard is a higher standard. Biofuels suppliers are also 
permitted to set up their own auditing procedures to demonstrate that their feedstocks 
meet the RTFO Meta Standard. Any scheme that meets an adequate number of the 
RTFO Meta-Standard criteria (but not in full) is considered as Qualifying Standard 
(RFA, 2010b).  
 
The G&S market is developing, and suppliers have been putting in procedures to 
track information about sustainability through their supply chains. According to the 
RFA (2010b), this is intended that by creating a market for G&S biofuels, and that 
suppliers will be able to source their feedstocks increasingly G&S for 
socioenvironmental protection.  
 
Appendix 4.1.4 The Renewable Transport Fuel Certificates 
The RFA awards one RTF Certificate to biofuels suppliers for every litre of biofuels 
supplied under the RTFO. The certificates are not physical objects, and can only be 
working within the RTFO system. They can be traded amongst suppliers, yet the 
RFA does not support or facilitate any of the commercial elements of the transaction, 
only the transfer of ownership of the certificates (RFA, 2010c). 
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Certificates may be revoked if the RFA finds that inaccurate/fraudulent information 
was provided in the application, reporting system, or subsequent requested evidence. 
These certificates are used by obligated suppliers as evidence of meeting their 
obligation. Once an obligation period has finished, the RFA calculates the obligation 
of each obligated supplier. They are then asked to either redeem certificates or buy 
out of their obligation (RFA, 2010c). 
 
Appendix 4.1.5 The Gallagher Review 
The UK Government policy on biofuels has always been aimed on making biofuels 
production and use, green and sustainable (G&S). However, recent research on the 
two systemic risks-rising food prices and biodiversity threatened; have highlighted 
the possible effects of other factors which are not monitored by the current 
mechanisms.   
 
According to Gallagher (2008), “We cannot afford to abandon biofuels as part of a 
low carbon transport future. Yet, equally, we cannot continue producing biofuels 
which are ultimately more environmentally and socially damaging than the 
hydrocarbon they seek to replace.” The Gallagher review, prepared by the RFA for 
the UK Government is responded to these systemic risks concerned. The aim has 
been to examine the scale of the indirect effects of current biofuels implementation 
and to propose solutions.  
 
The review concluded few points: First, there is a future for a sustainable biofuels 
industry. However, the feedstock production must avoid agricultural land for food 
production. This is because, the displacement of existing agricultural production due 
to biofuels demand, is accelerating land-use changes. If left unchecked, this will 
reduce biodiversity, and may even cause more GHG emissions rather than savings. 
At the EU level, targets within the EURED, EU Fuel Quality Directive (EUFQD) 
(refer appendix 4.1.6) should recognise the need to avoid both direct and indirect 
land use change, which leads to significant loss of carbon stocks (Gallagher, 2008). 
 
Second, the introduction of biofuels should be significantly slowed, until adequate 
controls to address displacement effects are implemented; and are demonstrated to be 
effective. A slowdown will also reduce the impact of biofuels on food commodity 
prices, which have a detrimental effect upon the poorest people. Third, it should be 
possible to establish a genuinely sustainable biofuels industry, provided that robust, 
comprehensive and mandatory sustainability standards are developed and 
implemented (Gallagher, 2008). 
 
Fourth, the review proposes 5% RTFO target to be deferred in 2013/14. The review 
recommends that, the RTFO should be further reviewed in 2011/12, to complement 
and coincide with the 2011/12 EU review of member states’ progress on biofuels 
targets. During the period to 2011/12, comprehensive, mandatory sustainability 
criteria within the EURED (2009) should be implemented for biofuels. Targets 
higher than 5% should only be implemented beyond 2013/14, if biofuels are shown 
to be demonstrably sustainable. This milestone should be applied both at the EU and 
the UK level. If the industry fails to deliver demonstrably sustainable biofuels by 
2013/14, the level of the target could also be reduced for subsequent years 
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(Gallagher, 2008).  
 
Appendix 4.1.6 The EU Fuel Quality Directive  
In April 2009, the EU Fuel Quality Directive (EUFQD, 2009) was adopted to revise 
the EUFQD (1998-Directive 98/70/EC). It amends a number of elements of the 
petrol and diesel specifications, as well as introducing in Article 7a-e as new sets of 
requirement. Targets in the EUFQD require by 2020, a minimum reduction in GHG 
emissions from road transport of 6% is set. The 7a and 7b laid down the criteria for 
GHG reduction and biofuels sustainability; while others are specifying the obligation 
of reporting system.  
 
Article 7a: GHG Emission Reductions 
-Requirement on fuel suppliers to reduce the GHG intensity of energy supplied for 
road transport. From 1 January 2011, suppliers shall report annually, to the authority 
designated by the Member State on:  
(a) the total volume of each type of fuel or energy supplied, indicating where 
purchased and its origin  
(b) the life cycle GHG emissions per unit of energy from fuel and energy supplied.  
-Member States shall require suppliers to reduce gradually life cycle GHG emissions 
per unit of energy from fuel and energy supplied at least 6%, up to 10% by 31 
December 2020. This reduction shall consist of the intermediate targets: 2% by 31 
December 2014 and 4% by 31 December 2017 (EUFQD, 2009). 
 
Article7b: Sustainability Criteria for Biofuels  
-Biofuels shall not be made from raw material obtained from land with high 
biodiversity value, namely:  
(a) primary forest and other wooded land, that is forest and other wooded land of 
native species, where there is no clearly visible indication of human activity and the 
ecological processes are not significantly disturbed; 
(b) areas designated by law/authority for nature protection purposes; or 
(c) for the protection of rare, threatened, endangered ecosystems/species recognised 
by international agreements or included in lists drawn up by intergovernmental 
organisations or the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, subject to 
their recognition in accordance (EUFQD, 2009). 
 
Appendix 4.2.1 Delegation Power between the UK and the Scottish Government 
Scottish devolution is the delegation of power from the UK Parliament and the UK 
Government to the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government. The Scottish 
Parliament has been given the power to make laws on certain issues such agriculture, 
forestry, environment and transport. These issues are known as devolved matters.  
 
Some of the issues concerning Scotland, that have a UK or international impact are 
dealt with by the UK Parliament. These issues are known as reserved matters like 
foreign affairs, international relations, relations with territories outside the UK/the 
European Communities (and their institutions) other international organisations, 
regulation of international trade, international development assistance and 
cooperation. Thus the UK Parliament can also make laws that will apply to Scotland 
on any subject, but it does not normally legislate on devolved matters and without the 
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consent of the Scottish Parliament (The Scottish Parliament, 2008). 
 
Appendix 4.2.2 The Scottish Government Renewable Action Plan 2009  
The Renewable Action Plan (RAP, 2009), is the latest policy which demonstrates the 
SG's visions/missions embarking on the green economy pursuance, as well as its 
achievements in various RE development projects. Even though the previous 
EU/UK/Scottish climate change policies have laid down the initial visions and aims 
for green economy pursuance, yet most of these policies were constructed during 
2000-2007. They are outdated and could not reflect the actual scenario of economic 
challenges since the 2008 world financial crisis occurred. Besides, these policies 
highlighted the political awareness at the urgency of combating climate change by 
reducing GHG/CO2 emission, yet did not outlines how to put such political messages 
into actions.  
 
The RAP (2009) sets the world most ambitious target. By 2020, Scotland is aim for 
42% of carbon reduction from the country. Subsequently, the RAP is set for a decade 
of unprecedented activities in this sphere, to ensure related activities are 
developed/established, so that this target could be achieved on time. The RAP 
demonstrates the SG's new thoughts, planning, new decisions made, latest 
information about RE development and strategies to such achievements. Taking into 
the consideration of the recent 2008 world financial crisis, it is crystallised by taking 
in most of the previously constructed EU/UK/Scottish policies, working under the 
realism of economic pressures, then turns them into visions/missions and objectives 
for measurable actions.  
 
The policy mainly covers the decarbonisation of electricity, heat supply and low 
carbon vehicles through RE generation. The primary electricity, heat and transport 
milestones for 2020 are set, as 50% of electricity, 11% of heat and 10% of national 
transport fuels would sources from RE (RAP, 2009).    
 
There are seven objectives of the SG in pursuing RE generation (RAP, 2009):  
(a)  to maximise the economic, social and environmental potential of Scotland's 
renewables resource, across different technologies;   
(b)  to establish Scotland as one of the leaders in the UK and wihitn the EU; 
(c)  to reduce the time for renewables to become cost-effective; 
(d)  to ensure maximum returns for Scotland's domestic economy, in terms of jobs 
creation, company wealth and IP generated, inward investment secured and tonnes of 
carbon saved; 
(e)  to meet the targets for energy from renewables, and for emissions reductions, to 
2020 and beyond; 
(f)  to maximise the confidence of developers, investors, and the workforce that these 
are unambiguous, long-term commitments, the SG-led, but with durable cross-party 
political backing; 
(g)  to ensure an advantageous integration between the activities of the SG, the UK 
and the EU Government. 
 
Appendix 4.2.3 Regional Selective Assistance 
The RSA is the main national investment grant scheme of financial assistance to 
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businesses in designated areas of Scotland in the Assisted Areas. It is aimed for 
wealth creation and to safeguard employment. There are two criteria for eligibility 
under the RSA Scheme: First the size of a business (small, medium or large 
businesses) and location of a business-which categorised under: 
-Tier 1(businesses located at highlands and islands),  
-Tier 2 (country sides) and  
-Tier 3 (which include cities and urban areas).  
These areas are designated for regional aid under European Community Law (The 
Scottish Executive, 2008).  
 
Appendix 4.2.4 The UK Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research 
Council 
The BBSRC is one of the seven the UK research councils. It obtains its funds from 
the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. The BBSRC supports research in 
life sciences. It annually invests around £420 million in a wide range of research that 
contributes to the quality of life for the UK citizens and supports a number of 
important industrial stakeholders including the agriculture, food, chemical, 
healthcare, pharmaceutical and biosciences (BBSRC, 2009). 
 
Appendix 4.2.5 Sustainable Bioenergy Centre 
The SBC's research activities encompass different stages of biofuels production, 
from widening the range of materials that can be the starting point for biofuels, to 
improving the crops by making them grow more efficiently to changing plant cell 
walls. Besides, the SBC will also analyse the economic and environmental life cycle 
of potential sources of bioenergy. This centre represents a £27M investment that 
increases UK bioenergy research capacity. It brings together six research hubs of 
academic and industrial partners, based at: University of Cambridge, University of 
Dundee, University of York, Rothamsted Research and two at the University of 
Nottingham. This is aimed to create a network with expertise and specialist resources 
that span the bioenergy, from growing biomass to fermentation for biofuels (SBC, 
2009). 
 
Appendix 4.2.6 Six Research Hubs 
There are six research hubs which are conducting six different types of research 
programmes: 
(1) Perennial Bioenergy Crops Programme 
-Optimising biomass yield and composition for sustainable biofuels. The programme 
aims to improve yields of fast growing trees and grasses, to make more of the plants’ 
carbon available for conversion into biofuels, without increasing inputs such as 
fertilizers. Leads by the Rothamsted Research, with associated programme members: 
Institute of Biological, Environmental and Rural Sciences (IBERS), Imperial College 
London and University of Cambridge. 
 
(2) Cell Wall Sugars Programme 
-Developing strategies to improve plants and enzymes for increased sugar release 
from biomass. The programme aims to better understand how sugars are locked into 
plant cell walls, by selecting the right plants and the right enzymes to release the 
maximum amount of sugars for conversion to biofuels. Leads by the University of 
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Cambridge with associated programme members: Newcastle University, Shell and 
Novozymes. 
 
(3) Lignocellulosic Conversion to Bioethanol Programme 
-Using agricultural and wood-industry wastes, to create material to produce fuels. It 
will also work on microbes which could efficiently turn the material into fuel. Leads 
by University of Nottingham with associated programme members: University of 
Bath, University of Surrey, BP, Bioethanol Ltd, Briggs of Burton, British Sugar, 
Coors Brewers, DSM, Ethanol Technology, HGCA, Pursuit Dynamics, SABMiller 
and Scottish Whisky Research Institute. 
 
(4) The Second Generation Sustainable, Bacterial Biofuels Programme 
-Optimising production of the more effective 2G biofuel (biobutanol) from non-food 
biomass. Biobutanol is better than bioethanol but currently available microbes used 
in biobutanol production processes are inefficient, produce unwanted by-products 
and cannot use plant cell walls directly as a feed material. The programme aims to 
generate and test new bacterial strains to overcome this. Leads by University of 
Nottingham with associated programme members: Newcastle University and TMO 
Renewables.  
 
(5) Cell Wall Lignin Programme 
-Improving barley straw for lignin production and transferring the new knowledge to 
other crops. Lignin is a polymer in plants that makes it difficult to access sugars for 
bioenergy production. The programme aims to alter lignin properties in barley to 
make it easier to produce biofuels without reducing the quality of the crop. Leads by 
University of Dundee with associated programme members: University of York, 
Scottish Crop Research Institute (SCRI), the Rural and Environment Research and 
Analysis Directorate (RERAD). 
 
(6) Marine Wood Borer Enzyme Discovery Programme 
-Creating new enzymes for the conversion of non-food plant biomass into biofuels 
from marine wood borers. Wood and straw contain polysaccharides that if converted 
to simple sugars could be fermented into biofuels. At the moment the market does 
not have suitable enzymes to break down these woody materials. However, marine 
wood borers consume huge amounts of woody material and their guts have all the 
enzymes needed to break it down. Leads by University of York with associated 
programme members: University of Portsmouth and Syngenta Biomass Traits Group. 
Source: The University of Dundee, 2009.  
 
Appendix 4.2.7 Examples of the Next Generation Biofuels News from the 
Scottish Government Website 
(a) Biomass Action Plan for Scotland (2007) 
-The 2G biofuels can be derived from a number of sources including non-food 
biomass, dedicated energy crops and biomass resources currently viewed as residue 
such as straw and forestry. Some of the advantages include the potential for 
significant farm-to-wheel reductions in GHG emissions, and reduced land use 
requirements as most biomass can be used as a feedstock. The 2G biofuels should 
also avoid some of the technical problems associated with the 1G biofuels such as 
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degradation and material incompatibility. In the EU Biomass Action Plan, the 
Commission commits to substantially increasing its support for the development of 
the 2G biofuels through its research budgets.  
 
(b) Bioenergy (2008b) 
-The 2G biofuels projects are likely to be very large scale and developments in 
Scotland would result in a highly competitive market for the available resource. 
Using biomass for energy offers a number of benefits as if properly planned it can be 
carbon neutral and sustainable. We need to recognise, however, that there are 
competitor industries for biomass supply and that it needs to be able to demonstrate 
its economic as well as its environmental benefits. A focus on local supply initiatives 
will therefore be important.  
 
(c) Cleaner Vehicles and Alternative Fuels (2008c) 
-With the emergence of viable technologies, to convert commonly available mixed or 
segregated waste streams into bioethanol, biobutanol, biodiesel and biogas. The use 
of waste materials in this context tends to confer improved life cycle carbon benefits 
on the final fuel. The R&D into the 2G biofuels is being carried out across the globe. 
Currently, while not commercially available, such fuel has been produced from 
hydro-cellulosic material (biodegradable/organic waste e.g. stalks and plant matter 
from forestry or agriculture). Some of the recent R&D into the use of marine algae 
has also taken place.  
 
(d) Draft Framework for the Development and Deployment of Renewables in 
Scotland (2008d) 
-The greatest potential for the NGB is lignocellulosic wastes.  
-Increase research into the 2G and the 3G biofuels along with marine biofuels. Again, 
huge potential, but all the sustainability criteria have to be met before incentivising 
their use.  
 
Appendix 5.1.1 BP and its Energy Businesses 
(a) BP Exploration and Production  
There are two clusters of Exploration and Production business: First, the upstream: 
includes oil/natural gas exploration, field development and production. Second, the 
midstream: involves the management of crude oil/natural gas pipelines, processing, 
export terminals and LNG processing facilities. Three major pipelines are within the 
midstream activities: the 1Trans Alaska Pipeline System; the 2Forties Pipeline System 
and the 3Central Area Transmission System pipeline both in the UK sector of the 
North Sea.  
 
Besides there are three major LNG plants: the 1Atlantic LNG plant in Trinidad, 
2Indonesia (BP and Sanga-Sanga Production Sharing Agreement, supplies natural 
gas to the Bontang LNG plant) and in 3Australia (through its share of LNG from the 
North West Shelf natural gas development). Currently, BP has exploration and 
production interests in twenty-five countries, include the US, the UK, Russia, 





(b) BP Refining and Marketing 
BP's Refining and Marketing business is responsible for supplying, trading, refining, 
marketing and transportation of crude oil and petroleum products to wholesale and 
retail customers. The products reached over one hundred countries, operating in 
Europe, North America, Australasia, parts of South East Asia, China, Africa, Central 
and South America. In oil refining, BP owns (wholly/in part) twenty-one refineries, 
which: five in the USA, seven in Europe and five in other parts of the world. Besides, 
through JV with TNK, BP has accessed to four refineries in Russia.  
 
There are three business areas in marketing: retail, lubricants and business to 
business marketing reaching worldwide markets. These products include gasoline, 
gasoil, marine/aviation fuels, heating fuels, LPG, lubricants and bitumen. BP's 
aromatics and acetyls businesses recently joined this business segment, with 
proprietary technology and benefits from strong positions in the growing Asian 
markets. Acetyls products are used as chemical intermediates in the production of 
derivative products of consumer goods. In addition, aromatics chemicals are raw 
materials for aromatics chemical purified terephthalic acid (PTA), a chemical 
intermediate for polyester fibres, films, containers and polyethylene terephthalate 
(PET) bottles (BP, 2010b).  
 
(c) BP Alternative Energy 
The Alternative Energy covers a wide range of renewable and alternative energy 
technologies, from large scale commercial businesses in solar, wind power to carbon 
capture and advanced biofuels. The aim of BP Alternative Energy is to provide 
secure, sustainable energy that is valued by customers and governments worldwide. 
With investment running at USD1.5billion a year, the alternative energy business 
demonstrates the scale of BP’s commitment to the clean technology sector. BP 
Alternative Energy has substantial businesses in solar photovoltaic, wind and gas-
fired power, and is developing projects in advanced biofuels, carbon capture & 
storage, and concentrated solar thermal power. BP Biofuels is blending and 
distributing today’s bioethanol and biodiesel, investing in research to explore 
advanced biofuels that will emit less carbon and use non-food crops (BP, 2010c). 
 
Appendix 5.1.2 The US Renewable Fuel Standard program 2005 
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is proposing to modify the national 
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program. The RFS-1 was established under the 
Energy Policy Act 2005 (EPAct) which amended the Clean Air Act. The US 
Congress gave EPA the responsibility to coordinate with the US Department of 
Energy, the US Department of Agriculture, and other stakeholders to design and 
implement this new program (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2009). 
 
On 8 August 2005, President Bush signed the 2005 Energy Policy Act into law. The 
comprehensive energy legislation includes a nationwide RFS-1 that will double the 
use of bioethanol and biodiesel by 2012. RFS-1 that started at 4 billion gallons in 
2006 will increase to 7.5 billion gallons in 2012. It also provides beginning in 2013, 
a minimum of 250 million gallons a year of cellulosic derived ethanol (besides the 




Under the Renewable Fuel Standard Program (RFS-2), US Environmental Protection 
Agency is finalising changes to the Renewable Fuel Standard Program (RFS-1), as 
required by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, to ensure that 
transportation fuel sold in the US contains a minimum volume of renewable fuel. 
The new requirements increase the volume of biofuels required to be blended into 
transportation fuel to 36 billion gallons by 2022. The rule was developed in 
collaboration with refiners, renewable fuel producers, and many other stakeholders 
(United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). 
 
Appendix 5.1.3 Carbon Neutrality 
Activities along biofuels value chain such as seeding, fertilising, irrigating, growing, 
harvesting, transporting, manufacturing and distributing; which each requires energy 
inputs. Every unit of the energy input is correlates with carbon emissions. Thus, 
lower energy input would lower the emission. Besides, land use could change the 
GHG/CO2 emissions. High biodiversity areas should be protected, and not to be 
turned into biofuels plantations. These areas are playing their role as green lungs, and 
potentially have the capability for carbon sink.  
 
Appendix 5.1.4 European committee for Standardisation (CEN) 
CEN is a major provider of European Standards and technical specifications. It is the 
only recognised European organisation according to Directive 98/34/EC for planning, 
drafting and adoption of European Standards in all areas of economic activity (except 
electrotechnology and telecommunication). These standards have a unique status 
since they also are national standards in each of its 30 Member countries. With one 
common standard in all countries, thus every conflicting national standard is 
withdrawn. Consequently, a product can reach a far wider market with much lower 
development and testing costs. European Standards help building a European Internal 
Market for goods and services trading (European Committee of Standardisation, 
2009).  
 
Appendix 5.1.5 Low Carbon Vehicle Partnership 
The LowCVP is a not-for-profit action and advisory group that is established in 2003 
to take a lead in accelerating the shift to low carbon vehicles and fuels in the UK. It 
is a partnership of over 300 organisations from automotive and fuel industries, the 
environmental sector, government, academia, road user groups and other 
organisations with a stake in the low carbon vehicles and fuels agenda (Low Carbon 
Vehicle Partnership, 2009).  
 
Appendix 5.2 BP's Ten Next Generation Biofuels Development Projects  
(a) BP and the Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) India, 2006 
BP is funding a USD9.4 million on Jatropha project, implemented by TERI (refer 
appendix 5.2.1) in the Indian State of Andhar Pradesh, to demonstrate the feasibility 
of producing biodiesel from jatropha Curcasan (refer appendix 5.2.2). 
 
New explained: “Because Jatropha is drought resistant and can grow on marginal 
land, it offers the possibility of an economically and environmentally sustainable.” 
The project is expected to take 10 years, will cultivate 8,000 hectares of jatropha on 
land which currently designated as wasteland. Besides, the project could produce 
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approximately 9 million litres of biodiesel per annum (BP, 2 February 2006). 
 
This is a mutually benefiting project. BP is acting as the project funder, while TERI 
is the project executor. TERI is responsible for the day-to-day management/execution 
of the project: from farming to biodiesel production. Thus, BP could tap into India 
for jatropha cultivation, while TERI has the profit making opportunity-to produce 
biodiesel at commercial scale. Furthermore, the project is benefiting the local 
economies, as it provides employment opportunity and captures foreign direct 
investment from BP. 
 
(b) BP and DuPont, 2006 
BP has been working with DuPont 328  and they formed the JV company called 
Butamax Advance Biofuels since 2003. This company aims to explore new 
approaches at biofuels development that would perform better than bioethanol. The 
first product which is going to be produced is biobutanol. Construction has begun on 
a biobutanol demonstration plant in Hull, UK, by using a wide variety of processed 
cereal feedstocks329. The pilot plant will produce 20,000 litres of biobutanol per year, 
which can be blended into petrol at various concentrations. This plant is expected to 
begin production in 2009-2010 (BP, 2009h). According to the Fuel Engineer from the 
interview, biobutanol is a solution for the weaknesses found in the existing 
bioethanol. Biobutanol has higher energy content than bioethanol, provides better 
engine performance and could enhance the fuel efficiency.   
 
(c) Energy Biosciences Institute, 2007 
Energy Biosciences Institute (EBI) (refer appendix 5.2.3) is a BP owned in-house 
R&D organisation, dedicated to the new field of energy bioscience. It focuses on the 
development of the NGB and various applications of biology to the energy sector. 
Established in February 2007, EBI represents collaboration between three American 
universities330  that conducting research activities, while BP supports the institute 
financially with a ten year USD500 million grant (EBI, 2008).  
 
The formation of EBI is at the early stage running by these three universities, and BP 
will venture on the learning curve to acquire know-how in strengthening its 
institutional knowledge on bioscience/biotechnology. Reflected from the interview: 
“We call this as big science. We are working with world's leading researchers to 
explore how bioscience can be used to increase energy production, and to reduce the 
impacts of energy consumption on the environment,” said the Executive of NWEEP. 
 
Justifying the selection of these three American universities, Jim Breson, BP's 
Project Manager who led the setting up of the EBI explained: “One of the key reason 
for selecting Berkeley and its partners was because, these institutions have excellent 
track records of delivering “big science” research that is: large, complex 
                                               
328 DuPont is a science company. Founded in 1982 and operating in more than 70 countries. DuPont 
offers a range of innovative products and services for markets including agriculture and nutritious (BP, 
20 June 2006).  
329 corn, wheat, sugar beet, sorghum, cassava and sugar cane (BP, 2006b). 
330 The University of California Berkeley, The Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and The  
University of Illinois. 
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developments aimed at making scientific breakthroughs that can subsequently be 
deployed in the real world as engineering applications” (Knott, 2007). Therefore the 
expertises, experiences, track records and reputations for these three American 
universities have convinced BP to fund USD500 million in order to get the institute 
established.   
 
The EBI will concentrate at the 2G biofuels in the early stage. According to the 
interview: “We have identified areas where we need the breakthroughs for making 
the next generation biofuels technically and economically viable. EBI is researching 
broader aspects of energy bioscience as its staffing levels build up. However, its first 
task is into lignocellulosis331  biofuels,” said the Sustainability Strategy Manager.  
 
The EBI establishment received a positive response from the California Governor. 
BP's decision on three universities (in California), not only enhances the reputation 
of these universities and the state, but also benefiting economically and socially for 
the local community. First, corporate tax and relevant taxes (income tax, value added 
tax on equipments, property tax) could generate income for the state's treasury. Next, 
the local employment opportunities will be opened to magnetise local/foreign high 
skilled and knowledge workers (scientists/researchers) working for the EBI. Third, 
further economic gains through research contributions like patents creations, 
innovative solutions, transferring research knowledge to the public, setting up 
research infrastructure; all of these would build a strong foundation for future 
bioenergy business proliferation, human capital development, attracting further FDI 
from the related industry and nurturing the local community/society towards energy 
bioscience literacy.  
 
Through local media, the California Governor responded: “The private sector has 
recognised the stature of the University of California, and our state's commitment in 
transforming to a clean energy future. This is a complement to our new low carbon 
fuel standard, which more than triple alternative fuel demands in California by 2020. 
With the research facilities like the EBI, California will continue to be the leader in 
the Cleantech industry” (Office of the Governor, 2 January 2007). 
 
(d) BP and Mendel Biotechnology, 2007  
In June 2007, BP entered a collaboration agreement with Mendel Biotechnology332 of 
California, to develop high yielding energy grasses333, as part of its investigation into 
alternative biofuels sources. BP is funding a five-year research programme 
conducted by Mendel. Mendel has experience in establish breeding programmes of 
perennial grass for variety improvements. As such, Mendel will accelerate this 
project by establishing breeding stations in the Midwest/South East of USA, as well 
as by promoting further cooperation with agriculture research groups in Germany 
                                               
331 Lignocellulosic refers to plant biomass composed of cellulose, hemicellulose, and lignin. These 
complex structure of carbohydrate polymers can be extracted through fermentation to produce  
bioethanol.   
332 Mendel Biotechnology core expertise is about plant gene and pathway function which enable 
accelerated improvement in plant varieties, through new genetic and chemical solutions to meet 
agricultural and energy production needs (Mendel, 2008).  




and China (BP, 2007a).  
 
This is because, energy grasses growing requires suitable climate, soil types, natural 
irrigation (amount of rainfalls) and skilled labour for seeding, growing and 
harvesting. The breading stations set in different locations could imply the empirical 
testing, to determine geographical suitability for types of energy grass cultivation. 
According to the Fuel Engineer from the interview: “Different types of energy 
grasses could provide many alternatives for the 2G biofuels production. Not only 
they are non-food which can evidence no food-fuel competition, but also the large 
quantity of perennial energy grasses (sustain for five to seven years) could ensure a 
consistent supply for biofuels production”. 
 
Through collaboration with BP Biofuels Business Unit in May 2007, Mendel has 
begun to create proprietary varieties of energy grasses for the 2G biofuels (Mendel, 
2009). Generally, is Mendel's expertise that has attracted BP's interests to have the 
project invested. Since Mendel's core expertise is at plant gene, its institutional 
knowledge of gene function enables the identification of natural/synthetic chemicals 
which can alter plant performance in useful ways. Mendel has discovered the 
functions of genetic that control many important aspects of plant growth, metabolism, 
stress responses and productivity334. By modifying these key genes, the project is 
aimed to obtain significant improvements in plant productivity towards higher yield 
with minimal resources (water, nutrient) consumptions (Biopact, 2007).  
 
(e) BP, British Sugar and DuPont Producing Vivergo Fuels, 2007 
On 26 June 2007, together with British Sugar, BP and DuPont have started building a 
USD400 million world scale bioethanol plant at Hull, UK; with a capacity to produce 
420 million litres of bioethanol annually from locally grown wheat. The production 
is expected to begin in 2010. The feedstock for the plant initially will be wheat, 
consuming some 25% of the UK's average annual wheat surplus. Although initial 
production will be bioethanol, the partners will look at the feasibility of converting it 
to biobutanol once the required technology is available (BP, 2007a; BP, 2007b; BP, 
2009i). The bioethanol plant, BP and British Sugar would each hold 45%, with 
DuPont owning the remaining 10%. Explained by the Sustainability Strategy 
Manager from the interview, this collaboration allows the companies to focus jointly 
on developing biofuels by making use of BP’s fuels expertise and access to major 
fuel markets; British Sugar’s experience in the agricultural value chain links to 
feedstock supply; together with DuPont’s biotechnology and biomanufacturing 
capabilities. 
 
(f) BP and D1 Oils, 2007 
On 29 June 2007, BP and D1 Oils335 have established a 50/50 JV partnership, named 
as D1-BP Fuel Crops Limited, to accelerate the planting of Jatropha Curcas. The JV 
                                               
334 Mendel uses advanced transgenic breeding techniques to improve yields, drought and freezing 
tolerance, disease resistance and the efficient use of nutrients in biomass crops (Mendel, 2009). 
335 D1 Oils pioneering the development of Jatropha curcas, provides commercial technology and 
services to the Jatropha sector, includes breeding, selection of Jatropha seeds/seedlings, the 
development of planting practices, husbandry methods, harvesting, processing of Jatropha oil (as 
source of biodiesel) and meal for animal feed like hog (D1 Oil PLC, 2009a). 
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is aim to produce biodiesel for commercial scale. According to Elliot Mannis, CEO 
of D1 Oils: “Our strategy is to produce inedible oil sustainably from jatropha for 
low-cost production of biodiesel.” Further responded from Iain Conn, CEO of BP’s 
Refining and Marketing Business: “This joint venture is a further milestone in our 
strategy to contribute to global energy supplies in ways that are sustainable and 
progressive” (BP, 29 June 2007). 
 
BP will invest USD90 million from a total JV investment of USD160 million over 
the next five years, and D1 Oils will contribute to the JV with its 172,000 hectares of 
existing plantations in India, Southern Africa and South East Asia. The investment 
will be made through directly managed plantations on owned/leased land; as well as 
through contract farming and seed purchase agreements, which will provide 
significant employment for local communities. It is anticipated, some one million 
hectares will be planted over the next four years, with an estimated 300,000 hectares 
per year thereafter (BP, 29 June 2007). Once plantations are established, the JV is 
expected to become the world's largest commercial producer of jatropha feedstock, 
producing up to 2.2 billion litres of jatropha oil per year (BP, 2007a). 
 
Supported by the interview from the Sustainability Strategy Manager: “Much of the 
jatropha oil produced from the plantations will be used to meet local biodiesel 
requirements and for export to Europe. The domestic European feedstock from 
rapeseed and waste oil is unlikely to be sufficient to meet anticipated demand (of 
round 11.2 million tonne equivalent per year from 2010).  Therefore jatropha could 
provide a consistent supply of biodiesel”.  According to New: “Once all the planned 
plantations are established, the joint venture is expected to become the world’s 
largest commercial producer of jatropha feedstock” (BP, 29 June 2007). Further 
explained by New: “As jatropha can be grown on land of lesser agricultural value 
with lower irrigation, it also exhibits a better CO2 balance, as less fertiliser is 
required to raise it. This hardy crop can make a significant impact on employment in 
local communities of developing countries” (BP, 29 June 2007).  
 
Talking about the latest stage of the BP-D1 jatropha project, the Sustainability 
Strategy Manager explained: “Currently jatropha is still under testing. We are waiting 
to see the yields and see how it performs with different amount of irrigation and 
difference types of land. The plant will grow anywhere. You plant in a middle of park 
it will grow. But how many gallons of oil you get out from jatropha growing in desert 
or in proper land, is something we are investigating now.” The manager's view is 
supported further by BP's publication. Currently, D1 Oils’ progress in identifying the 
most productive varieties of jatropha, means the project will access to seeds which 
can substantially increase jatropha oil production per hectare (BP, 29 June 2007).  
 
(g) BP, Arizona State University and Science Foundation Arizona, 2007 
In November 2007, BP has established a research partnership with Arizona State 
University (ASU) and Science Foundation Arizona (SFAz) (refer appendix 5.2.4) to 
develop biodiesel. The research effort focuses on using a specially optimised 
photosynthetic bacterium to produce biodiesel. The SFAz agreed that a group of ASU 
researchers will receive USD2.2 million over two years, while BP will collaborate 
with the ASU team and contribute funds equal to SFAz's grant. As such, total of 
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UDS4.4 million has been injected into this project (Flinn Foundation, 2 November 
2007).  
 
The representative from the ASU and SFAz welcomed this research partnership. 
William Harris, the President and CEO of SFAz responded: “The proposal from ASU 
was backed due to the calibre of scientists leading the project and the great untapped 
potential of microorganism driven biofuels production. This collaborative gives 
Arizona the opportunity to lead in solar technology336 and reap enormous benefits: 
environmental impacts, wealth generation resulting from commercialised 
technologies and economic implications for entire regions” (Caspermeyer, 2007). 
 
The use of photosynthetic bacteria in the production of biofuels eliminates the need 
for costly and complex processing. In addition, the large-scale microbial cultivation, 
using only solar energy and a controlled production facility, can be set up on arid 
land. ASU President, Michael Crow commented: “Because the bacteria are 
dependent upon CO2 for growth, a more environmentally friendly and potentially 
carbon neutral energy source is feasible.”  The bacterial biodiesel production allows 
the technology to be placed adjacent to power generating stations and the utilisation 
of flue gas as a carbon source (Caspermeyer, 2007). This helps towards total carbon 
reduction as whole.   
 
The utilisation of bacterium to produce biodiesel has opened a potential source for 
production, which can support the biofuels manufacturing mix, to provide a 
consistent future supply. The good criterion of this technology-it is a direct 
conversion from bacterium into biodiesel without going through the conventional 
process of transesterification. Besides, this could reduce the production cost. 
Furthermore, the direct conversion by using solar power could eliminate the energy 
inputs, which results lower CO2 emission. Since the technology utilise solar power 
and CO2 (emission from power stations) this method, if further developed could be a 
carbon sink instrument, and classified as the 4G biofuels.  
 
(h) BP and Tropical BioEnergia S.A, 2008 
Currently, sugarcane is the most efficient source of bioethanol available. Brazilian 
sugarcane with its bioethanol production has achieved 80% reduction of life cycle 
GHG emission. With more than three decades of production experiences, Brazil has 
become the giant in the bioethanol business (BP, 2008c). Brazilian flex-fuel vehicle 
sales are now at 94% of total market sales (Biofuels Digest, 11 September 2009), so 
the drivers can switch fuels whenever the prices change. 
  
In 2008, BP is JV with Tropical BioEnergia (refer appendix 5.2.5), to help BP meets 
its goal of providing more quantity, secure, greener and affordable biofuels (BP, 
2008c). BP has a 50% stake in Tropical (with USD59.8million financial injection). 
The first plant in Edéia, Goias State is scheduled to commence operation in the 
second half of 2008. It is anticipated to reach full capacity of 435 million litres per 
year by mid 2010. Furthermore, the JV also intends to build a second bioethanol 
refinery, investing a total of approximately USD1 billion in the two refineries (BP, 
                                               
336 using solar to optimise photosynthetic bacterium in producing biodiesel. 
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2009d). From the interview, explained by the Executive of NWEEP: “Once both 
refineries in full operation, they will be able to supply large demand in Brazil and can 
also export to US, Europe and Asia.”  
 
“Given today’s global interest in reducing dependency on hydrocarbon, Tropical 
Bioenergia gives BP a position in the sugarcane ethanol industry in Brazil,” said 
Paulo Pinho, Head of BP's Biofuels Venture, Brazil. “Brazil is producing around 22 
billion litres of sugarcane ethanol per year, according to its industry organisation 
UNICA (refer appendix 5.2.6)”. With two harvests per year, sugarcane is plentiful in 
Brazil, and studies show that there is enough arable land available to support 
production of biofuels without having an impact on land for food crops, or sensitive 
areas such as Amazon rainforests. In fact the farm areas are distance 600 miles from 
the edge of the rainforest (Kolmar, 2009). Meanwhile, New responded: “This 
investment represents a significant step in delivering BP’s strategy for biofuels which 
centres around sustainable feedstocks, do not impact on food supplies and investing 
in research work to develop the technologies required to produce the next generation 
biofuels” (BP, 2009d). Besides, the sugarcane not only could produce the 1G 
bioethanol, but also its bagasse337 can be a source for the 2G bioethanol feedstock.  
 
Supported by the interview and secondary data: “The sugar has been going down of 
its pricing for the last two years for the massive volume available. It is something 
that we receive of good investment. Obviously, biofuels will revolve into 
lignocellulosic (the 2G) within five to ten years from now. In the mean time, we have 
our investment in Brazil,” said the Sustainability Strategy Manager. According to 
Jorge Maeda, CEO of Maeda Group. “We are demonstrating how Maeda’s 
agriculture expertise, attendant network of relationships, and knowledge of the 
region’s soils, climate and rural labour conditions combined with Santelisa Vale’s 
sugarcane expertise can provide sustainable renewable and reliable solutions for 
fuel”. “BP’s logistical, technological and fuel supply chain experience will enable a 
significant enhancement of our strategic plans,” said Anselmo Lopes Rodrigues, 
CEO of Santelisa Vale (BP, 2009d). From this JV, Tropical will focus on sugarcane 
production, manufacturing and marketing of bioethanol, including the associated 
agricultural assets and cogeneration power plants338 (BP, 2009d). BP will provide the 
international market access, the blending facilities to take Brazilian bioethanol into 
the global market.  
 
(i) BP and Verenium Corporation, 2009 
The scientific evidence shows, cellulosic bioethanol from biomass (the 2G 
bioethanol) will deliver clean, sustainable fuel that have the potential to reduce GHG 
emissions up to 90% (BP, 2009j). On 18 February 2009, BP and Verenium 
Corporation339  announced the formation of a 50-50 JV, under the name Vercipia 
                                               
337 Bagasse is fibre remaining after the extraction of the sugar-bearing juice from sugarcane. It may be 
used as fuel in the sugarcane mill or as a source of cellulose for animal feeds (poultry). Paper is 
produced from bagasse in several Latin American countries, in the Middle East, and in all sugar-
producing countries that are deficient in forest resources. It is the essential ingredient for the 
production of pressed building board, acoustic tile, and other construction materials (Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 2008). 
338 using bagasse to generate power for the plant production. 
339 Verenium Corporation possesses the capabilities in pre-treatment, enzyme development, 
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Biofuels, to develop and commercialise cellulosic bioethanol from non-food 
feedstocks. Vercipia will act as the commercial entity for the cellulosic bioethanol 
development. Together, BP and Verenium have agreed to commit USD112.5 million 
each, in funding and building up assets to the USD225 million invested at Vercipia. 
 
This JV is intended to progress the design and engineering required for the 
development-one of the US’s first commercial scale cellulosic bioethanol facilities, 
located in Florida. Responded by Carlos A Riva, President and CEO Verenium: “The 
creation of this joint venture company brings together innovative and experienced 
developers, designers, engineers, operators and managers capable of realising the 
potential of this technology. This is a convergence of industrial biotechnology and 
energy production processes that will allow us to deliver cleaner, more sustainable 
biofuels” (BP, 2009j).  
 
Meanwhile, Sue Ellerbusch, President of BP Biofuels North America responded: 
“Our relationship with Verenium demonstrates our commitment to making cellulosic 
bioethanol a reality in the US market in the near term. BP and Verenium together 
have the technological know-how, engineering capability and market expertise to 
demonstrate that we can deliver better, more sustainable biofuels, more quickly.” (BP, 
29 July 2009). Vercipia will focus on securing financing for the first commercial-
scale cellulosic bioethanol facility in Florida, and expects to break ground on that site 
in 2010. Production from this plant is expected to begin in 2012, will have the 
capacity to produce 140 million litres of bioethanol per year.  
 
Since announcing the formation of Vercipia, it has been selected with due diligence 
on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Loan Guarantee for the project. This shows 
the US Government is supporting the 2G biofuels development. The project will 
signify the US Government's vision towards home-grown biofuels (for the sake of 
national energy security), fulfil American's Renewable Fuel mandates (refer 
appendix 5.1.2) for GHGs reduction, building nation's domestic infrastructure (for 
biofuels supply/distribution) and create the green jobs within biofuels industry. With 
the government support, Vercipia intends to develop a second site in the Gulf Coast 
region to scale up the 2G bioethanol production capacity (BP, 2009j; BP 29 July 
2009).   
 
(j) BP and Martek Biosciences, 2009 
On 11 August 2009, BP and Martek Biosciences Corporation 340  announced the 
signing of a Joint Development Agreement (JDA) to work on the production of 
microbial oils for biofuels applications. The partnership combines a broad 
technology platform and operational capabilities to advance the development of a 
technology for the conversion of sugars into biodiesel. Under the terms of the multi-
year agreement, Martek and BP will work together to establish a large scale, cost 
                                                                                                                                     
fermentation, engineering, project development and commercialisation its proprietary technology for 
the production of cellulosic ethanol from a wide array of feedstock, including sugarcane bagasse, 
dedicated energy crops, agricultural waste  and wood products (Verenium Corporation, 2009). 
340 Martek Biosciences Corporation is founded in 1985 with its expertise at fermentation technology 




effective microbial biodiesel production through fermentation (BP, 11 August 2009). 
 
Both Martek's and BP's representatives welcomed this JDA. “BP’s global leadership 
and commitment to alternative energy solutions complements Martek’s own 
commitment to responsible and sustainable products and production,” said Steve 
Dubin, Martek CEO. Meanwhile New responded: “As an alternative to conventional 
vegetable oils, we believe sugar to biodiesel (refer appendix 5.2.7) technology has 
the potential to deliver economic, sustainable and scalable biodiesel supplies” (BP, 
11 August 2009).  
 
The JDA crystallised the combination of Martek's leading know-how in microbial 
lipid production, with BP's expertise in biofuels markets, applications and 
commercialisation. Besides, BP agreed to contribute up to USD10 million to this 
initial phase of the collaboration which leverages Martek’s expertise. Martek will 
perform the biotechnology R&D, whilst BP will contribute to biofuels value chain 
know-how. All intellectual property (IP) owned prior to the execution of the JDA will 
be retained by each respective company, and all IP developed during the JDA will be 
owned by BP, with an exclusive licence to Martek for application and 
commercialisation in nutrition, cosmetic and pharmaceutical applications341 (BP, 11 
August 2009).  
 
Appendix 5.2.1 The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) 
Established in 1974, TERI launched its own research activities based in New Delhi. 
The strength of the Institute lies-not only in articulating intellectual challenges 
straddling a number of disciplines, but also in mounting research, training and 
demonstration projects leading to the development of specific problem-based 
technologies benefiting to the society at large (TERI, 2008). 
 
There are twenty-four Indian Government's institutions which support various 
projects undertaken at TERI. In biofuels project alone, there are nine institutions 
involved. All of these nine institutions welcomed the investment from BP in the 
jatropha project (TERI, 2008).  
 
Appendix 5.2.2 Jatropha 
Jatropha is a non-food medicine, which conventionally being used for piles, 
snakebite and dropsy. It is a drought-resistant perennial, which is growing well in 
marginal/poor soil342. It is easy to be established. It grows quick and produces seeds 
for 50 years. It produces an oil content of 37%-40%343, which mostly extracted from 
the nut seeds after two-to-five year grow. The oil could be combusted as fuel without 
being refined. It burns with clear smoke-free flame, and being tested as fuel for 
diesel engine. The by-products are press cake (an organic fertilizer) and insecticide. 
Jatropha grows wild in many areas of India and even thrives on infertile soil/rugged 
in nature. It can survive with minimum water (irrigation)/nutrient (fertiliser) inputs 
                                               
341 Biodiesel can be used in other products, apart from transport fuel. 
342 Fallow, marginal and waste land, or land which unsuitable for arable crops. Therefore jatropha 
would not compete with farmland or high biodiversity value areas such as rainforest (D1 Oil PLC, 
2009b). 
343 higher yield than soy 20% or rape 20% (BP, 29 June 2007). 
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and easy to propagate (Centre for Jatropha Promotion, 2008).  
 
Appendix 5.2.3 Energy Biosciences Institute (EBI) 
EBI is a R&D organisation that harnesses advanced knowledge in biology, physical 
sciences, engineering, environmental and social sciences to devise viable solutions to 
global energy challenges, and to reduce the impact of fossil fuels to global warming. 
It is the world’s first research institution solely dedicated to the new field of energy 
bioscience. EBI is focusing on the development of the NGB, but will also look into 
various applications of biology to the energy sector. EBI hosts approximately twenty-
five research teams, housed at the University of California Berkeley campus and the 
University of Illinois; while the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory will carry 
out supporting research (EBI, 2008). 
 
Apart from the NGB research, the EBI is responsible for wider energy bioscience 
avenues including improved oil recovery, carbon conversion and carbon 
sequestration. Over the next two years, the EBI team will ramp up to around 150 
people, alongside with 50 BP staff; specialists in refining and fuels processing (Knott, 
2007). 
 
Appendix 5.2.4 Arizona State University (ASU) and Science Foundation Arizona 
(SFAz)  
The Biodesign Institute at ASU is focused on innovations that improve health care; 
provide renewable sources of energy and bioremediation; outpace the global threat of 
infectious disease; and enhance national security. Using a team approach that 
converges the biosciences with nano-scale engineering and advanced computing, the 
goal is to find solutions to complex global challenges and accelerate these 
discoveries to market (ASU Biodesign Institute, 2008). SFAz is a non-profit 
organisation, delivering and managing research (scientific, engineering and medical 
research programs). Its innovation grants encourage collaboration between industry, 
government and the academic sector to leverage financial resources and human 
capital skills that yield measurable returns from the research outcomes (Science 
Foundation Arizona, 2007). 
 
Appendix 5.2.5 Tropical BioEnergia 
Tropical Bioenergia S.A is one of the country's agricultural experts which is a JV 
company originally-established by Santelisa Vale 25% and Maeda Group 25%. The 
Maeda Group is one of the largest cotton producers in the world with 80 years in the 
industry, while Santelisa Vale is the second largest sugarcane crusher in Brazil and 
the first in energy cogeneration from bagasse. Santelisa Vale with over 70 years of 
history operates five ethanol refineries, has expertise along the entire value chain of 
ethanol/sugar production (BP, 24 April 2008). 
 
Appendix 5.2.6 The Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA)  
UNICA is the largest organisation in Brazil representing sugar, ethanol and 
bioelectricity producers. Created in 1997, following a consolidation process 
involving regional organisations in the State of São Paulo after the government 
deregulation of the sugar and ethanol sectors. UNICA members answer for more than 
50% of all ethanol produced in Brazil and 60% of overall sugar production, covers 
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areas such as the environment, technology, energy, international trade, corporate 
social responsibility, legislation, economics and communications. In late 2007, 
UNICA launched its first international office in Washington D.C., followed by the 
opening of its European office in Brussels, with a third international office in Asia in 
2008. UNICA’s expanding foreign presence is an integral part of its strategy to 
provide consumers, government officials, NGOs, the business community and the 
news media with up-to-date, detailed information on vital social, economic and 
environmental contributions of Brazil’s sugar, ethanol and bioelectricity sectors 
(UNICA, 2009).  
 
Appendix 5.2.7 Sugar to Biodiesel  
The sugar to biodiesel pathway uses biological science to convert sugars derived 
from biomass into lipids using fermentation microorganisms. The lipids are then 
converted into fuel molecules through chemical/thermocatalytic processes. Biodiesel 
produced from sustainable feedstocks via the fermentation of sugars will offer the 
potential to deliver GHGs reduction of up to 80-90% when compared to traditional 
fossil fuel. Other advantages of this sugar to biodiesel pathway over conventional 
biodiesel made from vegetable oils include:  
(a) Access to a wide variety of biomass feedstocks such as sugar cane, sugar cane     
waste (bagasse), energy grass and woodchips, which can be produced at scale and       
in high yield. 
(b) Use of sustainable, non-food, plant biomass as its feedstock. 
(c) Ability to tailor the product for a variety of diesel and future jet-fuel needs.  
(d) Reduced exposure to vegetable oil price. 
Source: BP. 11 August 2009. 
 
Appendix 5.3.1 Green and Sustainable (G&S) Criteria 
Definitions of G&S criteria encompass three aspects:  
(a) Technical criteria: must comply with the technical quality standards of biofuels 
EN142140-15376 for seamless distribution infrastructure and engine adaptation;  
(b) Ecology criteria: by taking into account of the GHGs emission, water footprint, 
energy inputs, land use/changes, local biodiversity/ecosystems and global impact as 
whole from the international trading of biofuels (import and export activities 
involved from the producing nations to the importing countries);  
(c) Social criteria: biofuels must not compete with food or impair food security, must 
provide non-discriminative working conditions (no force labour, no child labour) and 
does not manipulate the local communities through resources exploitation, farm 
land/preserved high value areas (jungle/forest) conversion to biofuels plantation, but 
must conduct responsible agricultural practices which will safeguard social, 
economic interests and environmental concerns  
Source: Bioenergy and Energy Planning Research Group, October 2009. 
 
Appendix 5.3.2 Four Biofuels Roundtables 
(a) Roundtable for Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) 
RSB is an international initiative coordinated by the Energy Centre at the Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne. It brings farmers, companies, NGOs, 
experts, governments, and inter-governmental agencies concerned with ensuring the 




The RSB has developed a third party certification system for biofuels sustainability 
standards, which consists of environmental, social and economic principles/criteria. 
Participation in the RSB is open to any organisation working in a field relevant to 
biofuels sustainability (EPFL, 2008).  
 
On 12 November 2009, a first exploratory multi-stakeholder meeting was held at the 
Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland. The RSB has 
released Version One of its international standard for better biofuel production and 
processing. The vesion one includes the twelve344  principles and criteria (P&C), 
associated guidance documents, detailed compliance indicators, and the glossary of 
terms. In 2010 the RSB Standard will be pilot tested in biofuels supply chains 
throughout the world to identify areas in need for further refinement (EPFL Energy 
Centre, 2009). 
 
(b) Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) 
RSPO formed in 2004 with the objective of promoting the growth and use of 
sustainable oil palm products through global standards and engagement of 
stakeholders. BP is one of the ordinary members345 of RSPO.  
 
The RSPO is located in Zurich, Switzerland, secretariat in Kuala Lumpur with a 
satellite office in Jakarta. It is a not-for-profit association, unites stakeholders from 
eight sectors346 of the palm oil industry. This multi-stakeholders representation is 
mirrored in the governance structure of RSPO, lives out the philosophy of the 
roundtable, by giving equal rights to each stakeholder group to bring group specific 
agendas to the roundtable, facilitating traditionally adversarial stakeholders and 
business competitors to work together towards a common objective and making 
decisions by consensus (RSPO, 2008a) 
 
The RSPO Principles and Criteria (P&C) were adopted in November 2005 for an 
initial pilot implementation period of two years and reviewed at the end of 2007 
(RSPO, 2008b). This 2007 document defines eight principles with indicators and 
guidance for each criterion347. Indicators are specific pieces of objective evidence 
                                               
344 Twelve issues principles in the Version One: (a) legality, (b) consultation, planning and monitoring, 
(c) GHG emissions, (d) human and labour rights, (e) rural and social development, (f) food security 
(g) conservation (h) soil (i) water (j) air (k) economic efficiency, technology and continuous 
improvements, (l) land rights 
Source: Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels. 12 November 2009. 
345 There are two types of memberships offered from the RSPO. First Ordinary members are any 
organisations that have direct involvement in the palm oil supply chain, or associated NGOs. These 
members have voting rights at the General Assembly and are able to publicly state they are members 
of the RSPO.  Second Affiliate members are individuals or organisations with an indirect involvement 
or interest in the palm oil supply chain, do not have voting rights and do not have the right to claim 
they are members of the RSPO. Up to 16 February 2010, there are 382 of ordinary members and 100 
of affiliate members. BP and Shell are the ordinary member.  
Source: RSPO. 2010. 
346 The eight sectors are: oil palm producers, palm oil processors, traders, consumer goods 
manufacturers, retailers, banks and investors, environmental or nature conservation NGOs and 
social/developmental NGOs. 
347 There are eight principles for sustainable palm oil production. (a) Commitment to transparency: 
requires oil palm growers/millers to provide adequate information on environmental, social and legal 
issues. The management documents for public access is established, allows disclosure of information 
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that must be in place to demonstrate or verify that the criterion is being met. 
Guidance consists of useful information to help the grower/miller and auditor 
understand what the criterion means in practice, including in some cases specific 
guidance for national interpretation of the criterion and for application by all related 
stakeholders.  
 
(c) Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RTRS) 
RTRS, founded in Switzerland 2006, while the Executive Secretariat is based in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina. It is a combination among a group of producers, NGOs and 
companies gathered (international multi-stakeholders. The RTRS’s objective is to 
promote the use and growth of sustainable soy production, through the commitment 
of the stakeholders (farmers, producers, suppliers) of the soy value chain and through 
a global standard for sustainable production (RTRS, 2008).  
 
On 28 May 2009 the version for the field tests of “Principle and Criterion” (P&C)348 
for Responsible Soy Production was approved. This represents the beginning of the 
application of a global standard supported by main actors of the industry, producers 
and organisations349 of the civil society of the whole world, with back up of the 
European markets. 
 
(d) Better Sugarcane Initiative (BSI) 
BSI is a global multi-stakeholder non-profit initiative with twenty-seven members350  
                                                                                                                                     
to internal members as well as external stakeholder interested on the progress and latest information. 
(b) Compliance with applicable laws and regulations: mandatory require producers to comply all 
local, national and ratified international laws/regulations on biofuels production and supply. Rights on 
land use has been emphasised which will avoid diminishing of the legal rights/customary rights of 
local communities. (c) Commitment to long term economic and financial viability: in order to achieve 
long term economic and prospering the palm oil industry as whole. (d) Use of appropriate best 
practices by growers and millers: to emphasis on the operating procedures, documentations, to 
maintain soil fertility for optimal/sustained yield, avoid soil erosion/degradation, maintain the quality 
of surface and groundwater and avoid agrochemical pollutions. (e) Environmental responsibility and 
conservation of natural resources and biodiversity: to mitigate the negative impacts by good 
agricultural practices, consistent implementation with effective monitoring, integrated pest 
management, wastes management. (f) Responsible consideration of employees and of individuals and 
communities growers and mills affected: through occupational health and safety plan execution and 
consistent communication. (g) Responsible development of new plantings: from proper site planning 
and non-high biodiversity areas by using soil surveys and topographic screening. (h)Commitment to 
continuous improvement in key areas of activity: for future practices and updates 
Source: RSPO. October 2007.  
348 There are five principles with twenty seven criteria for implementation on responsible soy. (a) 
Legal compliance and good business practice. (b) Responsible labour conditions. (c) Responsible 
community relations. (d) Environmental responsibility. (f) Good agricultural practice.  
Source: RTRS. 2010a 
349 Up to 15 February 2010, there are 114 members in the RTRS. Both BP and Shell are the members 
of RTRS. There are four categories of memberships: (a) Producers 20 members, (b) Industry, finance 
and trade 59 members, (c) Civil society 15 members, (d) Observers 20 members. Only 
individuals/organisations such as regulatory authorities, governmental agencies, consulting and 
auditing firms, academia and donor organisations, which do not belong to one of the three 
constituencies, may request membership as Observing Members. 
(a), (b), and (c) are participating members, while (d) is observing member.  
Source: RTRS. 2010b. 
350 Up to date, there are twenty seven members in BSI: Bacardi, BP, Coca-Cola, Ethical Sugar, 
International Finance Corporation, Solidaridad, Tate and Lyle, Unica, Cargill, Cadbury, ED&F Man, 
70 
 
dedicated to reduce the environmental and social impacts of sugarcane production. 
Its aim is to development a code of conduct351  to certify sustainable practices (BSI, 
2008). The emphasis on sustainability is now a commonplace in the sugarcane sector 
where energy use, production efficiency, elimination of waste and the effect on 
global climate change are all being closely monitored. Therefore, BSI recognises the 
wide range issues connected with sugarcane cultivation and focus on a few 
significant social and environmental concerns such as: soil productivity, water use, 
agrochemical use, effluent management, biodiversity maintenance and equitable 
labour.  
 
Appendix 5.3.3 Biomass, the 2G Bioethanol Feedstock 
The 1G bioethanol is currently derived mainly from sugars and starches in crops such 
as cereals and sugarcane. However, other substances that occur in plants in greater 
proportions than sugars and starches-notably cellulose, hemicellulose and lignin, 
could possibly be converted into bioethanol. 
 
Generally, there are three sources of biomass: First, it could be obtained from the 
agricultural residues (leaves, stem, stalks, roots, corn stover, wheat straw, bagasse) of 
even the entire plant after fruits have been harvested. This is aim to maximise the 
reuse and recycle of the whole plant, rather than just the fruit grains as currently 
under practice. Second, some species of tall, fast-growing energy grasses: such as 
miscanthus and switchgrass offer the potential to be converted into lignocellulosic 
bioethanol, could exhibit higher ethanol yields per hectare than the current food 
derived feedstocks. Third, the woods/forest residues such as leaves, branches, un-
merchantable wood left in the forest after the cleaning, thinning or final felling of 
forest (BP, 2007a). 
 
Appendix 5.3.4 The GM Crops in the US 
The enhanced yields available from the current generation of GM crops such as corn 
and soybeans help the US farmers to meet the growing feedstock demand for 
biofuels while still producing sufficient quantities of food and animal feed. In fact, 
GM crops have helped the US farmers to increase yields by 30% over the past 10 
years. This relationship between GM crops and biofuels has blossomed in the US, 
which claim as the largest single market for both GM crops and biofuels. In 
particular, it is GM corn accounting for 73% of all the corn planted in the US in 2007 
and being the main feedstock for US ethanol production (Evans, 2008). Furthermore, 
the US is also the largest producer of Sorghum. In 2006, bioethanol production for 
domestic used consumed nearly 26% of the nation's sorghum crop. The R&D of 
sorghum is underway to improve higher efficiency in bioethanol production 
                                                                                                                                     
Pangea, Shell, British Sugar, EID Parry, Vicini, CAEL, Kenana Sugar, Terrain Natural Resouce 
Management, Reef Catchment, Syngenta, Central Romana, WWF, Consorcio Azucarero Central, 
Neltec Denmark, Greenergy and Cevasa.  
Source: BSI. 2010. 
351 There are five principles under the code of conduct for members of the BSI: (a) Obey the law  (b) 
Respect human rights and labour standards (c) Manage input, production and processing efficiencies 
to enhance sustainability (d) Commit to continuous improvement in key areas of their business (e) 
Actively manage biodiversity and ecosystem services.  






Appendix 5.3.5 Mechanisms of Biofuels Carbon Savings  
(a) GHG/CO2 Saving from Tailpipe 
When biofuels blends are used at 5%, this could allow direct 10-15% of GHG/CO2 
reduction from the tailpipe (Sekab Biofuels and Chemicals, 2009). 
(b) Carbon Neutrality 
Looking at biofuels carbon neutrality in a bigger picture, carbon in the form of a 
molecule of CO2 is absorbed from the atmosphere by a plant during photosynthesis. 
The vegetations then converted into biofuels, burned in the vehicle's engine, and then 
carbon released back into the atmosphere as one molecule of CO2 -a cycle that is 
theoretically neutral in terms of carbon equation (BP, 2007a; Knott 2007).  
 
Appendix 5.3.6 Energy Grasses  
The 2G biofuels is a general classification of using biomass. There are three types of 
biomass as, discussed at appendix 5.3.3. This section, we will look at energy grasses. 
According to BP's Cellulosic Biofuels Fact Sheet (2009p), there are five benefits of 
adopting energy grasses: 
(a) They can be stored in bales until they are needed, which offers great flexibility for 
biofuels production.  
(b) They contain large amounts of the sugar held in their cell walls, can produce 
between 1000-2000 gallons of biofuels per acre, compared with around 400-500 
gallons per acre for corn. This means more fuel produced from each tonne of 
feedstock, and each acre of land, in comparison with any conventional the 1G 
biofuels feedstocks. 
(c) Energy grasses can be grown on lower quality agricultural land that is not suited 
to growing food crops.  
(d) Due to the grow-ability of energy grasses, it is possible to grow these feedstocks 
needed in close proximity to the facility where biofuels will be produced. This means 
that the agricultural footprints of the feedstocks are smaller as the transportation of 
the feedstocks can be minimised. This improves both the cost and the environmental 
impact of the required logistics and transport aspects of biofuels production.  
(e) They do not require fertilisers. Hence the emissions of Sulphur, Nitrite and CO2 
can be eliminated. 
 
Through partnership formed in February 2009, BP and Verenium are developing 
bioethanol via energy grasses. Due to the benefits of energy grasses provided, and 
applicability of the technology, BP-Verenium JV has commenced the construction of 
the US’s first commercial scale cellulosic bioethanol facilities, located in Florida.  
 
Appendix 5.3.7 BP JV with Tropical BioEnergia: Good Example for Brazilian 
Sugarcane 
In 2008, BP has announced its investment in Tropical BioEnergia, a bioethanol 
producer in Brazil, JV established by Santelisa Vale-the second largest sugarcane 
crusher in Brazil, and Maeda Group-one of the largest cotton producers in the world 
(BP, 2008d). The Brazilian sugarcane is the most effective carbon saving crop (offers 
the potential to deliver GHGs reduction of up to 80-90% when compared to 
traditional fossil fuel), and cost efficiently produced. New said, “It is part of our 
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approach of integrating sugarcane and lignocellulosic biofuels with advanced 
technologies to produce products with a wide range of uses.” (BP, 11 August 2009). 
(a) G&S Criteria of Brazilian Sugarcane 
Brazilian Sugarcane is a sustainable feedstock, producing the most efficient biofuels 
available today. Brazilian bioethanol production using standard practices typically 
achieves a reduction of up to 90% in life cycle GHG emissions (BP, 2008d). Apart 
from sugar extractions, the whole sugarcane plant has been fully exploited towards 
maximisation of the bioethanol production. Some of the literatures and BP 
publications rename sugarcane as “Energy Cane”, where this new term 
reintroduction is to identify sugarcane's multiple functions as source for food, drugs, 
medicine as well as biofuels.   
  
There are five benefits of Brazilian sugarcane which characterised as the most 
sustainable feedstock for current implementation (BP, 2008d). These have been 
implemented effectively in Brazil for more than three decades, which shows the 
significant practicality.   
(i) Sugarcane is planted once every five to six years and requires less energy 
consumption than annual crops, such as grains. 
(ii) Bagasse, first by-product of sugarcane can be burned to produce energy in the 
form of power and steam. This can be used to fuel the fermentation process, with 
excess power being exported to the grid. The refinery is expected to export 30MW of 
power to the grid annually from 2010 onwards.  
Further explained by the Sustainability Strategy Manager from interview: “Our joint 
venture with Tropical BioEnergia, we plan to export excess renewable energy 
generated from bagasse back into the state grid and turning vinasse, into fertiliser.”  
(iii) Second harvest by-product, vinasse, can be used to restore nutrients to the soil, 
reducing requirements for energy-intensive nitrogen and potassium fertilizers.  
(iv) Third fertilizer by-product, filter cake, a phosphorous-rich product that can be 
used as an organic fertilizer to promote sugarcane growth, further reducing the need 
for hydrocarbon-based fertilizers.  
(v) Fourth by-product, molasses352, can be used as an animal feed for cattle and 
poultry.   
 
(b) Land Use for Sugarcane Planting 
The sugarcane feedstock is planted on land that has previously been planted with 
other non-food crops, such as cotton, or under-utilised pastures. The land is more 
than a thousand kilometres from the Amazon and has no impact on deforestation on 
Amazon. Besides, sugarcane is a semi-perennial root crop and well managed sugar 
cane cultivation can help to restore soil carbon in areas which have been degraded 
(BP, 2008d).  
 
This is further support from the interview: “We are focusing on using land that is 
been under-utilised and carry out EIA (Environmental Impact Assessments)353  to 
                                               
352 Good quality molasses can be used to make medicine (as it is rich in calcium, magnesium, 
potassium and iron), baking ingredient, food additive, base materials for fermentation into rum and 
tobacco. Low quality molasses can be used for minor component of mortar for brickwork, fishing 
ground bait and animal feed (BP, 2008d). 
353 guided by UNICA-SugarCane Industry Association of Brazil , local government   
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help us avoid negative impacts related to land use changes. We take the rights of 
local people (their rights for unpolluted environment) when we enter into commercial 
arrangements such as land acquisitions. We also seek guidance from the World Bank 
and the Roundtable for Sustainable Biofuels,” commented the Sustainability Strategy 
Manager. 
 
(c) Sugarcane has Small Impacts on Soil Erosion 
Due to sugarcane is a semi-perennial crop replanted every five to six years, 
sugarcane has a relatively small impact on soil erosion. Each year, some bagasse is 
left on the soil. It leaves a thick carbon-rich layer which can improve the ability of 
the soil to hold water and increases the amount of organic matter in reducing erosion. 
The BP-Tropical BioEnergia JV has been cultivating a nursery of native sugarcane 
tree, which will be planted to further minimise soil erosion, protect waterways and 
promote biodiversity. The aim is to plant 60,000 trees, in key locations around the 
plantation over the next 5 years (BP, 2008d). 
 
(d) Water Utilisation in Sugarcane for Minimal Pollutions 
Brazilian sugarcane fields require practically no irrigation because rainfall is 
abundant and reliable in the main South Central production region where the project 
is based. During the short dry season, when some irrigation is required, the water 
comes mainly from water-rich vinasse, recycled water, or from small rain-fed ponds 
scattered throughout the plantation (BP, 2008d). 
 
Naturally, sugarcane does not require excessive irrigation as they are growing in 
tropical zones where conditions are warm and wet. In Brazil, rain provides almost all 
the water the crops require. Therefore enough amount of precipitation would not put 
stress on the water consumption. In a responsible way of managing water footprint, 
the Sustainability Strategy Manager from the interview explained: “We have carried 
out EIA (Environmental Impact Assessments) for our operations in Brazil and plan 
our water use accordingly. The adequate rainfall helps a lot for our sugarcane 
plantation in Brazil.” 
 
(e) Employees and Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in Sugarcane Plantation 
As the project employs around 1,000 people, many of whom work in the fields has 
been protected under the HSE. The joint venture has established a code of conduct, 
containing principles that guide the operations of the business. Each employee 
receives a copy of the code and induction training to learn about it. The code is also 
used in the procurement of goods and services. The safety practices and standards 
include induction safety training, a range of safety briefings and campaigns, 
including fire fighting, road safety have been implemented, with personal protection 
equipment is issued to all employees working in the plantation, as well as in the 
production plant (BP, 2008d). 
 
Appendix 5.4.1 Advantages of the Sugar-to-Diesel Pathway  
(a) Access to a wide variety of biomass feedstocks such as sugarcane, bagasse, 
energy grasses, woodchips or other cellulosic material. 
(b) Ability to tailor the product for a variety of diesel and bioethanol needs. Hence 
this is an adding value to the lignocellulosic feedstocks, which not only can be used 
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to produce bioethanol, but also biodiesel. This helps to diversify biodiesel feedstocks, 
which will not entirely depend on the oil-seeds (grains or jatropha), but also could be 
sourced from potent sugar.  
(c) Reduced the exposure to fluctuations in the global price of vegetable oils, which 
will consistently maintaining the production cost and gaining further profits from the 
product.  
(d) Biodiesel produced from these specified sustainable feedstocks via the 
fermentation of sugars will offer the potential to deliver GHG reductions up to 80-90% 
when compared to conventional diesel (BP, 2009r). 
 
Appendix 6.1.1 Shell's Expertises 
(a) upstream business-Shell continuously in searching for fresh/recovers oil and 
natural gas all over the world (Shell, 2010a).  
(b) downstream business-Shell downstream businesses include refines, supplies, 
trades and ships crude oil worldwide; manufactures and markets a range of products 
such as lubricants, and produces petrochemicals for industrial customers (Shell, 
2010a).  
(c) technology development-Shell manages its projects for both fossil energy (FE) 
and renewable energy (RE) development, driving the research and innovation to 
create technological solutions for both FE and RE. The FE outcomes are Shell V 
Power, Shell Diesel Extra, Liquified Petroleum Gas. The ongoing RE are hydrogen 
(H2), solar, biofuels and wind (Shell, 2010a). 
 
Appendix 6.2 Shell's Seven Next Generation Biofuels Development Projects 
(a) Shell JV with Iogen Corporation, 2002; extended in 2008 
Shell-Iogen354 JV, is focused in developing bioethanol derived from wheat straw. The 
project takes place in Canada, as Canada is the world sixth biggest wheat producers 
in 2009 (FAO, 2009) and wheat straw is abundant. Taking wheat straw as the primary 
feedstock, Shell could secure this vast quantity of biomass available for the 2G 
bioethanol production. Besides, bioethanol made from wheat straw provides a 
significant reduction of CO2, which comparatively better than the corn bioethanol.  
 
This is supported by the Engineer of the Renewable Energy Team from the interview: 
“This collaboration is the first Shell’s investment for the lignocellulosic biofuels. The 
fuel made from wheat straw, capable to reduce CO2 up to 90% compared to gasoline 
we are using now.” 
 
In 2008, Shell and Iogen announced an extended alliance, each holding 50% equity 
to accelerate the development of cellulosic ethanol since after 2002 (Shell, 15 July 
2008). Thus, this evidence, as early in 2002, Shell has demonstrated its ambition in 
fast track the market entry strategy through the 2G bioethanol R&D with Iogen. 
Hence, Shell's early the 2G research could lead to an earlier production, which 
enables Shell in gaining a bigger market share. 
 
Since the partnership began in 2002; the JV has resulted the first demonstration plant 
                                               
354 Iogen Corporation is established in the 1970s, with its expertise to produce cellulosic ethanol, 




opened in Ottawa in 2004. This plant currently is a pilot plant, which is testing for 
cellulosic bioethanol production. Once the plant could demonstrate the production 
capacity required, it then could be upgraded for a full-scale commercial production. 
This is supported by Sweeney, Shell Executive Vice President of Future Fuels and 
CO2 “We have come a long way on this particular technology pathway for 
sustainable biofuels and we will be working closer to meet the technical and 
commercial challenges facing larger scale production” (Shell, 15 July 2008). 
 
(b) Shell JV with Choren Industries GmbH, 2005, Extended in 2008  
Shell-Choren 355  JV, is working to develop a new fuel from wood residue, the 
Biomass to Liquids (BTL). The partnership began in 2005, and the first 
demonstration plant in Freiberg has started in producing BTL fuel since 2008 (Shell, 
2008). According to Routs: “Shell is committed to a secure, affordable and 
sustainable energy supply in the future. With our investment in the BTL, Shell-
Choren are driving innovation in low-carbon fuels for sustainable mobility” (Shell, 
17 April 2008).  
 
The opening of the Freiberg plant marked the completion of the world’s first 
production plant to convert biomass into synthetic diesel fuel. The German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel visited the plant on 17 April 2008, which attracted high 
attentions from the local media. The plant was built by Choren, capable to produce 
18 million litres of fuel per year (Shell, 17 April 2008). 
 
The BTL 356  gasification technology is a patent owned by Choren. Through the 
partnership, Shell is utilising Choren's expertise to produce the 2G biodiesel. The 
BTL technology is significantly different from the transesterification process, and 
effective to produce large quantity of biodiesel. Since BTL's feedstocks are taken 
from biomass357, the usage of these feedstocks does not pressure the food chain. 
Besides, one litre of BTL will need less than 1/3 of the land required to produce one 
litre of rapeseed biodiesel. BTL promises to reduce 90% of CO2, compared to 
conventional diesel; and it is compatible with standard diesel engines and existing 
diesel supplying infrastructure.  
 
Previously, biomass has been widely recommended for heat and power generations at 
specific buildings, such as offices or residential apartments. For example, the Queen 
Margaret University in Edinburgh is using biomass for heat generation at some of its 
building (QMU, 2008). Yet, BTL of Shell-Choren is a world first commercial scale 
technology successfully being developed, where two automobile manufacturers 
Volkswagen and Daimler recognise it as SunFuel. The uniqueness of BTL is, it does 
                                               
355 Choren is a gasification technology company for solid biomass and oil based residue feedstock. 
The gasification technology is the patented Carbo-V process that made the production of tar-free 
synthetic combustion gas possible. The technology provides a breakthrough for the conversion of 
biomass to energy. The process now can be used to generate power for transport (Choren Industries 
GmbH., 2008).  
356 The Fischer-Tropsch (FT) synthesis is used to convert the synthesis gas into an automotive fuel. 
During this process, the reactive parts of the synthesis gas (CO and H2) interact with a catalyst to form 
hydrocarbons (HC). This method was developed in Germany in 1920s, and it has been materialised 
through Choren's technology in R&D and commercial scale production (Choren, 2009a).  
357 forest residues, agriculture residues and waste wood 
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not need to be blend with the fossil diesel, because it has a high cetane number and 
carrying better ignition performance than conventional diesel. Besides, it has no 
aromatics or sulphur could significantly reduce pollutants from exhaust emissions 
(Choren, 2009b).  
 
(c) Shell JV with HR BioPetroleum (HRBP) Forming Cellana, 2007 
Shell and HRBP 358  has formed a JV company named Cellana. The company is 
constructing a pilot demonstration facility on the Kona coast of Hawaii, to grow 
marine microalgae and produce vegetable oil (biodiesel). This project is approved by 
the Hawaii Department of Agriculture on the selected Kona coast (location) for 
facility construction (Shell, 11 December 2007). The local government approved the 
site for pilot facility in Hawaii which is leased from the Natural Energy Laboratory 
of Hawaii Authority.  
 
The facility is growing only non-genetic modified (natural) marine microalgae 
species in open air ponds. Protection of the local environment and marine ecosystem 
has been central to facility design, to avoid the microalgae spread that will threaten 
the coastline and marine habitats. Besides, an academic research programme is 
supporting the project in screening natural microalgae species to determine which 
has the highest yield of oil. The research programme includes scientists from the 
Universities of Hawaii, Southern Mississippi and Dalhousie, in Nova Scotia, Canada 
(Shell, 11 December 2007). 
 
The technical characteristics of microalgae are promising, as it grows rapidly, high-
yield in oil and can be cultivated in hydro surroundings (ponds of seawater). Some 
microalgae species grow so fast that they double their size three/four times in one 
day. Besides, microalgae produces at least fifteen times more oil per hectare than 
rape, soy or palm. This means they can be harvested frequently- an advantage over 
crops which are only harvestable a few times a year (Shell, 11 December 2007). 
Furthermore, microalgae has higher CO2 saving. According to the Executive of CO2 
Abatement Project Team from the interview: “Microalgae is a sustainable feedstock 
for biodiesel production with a very small CO2 footprint, nearly zero carbon if we 
can manage it well.”   
 
The executive further explained about the concept of zero carbon. The microalgae 
does not require fertiliser. The nutrients can be obtained from the mineral-rich 
seawater. The production plant will be build near to the cultivation site, which 
minimise the feedstock transportation. If a well plan landscape has been adopted, the 
microalgae slime can be transported through pipes connected to the factory directly. 
Besides, manpower is currently utilised for the harvesting which minimise the use of 
machineries on field (refer appendix 6.2.1). Only water circulation and production 
would use energy, and these two activities are seeking a lower carbon footprint359. 
                                               
358HRBP is a Hawaii-based RE technology company focused on utilising the marine 
micromicroalgae to produce biofuels feedstocks.  HRBP proprietary processing technology, called  
ALDUO technology, leverages the photosynthetic power and rapid growth characteristics of 
micromicroalgae to convert sunlight, CO2, and nutrients into vegetable oil (biodiesel) (HR 
BioPetroleum, 2009).  
359 Utilise altitude differences to pump in fresh seawater and flow out treated pond seawater through 
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However, carbon emission from processing would be trade off from the growing, 
harvesting and transporting which has nearly zero carbon emission. For long-term, 
microalgae cultivation facilities also have the potential to absorb industrial waste or 
capture CO2 directly from industrial facilities, which acts as carbon sink instrument. 
 
This JV involves Shell providing funding and fuel marketing expertises, while the 
local partner HRBP providing the products, technological know-how, experiences 
and local access (in Hawaii) for microalgae plantation. About the business prospect, 
Routs commented: “Currently, a pilot facility is under way in Hawaii to grow marine 
microalgae and produce biodiesel. If the first step goes well, we will build a 
demonstration-scale commercial facility. But we need to keep our feet on the ground. 
It will take five to ten years before we may be able to produce this biodiesel in 
commercial quantities” (Shell, 29 October 2008). 
 
(d) Shell Collaborates with Virent Energy Systems, 2008 
Shell and Virent 360  announced a joint R&D to convert sugars directly into fuel 
(biogasoline) rather than bioethanol. The collaboration could herald new biofuels that 
can be used at high blend rates in standard gasoline engines. Virent's technology, 
patented as “BioForming” uses catalysts to convert sugars into hydrocarbon.  
 
Shell and Virent have collaborated for a year on the research. According to Randy 
Cortright, Virent CTO, Cofounder and Executive Vice President said: “Virent has 
proven that sugars can be converted into the same hydrocarbon mixtures of today’s 
gasoline blends. Our products match petroleum gasoline in functionality and 
performance. Our results to date fully justify accelerating commercialisation of this 
technology” (Shell, 26 March 2008). Through the partnership, Shell is utilising 
Virent's expertise to open another path for biofuels production, which is significantly 
different from the fermentation process, yet effective to produce biogasoline in large 
quantity. This technology formed as one of the production mix, supporting the supply 
chain towards sustainable biofuels production.  
 
After two years of collaboration, Shell and Virent announced the start of production. 
According to Luis Scoffone, Vice President of Alternative Energies at Shell: 
“Moving from lab-scale to a demonstration production plant is an important 
milestone for biogasoline.’’ On the other hand, Lee Edwards the CEO of Virent 
responded: “The successful start-up, which was on-time and within budget, 
demonstrates the potential for scalable, commercial manufacturing of high quality 
renewable fuels.” This renewable fuel that provides high performance, reliability, and 
lower emissions are now closer to reality as a viable alternative for transportation 
fuel. The demonstration plant is located at Virent’s facilities in Madison, Wisconsin 
USA. It has the capacity to produce up to 38,000 litres per year, which will be used 
                                                                                                                                     
potential energy mechanism. Adopting RE source (tidal, wave or wind since it is located at coast line) 
to power the production. 
360 Virent is founded in 2002,  with its ground-breaking discoveries in 2006 by expanding the 
BioFormingTM technology to convert plant sugars into hydrocarbon molecules. These hydrocarbon 
mixtures can be used directly or blended seamlessly to make conventional liquid fuels. Biogasoline is 
the first liquid fuel Virent produced through using this technology, followed by diesel and jet fuel 
(Virent Energy System Inc, 2008).  
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for engine and fleet testing (Shell, 23 March 2010).  
 
(e) Shell Funds Six Universities through the NGB Research Agreements, 2008 
On 17 September 2008, Shell announced six 361  new research agreements with 
experts in six academic institutions across the world (Shell, 17 September 2008). The 
R&D programmes are funded by Shell, aimed to investigate new feedstocks and new 
biofuels production processes, with a focus on improving efficiencies and lowering 
production costs. The research agreements will last between two and five years. The 
team now is working at four Shell-owned research centres: Thornton in Chester, UK; 
Westhollow in Houston, US; Amsterdam, Netherlands; and Bangalore, India, with 
the equipped research facilities for the work to be undertaken (Shell, 17 September 
2008). 
 
Utilising academic research towards commercial application can bring at least four 
benefits for both parties. First, Shell can tap different fresh ideas grounded from the 
theoretical based (which is the core strength for most of the academic institutions), 
turning them into commercial applications. Second, these academic institutions can 
participate in the process to materialise, test run and apply their knowledge/expertise 
in producing commercially oriented results. Along the process of commercial 
oriented research, these institutions are pursuing throughout the learning curve, 
gradually building up their institutional knowledge from the projects conducted. If 
the outcomes are successfully developed (which attracts Shell's interest), this could 
commence another level of business cooperation, for both parties in profits seeking 
through the findings/patents commercialisation.  
 
Third, the research collaboration with Shell can enhance the good name of these 
academic institutions. The brand name of Shell would embellish the reputation of 
these institutions. Most of the academic institutions would be honoured to have such 
reputable company to be their projects funder. This is because funding from Shell, 
not only be helpful financially to continue the research and development (especially 
since the economic downturn from September 2008), but also an acknowledgement 
from Shell to choose them from thousands of institutions worldwide.  
 
Collaborate with Shell can be shined by Shell's reputation, towards upbringing their 
capability, gain wider recognition and higher peer reviews (halo effects of Shell). 
These institutions are proudly announced their respective projects with Shell, 
declared through their websites, promoting their expertises and signify their 
outstanding expertises which led to be chosen by Shell.  
 
Fourth, Shell as the funder, is aim to search for potential findings which could lead to 
commercial opportunities. Besides, the funding is also building its image as socially 
                                               
361 The six universities partnered with Shell in 2G biofuels R&D are: 1The Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), US; 2The University of Campinas (Unicamp), Sao Paulo, Brazil; 3The Institute of 
Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences (IMCAS), Beijing, China; 4The Qingdao Institute of 
Bioenergy and Bioprocess Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences (QIBEBT), Qingdao, China; 
5The Centre of Excellence for Biocatalysis, Biotransformations and Biocatalytic Manufacture 
(CoEBio3) based at Manchester University, UK; and 6The School of BioSciences Exeter University, 




concern362, provides financial support to these institutions for knowledge generation. 
The Executive of CO2 Abatement Project Team from the interview responded: “We 
always interested in new ideas. Things can be done in a better way, effective and 
economic. Our recent announced researches with six academic institutions are the 
evidence.” 
 
According to Sweeney: “Shell’s in-house biofuels R&D is long standing and globally 
coordinated. We know that adding to our knowledge through genuine and nimble 
partnerships with top experts worldwide, will be critical to speed and success in the 
fast moving area of biofuels. On the other hand, Professor Nick Turner, Director of 
CoEBio3, from The University of Manchester welcomed Shell's funding and 
responded: “Biotechnology has traditionally been the preserve of the pharmaceutical 
and fine chemical industries, but it is poised to expand dramatically over the next few 
years into energy industry. CoEBio3 is excited at the prospect of working with Shell 
in this innovative programme to further existing techniques in the field and develop 
new, groundbreaking technology (for biofuels)” (Shell, 17 September 2008). 
 
These six universities research collaborations are one of Shell's expanded R&D 
strategies in the NGB development, which will complement Shell’s ongoing biofuels' 
R&D with other six business partners. The other six research projects are objective 
oriented, specifying the types of technology required 363 . Through these six 
universities research agreement, Shell is seeking more innovative/fresh ideas for new 
high yield feedstocks, and new process technology, aimed at increase the efficiency 
of the NGB production.  
 
(f) Shell JV with Codexis, 2009  
On 10 March 2009, Shell and Codexis 364  announced an expanded agreement, 
(previous agreement was in November 2007) to develop enzymes that could 
accelerate the commercialisation of the 2G biofuels. Shell also increased its equity 
stake in Codexis and will take an additional seat on the company’s board. After more 
than a year of collaboration (November 2007-March 2009), Codexis's enzyme has 
demonstrated positive results on wheat straw bioethanol production through the 
demonstration plant in Ottawa (Shell, 10 March 2009). 
 
From 2009 onwards, both companies are striking for full commercial scale 
production. This is further explained by Alan Shaw, Codexis President and CEO: 
“Codexis’ biocatalytic technology provides a discovery pathway for development of 
next generation biofuels from renewable resources. In the first year of our 
collaboration, we have demonstrated the ability to solve complex technical 
                                               
362 The big corporate like Shell is always being expected by the public, to perform some contributive 
activities for the social well being. From these R&D projects, Shell as funder, has provided 
employment opportunity for researchers, open more research opportunity/scholarships for new 
researchers, allows cross disciplinary collaborations taking place from different departments in the 
university (which previously has no significant cooperation or limited connection). 
363 Shell-Iogen for cellulosic bioethanol; Shell-Choren for BTL; Shell-HR BioPetroleum for marine 
microalgae biodiesel; Shell-Virent on sugar-to-biogasoline, Shell-Codexis for enzyme and Shell-
Cosan for sugarcane. 
364 Codexis technology creates enzymes that make new industrial process possible and make existing 
processes faster, cleaner and more efficient towards commercial scale (Codexis Inc, 2009).  
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challenges to successful biofuels development. In just over two years, our biofuels 
collaboration with Shell has grown from a pilot project to a programme which can to 
create commercial scale biofuels from non-food sources” (Shell, 6 November 2007; 
Shell, 10 March 2009). 
 
Cellulose is the molecules that make up plants' cell walls, can be found in a number 
of forms in biomass. To break down the cellulose, enzymes are needed to act as a 
catalyst for the fermentation process, and Codexis's enzyme provides a solution for 
bioethanol conversion. This is supported by interview: “Biomass has high energy 
content. Yet, it contains a lot of water which we must get rid of. Nature makes 
biomass difficult to break down. Shell is working with Codexis to develop enzymes 
which can improve efficiency and help lower production costs,” said the Quality 
Engineer from the interview.  
 
Further explained by Sweeney: “Breaking down and converting biomaterial/biomass 
into transport fuels is complex. This research works into enzymes for more efficient 
conversion and better biofuels, is part of Shell accelerating its drive to make next 
generation biofuels a commercial reality” (Shell, 6 November 2007; Shell, 10 March 
2009). Currently, Codexis is working with Shell and Iogen to enhance the efficiency 
of the cellulosic bioethanol production, by shorten the timeline to its full-scale 
commercial deployment. The new agreement also continues the collaboration to 
investigate other feedstocks, researching new enzymes to convert biomass directly 
into components similar to gasoline and diesel, while Codexis will expand researches 
at centres in the US and Budapest (Shell, 10 March 2009). 
 
(g) Shell and Cosan sign MOU to Form JV in Brazil 
Shell and Cosan365  announced on 1st February 2010, they have signed a “Non-
Binding Memorandum of Understanding” (refer appendix 6.2.2), intended to form a 
circa USD12 billion 50-50 JV in Brazil for the production of bioethanol, sugar and 
power (co-generation of electricity from sugarcane); together with the supply, 
distribution and retail of transportation fuels. Under the terms of the MoU, both 
companies contribute certain assets to the JV, Shell would contribute a total of 
USD1.625 billion in cash, payable over two years. Mark Williams, Shell’s 
Downstream Director welcomed this JV: “Joining with Cosan is a way to grow the 
role of low carbon, sustainable biofuels in the global transportation fuel mix” (Shell, 
1 February 2010). 
 
Responded to the environmentalists about negative implications in threatening 
rainforests by expanding sugarcane plantations, Shell spokeman responded through 
Guardian: “Sugarcane for bioethanol uses about 1% of Brazil's arable land (354m 
hectares). None of Cosan's farms are anywhere near rainforests” (Guardian, 1 
February 2010). Besides, the company has developed sugarcane harvest satellite 
monitoring software, which provides better decision-making on land use and precise 
estimates on production (Cosan S.A., 2010). The two parties now maintaining 
                                               
365 Founded in 1936 in Brazil, Cosan now has twenty-three production facilities, four refineries and 
two port terminals. As a producer of sugar, ethanol and electric energy (produced from sugarcane), 
Cosan is the third largest sugar producer in the world, the fifth largest ethanol producer in the world 
(Cosan S.A., 2010).  
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exclusive negotiations towards a binding JV agreement, which shall be subject to 
final transactional documentation, due diligence, agreement between the two parties 
on sustainability issues, regulatory approvals and respective corporate approvals 
(refer appendix 6.2.3) (Shell, 1 February 2010). 
 
The JV enables Shell and Cosan to establish a scalable and profitable position in 
sustainable biofuels. There are two reasons backed for this decision. First, Brazilian 
sugarcane bioethanol technology is one of the most efficient commercial scale 
solutions, while Brazil is the most efficient ethanol producing country in the world 
(Financial Times, 1 February 2010). Second, the NGB biofuels would need another 
five to ten years before they could be produced at commercial scale. Hence, with the 
corporate intention not to lost the market share from the current biofuels business, 
while can control bioethanol supply chain from farm to kiosk, Shell has this JV 
established to secure its position as the near-term and long-term biofuels producer 
and supplier.  
 
Appendix 6.2.1 Manpower Used in Microalgae Harvesting 
The most common harvesting processes are flocculation, microscreening filtration 
and centrifugation which employ manpower. 
(a) Flocculation is a method of separating microalgae from the medium by using 
chemicals to force the microalgae to form lumps. The main disadvantage of this 
separation method is the additional chemicals are difficult to remove from the 
separated microalgae, probably making it inefficient/uneconomic for commercial 
use. The cost to remove these chemicals may be too expensive (Oilgae, 2009a). 
 
(b) Microscreening filtration is carried out commonly on membranes of modified 
Cellulose with the aid of a suction pump. The greatest advantage of this method as a 
concentrating device is that, it is able to collect microalgae/cells of very low density. 
However, concentration by filtration is limited to small volumes and leads to the 
eventual clogging of the filter by the packed cells when vacuum is applied.  
 
Several methods have been devised which avoid these problems. One involves the 
use of a reverse-flow vacuum in which the pressure operates from above, making the 
process gentler and avoiding the packing of cells. This method itself has been 
modified to allow a relatively large volume of water to be concentrated in a short 
time (20 liters in 3 hours). A second process uses a direct vacuum but involves a 
stirring blade in the flask above the filter which prevents the particles from settling 
during the concentration process (Oilgae, 2009b). 
 
(c) Centrifugation is a method of separating microalgae from the medium by using a 
centrifuge to cause the microalgae to settle to the bottom of a flask or tank. 
Centrifugation and drying are currently considered too expensive for small scale use 
(Oilgae, 2009c). 
 
Appendix 6.2.2 Memorandum of Understanding 
It is a common practice for an MOU to be part binding and part non-binding. 
Whether an MOU is binding is a question of general contract law. A contract will be 
binding if there is offer/accepted/intended to be legally bound and consideration. For 
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an MOU, what is particularly important is the intention of the parties at the time of 
signing the MOU. For commercial contracts, there will be a strong presumption that 
the parties intend to create a legally binding contract if the terms of the MOU are 
clearly defined and supported by consideration. For this reason, if the parties do not 
wish to be bound by the MOU until the execution of formal documents, then the 
parties must state clearly and unambiguously their intention not to be bound. This 
may be achieved by using the words “subject to contract”, or to include a clause in 
the MOU stating which provisions of the MOU are binding and which are not.  
Source: Mallesons Stephen Jaques. 2002. 
 
Appendix 6.2.3: Corporate Approvals Between Shell and Cosan 
Cosan and Shell would contribute the following to the JV 
Cosan Shell  
(a) Sugarcane crushing capacity: currently 60 
million tonnes per annum from 23 mills 
(b) Ethanol production capacity: currently 2 
billion litres per annum and ethanol logistics 
assets will increase up to 4-5 billion litres a year.  
(c) Co-generation: seven existing plants, two 
under construction and a further three to be built 
in the next three to four years. 
(d) Brazilian downstream assets, including 1730 
retail sites and supply and distribution assets. 
(e) Controlling share in ethanol trading company 
(f) Net debt of approximately $2.5billion. 
(a) Brazilian downstream assets, including 2740 
branded retail sites, supply and distribution 
assets, and the aviation fuel business, including 
the one recently acquired from Cosan. 
(b) Shell's 50% share interest in Iogen Energy 
(c) Shell's 14.7% share interest in Codexis 
(d) $1.625 billion in cash, paid over two years. 
 
 
Source: Shell. 1 February 2010.  
 
Appendix 6.2.4 Shell's Sustainable Sourcing Policy (SSP) 
Shell's SSP (2007) is a policy enforces its suppliers, pressing for sustainable biofuels 
feedstocks and productions. It encompasses statements, not only enlists Shell's 
responsibilities link to its 1G biofuels suppliers, but also an evidence showing Shell's 
commitment on the social responsibility and environmental concern. In a simpler 
description, the SSP has elaborated the code of conduct for biofuels' feedstocks 
farming and production. Examining the SSP (2007), the key component of Shell 
approach to sourcing sustainable biofuels is engaging with both its stakeholders and 
suppliers. 
 
(a) Commitment to Stakeholder Engagement 
(i) Shell is working with environmental groups, governments, suppliers and 
industrial partners on standards for producing energy crops sustainably and supports 
an industry wide approach on sustainable biofuels productions, both at the global and 
local level. 
(ii) Shell is playing role in shaping and promoting sustainability standards and is 
participating in multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the various Roundtables. 
(iii) Shell is engaging with suppliers and stakeholders to work towards reducing 
biodiversity impacts and build capacity towards the sustainable production of 
biofuels feedstocks. 
 
(b) Engagement with Suppliers 
(i) Shell is working with its suppliers to create awareness about sustainable sourcing 
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and to work towards a more sustainable supply chain. 
(ii) Shell is working with its suppliers to incorporate clauses in supply contracts that 
will seek to ensure that biofuels are not linked to: 
-recent clearing of areas of high biodiversity value (forests/jungles, wetlands and 
food farms/plantations), which previously is not for biofuels (Shell, 2007b) 
-violation of human rights (including child/forced labour) (Shell, 2007c) 
(iii) Shell encourages its suppliers to establish a supply chain traceability system; 
through the reporting from the suppliers on monthly basis on quantify, source of 
supply, location and types of feedstock used. 
(iv) If any suppliers wish to supply to Shell, they must commit to work with Shell to 
develop a more sustainable supply chain. It depends on which stages the supplier is 
in. Starting with communication for information sharing, guidance and advice will be 
provided, then the inspection on biofuels farm/plantation is necessary to assessment 
the sustainability criteria. If match, finally supplier contract will be awarded.  
(v) Shell engages with suppliers to review progress on a regular basis and reserves 
the right to conduct independent audits of its suppliers and to terminate contracts. 
Source: SSP Shell. 2007. 
 
Appendix 6.4.1 Shell and Ferrari 
Within Shell and Ferrari, it shows the symbiotic collaboration between them. Shell’s 
works covering fuels, engine lubricants and transmission fluids, where the Ferrari 
engines provide a testing ground for constant improvements to the Shell road 
products (Shell, 2009d). Therefore, Ferrari’s approval and endorsement is important 
recognition for Shell. 
  
As Ferrari engineers devote their time and energy to developing the F1 cars, 
technical partner Shell dedicates its expertises in building the portfolio of products 
which contribute to success on the track. The Shell facility in Maranello allows Shell 
scientists and technicians to work hand-in-hand with Ferrari engineers during any 
development stage in the car’s development, to ensure that the fuel design is 
optimised for maximum performance and reliability. Shell takes an integrated design 
approach alongside Ferrari to the F1 programme and the challenge is to improve the 
development rate, pushing the boundaries of F1 fuel and lubricants to a more 
competitive level (Shell, 2009d). 
 
Appendix 6.4.2 Shell and Ducati 
Within Shell and Ducati, over ten years, Shell's technical partnership with Ducati has 
been a successful collaboration in motor sport. Working with the Ducati team, Shell 
is learning from the extreme testing environment of the race track contribute to 
providing bikers with high performing fuel products such as Shell V-Power road fuel 
and Shell Advance oil. The results have been constant across the ten-year 
relationship, with Shell’s continued goal to provide Ducati with reliability, whilst 
optimising the power output from the bike.  
 
Jörg Landschof, Fuel Development Expert, Shell Global Solutions explained, “The 
target is always to increase the engine efficiency, by getting maximum possible 
power at minimum possible consumption. Sometimes this can be a difficult task. The 
Shell V-Power fuel blend is constantly being developed as we continue to learn by 
84 
 
racing these high revving, ultra-powerful engines. The knowledge gained at the track 
for fuels and lubricants is then used in Shell V-Power road fuels and Shell Advance 
lubricant to the benefit of the customer” (Shell, 2009e). 
 
Shell focuses on maximising the power provided by the Shell V-Power racing fuel, 
while developing Shell Advance Ultra Racing Oil to further reduce friction in the 
engine and ensure the greatest performance from the Ducati bikes. Claudio 
Domenicali, Ducati Corse CEO and Ducati Motor Holding product director added, 
“To celebrate ten years of collaboration with Shell and to be able to continue to count 
on a partner that is so dedicated to top-level technical development and research. 
Shell develops oils and fuels for the highest levels of motor sport competition, such 
as Formula 1, MotoGP and Superbike, and then transfers the experience gained into 
creating products for the road, a philosophy that we in Ducati have always adhered to 
and which further strengthens the link between our two companies” (Shell, 2009e). 
 
Today, Shell’s technical partnership with Ducati has become one of the successful in 
motor sport-with seven World titles and over 150 wins collected during its first 10 
years. At the core of this relationship lies a common passion for technology: Ducati 
develops its race and road bikes, while Shell works to design high-performing fuel 
and lubricants technology for the benefit of bikers.  
 
Appendix 7.1.1 BP and Shell Next Generation Biofuels Development  
Supported by four publications366, there are six oil companies367 embarking on the 
NGB R&D. Up to date (31 December 2010), the oil companies operating in the UK, 
have not produced their own biofuels yet, as they are purchasing biofuels from the 
international market. 
(a) Chevron  
Chevron is a US based company, which has more than 1100 petrol stations (Texaco, 
2010a) operating in the UK under the brand name of Texaco. Due to the limited 
information could be found from the Chevron website, added with no response from 
the HQ in Gloucestershire after letters/emails sent for invitation to participate in my 
research, Chevron has not be selected as one of the case study. 
  
Up to date, Chevron has seven R&D projects on going:  
(i) Chevron-Georgia Institute Technology formed a strategic research alliance for 
cellulosic biofuels in 2006 (Georgia Institute of Technology, 3 July 2006). 
(ii) Chevron funds University of California Davis for rice straw/agricultural waste 
biofuels in 2006 (University California Davis, 19 September 2006). 
(iii) Chevron and US National Renewable Energy Laboratory enter collaborative 
research for cellulosic biofuels in 2006 (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 4 
October 2006)  
(iv) Chevron-Weyerhaeuser announced letter of intent for cellulosic/lignin 
conversion into biofuels in 2007 (Weyerhaeuser Company, 12 April 2007). 
(v) Chevron-Texas A&M University into strategic research alliance for conversion of 
                                               
366 1Krauss, C. 26 May 2009; 2Mollman, S. 23 August 2009; 3Chazan, G. 19 October 2009; and 
4Nelson, T. 3 November 2009. 




non-food crops to biofuels in 2007 (Chevron, 29 May 2007). 
(vi) Chevron and US National Renewable Energy Laboratory enter collaborative 
research for algae biofuels in 2007 (Chevron, 31 October 2007). 
(vii) Chevron enters agreement with Solazyme for algae biofuels in 2008 (San 
Francisco Business Times, 22 January 2008). 
 
(b) Total 
Total is a French company and recently embarks on biofuels R&D. It established 
joint venture with Gevo to develop biobutanol/isobiobutanol (Total, 2009; Gevo, 
2009). Butanol/Isobutanol is a 2G bioalcohol, created from the fermentation of 
biomass such as corn, grass and agricultural waste. Total and Nestle Oil have 
discontinued their biodiesel project on 6 February 2007 due to high cost needed for 
the investments (Nestle Oil Corporation, 6 February 2007). 
 
(c) Exxon Mobil 
On 14 July 2009, Exxon Mobil has established JV with Synthetic Genomics on the 
algae biofuels research (ExxonMobil, 14 July 2009; Synthetic Genomics, 14 July 
2009). 
 
Both Total and Exxon Mobile are the new comers into the NGB R&D. Because the 
dates of announcement were beyond my data collection (ended in March 2009), both 
Total and Exxon Mobil have been excluded from the research. 
 
(d) Petrobras 
Petrobras is a Brazilian oil company. Due to geographical concentration of Petrobras 
in Brazil, it has no significant business investment in the UK, Petrobras also has been 
exclude from the research. 
 
Appendix 7.1.2 Technical Criteria of Biofuels  
Biofuels cover two types of products: bioalcohol368 and biodiesel. They are derived 
from biomass, living organisms, or their metabolic by products/wastes (BBC, 24 
January 2007). Biomass is an organic plant material containing energy obtained from 
sunlight that the plant stored when it grew. This stored energy can be converted into 
liquid fuels. Besides, organic wastes which contain carbon compounds can be 
processed in order to produce biofuels. Biofuels manufacture is based on processes 
of fermentation and transesterification, which convert the carbon held in organic 
plant/animal matter, to other carbon based molecules which have suitable properties 
for serving as liquid transport fuels. 
 
(a) Bioethanol 
It is the most common of ethyl alcohol produced by the action of microorganism 
enzymes in the fermentation of sugars/starches369. The starches are hydrolysed using 
enzymes, fermented, distilled and then dehydrated to give 95-97% bioethanol (Knott, 
2007; BP, 2007a). The technical characteristics of bioethanol are shown below: 
 
                                               
368 the current bioalcohol used in the market is bioethanol. It is foreseeable that BP's biobutanol 
would be available after five years from 2008. 
369 found in plants such as cereals, potatoes, corn, cassave, sorghum, wheat and sugarcane. 
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Table 7.1.1: Comparative between Bioethanol (Be) and Petrol (P) 
Characteristics Be P Contributions 
Octane 
number370 
98 80 Be is safer than P which ensures drivers 
safety. 
Vapour pressure Lower evaporative 
emission, vapour 
density of 1.59 
Higher evaporative 
emission, vapour density 
3-4  
Be provides better fuel economies to minimise 




Lower, with flash point 
-5oF 
Higher, with flash point -
45oF 
Be is safer, which to reduce the severity of 
vehicle fires. This could ensure user safety. 
*Heating values 21.2-23.4MJ/litre 30.1-34.9MJ/litre P generates higher energy than Be. This means 
Be has only 67% of the P's energy content for 
the same volume. This is the weakness of Be 
and results in a lower fuel efficiency. 
*Energy content, 




Required 20% more 
than P 
Normal use Be is uneconomical. Flex fuel371/biofuels cars 
are needed as they have engines with a higher 
compression ratio. While used in the existing 
ICEs this would cause more energy losses. 
This is the weakness of Be, which results in a 
lower fuel efficiency. 
GHG emissions If E100 is used, this 
causes:   




(b) cutting sulphur, 
CO2, CO, Lead 
ambient. 
(c) Increase aldehyde 
emissions372 
(d) Blue flame with no 
carcinogenic 
compounds found 
(a) Smoke from burning P 
is black and has toxic 
components 
(b) carcinogenic 
compounds found  
Be's emissions are cleaner than P. Be 
contributes to the environmental benefits for 
combating climate change and reduce air 
pollution/GHG emissions.  
*Water affinity  High and water soluble 
(hydrophilic) 
Non water miscible  and 
insoluble (hydrophobic)  
Be's water affinity could bring problems to the 
ICEs. This could cause components of ICE to 
rust. This is a weakness of Be and result in a 
lower social confidence on a higher 
percentage of bioethanol use. 
General 
characteristics 
Renewable Fossil Renewable of bioenergy. This is the strength 
of Be, contributing to the political, economic, 
social and environmental benefits373. 
Source: The researcher utilised Goldemberg (2008) framework and made further analysis.  
* prioritised in the NGB research.  
 
                                               
370 The anti-knock properties of a liquid motor fuel. The higher the number, the less likely the 
possibility of the fuel detonating (World Encyclopedia, 2008). 
371 Flex-fuel motors are capable of running with blends from pure petrol to E100. The technology is 
based on sensors in the fuel system that automatically recognises the ethanol level in the fuel. The 
engine's electronic control unit then self-calibrates for the best possible operation; if ethanol is not 
present, the engine will self-calibrate to gasoline-only operation. The process is instantaneous and 
undetectable by the vehicle driver (Goldemberg, 2008). 
372 Acetaldehyde from bioethanol is less aggressive to human health and the environment than 
formaldehyde produced when gasoline is burned (Goldemberg, 2008).   
373 Political (energy security), economical (generate more employment opportunities, enable wealth 
generation for oil companies in renewable energy profile), social environmental benefits (in reducing 
GHG/CO2 emissions towards better public health and slow down the climate change implications)  
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Figure 7.1.1: Basic Process for Bioethanol and Biodiesel 
Source: BP. 2007a.  
 
There are some good characteristics of bioethanol when compared with petrol. 
However, there are three critical liabilities374 to be found, which have captured the oil 
companies' attention in order to overcome bioethanol's limitations. Through ongoing 
R&D 375 , BP and Shell aim to breakthrough these technical limitations, and are 
seeking a higher performance bioalcohol. Currently, bioethanol is produced from 
more than thirty countries, with the US and Brazil topping the list and together 
account for some 90% of world supply376.  
 
(b) Biodiesel 
Biodiesel manufacturing is based on the extraction of oils from plants (such as 
soybeans, rapeseed, sunflowers and palm oil), animal fats/tallow, used cooking oil 
and algae. The chemical process used to convert these oils to biodiesel is called 
transesterification, and the resulting biodiesel is chemically identified as fatty acid 
methyl ester (FAME). Methanol is used in conjunction with an appropriate catalyst 
under controlled conditions, which allows the oil based material to be transesterified 
to a FAME. The FAME then undergoes a series of washing steps before finally being 
distilled to produce biodiesel which meets the European standard (Argent Energy, 
2009). 
 
Biodiesel has combustion properties similar to mineral diesel, and can be blended 
with mineral diesel used in ICEs. It is less toxic than table salt and as biodegradable 
as sugar (Argent Energy, 2009), which is good for public health and environmental 
impact. The technical characteristics of biodiesel are shown below: 
                                               
374 Low heating values, low energy content- bioethanol energy content accounts only 2/3 of gasoline, 
and a high water affinity.  
375 BP JV with DuPont researching on biobutanol, while Shell joint R&D with Virent to convert 
sugar to biogasoline- which will expected to have some similarities of petrol. Both biobutanol and 
biogasoline will demonstrate better performance than existing bioethanol, with higher energy content 
and lower water affinity. 
376 In 2006, the US produced over 18.5 billion litres of bioethanol; mainly from corn, using about 1/6 
of its domestic corn crop to do this and replacing about 2% of the country's gasoline use. In Brazil, 
which has been making bioethanol since the 1970s, around half of the country's sugarcane crop goes 
into bioethanol for domestic use and export. In 2006, Brazil produced over 17.8 billion litres, 
achieving attractive economic efficiencies. In contrast to corn based bioethanol, conversion from 
sugarcane eliminates the hydrolysis stage. In Brazil, the plant residue, or bagasse, is reused to generate 




Table 7.1.2: Comparative between Biodiesel (Bd) and Diesel (D) 
Characteristics Bd D Contributions 








Bd is safer to reduce the severity of vehicle 
fires. Thus this could ensure user safety. 





and soft plastic 
Normal use High concentration of Bd (equivalent to B20 
or more) could cause problems to ICEs 
engine components378. This is a weakness of 
Bd, which would prohibit a higher percentage 
use and result in lower social confidence. 
GHG 
emissions 
In B100, render 
to the  




acid rain)  








(a) Smoke from 
burning D is 



















acid rain) found 
Bd's emissions are cleaner than D and helps 






non toxic, low 
sulphur379. 
Fossil, toxic. Renewable of bioenergy contributes to the 
political economical, social and 
environmental benefits380. 
Source: Yuksek, et al. 2009; NREL, 2008; von Wedel, 1999.  
* prioritised in the NGB research. 
 
There are some good characteristics of biodiesel when compared with diesel. 
However while one major problem (strong solvent properties) has captured 
consumers' attentions. A case study was conducted by von Wedel (1999) on a boat 
using 100% neat biodiesel. After four years of operations, the fuel lines and gaskets 
were seriously affected. They turned out to be sticky, soften and swell, causing fuel 
                                               
377 A number that provides a measure of the ignition characteristics of a diesel fuel. The higher a 
cetane number is, the better combustion efficiency it will provide (Daintith, 2009).  
378 Rubber fuel lines, seals and gaskets on ICE fuel tanks may slowly deteriorate in the presence of 
higher concentrations of biodiesel.  
379 Bd sulphur content is 7.46-10mg/kg, while D sulphur content is 1471-7000mg/kg.  
380 Political (energy security), economical (generate more employment opportunities, enable wealth 
generation for oil companies in renewable energy profile), social environmental benefits (in reducing 
GHG/CO2 emissions towards better public health and slow down the climate change implications). 
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to drip from the connections.  
 
This caused the rubber fuel line between the primary filter and the fuel pump on the 
sailboat engine to became tacky. Thus, the solvent effect found in biodiesel-
equivalent of more than 20% (B20 and above), could reduce public confidence and 
prohibit a higher concentration of biodiesel use. However, it could be reduced 
through three ways: First, lower the biodiesel blend to less than 20%. Second, to 
replace ICEs' lines and gaskets with modern synthetic hoses and seals. However, this 
replacement would require personal investment by the consumer. Third, a using flex 
fuel/biodiesel engine which can run on neat biodiesel. This last option would require 
a much higher investment.  
 
7.1.3 Biofuels and Carbon Neutrality 
The mechanisms of biofuels in reducing CO2 take place in two ways: Firstly, when 
they are mixed with petrol/diesel, this blend can reduce nearly 2.5-4%381 of CO2 
emission from the tailpipe.  
 
Secondly, it is about the natural carbon neutrality. The vegetations (feedstocks) are 
growing under the photosynthesis mechanism and could capture CO2 from 
atmosphere, exhale O2 and produce yield in a biological way (Figure 7.1.2). 
Therefore, this makes biofuels stands out as better than other alternative REfT, such 
as H2/electricity. No doubt scientific evidence validated both H2 and electricity can 
significantly reduce the CO2/GHG emissions from the tailpipe, yet they do not have 
the biological capability for carbon neutrality. 
Figure 7.1.2: Biofuels and the Carbon Circle 
Source: Interesting Energy Facts. 2008. 
 
                                               
381 5% biofuel blend would result in a carbon reduction of around 2.5% (biodiesel) and 4% 
(bioethanol) (Whatagreencar, 2008). 
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Appendix 7.1.4 Countries with Respective Biofuels Feedstocks 
Table 7.1.3 Countries with Respective Biofuels Feedstocks 
Countries  Biofuels Feedstocks 
Malaysia    Palm oil 
Brazil  Sugarcane, sunflower, soy, castor bean 
India  Jatropha  
Pakistan  Sugarcane  
Thailand  Sugarcane , cassava, palm oil, coconut, jatropha 
China Cassava , jatropha, wheat, sweet sorghum, corn 
Indonesia  Palm oil, sugarcane, cassava, jatropha 
Cambodia Jatropha 
Costa Rica Palm oil 
The US    Corn, soy 
France  Sugar beet, rapeseed, sunflower 
Germany  Rapeseed, cereals  
Spain  Barley, wheat  
New Zealand   Oilseed  
Canada  Wheat, corn  
Source: Collected by the researcher  
 
Appendix 7.1.5 The Green Economy 
Green economy is a growing economic development, in contrast to the existing 
“black” economy-based on fossil fuels (coal, petroleum and natural gas). It is rooted 
on the knowledge of ecological economics, which aimed at addressing the 
interdependence of human economies and natural ecosystem with the adverse 
impacts of human economic activities on climate change/global warming. In the 
midst of the global economic crisis since 2008, the UNEP called for a Global Green 
Deal, where governments all over the world are encouraged to support its economic 
transformation to a greener/low carbon economy.  
 
The activities in the green economy includes green energy generation based on RE, 
to substitute for fossil fuels; energy conservation for efficient energy use-which 
sectors include efficient building constructions, sustainable transport, sustainable 
agriculture, freshwater and ecological infrastructure. The green economy is 
considered being able to both create new jobs, ensure real and sustainable economic 
growth, and prevent environmental pollution, global warming, resource depletion 
and environmental degradation (United Nations Environment Programme, March 
2009). 
 
Appendix 7.3.1 Food-Fuel Competition and Biodiversity Threatened  
To have a closer look at these two systemic risks, this discussion is mainly focused 
on the US. This is because, there are more articles found about the US biofuels, 
which could support the discussions further. Besides, the US, as one of the world 
largest biofuels producers, demonstrates the complete cycle of biofuels supply chain: 
from growing feedstocks, to production and finally international trading. With the 
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biodiversity threatened home environment, the food-fuel competition caused by the 
US, impacted not only the domestic market, but also has pervaded cross-borders.  
 
(a) Food-Fuel Competition 
The current international/national biofuels policies are favoured at grain based 
biofuels (1G biofuels). As the 1G biofuels increasingly impinge on the supply of corn 
and soy, a food-fuel competition broke out. This then drove up the prices of staple 
foods in the US and in other parts the world.  
 
In the US, the explosive growth of the biofuel sectors and their demand of raw stocks 
for production triggered increases run ups in the prices of corn, grains, oilseeds and 
livestocks/poultry. Eventually, these higher costs also appeared in the prices of 
frozen/canned vegetables and processed meat. Besides, rising feed prices (mainly soy 
and corn) also hit the livestock and poultry industries. Some agricultural economists 
predict that, Iowa's pork producers could be driven out of business as they are being 
forced to compete with ethanol producers for corn/soy (Johnson and Runge, 2007). 
Critics note that, both domestic and international consumers of food and livestock 
fed with grains faced abrupt rising prices in 2007/8. This then being repetitively 
reported over the BBC News (4 March 2008; 29 May 2008; 15 October 2008), “The 
era of cheap food is over!”   
 
In the rest of the world, the demand for biofuels produced many negative effects. In 
January 2007, due to the rise in the US of corn prices from USD2.80 to USD4.20 in 
less than four months, the price of tortilla flour in some parts of Mexico rose sharply. 
The reason for this was, 80% of Mexico's corn is imported, which accounts 1/4 of its 
consumption are from the US (BBC News, 1 February 2007). The implications were 
daunting, when the World Bank report researched by Mitchell (8 April 2008; 2008) 
revealed: from January 2005 until February 2008 world maize prices +131%, wheat 
prices +177%, and rice prices +62%. From June 2006 until February 2008 world 
palm oil prices +165%, soybean oil prices +175%, coconut oil +153%, palm kernel 
oil +137% and groundnut oil +111%.  
 
This was particularly hurtful to the world poorest consumers. The OECD-FAO 
(2007) issue an outlook for 2007-2016, stating that biofuels had introduced global 
structural shifts in food markets, which would raise food costs during the next ten 
years. For the 2.7 billion people in the world living on the equivalent/less than USD2 
per day; and the 1.1 billion surviving on less than USD1, even marginal increases in 
the cost of staple grains can be devastating.  
 
According to Johnson and Runge (2007) calculations, filling a 25 gallon tank of a 
sport utility vehicle with pure ethanol would require more than 450 pounds of corn, 
which is enough calories to feed one person for a year. Added by Vidal (22 January 
2010), 90 million tonnes of the US grain used to produce bioethanol in 2009, was 
enough to feed 330 million people for one year at average world consumption levels. 
What we can see here, is the enormous volume of gains required by the ethanol 
industry sent a shock wave through the food system. This is the cruel competition 
between mobility and humanity, where biofuels are believed to be bringing more 
harm than good.  
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(b) Biodiversity Threatened 
If substantial additional acres are needed for corn, then the land will have to be 
pulled from other food farms, as well as other environmentally fragile areas. In 
Minnesota, according to Johnson and Runge (2007), land diverted to corn to feed the 
ethanol maw has reduced the acreage planted to a wide range of other crops, 
especially soy. Searchinger et al. (2008) asserted that US biofuels production on 
agricultural land has displaced existing agricultural production, causing land-use 
change leading to increased net GHG emissions. Then Maynard (1 March 2007) 
stresses that, when food and fuel are competing for farmland, then food prices will 
rise drastically and the poor will suffer, as well as the rainforests. 
 
On the other hand, Augustyn (2007) describes the impact of forest fires to clear land 
for oil palm plantations in Indonesia. Even though palm oil holds great promise as 
biodiesel, the plantations have displaced natural ecosystems and destroyed habitat for 
numerous species, as well as for the indigenous people. A team of UK scientists 
suggested that, reforestation and habitat protection was a better option as forests 
could absorb up to nine times more CO2 than the production of biofuels could 
achieve on the same area of land. Righelato (1 March 2007) reminds us that, when 
forests are cleared, they no longer serve as carbon sinks. Thus, deforestation adds to 
the global warming problem, and it may take a century for the benefit of biofuels to 
show itself.  
 
Appendix 7.3.2 BP and Shell Strategies to Deal with the Systemic Risks 
Apart from complying with the RFA stringent “Carbon and Sustainability” monthly 
reporting system, most of the information released through BP and Shell websites382 
are describing their participations in various roundtables, thus demonstrating their 
commitments for the G&S biofuels supply. Besides, information about the ongoing 
NGB R&D projects is also published. These messages are clear, to show their 
dedications for G&S biofuels and their efforts to develop the NGB-which can 
counterbalance the limitations of the 1G biofuels, and could eliminate the two 
















                                               
382 appear as newsletters, annual report and internal circulated magazines 
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Table 7.3.1 BP and Shell Strategies 
Types of R&U Strategies adopted  
 BP's approach Shell's approach 
















iii. Ambiguity of 

























i. to resolve food-fuel competition 
-Invest in large scale Jatropha 
plantations, as a non-food biodiesel 
feedstock. 
-Invest in the 2G biofuels (energy grass) 
R&D, as a non-food feedstocks. 
 




iii. to strengthen the claims of carbon 
saving  
-JV with Tropical BioEnergia for 
sugarcane (because sugarcane can 
achieve 90% farm-to-wheel CO2 
reduction). 
-Invest in the 2G biofuels (energy 
grasses) R&D. 
(because energy grasses have the 






iv. to resolve biodiversity threatened 
-Complies with the RFA Meta & 
Qualifying standards, and reports to the 
RFA every month with higher 
transparent data. 






i. to resolve food-fuel competition 
-Invest in the 2G biofuels R&D (wheat 
straw, BTL, biomass to biogasoline), 




ii. to resolve land competition 
-Invest in the 3G algae biofuels R&D, 
through sea farming technique.  
 
iii. to strengthen the claims of carbon 
saving  
-JV with Cosan for sugarcane 
(because sugarcane can achieve 90% 
farm-to-wheel CO2 reduction). 
-Invest in the 2G/3G biofuels R&D  
(because energy grasses or algae have 
the potential to deliver GHG 
reductions up to 80-90%). 
-SSP execution to promote good 
agriculture practice along biofuels 
value chain by minimising energy 
input, and thus to reduce CO2 
emissions. 
 
iv. to resolve biodiversity threatened 
-Shell complies with the RFA Meta & 
Qualifying Standards, and reports to 
the RFA every month with higher 
transparent data. 
-Enforced SSP to its biofuels 
suppliers/contractors. 
-Roundtables participations. 
Source: Summarised by the researcher  
 
Appendix 7.3.3 Independent Organisations to Disseminate Biofuels Information  
-The WorldWatch Institute is an independent research organisation. Its three program 
areas include Climate & Energy, Food & Agriculture and Green Economy. Since 
1974, Worldwatch's interdisciplinary research is based on science and focuses on the 
challenges that climate change, resource degradation and population growth pose for 
meeting human needs in the 21st century. WorldWatch seeks solutions to intractable 
problems, emphasising a blend of government leadership, private sector enterprise, 
                                               
383 Utilise the collective strengths/representations of roundtables to establish the P&C requirements 
for a sustainable biofuels business, to reduce the public pressure. 
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and citizen action that can make a sustainable future a reality. Based in Washington, 
D.C., WorldWatch research is disseminated in over 20 languages through innovative 
use of print and online media (WorldWatch Institute, 2009). These publications 
include: Better than corn (8 October, 2007), and Time to get smart on biofuels (18 
February 2009). 
-The UK Royal Society is the national academy of science of the UK and the 
Commonwealth. It is an independent, charitable body which derives its authoritative 
status from over 1400 Fellows and Foreign Members (The Royal Society. 2009). The 
publications include: Sustainable biofuels: prospects and challenges (2008a) and 
Biofuels (2008b) 
-The European Biodiesel Board (EBB), is a non-profit organisation established in 
January 1997. EBB aims to promote the use of biodiesel in the EU, and at the same 
time, grouping the major EU biodiesel producers (European Biodiesel Board, 2009). 
-Nature is the foremost weekly scientific journal and is the flagship journal for 
Nature Publishing Group (NPG). Launched in 1869, it develops publication arising 
from new technology and serves a growing audience of readers. NPG publishes 
journals and online databases across the life, physical and applied sciences and 
clinical medicine. Content encompasses daily news from journalists, expert opinion 
and practical methodology, and more high impact research and reviews (Nature.com, 
2009). The publications include: Towards better biofuels (21 June 2007), Energy: 
Not your father's biofuels (20 February 2008). 
-Biofuels Digest covers producer news, research, policy, policy makers, conferences, 
fleets and financial news. The Daily Biofuels News Digest is one of the most widely 
read biofuels daily in the world and has more than 240,000 references in Google with 
readers in more than 200 countries. So far, BiofuelsDigest.com has 34,200 monthly 
visitors and the Biofuels Digest daily e-newsletter has more than 12,900 subscribers 
spread over more than 7,000 companies (Biofuels Digest, 2009).  
 
Appendix 7.4.1 The Roundtables in Shaping Green and Sustainable (G&S) 
Criteria for Biofuels 
Apart from reporting to the RFA, BP and Shell are bearing more responsibility to 
ensure that emphasis is put on supplying G&S biofuels, not only in the 1G biofuels 
supply, but also the NGB being developed. These messages have to be delivered 
across industries, in order to inform related stakeholders such as peers, other 
exporting regulators, JV partners and social movements/environmentalists. In order 
to compliment the internal biofuels management approaches (on activities related to 
the RFA reporting system), the external collaboration is required to strengthen the 
entire biofuels supply chain. Both BP and Shell understand that, the biofuels sector 
must be developed in a G&S ways in order to prolong their biofuels business for 
many decades to come. 
 
BP and Shell are members for four roundtables 384 , and have consistent 
communication with different stakeholders including organisations in the private 
sector385, international bodies386 and local GOs/NGOs387 in countries where biofuels 
                                               
384 There are four roundtables: Roundtable for Sustainable Biofuels (RSB), Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), the Roundtable for Responsible Soy (RTRS) and the Better Sugarcane 
Initiative (BSI).  
385 Private sectors: BP, Shell, Toyota Motor Europe, Petrobras, Bunge. 
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are produced. These roundtables provide a platform and a cohesive channel for 
various stakeholders to share information and make collective/consensual decisions. 
These various roundtables address many diverse issues that have been raised 
concerning biofuels production and which not only gain external 
understanding/support for the respective biofuels stakeholders' involvement, but also 
for charting the path of G&S biofuels management system internationally for current 
and future global biofuels trading.  
 
The tangible outcomes from these roundtables are the general principles for G&S 
biofuels applications and practices (summarised in Table 7.4.1). The RSB is focused 
solely on the general principles which address twelve common issues. These twelve 
common issues provide a guide/reference/backbone for other roundtables to develop 
their respective code of practices. The other three are specifically driven to respective 
types of feedstocks: palm oil (RSPO with eight principles), soy (RTRS with five 
principles) and sugarcane (BSI with five principles)-which not only constitute the 
largest three types of feedstocks used in biofuels388 production, but also the largest 
foodstocks consumed by the world’s population.  
 
These roundtables are the platforms that pool together different stakeholders, experts, 
interest groups from different level389 in order to keep in pace, align and converge 
different views, opinions, actions, experiences and knowledge towards standards 


















                                                                                                                                     
* They are part of the Founding Steering Board members of Roundtable Sustainable Biofuels (RSB). 
386 International bodies: WWF International, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), National Wildlife Federation, World Economic Forum, UN Foundation, Forest 
Stewardship Council, UN Environment Programme. 
* They are the Founding Steering Board members of Roundtable Sustainable Biofuels (RSB). 
387 Local GO/NGO: Swiss Energy Ministry, Fed of Swiss Oil Companies, Keio University, UNICA 
SugarCane Industry Association Brazil, Energy Centre EPFL, TERI India, Brazilian 
Environmentalists, Mali Folkecentre, Dutch Ministry of Housing and the Environment. 
* They are the Founding Steering Board members of Roundtable Sustainable Biofuels (RSB). 
388 apart from corn which does not have its roundtable 
389 Local community, national, some from the regional (EU, Asia Pacific) to international (UN). 
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Table 7.4.1: Summary of Four Roundtables 











Principles twelve eight five five 








(a) Obey the law 




employees and of 
individuals and 
communities 




(b) Respect human 
rights and labour 
standards  
 (c) GHG emission 
































(d) Commit to 
continuous 
improvement in 
key areas of their 
business  
 (k) Rural and 
social 
development 
(e) Commitment to 
continuous 
improvement in 































Source: Summarised by the researcher 
 
These roundtables have different levels of stakeholders which gradually build up 
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their substantial reputation and significant influences in the G&S biofuels 
applications. BP and Shell are the first oil companies to collaborate with other 
members in these four roundtables, while other the international oil companies still 
have not participated as members of any of these four roundtables.  
 
Working with world reputable socio, economic and environmental organisations390 
would shade BP/Shell from the international criticisms on the unsustainable biofuels 
controversy. Since the establishment of the four roundtables and the general 
principles which have been established respectively from them, there has been 
significantly lower open criticism heard and reported by the media, compared with 
the previous media wars accusing the oil companies and regulators acting recklessly 
to cause these systemic risks. This is a strategic act from BP and Shell, rather than 
rhetorically promising on the G&S issues abstractly. They have turned their 
participation in four respectable roundtables as evidence of their actions to the world 
of their efforts and eagerness to commit G&S biofuels businesses as their current and 
future business objectives.  
 
Appendix 7.4.2 Sustainability  
Sustainability is first defined from the publication of the report “Our Common 
Future” by the United Nations' Brundtland Commission in 1987. The commission 
defined sustainability, and in particular sustainable development, as development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs (United Nations, 1987). In the context of energy, 
sustainability has come to mean the harnessing of those energy sources: 
(a) that are not substantially depleted by their continued use; 
(b) the use of which does not entail the emission of pollutants or other hazards to the  
environment on a substantial scale; and 
(c) the use of which does not involve the perpetuation of substantial health hazards or  
social injustices. 
 
Sustainability indeed is a very broad ideal, according to Boyle (2004). Although a 
few energy sources can come close to fulfilling these conditions, most fall 
considerably short of the optimum. This means that, in practice, sustainability is a 
relative rather than an absolute concept. It is not so much that some energy sources 
are sustainable and others not. It is more that some energy sources, in certain 
contexts, are more sustainable than others. Determining the relative sustainability of 
one energy system vis-a-vis another is usually a complex process, involving detailed 
consideration of the specific processes and technologies proposed, the context in 
which they are being used and the differing values and interests of the various parties 
involved.  
  
To describe the definition of sustainability criteria for biofuels, which covers wider 
applications, it encompasses three aspects as advocated by the Bioenergy and Energy 
Planning Research Group (14 October 2009):  
 
(a) Technical criteria: must comply with the existing technical quality standards of 
                                               
390 WWF International, UNCTAD, National Wildlife Federation, World Economic Forum, UN 
Foundation, Forest Stewardship Council, UN Environment Programme. 
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biofuels certification in the EU: EN142140-15376 for seamless distribution 
infrastructure and engine adaptation. Besides, biofuels must comply with the criteria 
defined in EU Biofuels Directive and legislation in place of the EU Member States. 
(b) Ecology criteria: taking into account the GHGs emission, water footprint, energy 
inputs, land use/changes, local biodiversity/ecosystems and global impact as a whole 
from the international trading of biofuels (import and export activities involved from 
the producing nations to the importing countries);  
(c) Social criteria: biofuels must not compete with food or impair food security, must 
provide non-discriminative working conditions (no force labour, no child labour) and 
does not manipulate the local communities through resources exploitation, farm 
land/preserved high value areas (jungle/forest) conversion to biofuels plantation, but 
must conduct responsible agricultural practices which will safeguard social, 
economic interests and environmental concerns  
 
Appendix 7.4.3 Feedstocks Yield Comparison 
When choosing biofuels feedstocks, people have looked primarily to plants that can 
be grown in large scale to produce large quantities of biofuels. This is indeed a 
misconception that “large scale” could guarantee higher outputs. Balancing between 
“large scale” and “high yield”, one of the aims for the NGB R&D which is 
emphasised on the later. The comparison between large scale and higher yield are 
indeed different. The related feedstocks with respective yields are shown below: 
 
Table 7.4.2: Biodiesel Feedstocks with Respective Yield Capacity 
Feedstocks Yield 
(L/ha) 
Commercial Usages  
Palm oil 4752 Food, cooking oil, medicine 
Algae 3000 Non-food, some for medicine, nutrition, abalone feed, fertiliser, 
pigment, and chemical substance 
Coconut 2151 Food, coconut water for drink, coconut milk, cooking oil, nectar and 
toddy 
Rapeseed 954 Animal feed, cooking oil 
Soy 554-922 Food, nutrition, cooking oil, flour, infant formula,  cattle feed 
Peanut 842 Food, cooking oil, flour 
Sunflower 767 Cooking oil, livestock feed 
Source: Roberts, D. 7 February 2006. 
 
From these seven high yield feedstocks, algae does not fall into the food category. 
Others have strong connections with food/animal feeds which affect the entire food 
supply chain. This explains the current NGB aims in finding high yield feedstocks, 
and where most of the oil companies are embarking on algae R&D. Algae has 
seven391 taxonomic groups, and they are classified according to flagellar apparatus, 
                                               
391 1Bacillariophyta, 2Chloro phycophyta (green algae), 3Chrysophycophyta (golden algae), 
4Cyanobacteria (blue green algae), 5Phaeco phycophyta (brown algae), 6Dinophyta (dinpflagellates), 
7Rhodo phycophyta (red algae)  
Source: Oilgae,com. 2009. 
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cell division process, organelle structure and function which determine the oil yield 
respectively.  
 






Miscanthus 7300 7300 Burning to generate energy, authentic paper making 
in Japan 
Sugarcane 6800-8000 7400 Food, bioethanol, sweetener, alcohol (rum, cachaca) 
Switchgrass 3100-7600 5350 Livestock feed, soil conservation to control erosion 
Poplar 3700-6000 4850 Paper, inexpensive furniture,  
Sorghum 2500-7000 4750 Syrup, cattle feed.  
Corn 3100-4000 3550 Food, medicine, bioethanol, livestock feed 
Source: Sanderson, K. 2006. 
 
The table above justifies BP’s/Shell’s the NGB researches focusing much on the 
non-food biomass and energy grasses like miscanthus/switchgrass. Besides, both 
companies have also invested in sugarcane bioethanol through JV with Brazilian 
local companies392. Although sugarcane is a foodstock, due to the high economies of 
scale of Brazilian bioethanol, (while sugar production is also supported by other 
producing countries393), the food-fuel competition did not occurred on sugar. Hence, 
it is not the large scale of feedstocks, rather the efficiency (as natural characteristics 
of the feedstocks themselves), that would determine the large biofuels production 
output. 
 
Appendix 7.5.1 the oil Companies' Diversified Strategies for the NGB 
Development  
(a) JV 
JV allows the combination of resources394 to be shared between partners for the NGB 
R&D, the NGB production and penetration into foreign market for biofuels business 
expansion.  
 
(i) Risks and costs sharing 
Although JVs will divide the equities of the oil companies/partners hold, 
(consequently influencing their respective control authorities and entire profit 
possession), R&U could also be lowered to avoid severe financial/resources losses. 
Hence, there is a trade-off between high risk-high return, while JV provides shared 
risks with shared returns.  
 
The R&D infrastructure and production plant are large and expensive. Rather than 
                                               
392 In 2008, BP JV with Tropical Bioenergia to set up plantations and refineries producing bioethanol 
from Brazilian sugarcane. In 2010, Shell JV with Cosan to establish Brazilian sugarcane plantations 
and bioethanol processing facilities. 
393 There are world top ten sugar producers: Brazil, EU, India, China, US, Mexico, South Africa, 
Australia, Thailand and Russia which could contribute to the food use on sugar. (Workman, 22 June 
2007). 
394 tangible resource such as land, capital, laboratories, machineries, infrastructure and intangible 
assets such as knowledge, skills and networking.  
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building their own facilities-which are not only costly395, risky and time consuming, 
BP and Shell can access their partner's existing facilities, which could result in the 
commencement of the R&D, or the production of the NGB in a shorter timescale. 
The research points out that, BP and Shell have utilised their partners' existing 
research facilities/manufacturing plants, or are working together to construct some 
new production plants. There have been a few pilot demonstration plants set up by 
BP and Shell with their JV partners. These pilot plants could be turned into full scale 
commercial plants once the pilot testing on the production performance has been 
adequately accessed. The biotechnology/agriculture partners obviously have the 
absolute experiences, expertises and know-how for the most efficient/economic ways 
for the NGB development/production.  
 
(iii) Building institutional knowledge for both parties 
The biotechnology/agriculture partners are providing technical know-how of R&D 
and production capability; while BP and Shell are contributing their marketing 
experiences, supply/distribution infrastructure and their significant position within 
the regulated market396. From these JVs, the oil companies could gradually build up 
their institutional knowledge on the NGB R&D and production. Meanwhile, 
biotechnology/agriculture partners could learn from the oil companies at fuel 
marketing, distribution and supply know-how. Thus, the knowledge transfer mutually 
happens between them which result in the enriching of each parties institutional 
knowledge. 
 
(iv) To obtain the NGB feedstocks and to penetrate new market 
Through JVs with local partners, these help the oil companies to gain specific 
feedstocks required-which based on geographical factors; and help to ease the 
penetration into new marketplaces 397 . If any feedstock could be sourced from a 
country and produced in sufficient quantities, then biofuels could be supplied to this 
new market. This would allow a full exploitation of the supply chain, lowering the 
international trading costs and attaining economics of scale. The home-grown 
biofuels would not only capable of fulfiling the local demand and create job 
opportunities; but any surplus could also be exported to other parts of the world in 
order to create added value on biofuels produced.  
 
(b) SA through joint R&D 
SA is a contractual/agreement relationship between firms, in order to take advantage 
in sharing both firms’ strengths398, or to engage in activities such as R&D. SA is 
                                               
395  According to Dinneen (2007), the capital investment to build cellulosic ethanol facilities remains 
about five times than an existing corn ethanol plant, while the enzymes involved in the cellulosic 
ethanol process remain a significant cost as well.  
396 Under the regulated market, oil companies have a closer relationship with regulators, and are 
constantly communicating with the policy makers for most of the decision on policy making relating 
to energy supply. 
397 BP-India jatropha for Indian market, BP-British Sugar-Dupont use wheat for the UK market, BP-
Tropical take sugarcane for Brazilian market, BP-Verenium utilise biomass for the US market. Shell-
Iogen use wheat straw for Canadian market. Shell-Choren make use of biomass for German market. 
Shell-HRBP use algae for US market, Shell-Virent utilise energy grasses for the US market, Shell and 
Cosan make use of sugarcane for Brazilian market.  
398 proprietary processes, intellectual, capital, market, distribution capabilities.  
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generally less cohesive than JV, and may often be designed to last for a limited time 
(Law, 2009). To date, BP has established two SA, while Shell has established one 
SA399. These SAs set up ways for the oil companies to work with biotechnology 
institutions in the NGB R&D, while not losing their individuality.  
 
(c) Direct Funding 
To date, BP has funded three projects while Shell has funded one400. These funded 
projects (exclude BP's EBI401) are complementing other ongoing the NGB R&D 
projects under the JV and SA collaborations, but signify a gap between BP/Shell (as 
projects funder) and executors whom are operating/conducting these projects. There 
are two conditions favouring this particular type of collaboration: 
 
Firstly, through seeking new feedstocks and new process technology, these funded 
projects could open up more innovative findings, which can contribute to the 
knowledge pool and expand the potential feedstocks search (at different locations) 
and identify new efficient production methods, apart from what have been known so 
far from respective JVs and SAs collaborations. Secondly, due to the geographical 
distances which are beyond BP's/Shell's reach, funded projects could ensure the NGB 
development runs with minimal managerial involvement from the oil companies. 
BP's TERI jatropha project and Shell's six universities researches are located some 
distance from their own headquarters.  
 
 
                                               
399 BP established collaboration agreement with Mendel Biotechnology and joint development 
agreement with Martek. Shell joint R&D with Virent. The collaboration agreement formalises the 
relationships between the project participants and sets out the rights and obligations of each 
participant (Link Directorate, November 2000). 
400 BP-TERI on Indian Jatropha, EBI, BP-Arizona State University for biodiesel, and Shell with six 
universities.  
401 The EBI is BP's in house laboratory, set through pulling together three American universities for 
executing research operations. It is funded by BP, aimed for mid to long term establishment, with BP's 
participation for getting knowledge transfer from three American Universities. USD500 million has 
been injected for some ten-year research projects. Therefore it does not have gaps between funder and 
executor, since BP is participating in the NGB R&D projects. 
